Peter Gerard Lonergan, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0715

Peter Gerard Lonergan,
Appellant,

vs.

Nancy Johnston, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed April 19, 2021
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-20-678

Peter Gerard Lonergan, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney Genera l, Molly Beckius, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Peter Gerard Lonergan is indeterminately civilly committed as a sexually
dangerous person at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) facility in Moose Lake.
Following an incident with a staff member and a subsequent hearing on the matter, MSOP
restricted Lonergan from certain areas outsi de his living unit and other comfort-related

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amenities for three days. In response, Lonergan filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in
the district court against respondents MSOP executive director Nancy Johnston and facility
director Kevin Moser, challenging the rest rictions and the lawfulness of MSOP’s
disciplinary policies and procedure. The di strict court denied the petition. Because
Lonergan has adequate legal remedies for his claims, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying a writ of prohibition. We affirm.
FACTS
These facts cited here are derived from the hearing on Lonergan’s application for a
writ of prohibition as well as the application’s supporting documents.
Lonergan is a civilly co mmitted sexually dange rous person residi ng at MSOP’s
Moose Lake facility. He has resided there since 2009. In Decemb er 2019, Lonergan
approached the staff desk to ask a staff memb er a question and walked around the side of
the desk. The staff member aske d Lonergan to move to the fr ont of the desk, explaining
that that was the direction that staff had been given. MSOP had not yet sent notice to clients
that, in order to protect confidentiality and security, clients were not permitted behind staff
desks. Lonergan did not comply with the employee’s request. After the employee repeated
the request, Lonergan shouted, “Are you f-----g kidding me?,” “What? I don’t have a right
to be at the desk?,” and, “Are you really f-----g joking with me ri ght now? Nevermind!”
The employee directed Lonergan to leave for a third time. Lonergan then complied. While
leaving, Lonergan told the employee, “I’ll get away from the desk, but I am a human f----
-g being and you people should treat me like one,” and said that he ne eded to “get out of
here before these f-----g people make [him] go nuts.”

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Lonergan received a Beha vioral Expectation Repo rt (BER) citing abuse,
harassment, and failure to comply with em ployee instructions. A BER is issued for
violating the facility’s Behavioral Expectations Handbook. A BER citation may lead to the
loss of privileges or other restrictions de pending on the infraction’s severity. Under
MSOP’s disciplinary policy—th e policy on Client Behavior al Expectations—Lonergan
had the right to a hearing before the MSOP Behavioral Expectations Unit (BEU). The BEU
reviews the BERs and issues findings based on the preponderance of the evidence. The
BEU may rescind or amend the BER and the restrictions im posed. Clients cannot call
witnesses or be represented by counsel during the BEU hearing process, but they may make
a statement during the hearing. The BEU, however, may examine any evidence or call
witnesses as it deems appropria te. A client may appeal the BEU’s decision to the facility
director and may appeal the facility director’s decision to the MSOP executive director.
Lonergan attended his h earing and made a statemen t to the BEU. The BEU
rescinded the abuse and harassment violations but affirmed the failure-to-comply violation,
which is a major rule violation. As a result, MSOP restricted Lonergan from certain areas
outside his living unit and other comfort-related amenities for three days. Lonergan did not
appeal this decision to the MSOP facility director or executive director.
Instead, Lonergan filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the district court, along
with a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO). The district court held a hearing on
the petition and the motion. The district court denied the TRO at the hearing, and it later
denied the writ of prohibition in a written order.
Lonergan appeals the denial of the writ of prohibition.

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DECISION
“A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy and is only used in extraordinary
cases.” In re Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 735 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Minn. 2007). “The writ is not
one of right but of discretion and issues only in extreme cas es where the law affords no
other adequate remedy by motion, trial, appeal, certiorari, or otherwise.” Wasmund v.
Nunamaker, 151 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Minn. 1967). To warrant a writ of prohibition, three
requirements must be met: “(1) an inferior c ourt or tribunal must be about to exercise
judicial or quasi-judicial power; (2) the exer cise of such power must be unauthorized by
law; and (3) the exercise of such power must result in injury for which there is no adequate
remedy.” Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Schumacher , 392 N.W.2d 197, 208 (Minn.
1986) (citations omitted). We review denials of a writ of prohib ition for an abuse of
discretion. See In re Paul W. Abbott Co. , 767 N.W.2d 14, 18 (Minn. 2009). The district
court abuses its discretion when “its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or
is against logic and the facts in the record.” Thompson ex rel. Minor Child v. Schrimsher,
906 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted).
The district court determined that the third requirement for a writ of prohibition was
lacking. This determination was not error. To the extent that Lonergan was challenging the
BER already imposed, he confirmed to the district court that he had chosen not to pursue
MSOP’s internal appeal process—an avenue of relief that was available to him. In addition,
in his petition for a writ, Lonergan sought declaratory relief declaring MSOP’s disciplinary
policies and procedure unlawful and injunctive relief to prohibit the imposition on him of
future BERs, require the repeal of MSOP’s th e policy on Client Behavioral Expectations,

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and require the appointment of a special ma ster to develop a new policy MSOP policy
structure. But Lonergan did not demonstrate that avenues are unavailable to obtain the legal
remedy of declaratory relief or relief under civil rights statutes.
Lonergan argues that the third requirement for a writ of prohibition was met because
it is evident that he “is injured by the imposition of BERs .” But merely showing injury is
not enough—the party seeking the writ must dem onstrate an injury for which there is not
an adequate legal remedy. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 392 N.W.2d at 208.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Lonergan
failed to meet the third requir ement for obtaining a writ of prohibition. Because all three
requirements must be met, id., we need not address whether Lonergan satisfied the other
two. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lonergan’s
petition for a writ of prohibition.
Affirmed.