State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0716

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Terrell Edward Trambell,
Appellant.

Filed April 25, 2022
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-2767

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorn ey, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Craig E. Cascarano, Cascarano Law Office, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presid ing Judge; Bryan, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from final judgments of conviction for five counts of promoting
prostitution of an individual, appellant dis putes the sufficiency of the circumstantial
evidence presented against him and challenges the denial of his petition for postconviction
2
relief without an evidentiary hearing. Because we conclude that the evidence presented at
trial is sufficient to sustain appellant’s convictions and that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying his postconviction petition, we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2019, the state charged appellant Terrell Tramble 1 with five counts of
promoting prostitution of an individual in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.322,
subdivision 1a(2) (2016). Each count was with resp ect to a different victim. The case
proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury found Tramble guilty on all five counts. The district
court imposed consecutive sentences of 180 m onths on Count 1, 48 months on Count 2,
and 48 months on Count 3, as well as concurrent sentences of 180 months each on Counts 4
and 5.
Tramble filed a direct appeal, arguing that the circumstantial evidence presented at
trial was insufficient to show that he—and not someone else using a Facebook account in
Tramble’s name—facilitated prostitution. Im portantly, Tramble ack nowledges that the
evidence shows that whoever used the Facebook account in Tramble’s name facilitated
prostitution. This court stayed the appeal to permit Tramble to pursue postconviction relief.
Tramble filed the petition for postconviction re lief in November 2020, raising a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district cour t denied the petition without a
hearing and this court reinstated the appeal. Given the issues raised, we summarize the

1 The case caption spells appellant’s last name as “Trambell.” See Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 143.01 (directing that the title of the action not be changed on appeal). At trial, however,
the district court clarified that appellant’s last name is spelled as “Tramble.” We therefore
use that spelling throughout this opinion.
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evidence presented at trial, Tramble’s waiver of his right to testify, the district court’s
responses to the jury’s questions, and the di strict court’s decision to deny the petition
without a hearing.
A. Evidence Presented at Trial
Among other witnesses, the state presente d the testimony of a detective with the
Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office. The detective testified that an individual, A.W., was in
custody and suspected of invo lvement in human traffickin g crimes. Law enforcement
officers obtained and listened to recorded phone calls made by A.W. while he was in jail.
During one such recording, A.W. called a person he refe rred to as “Stixx” and “Terrell.”
Using state and county databases, investigating officers determined that the phone number
called by A.W. was one that Tr amble had identified as his ph one number. Officers also
used a software program that collects information from websites advertising sex trafficking
or prostitution. The same phone number wa s linked to a prostitution advertisement. A
police analyst also located a Facebook page associated with Tramble and executed a search
warrant to obtain the Facebook records for that page.
A records custodian with Facebook authenticated th e Facebook records for the
account associated with Tramble, and the state introduced those records into evidence. The
records showed that the Facebook account ha d been created in the name of “Terrell
Tramble.” The records custodian explained that the name on the account was provided by
the account holder, and that the Facebook acco unt in Tramble’s name listed a birthdate,
which was the same as Tramble’s date of birth. The Facebook account also listed a phone
number. According to the testimony of the Facebook analyst, phone numbers for an
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account are provided by the ac count holder and verified by text message. The phone
number listed for the account in Tramble’s na me matched the phone number that A.W.
called and that officers had associated with Tramble. The Facebook records showed that
Facebook had verified that phone number, meaning that Facebook had sent a text message
to that number and the user had verified it. The state also intr oduced into evidence
screenshots of photos that had been posted on the Facebook page. The Hennepin County
detective identified Tramble as the person in the profile picture and other photos on the
Facebook page.
The state also presented evidence of pr ostitution advertisemen ts that had been
posted online for three of the five victims. The advertisements were posted on websites
commonly used for sex trafficking. Some of the advertisements directed potential patrons
to call the phone number associ ated with Tramble. The Hennepin County detective
testified that, based on the advertisements ’ provocative and sexual nature, they were
consistent with prostitution advertisements.
The state also introduced into evidence Facebook me ssages, authenticated by a
records custodian, that had been exchanged between someone using the Facebook account
in Tramble’s name and each of the five victims. A Minneapolis police officer, who testified
as an expert in sex trafficking, said that the Facebook messages sh owed that the victims
were engaged in prostitution at the direct ion of the person usi ng Tramble’s Facebook
account. Based on this eviden ce, the expert testified that Tramble was facilitating
prostitution by paying for hotel rooms that would be used for sex, transporting the women
to and from “dates,” and collecting the money received.
5
The state presented further testimony from an informant who was in custody at the
time of the trial and who had pleaded guilty to two charges of promoting prostitution but
had not yet been sentenced. The informant acknowledged that the state had not made any
promises to him in exchange for his testimony, but he admitted that he hoped to get a lighter
sentence for testifying against Tramble. The informant testified that he placed
advertisements on internet services, drove wo men to “dates,” and pr ovided security for
those “dates” to make sure that nothing went wrong. The informant identified Tramble as
“an associate from the streets” who also prostituted women. He testified that he had “been
with [Tramble] on occasion” while promoti ng prostitution. The informant also knew
Tramble by his street name, “Stixx,” and re cognized the Facebook account in Tramble’s
name as belonging to Tramble.
The informant also recognized Victims 1, 2, and 5 as women who were involved in
prostitution. He testified that he once took Victim 2 to see Tramble in a hotel room. On
that occasion, Tramble told the informant about the previous night, saying that “the ad was
going crazy last night.” The informant expl ained that he understood Tramble to be
referring to an advertisement for prostitution and saying that Trambl e had made a lot of
money from the prostitution of Vi ctim 2. The inform ant also testified that he had seen
Tramble with Victim 5 and that Tramble had asked him to put up an advertisement to help
promote her as a prostitute.
B. Waiver of Right to Testify and Jury Questions
After the state presented its case in ch ief, Tramble’s trial counsel informed the
district court that Tramble had chosen not to testify. The district court had reminded
6
Tramble multiple times throughout the trial th at he had the right to decide whether to
testify. The district court as ked Tramble if he had enough tim e to talk with his attorney
before deciding not to testify. Tramble responded that he had and reaffirmed that he wished
to remain silent. The defense rested without calling any witnesses.
During jury deliberations, the jury submitted two questions to the judge. The first
question was, “Is it legal to provide the hard evidence from the defendant’s call to [the
suspect] in jail, (i.e. a transcript or call log)? In other words, could the [s]tate have provided
that as evidence?” The second question was, “How did the defendant provide the [phone]
number to the [s]tate as referenced by [the detective] in his testimony?” The judge
discussed these questions with the attorneys off the record. Once th ey were back on the
record, the district court summ arized the parties’ discussion, including objections that
Tramble’s counsel had made:
We talked about a couple of di fferent ways of responding to
this. I had prepared a draft re sponse that I shared with the
[attorneys] before we really talked substantively about it.
Through our discussions I am ended my proposed draft
to take out the first sentence at the [s]tate’s request, and the
[s]tate made some further reque sts for additional information
or different responses to which [defense counsel] had objected
and I agreed with the defense in that regard.
The district court then read the proposed response and asked if counsel for either party had
any additional concerns or proposals. Both attorneys responded that they had no objection
to the proposed response.
The jury returned to the courtroom and the district court gave the following response
to the jury’s questions:
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You must make your determin ations in this case based
upon the evidence you have been provided. While I understand
you have these questions, it wo uld be improper for me to
answer them at this time.
You must decide what the facts are from the evidence
presented and apply that to th e law you were provided. You
must then decide if the pros ecution has proven Mr. Tramble
guilty of one or more of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.
You should refer to all the inst ruction you receiv ed to assist
you in fulfilling this duty.
C. Postconviction Proceedings
Tramble’s postconviction petition alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for
indirectly convincing him not to testify, fa iling to investigate the charges, failing to
vigorously cross-examine a witness regarding Facebook, and failing to make additional
objections to the district court’s response to the jury’s questions. The district court denied
Tramble’s postconviction petition without an ev identiary hearing in a May 2021 order.
The district court determined that Tramble failed to make the necessary showing for a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel because his petition and accompanying memorandum
provided merely “bare argument and speculative conclusions,” with no factual support.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Tramble argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of all five counts
of promoting prostitution of an individual. We conclude that the circumstances proved are
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with an inference that someone other than Tramble
created and used the Facebook account to facilitate prostitution.
8
It is a crime to, “while acti ng other than as a prostitute or patron, intentionally . . .
promote[] the prostitution of an individual.” Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1a(2). A person
promotes prostitution if that person knowingly commits any of the following acts:
(1) solicits or procures patrons for a prostitute;
(2) provides, leases or otherwise permits premises or facilities
owned or controlled by the person to aid the prostitution of
an individual;
(3) owns, manages, supervises, c ontrols, keeps or operates,
either alone or with others, a place of prostitution to aid the
prostitution of an individual;
(4) owns, manages, supervises, c ontrols, operates, institutes,
aids or facilitates, either alone or with others, a business of
prostitution to aid the prostitution of an individual;
(5) admits a patron to a place of prostitution to aid the
prostitution of an individual; or
(6) transports an individual from one point within this state to
another point either within or without this state, or brings
an individual into this state to aid the prostitution of the
individual.

Minn. Stat. § 609.321, subd. 7 (2016).
When, as here, “the direct evidence of guilt on a particular el ement is not alone
sufficient to sustain the verdict,” we apply the circumstantial-evidence standard of review.
Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence
from which the factfinder can infe r whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.”
State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). “[C]ircumstantial
evidence always requires an inferential step to prove a fact that is not required with direct
evidence.” Id. In assessing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, we conduct a two-
part analysis. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329-30 (Minn. 2010). First, we “identify
the circumstances proved,” id. at 329, deferring to the jury’s credibility determinations and
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weighing of the evidence, Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600. Second, we consider whether the
circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with a rational hypothesis
other than guilt. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 329-30. “Circumstantial evidence must form a
complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the
defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than
guilt.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). In this
second step, no deference is given to the jury’s verdict. Loving, 891 N.W.2d at 643.
In this case, the state proved the following circumstances. A Facebook account was
opened in Tramble’s name. The Facebook account listed Tramble’s date of birth, displayed
photos of Tramble, and had been verified using a phone number that Tramble had provided
as his phone number, according to law enforcement databases. That phone number was
the same one that A.W. dialed when he ca lled the person he referre d to as “Stixx” and
“Terrell.” Further, the state’s informant testified that he wa s an associate of Tramble as
well as Facebook friends with Tramble. The informant recognized the Facebook page as
belonging to Tramble and testif ied that he knew Tramble went by the name “Stixx.” He
also testified that he had been present at times when Tramble facilitated prostitution,
including when Tramble promoted the prostitution of three of the five victims.2 As noted
above, Tramble acknowledges that whoever used the Facebook account in his name
promoted prostitution of each of the five victims.

2 We note that some of this testimony c ould be characterized as direct evidence.
Nevertheless, we apply the circumstantial-evid ence standard of review because the state
relied heavily on indirect evidence and because both parties frame the convictions as based
on circumstantial evidence on appeal.
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We conclude that this evidence is consis tent with Tramble’s guilt and inconsistent
with the alternative inference proposed by Tramble: that someone other than Tramble, who
also goes by the nickname “Stixx,” used Tramble’s phone to create a Facebook account in
his name and used Tramble’s phone and the Facebook account to promote prostitution. 3
Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence to sustain Tramble’s convictions.
II. Denial of Postconviction Petition
Tramble also argues that the district court erred by denying his postconviction
petition without holding an evidentiary heari ng. Specifically, Tramble’s postconviction
petition alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for the following four reasons: (1) trial
counsel “did not want [Tramble ] to testify and indirectly co nvinced [him] not to take the
stand;” (2) trial counsel failed to adequately investigate to determine whether Tramble was
the person who posted the Facebook advertisements that formed the basis for the offenses;
(3) trial counsel “failed to conduct vigorous cross-examination” regarding the Facebook
advertisements and messages; and (4) trial coun sel failed to object to the district court’s
written response to a jury que stion during deliberations, wh ich resulted in the response
being “worded in a way which was detrimenta l to” Tramble. We are not convinced by
these arguments and conclude that because the allegations in the petition were insufficient
to support relief, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the petition
without a hearing.

3 We note that this alternative inference conf licts with the informant’s testimony. Our
standard of review, however, requires us to assume that the jury found the informant to be
credible and prohibits this court from making its own credibility determinations. Harris,
895 N.W.2d at 600; Loving, 891 N.W.2d at 643.
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The district court may dismiss a postc onviction petition w ithout holding an
evidentiary hearing if “the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively
show that the petitioner is entitl ed to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2020).
When determining whether to ho ld an evidentiary h earing, the district court must accept
the facts alleged in the petition as true, but if these facts “are legally insufficient to grant
the requested relief,” the district court ma y deny the petition with out an evidentiary
hearing. Rhodes v. State, 875 N.W.2d 779, 786 (Minn. 2016); see also Thoresen v. State,
965 N.W.2d 295, 303 (Minn. 2021) (concluding that alle gations in the petition “must be
more than argumentative assertions withou t factual support” (quotation omitted)). We
review the district court’s denial of a post conviction petition, including denial without an
evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion. Chavez-Nelson v. State, 948 N.W.2d 665,
671 (Minn. 2020). A district court abuses its discretion when its decision “is against logic
and the facts in the record.” Dolo v. State, 942 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn. 2020).
For a petitioner to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective-assistance-
of-trial-counsel postconviction claim, the petitioner “must allege facts that, if proven by a
fair preponderance of the evid ence, would satisfy the two-prong test” articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Chavez-Nelson, 948 N.W.2d at 671 (quotation omitted). Under this standard, a petitioner
must show that (1) his counsel’s represen tation “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness,” and (2) “there is a reas onable probability that , but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the pr oceeding would have been different.” Id.
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(quotations omitted). If one prong is not sati sfied, we may dispose of the claim without
considering the other prong. Peltier v. State, 946 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. 2020).
In this case, Tramble’s allegations are unable to satisfy the Strickland test. We begin
with the allegation that Tramble’s trial couns el “indirectly convinced” Tramble not to
testify at trial. “[A] claim that [a defendant’s] attorneys’ actions denied him the right to
testify must fail ‘absent some indication in the record that his lawyers coerced him into not
testifying by applying undue pressure, using illegitimate mean s, or otherwise depriving
him of his free will.’” Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 2013) (quoting State v.
Berkovitz, 705 N.W.2d 399, 407 (Minn. 2005)). Here , the district court made sure that
Tramble understood his right to testify, and Tramble made a va lid waiver of that right.
While the petition alleges that his counsel “indi rectly convinced” him not to testify, and
his accompanying memo randum states that co unsel “persuaded” him no t to testify, such
allegations fall short of the coercion required by Andersen to succeed on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel concerning a valid waiver of the right to testify.
We are also unpersuaded by the arguments regarding the other allegations of
ineffective assistance concerning counsel’s pretrial investigation, cross-examination, and
response to the jury’s questions. We conclude that the petition fails to establish the second
prong of the Strickland test for each of these remaining allegations. For instance, although
Tramble speculates that further investigation could have uncovered evidence that someone
else created and used the Facebook accoun t in his name, the petition offers no specific
investigative steps or methods that counsel could have taken that would have changed the
outcome of the trial. Likewise, Tramble’s petition does not explain what a more “vigorous
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cross-examination” would have revealed or how those revelations would have affected the
outcome of the trial. Finally, while the petit ion characterizes the district court’s response
to the jury’s question as “detrimental” to Tramble, Tramble does not explain how the
response was detrimental, what additional objection counsel could have made, and how
this additional objection would have changed the outcome of the trial.
In sum, the allegations in Tramble’s petiti on are insufficient to show that his trial
counsel was ineffective on any of the four bases raised. The district court therefore did not
abuse its discretion by denying the postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.