Mark Lanterman, Plaintiff,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0709

Mark Lanterman,
Plaintiff,

Computer Forensic Services,
Respondent,

vs.

Michael Roman Afremov,
Appellant.

Filed March 15, 2021
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-12-22089

Christopher W. Madel, Cassandra B. Merri ck, Madel PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

William R. Skolnick, Andrew H. Bardwell, Skolnick & Joyce, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota; and

Craig D. Singer (pro hac vice), Williams & Connolly LLP, Wa shington, D.C. (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Pres iding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by violating our remand
instructions, admitting evidence of his wealth and prior federal criminal charges, and
excluding the testimony of his expert witness. He also argues that the cumulative effect of
these errors warrants a new trial. We affirm.
FACTS
This case returned to our court following remand in Lanterman v. Afremov , No.
A15-0729, 2016 WL 1551602 (Minn. App. Apr. 18, 2016). Plaintiff Mark Lanterman and
his company, respondent Computer Forensic Services (CFS), brought the underlying
lawsuit seeking payment for two unpaid invoi ces for their work analyzing and preparing
data for appellant Michael Roman Afremov’s criminal lawsuit. Lanterman, 2016 WL
1551602, at *1. Additional facts of the lawsu it and initial jury tria l are outlined in our
previous opinion.
The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows. Our remand was the result of our
reversal of the district court’s judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on Lanterman’s breach-
of-contract claim and our conclusion that th e district court abused its discretion in
instructing the jury on the measure of contract damages and improperly responding to the
jury’s question about the first billing invoice. Id. at *7-8. We expressly remanded to the
district court “for proceedings consistent with this opinion.” Id. at *1.

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On remand, Afremov moved the district court to exclude, among other things, all
evidence about the second invoice, Afremov’s wealth, and Afremov’s felony indictments.
The district court denied Afremov’s motions.
Following a trial, the jury found that the breach-of-contract damages amounted to
$807,587.33. Of that amount, $628,737.33 related to the first invoice and $178,850 to the
second. The district court entered judgment adopting the jury’s findings. CFS moved to
amend the judgment to include interest. The district court granted CFS’s motion in part,
adding six percent interest per annum from the date of the invoices.
Afremov moved for a new trial based on several alleged errors, including the
arguments he makes on appeal. The district court denied Afremov’s motion. The district
court concluded that an award of damages based on the second invoice was proper because
our remand instructions did not limit damages to the first invoice. The district court stated,
“The Court of Appeals did not say Plaintiffs were only entitled to a new trial on damages
arising out of the first invo ice, and Plaintiffs were not entitled to a new trial on damages
arising out of the second invoice.” The di strict court also conc luded that it properly
admitted evidence that Afremov received approximately $300 million from a previous
settlement because “federal prosecutors were seeking to forfeit this money” from Afremov
and the evidence “was necessary to show the jury the scope of CFS’s work under the
contract.” Finally, the district court determined that it “properly admitted evidence related
to the indictments because its probative value to facts at the very core of this lawsuit
outweighed its prejudicial effect.” The indict ments were “relevant to show the jury what
work CFS was required to perform under the contract.” This appeal followed.

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DECISION
Remand instructions
Afremov first argues that the district cour t abused its discretion by allowing the jury
to consider damages on CFS’s second invoice because this court remanded for a trial on
the damages from only the first invoice.
We review a district court’s compliance with a remand instruction for an abuse of
discretion. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, LLP , 704 N.W.2d 759, 76 3 (Minn. 2005). A
district court abuses its discretion when it acts “in a way that is inconsistent with the remand
instructions provided.” Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minn. , 895 N.W.2d 623,
633 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). A district court al so “exceeds its broad discretion
on remand when it makes findings on a subject not included in the appellate court’s remand
instructions.” Id.
When we previously reversed the district court’s grant of JMOL on the breach-of-
contract claim, we also determined that the district court abused its discretion by
(1) instructing the jury that “costs,” for purposes of measuring damages, included only lost
revenue for employee hours and (2) in answ ering the jury’s question about whether
awarding CFS the full first price of the firs t invoice would violate the instruction.
Lanterman, 2016 WL 1551602 at *7-8. We concluded that “the erroneous jury instruction,
coupled with the district court’s reply instructing the jury on how CFS could recover on its
breach-of-contract claim, resulted in substa ntial prejudice warranting a new trial on
damages arising from CFS’s first billing invoice.” Id. at *8.

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Afremov argued to the district court that this court had by inference denied any
recovery with respect to the second invoice. The district court correctly concluded that we
did no such thing. It denied Afremov’s posttrial motion, stating that “the Court of Appeals
remanded on damages. It did not limit the sc ope of the remand to exclude the second
invoice.” The district court noted counsels’ agreement that it was unclear how the first
jury reached its damages award and whethe r the award included da mages for the second
invoice. It also noted that this court’s opinion “did not say Plaintiffs were only entitled to
a new trial on damages arising out of the first invoice.” The district court concluded that
our opinion did not need to address the s econd invoice because we “found substantial
prejudice related to the first invoice,” and “[t]he evidence the Court of Appeals found
supported the jury’s finding of a contract a nd substantial prejudice related to the first
invoice also supported a jury finding of a contract covering the second invoice and
substantial prejudice related to the second invoice.”
The district court correctly noted that th e issue before us in the first appeal was
whether the district court abused its discre tion by instructing the jury on damages and
answering the jury’s question about whether awarding CFS the full price of the first invoice
would violate the instruction. See id. Moreover, our express remand instruction was “for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.” Id. at *1. Consideration of damages from the
second invoice is not inconsistent with the analysis in our earlier opinion. Afremov has
not shown that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the jury to consider
damages on CFS’s second invoice.

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Admission of evidence
Afremov next challenges the district court’s admission of evidence. “The admission
of evidence rests within the broad discretion of the [district] court and its ruling will not be
disturbed unless it is based on an erroneous view of the la w or constitutes an abuse of
discretion.” Kroning v. State Fa rm Auto. Ins. Co. , 567 N.W.2d 42, 45-46 (Minn. 1997)
(quotation omitted). We review a district court’s denial of a motion to ex clude evidence
for an abuse of discretion. City of Moorhead v. Red River Valley Coop Power Ass’n, 811
N.W.2d 151, 161 (Minn. App. 2012), aff’d, 830 N.W.2d 32 (Minn. 2013). “Entitlement to
a new trial on the grounds of improper evid entiary rulings rests upon the complaining
party’s ability to demonstrate prejudicial error.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. Relevant evidence is generally
admissible, but it “may be excluded if its probative value is subs tantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice.” Minn. R. Evid. 402, 403.
Wealth evidence
Afremov first argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting
evidence of his wealth.
Before trial, Afremov moved to exclude all references to his wealth. The district
court denied this motion because his wealth was relevant to the scope of work authorized
by the parties’ contract. The district cour t concluded that the probative value was not
substantially outweighed by th e risk of unfair prejudice fro m the jury hear ing about his

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wealth. In denying Afremov’s motion for a new trial, the district court stated that evidence
of Afremov’s wealth, “showed why [Lanterm an] would not notify . . . Afremov of the
additional $500,000.00 regeneration cost. It showed why CFS would perform $628,737.33
of work before billing . . . Afremov.” The district court also concluded that Afremov was
not prejudiced because there “was no indication the jury improperly awarded CFS damages
because . . . Afremov receive d $300 million from [his past] settlement. [And he] cannot
show that the outcome might reasonably have been different.”
Afremov argues that his wealth is irrele vant to calculating breach-of-contract
damages and, “[a] customer’s ability to pa y cannot be underst ood as a proxy for his
willingness to pay, or as a proper basis for a co mpany to charge more to that customer.”
While certainly true in some contexts, the scope of the cont ract between the parties was
not placed in writing. At least some evid ence of Afremov’s wealth was relevant and
necessary in setting the scope of the unwritten contract and aid the jury in calculating
damages. Further, evidence of the roughly $300 million that Afremov received from his
past settlement was particularly relevant because the federal indictments sought to garnish
this money. The district court correctly conc luded that this aspect of Afremov’s wealth
was relevant to determining the scope of the contract in question. Afremov did not meet
his burden in showing that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to
exclude evidence of his wealth.
Indictment evidence
Afremov similarly argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
evidence of his prior criminal indictments.

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The district court denied Afremov’s motion to exclude references to his criminal
indictments because the indictments were relevant to the scope of the parties’ contract.
Again, Afremov hired Lanterman to assist in preparing evidence for his criminal
trial. The charges that Afremov faced are re levant in determining the scope of the work
that he hired Lanterman to complete. Afremov has not met his burden in showing that the
district court abused its discretion by admitting this evidence.
Expert
Finally, Afremov argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
motion to substitute an expert witness.
Expert testimony is admissible if the proponent of the testimony passes a four-part
test: (1) the witness qualifies as an expert; (2) the expert ’s opinion has foundational
reliability; (3) the expert’s testimony is helpful to the trier of fact; and (4) if the testimony
involves a novel scientific theory, that it passes the Frye-Mack standard. Minn. R. Evid.
702; Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul , 817 N.W.2d 150, 164 (Minn. 2012). We review a
district court’s decision denying expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. See Doe, 817
N.W.2d at 164.
Afremov argued in district court that his new expert should be allowed to testify
because his other expert could no longer testify for reasons beyond his control, and that he
timely disclosed the new expert under rule 26. The district court denied Afremov’s motion,
stating that the expert he was trying to replace was excluded in the first trial, so a substitute
was not relevant on remand. The district court also noted that “Afremov has not provided
any indication of the opinions [the expert] will offer or the basis for those opinions,” and

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Afremov did not show that the expert was qua lified to testify about contract damages.
Finally, the district court concluded that Afre mov was not prejudiced by the exclusion of
the expert’s testimony.
The district court denied Afremov’s moti on for several reasons, including because
he did not attach a relevant affidavit to his motion to amend. There was an affidavit from
the expert relating to the standard of care and spoliation of evid ence that accompanied
Afremov’s motion to amend. But the district court found that this was not relevant to any
testimony on damages, and Afre mov is not challenging that determination on appeal.
Instead, Afremov argues on appeal that an affi davit about his qualifications was already
filed two years before trial. This affidavit is not part of the record on appeal. Regardless,
Afremov is arguing that the district court abused its discretion because it did not reference
an affidavit submitted several years before Afremov’s motion in a case with thousands of
documents in the record. Afremov has not met his burden in showing that the district court
abused its discretion by denying his motion to substitute an expert witness.
Because Afremov has not shown any error by the district court, we need not analyze
his argument about cumulative prejudice.
Affirmed.