State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0695

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Scott Clarence Carrillo,
Appellant.

Filed June 14, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CR-19-2755

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Pamela L. Foss, Chief Assistant County Attorney,
Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction of two counts of third-degree
criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) (2018), appellant
argues that the district court erred by allowi ng the state to impeach him with three prior

2
felony convictions. He also seeks review of the district court’s decision to require
disclosure of some, but not all, of the confidential records that he requested from
respondent. Lastly, he conten ds that the district court erred by entering convictions and
imposing sentences on both counts of criminal se xual conduct rather than just one count.
We conclude that the district court did no t abuse its discretion by admitting appellant’s
prior convictions for impeachm ent purposes, did not abuse its discretion by ordering
disclosure of only a portion of the confidential records sought by appellant, and properly
sentenced appellant. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
On July 11, 2019, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Scott Clarence
Carrillo with two counts of third-degree crim inal sexual conduct in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b), following allegations that Carrillo engaged in oral and anal sex
with a 14-year-old boy. The complaint alleged that the victim reported to his mother that
he had been sexually abused. His mother th en contacted the police, who arranged for the
victim to be interviewed. During the interview, the victim relayed “two occasions of sexual
abuse.” The complaint also noted that record s show the victim is visually impaired and
developmentally delayed.
Pretrial
In September 2019, Carrillo moved the district court “for an [o]rder for an in camera
review of all documents in the possession of [the county social services department]
regarding the alleged victim.” By an order dated December 2019, the district court granted
the defense’s motion for in camera review of the social services re cords concerning the

3
alleged victim. After reviewing the social se rvices records in came ra, the district court
found that certain record s were “relevant and ma terial in this case.” The district court
granted disclosure of those records and ruled that the “remainder of the documents will not
be disclosed.”
In December 2019, the state filed a motion in limine to admit three of Carrillo’s
prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes if he chose to testify. The district court
held a hearing on the matter. At the hearing, the defense objected to the prior convictions
as unfairly prejudicial. After hearing from the parties, the district court granted the motion
to admit the three convictions but ruled that the state could not reference the convictions
by name and instead could refer only to three unspecified felony convictions.
Trial
The following summarizes the ev idence received during the jury trial. The victim
was born prematurely in 2004, he is legally blind, and he undergoes therapy to address
behavioral issues and difficulty socializing. The victim’s mother met Carrillo in the
summer of 2018 and had a brief sexual relations hip with him. The victim “looked up” to
Carrillo as a mentor. The vic tim often rode his bicycle over to Carrillo’s apartment. On
occasion, the victim would help Carrillo with maintenance work at the apartment building
where Carrillo worked as the building manage r. Carrillo cooked for the victim, and they
often watched TV together. The victim spent the nigh t at Carrillo’s one-bedroom
apartment without his mother “a couple dozen times.”
In June 2019, the victim went to sleep-aw ay camp for visually impaired children.
While driving her son home from camp, the victim’s mother stopped at a scenic spot where

4
she received a phone call from a friend. The friend lived next door to Carrillo. The friend
informed the victim’s mother that the vi ctim should not be goi ng over to Carrillo’s
apartment. After talking to the friend, the victim’s mother spoke with the victim. She
asked him if there was anything that she ne eded to know about what was happening at
Carrillo’s apartment. The victim told his mother that Carrillo had “made him do oral sex”
and that Carrillo had intercourse with the victim.
After returning home, the victim’s moth er flagged down a passing police officer
who was driving through the neighborhood. She told the officer what the victim had
reported to her. The officer spoke to the vic tim. Following the officer’s report, the chief
of police arranged for the victim to be interv iewed at the Child Advocacy Center (CAC).
CAC employees are specially trained to interview juveniles who may have been assaulted.
During the interview at the CAC, the vic tim stated that Carrillo forced him to
perform oral sex on more than one occasion a nd anally penetrated him once. The victim
told the interviewer that the ac ts happened in Carrillo’s bedr oom. During the interview,
the victim wrote the words “h e made me suck his dick” on a piece of paper. The state
called the interviewer to testify, and it introduced the video recording of the interview and
the note written by the victim through the interviewer’s testimony.
At trial, the victim testified that, when he was 14 years old, Carrillo made him touch
Carrillo’s penis with his mouth “[t]wice.” The victim testified that this conduct occurred
in Carrillo’s bedroom. He also testified that Carrillo inserted his penis into the victim’s
anus on more than one occasion. He further testified that the sexual contact “happened in

5
more than one day.” The victim testified that Carrillo told him to not tell anyone about the
incidents but that he eventually told his mother.
Carrillo chose to testify. He testified th at he knew the victim prior to meeting his
mother. According to Carrillo, he met the victim while working at the apartment building
where he lived. He testified that the victim would show up at the apartment building while
he was working. According to Carrillo, the victim introduc ed Carrillo to his mother.
Carrillo testified that the victim is “[l]ike a son” to him. He testified that he cooked for the
victim often. Carrillo testified that mothe r’s friend—who originally alerted the victim’s
mother—had robbed him twice. He denied the victim’s allegations of sexual contact. He
described his relationship with the victim as positive and believed that he was a good role
model. He testified that he had a positive relationship with the victim’s mother until just
before the victim went to summer camp, at which point their relationship soured.
Carrillo also admitted on direct examination that he had previously been convicted
of three felonies. On cross-examination, the prosecutor confirmed that Carrillo admitted
to having been convicted of three unspecified felonies. The district court then informed
the jury that the felony convictions were admitted only to assist the jury in considering the
credibility of Carrillo’s testimony.
At closing, the state argued that the victim testified that he had been abused on more
than one occasion and that the abuse involved two types of penetration—oral penetration
and anal penetration. The defense emphasized the third-party origins of the report that
Carrillo had molested the victim. The jury found Carrillo guilty of both counts.

6
The district court imposed convictions an d sentences on both counts. The district
court sentenced Carrillo to concurrent sentences of 168 months’ imprisonment on the two
counts and to lifetime conditional release on count two. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Carrillo presents three claims of error. Fi rst, Carrillo argues that the district court
committed prejudicial error by ruling that his three prior felony convictions were
admissible for impeachment purposes. Second, he argues that this court should review the
confidential social services records sought by his trial attorney to determine if the district
court should have disclosed any additional documents to the defense. Third, he argues that
the district court erred by imposing convictions and sentences for both counts because the
two offenses stemmed from a single course of conduct. We address Carrillo’s arguments
in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by determin ing that Carrillo’s
prior felony convictions were admissible for impeachment purposes.
Carrillo argues that the district court abus ed its discretion by determining that his
three prior felonies were admissible for impeachment purposes. He further argues that he
is entitled to a new trial because he was prejudi ced by that error. The state contends that
the district court did not ab use its discretion because it ru led that the state could not
reference the convictions by name. Instead, the state could refer only to three unspecified
felony convictions, which the state contends lessened any prejudicial effect. The state also
argues that any potential error was harmless b ecause the district court gave a cautionary
instruction.

7
Evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime is admissible to impeach the
credibility of that witness when the crime is punishable by more than one year in prison
and the court determines that the probative value of admitti ng the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect. Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(1). “District courts exercise discretion under this
evidentiary rule, and in do ing so must consider th e factors established in State v. Jones.”
State v. Reek, 942 N.W.2d 148, 162 (Minn. 2020) (citing State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 534,
538 (Minn. 1978)). Those factors include: (1) the impeachment value of the prior
conviction, (2) the age of the conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history, (3) the
similarity of the prior conviction and current charge, (4) the importance of the defendant’s
testimony, and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue. Id.
We “will not reverse a district court’s ru ling on the impeachment of a witness by
prior conviction absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. (quotation omitted). The district
court “should demonstrate on the record that it has considered and weighed the Jones
factors.” State v. Swanson , 707 N.W.2d 645, 6 54 (Minn. 2006). To obtain a new trial,
Carrillo must show both that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the prior
convictions and that he suffe red prejudice as a result. Reek, 942 N.W.2d at 162. Before
turning to Carrillo’s arguments on appeal, we review the context surrounding the district
court’s decision to admit his felony convictions.
Before trial, the state moved the district court to admit three of Carrillo’s prior
felony convictions under rule 609(a)(1). These convictions included an aggravated assault
from 2017, a felony domestic assault from 201 1, and a burglary from 2011. The state
argued that all three offenses were admissible under a weighing of the Jones factors. In

8
support of its motion, the state provided a separate Jones factor analysis for each of the
three convictions. The state admitted that th e third factor—the similarity of the prior
conviction to the crime ch arged—weighed against admission for the two assault
convictions but argued that the remaining fa ctors weighed in favor of admission for each
of the convictions.
At a hearing on motions in limine, defense counsel objected to the admission of the
prior convictions on the ground that they were prejudicial. The district court then went
through the five Jones factors on the record and concluded that all three convictions were
admissible. In analyzing whether the probative value of the convictions outweighed their
prejudicial effect, the district court concluded that the greatest risk of prejudice came from
the names of the offenses. To address this risk, the district court decided to “sanitize the
three prior felony convictions and require that the [s]tate identify them as unspecified
felony convictions.” With this in mind, we turn to Carrillo’s arguments on appeal.
Carrillo argues that the district court a bused its discretion by deciding that the
probative value of his three prior felonies outweighed their prejudicial effect. First, Carrillo
argues that the district court abused its discretion by considering the three convictions “as
a class” instead of considering each convictio n individually. Carrillo is correct that the
district court applied the Jones factors to the three felonies as a group. But it also noted
differences between the convic tions where appropriate in c onducting its analysis. The
record reflects that the di strict court meaningfully considered each of the Jones factors
before admitting the convictions.

9
Second, Carrillo argues that the district c ourt underestimated the prejudicial effect
of allowing impeachment with all three conv ictions because the jury could have been
tempted to consider Carrillo’s prior convictions “as evidence of propensity, rather than for
assessing credibility.” We are not persuaded. To limit any potential prejudice from the
use of the prior convictions, the district court specifically ordered the state to refer to the
convictions as “unspecified felony convictions.” The risk that the jury would infer
propensity was greatly dimini shed given that th e jury did not know what prior conduct
Carrillo had engaged in that resulted in the convictions. In addition, the district court gave
a cautionary instruction to the jury on the use of the impeach ment evidence. The district
court specifically instructed the jury that “evid ence concerning prior convictions of
[Carrillo] . . . [is] admitted on ly for your consideration in de ciding whether [Carrillo] is
telling the truth in this case. You must not c onsider these convictions as evidence of the
defendant’s character or conduct, except as you may think it reflects on credibility.” We
presume that the jury follow ed the instructions given by the district court.
State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 550 (Minn. 2010). Accordingly, we discern no basis
for concluding that the district court abused its discretion by determining that the probative
value of admitting the prior convictions fo r impeachment purposes outweighed the
prejudicial effect.
II. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by declining to disclose certain
confidential records after in camera review.
Prior to trial, Carrillo’s attorney requested that the district court conduct an in
camera review of certain confidential social services records in the possession of the state

10
to determine if the records shou ld be provided to Carrillo’s attorney. The district court
undertook the requested review. After doing so , the district court required disclosure of
some, but not all, of the records.
Carrillo requests that this court conduct its own in camera review of the confidential
records to determine whether the district court abused its discretion by requiring disclosure
of only a portion of the records. The state contends that such a review is not necessary.
Criminal defendants have a broad right to discovery to prepare for trial, but requests
to discover confidential records require a dist rict court to balance this right against the
victim’s right to privacy. State v. Paradee , 403 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Minn. 1987). “On
appeal, we review the limits placed by the district court on the release and use of protected
records for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d 340, 349 (Minn. 2012).
We first address whether it is appropriate for this court to conduct our own in camera
review of the records. The state argues that Carrillo has no basis to request this court to
review the records because Carr illo did not explicitly claim in his brief that the district
court abused its discretion by not disclosing certain records. The state’s argument misses
the mark. Where a district court performs in camera review of confidential records, an
appellant in a criminal matter is not required to claim an abuse of discretion by the district
court with regard to the undis closed documents to be entitle d to a subseque nt in camera
review by an appellate court. See Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d at 349-50 (conducting in camera
review on appeal of confidential social services documents previously reviewed in camera
by district court without requi ring appellant to claim that district court abused its
discretion). Requiring an appellant to claim or demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the

11
district court would impose an impossible bur den on the appellant because the appellant
has not had the opportunity to view the documents in question—only the state and district
court have reviewed the documents. Therefore, we conclude that it is appropriate for this
court to review the undisclosed documents to determine whether the district court properly
exercised its discretion by ordering the release of only a portion of the documents.
Based on our own independent , careful review of the undisclosed, confidential
social services records, we conclude that th e district court did not abuse its discretion by
limiting access to certain records. The district court disclosed the relevant social services
records to Carrillo. The undisclosed documents would not have aided Carrillo in his
defense. We therefore conclude that the di strict court did not abuse its discretion by
deciding to disclose some documents to Carrillo but not others.
III. The district court correctly convicted and sentenced Carrillo on both counts of
third-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Carrillo argues that the district court erroneously convicted him and sentenced him
for both counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. He contends that the district court
should have imposed a conviction and sentence for just one count. Because the state proved
that Carrillo engaged in multiple acts of criminal sexual conduct against the victim on more
than one day, the district court did not err by imposing convictions and sentences for both
counts.
Carrillo raises arguments challenging th e district court’s decision under Minn.
Stat. § 609.04 (2018) and Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (2018). Both statutes govern dispositions
for multiple offenses, but the statutes conc ern different matters and require separate

12
inquiries. Section 609.04 concerns whet her a district court can impose multiple
convictions, while section 609.035 concerns whethe r a district court can impose multiple
sentences. Compare Minn. Stat. § 609.04 with Minn. Stat. § 609.035. The relevant inquiry
under section 609.04 is whether the multiple offenses constituted separate acts.
State v. Spears, 560 N.W.2d 723, 72 6 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. May 28,
1997). The relevant inquiry under section 609.035 is whether the offenses were committed
as part of a “single course of conduct.” State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 533 (Minn. 2014).
Thus, even where multiple convictions are permissible under sect ion 609.04 because a
defendant engaged in multiple, separate acts, the district court may not impose multiple
sentences if the separate acts cons tituted a single course of conduct. State v. Papadakis,
643 N.W.2d 349, 357-58 (Minn. App. 2002).
We review de novo whether section 609 .04 precludes multi ple convictions.
State v. Cox, 820 N.W.2d 540, 552 (Minn. 2012). A defendant may not be sentenced both
for an offense and “a crime necessarily prove d if [that offense] were proved.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1(4). To determine wh ether an offense is necessarily proved, we
examine “the elements of the offense.” State v. Bertsch , 707 N.W.2d 660, 664
(Minn. 2006). Here, both of Carrillo’s convictions contain identical elements because the
state charged him twice under the same statute. But section 609.04 does not preclude
multiple convictions if the two offenses constitute separate criminal acts. Id. And “[t]he
inquiry into whether two offenses are separate criminal acts is analogous to an inquiry into
whether multiple offenses constituted a si ngle behavioral incident under Minn.
Stat. § 609.035.” Id.

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A defendant whose multiple offenses occurred as part of a single course of conduct
generally may be sentenced for only one of those offenses. Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1.
Whether “offenses occurred as part of a singl e course of conduct is a mixed question of
law and fact.” State v. Barthman, 938 N.W.2d 257, 265 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted).1
When an issue presents a mixed question of law and fact, we will “review the district
court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of the law to those facts de novo.”
State v. Bakken, 883 N.W.2d 264, 270 (Minn. 2016). When reviewing findings for clear
error, we will not overturn a district court’s findings “if there is reasonable evidence in the
record to support the court’s findings.” State ex rel. Young v. Schnell , 956 N.W.2d 652,
668 (Minn. 2021) (quotations omitted).
When determining whether multiple o ffenses were comm itted during a single
course of conduct, we consider “whether the offenses occurred at substantially the same
time and place” and “whether the conduct was mo tivated by an effort to obtain a single
criminal objective.” Barthman, 938 N.W.2d at 265 (quotations omitted) . “The [s]tate
bears the burden of proving, by a preponder ance of the evidence, that a defendant’s
offenses were not part of a single behavioral incident.” Bakken, 883 N.W.2d at 270. With
this background in mind, we consider Carrillo’s arguments in turn.
First, Carrillo argues that his two convictions violate section 609.04 because the jury
could have “found that [he] co mmitted one act and returned bo th verdicts as alternative
theories of guilt.” But the r ecord does not support his a ssertion. By imposing two

1 The phrases “a single course of conduct” and “a single behavioral incident” are
interchangeable. Jones, 848 N.W.2d at 531 n.1.

14
convictions, the district court implicitly found that the state proved that Carrillo committed
two separate acts. Carrillo has not shown that the district court clearly erred in that regard.
The record shows the following. The victim testified that Ca rrillo orally penetrated him
“[t]wice.” The victim also te stified that Carrillo anally pe netrated him “[m]ore than one
time.” And he testified that the acts happened on “more than one day.” Because the record
contains evidence of separate criminal acts committed by Carrillo at different times, the
state met its burden under section 609.04 to support two separa te convictions of
third-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Second, Carrillo argues that the state failed to meet its burden under Minn.
Stat. § 609.035 to show that Carrillo’s offenses were not part of a single course of conduct.
He notes that the victim stat ed during the CAC interview th at the oral and anal sex acts
happened on the same day. We are not pers uaded because his argument fails to consider
the record as a whole.
Offenses that occur at “subs tantially the same time and place” and are “motivated
by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective” are part of a single course of conduct.
Bakken, 883 N.W.2d at 270. Carrillo focuses on some of the victim’s statements made
during the interview to support his argument that the acts were part of a single course of
conduct. But later in the interv iew, the victim stated that Carrillo made him perform oral
sex twice. And at trial, the victim testified that two different types of penetration happened
“[m]ore than one time” and on “more than one day.” The victim’s testimony about multiple
acts of penetration on more than one day sa tisfies the state’s burden to show that the
offenses did not occur at substantially the same time.

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The victim’s testimony is also sufficien t to show that the offenses were not
committed to attain a single criminal objectiv e. “[T]he mere fact that [defendant]
committed multiple crimes over time for the same criminal objective does not mean he
committed those crimes to attain a single criminal objective.” Bakken, 883 N.W.2d at 271.
Carrillo’s separate acts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct were not in furtherance of
the successful completion of any of his other acts, and therefore were not committed to
attain a single criminal objectiv e. Consequently, the record supports the conclusion that
Carrillo’s acts were not part of a single course of conduct.
Finally, Carrillo contends that the prosec utor “did not specify which count went
with which act.” Carrillo’s characterizati on of the prosecutor’s closing argument is
inaccurate. The prosecutor argued that “[t]he reason that there are two counts is that [the
victim’s] testimony was that this has happened to him more than once . . . and there were
two types of penetration, . . . anal penetra tion and . . . oral sex.” And the prosecutor
clarified that although the two counts looked the same, “one count would refer to the anal
penetration. Another count would refer to the oral penetration.” Carrillo has not
demonstrated that the state failed to show that his two offenses were not committed as part
of a single course of conduct because the victim testified about multiple acts of penetration
occurring at different times.
Conclusion
In sum, Carrillo has not shown that the district court abused its discretion by
determining that Carrillo’s prior felony co nvictions were admissible for impeachment
purposes because the district c ourt sufficiently evaluated the Jones factors. We have

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reviewed the confidential records sought by Carrillo and find no abuse of discretion by the
district court in its decision to order the re lease of only a portion of the records to the
defense. And the district court properly convicted and sentenced Carrillo for both counts
of third-degree criminal sexual conduct becaus e his two offenses were separate acts, not
committed as part of a single course of conduct.
Affirmed.