State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0723

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jerome Allen Mindermann,
Appellant.

Filed May 17, 2021
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Cochran, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-CR-17-2205

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Michael Everson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Michelle Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction of seven counts of unlawful
possession of a firearm and one count of fifth- degree sale of marijuana, appellant argues
that the evidence is insu fficient to prove that he possessed the firearms or sold marijuana

2
within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1(1) (2016). Alternatively, he argues
that the district court erred by sentencing him for all seven firearm-possession offenses.
We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdicts but that the district court
erred in sentencing appellant. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
In July 2017, the state charged appellant Jerome Allen Mindermann with one count
of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person in viola tion of Minn. Stat. § 624.713,
subd. 1(2) (2016), and one count of fifth-degree sale of marijuana in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1(1). In June 2019, the state filed an amended complaint and added
six more counts of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2). Mindermann proceeded to a jury trial.
At trial, the state presented the fo llowing evidence. On July 17, 2017, while
Mindermann was on probation for a 2015 o ffense, Mindermann’s probation officer
received a report from Mindermann’s wife. Wife told the prob ation officer that
Mindermann was in possession of firearms and growing marijuana. The day after receiving
the report, the probation officer went to Mindermann’s home. Mindermann’s wife and
nephew lived in the house with him. Mindermann’s brother owned the house and lived in
a separate trailer on the same property. Mi ndermann’s wife had be en staying with her
daughter for “a couple months” prior to July 17, 2017, but she discovered the guns and
marijuana when she was at the house packing. Mindermann and his wife planned to move
out of the house to a trailer so that Mindermann’s ailing brother could move into the home

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from his trailer. Wife was also at the house when the probation offi cer arrived the next
day.
Wife met the probation officer at the home. While in the home, the probation officer
observed marijuana and six firear ms as well as ammunition. She observed four firearms
and ammunition in Mindermann’s bedroom. She knew the bedroom to be Mindermann’s
based on her previous probatio n-related visits to the home. And she observed two other
firearms in a storage area. The probation officer relayed her findings to local police, who
obtained and executed a search warrant that day. After police arrived, Mindermann’s
probation officer had no further involvement with the search. Mindermann was not home
during the probation officer’s visit or at th e time the police execute d the search warrant,
and he had been away from the home for two days prior to that time.
Two police officers who had executed the sear ch warrant testified at trial. The first
officer testified that while executing the sear ch warrant, he recovere d “seven firearms; a
couple bags . . . which [he] recognized to be consistent with marijuana; . . . and some
ammunition for the firearms.” He testified that he also locat ed “five to seven plants of
marijuana” outside the home. With regard to the seven firearms, the first officer testified
that police found two firearms in a staircase off of a living room and five firearms in a
bedroom that he believed to be Mindermann’s. The office r testified that the bedroom
contained medications and mail bearing Mindermann’s name. He also testified that two of
the seven firearms were found loaded with ammunition. Additionally, officers recovered
ammunition corresponding to other firearms, either inside gun cases or in the general area

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in which the guns were found. The first officer then specif ically identified each firearm
and testified to the location in which it was found.
The state then called a second officer w ho had searched Mindermann’s home. The
second officer testified that he located five mature marijuana plants outside Mindermann’s
home and several smaller immature plants inside Mindermann’s home. The second officer
found more marijuana and $5,811 in cash in the kitchen. Most of the cash was banded into
thousand-dollar increments. Officers rec overed the marijuana in separate packaged
quantities. The second officer testified that they recovered small plastic baggies
“commonly found and used in the distribution of different controlled substances.” Officers
also found a digital scale with a leafy green substance on t op and on the case. The state
rested at the conclusion of the second police officer’s testimony.
Defense counsel called only one witness—Mi ndermann’s wife. Wife testified that
she called Mindermann’s probation officer because her daughter told her that if she did not
report the firearms to law enforcement she would never see her daughter or grandson again.
According to wife, her daughter wanted her to separate from Mindermann. Wife also
testified that the firearms in Mindermann’s bedroom were placed there by her daughter and
son-in-law. She explained that her daughter and son-in-law came to the house, found
firearms in the storage area “upstairs,” and brought them down to the bedroom. She further
testified that her daughter and son-in-law we re responsible for the marijuana found at the
house. And wife testified that the cash was meant to pay carpenters working on a trailer
that she and Mindermann planned to move into and that the money was wrapped in

5
thousand-dollar increments b ecause it had come from a bank. She further testified that
Mindermann’s relative had brought “some guns over” to the house at some point.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked wife about the firearms. Wife changed
her testimony. She testified that her daughter and son-in-law brought five firearms with
them to the house, retracting her earlier stat ement that they placed guns found elsewhere
in the house in Mindermann’s bedroom. And she reiterated that th ey placed marijuana
around the house as well as outside. Wife admitted that she called Mindermann’s probation
officer to report firearms and marijuana at the home. She also admitted that she never told
the probation officer that the firearms or marijuana did not belong to Mindermann. And
she admitted that she had neve r reported being threatened by her daughter in connection
with her call to the probation offi cer until she testified at trial. On redirect, wife testified
that she did not reveal the threats because she was concerned about what her daughter
would do in response. Mindermann chose not to testify, and the defense rested.
The jury found Mindermann guilty of all counts. The district court entered
judgment of convictions of all seven unlawful-possession-of-a-firearm counts and imposed
concurrent 60-month sentences for each count. The district court also entered a judgment
of conviction of fifth-degree sale of ma rijuana and imposed a concurrent 24-month
sentence. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. Mindermann’s convictions are s upported by sufficient evidence.
Mindermann challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of all eight of his
convictions. Mindermann contends that the evid ence at trial is insufficient to support his

6
seven unlawful-possession-of-a-firearm convictions because the state did not prove that he
knowingly possessed the firearms. Similarly, he contends that his fifth-degree-drug-sale
conviction must be reversed because the state failed to prove that he sold marijuana within
the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1( 1). The state argues th at the evidence is
sufficient to support the convictions. We agree with the state.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we “view
the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict and assume the fact-finder disbelieved
any testimony conflicting with that verdict.” State v. Balandin , 944 N.W.2d 204, 213
(Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted). “We will not overturn a verdict if, giving due regard to
the presumption of innocence and to the pr osecution’s burden of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, the jury could reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the charged
offense.” Id. (quotation omitted).
When the state proves a crime through ci rcumstantial evidence, appellate courts
conduct a heightened two-step analysis. State v. Barshaw , 879 N.W.2d 356, 363
(Minn. 2016). First, we iden tify the circumstances proved. Id. In doing so, we defer to
the jury’s “acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the
record that conflicted with the ci rcumstances proved by the [s]tate.” Id. (quotation
omitted). We defer to the jury because even in cas es involving circumstantial evidence,
the jury is “generally in the best position to weigh the credibility of the evidence and thus
determine which witnesses to believe and how much weight to give their testimony.” Id.
(quotation omitted). Second, we “independently examine the reasonableness of all
inferences that might be drawn from the ci rcumstances proved to determine whether the

7
circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted). “If a reasonable inference other
than guilt exists, then we will reverse the conviction.” State v. Petersen, 910 N.W.2d 1, 7
(Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted).
With this standard in mind, we examin e the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
Mindermann’s convictions. We first addres s the seven unlawful-possession-of-a-firearm
convictions and then turn to the conviction for fifth-degree sale of marijuana.
A. The evidence is sufficient to support all seven convictions of unlawful
possession of a firearm.
The state charged Mindermann with seven counts of violating Minn.
Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2), which provides that “a person who has been convicted of . . . a
crime of violence” shall not “be entitled to possess ammunition or a pistol or semiautomatic
military-style assault weapon or . . . any othe r firearm.” Mindermann stipulated before
trial that he was ineligible to possess a firearm. To convict Mindermann of possession of
a firearm by an ineligible person, the state was required “to prove in re levant part that he
knowingly possessed the firearm.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017).
Possession can be proved by evidence of actual or constructive possession. Id. at
601. Constructive possession exists “where th e inference is strong that the defendant at
one time physically possessed the [item] and did not abandon his possessory interest in the
[item] but rather continued to exercise dom inion and control over it up to the time of the
arrest.” State v. Florine , 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Minn. 1975). The state may prove
constructive possession in one of two ways. Id. at 611. The state can show that the item

8
was recovered from a place “under defendant’s exclusive control to which other people did
not normally have access.” Id. Or, if the item was recovered from a place to which others
had access, the state must show that “there is a strong probability (inferable from other
evidence) that defendant was at the time consciously exercising dominion and control over
it.” Id. “A defendant may possess an item jointly with a nother person.” Harris,
895 N.W.2d at 604 (citing State v. Lee, 683 N.W.2d 309, 316 n.7 (Minn. 2004)).
Because Mindermann was away from the home for two days when the firearms were
discovered by police, the state was required to prove constructive possession of the
firearms. Accordingly, we limit our suffici ency-of-the-evidence review to whether the
evidence is sufficient to support constructive possession of the seven firearms. And,
because the firearms were discovered in a house at which others lived, we focus our review
on whether there is a strong probability (inf erable from the eviden ce) that Mindermann
consciously exercised dominion or control over the firearms. We begin by analyzing the
evidence relating to the five firearms found in the bedroom. We then turn to the evidence
relating to the firearms recovered from the storage area.
i. The evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that
Mindermann possessed the five firearms found in his bedroom.
Viewing the evidence in th e light most favorable to th e verdict, the circumstances
proved at trial relevant to the bedroom-fi rearm convictions are as follows: (1) police
recovered five firearms from Mindermann’s bedroom; (2) police recovered multiple items
bearing Mindermann’s name—including ma il and prescription medications—in close
proximity to the firearms; (3) police discovered ammunition for the guns in Mindermann’s

9
bedroom, including inside a metal cabinet next to his bed; (4) Mindermann’s nephew lived
in the same house; and (5) wife reported to the probation officer that Mindermann was in
possession of firearms in the residence.
These circumstances proved support th e inference that Mindermann exercised
dominion and control over the firearms recove red from his bedroom, and, therefore, that
he constructively possessed all five firearms. First, the firearms were recovered in
Mindermann’s private space. Even though he had been out of the house for two days prior
to the search, Mindermann had more control over that room than any other part of the house
because it was not a sh ared space. Second, his many personal effects in the room
corroborate his exclusive use of that bedroom. Third, the ammunition stored alongside the
firearms shows that Mindermann had organized the storage of the firearms to some degree.
And the ammunition recovered from the metal cabinet in hi s bedroom shows that he
stockpiled ammunition beyond that which was ke pt with the guns in the cases. Fourth,
wife’s statement to the probation officer that Mindermann had firearms in the house shows
that she was aware that Mindermann possessed multiple firearms.
Mindermann acknowledges that these circumstances “may give rise to a reasonable
inference that [he] possessed the firearms by consciously exercising dominion and control
over them.” But he argues that, because his nephew also lived at the house and his brother
lived nearby, the circ umstances proved do not eliminat e “the rational inference that
[Mindermann] did not have dominion and control over the firearms and someone else did.”
In support of this alternative hypothesis, Mindermann notes that the supreme court held in
Harris that the state must prove mo re than the defendant’s mere proximity to an item to

10
show constructive possession. 895 N.W.2d at 601; but cf. State v. Sam, 859 N.W.2d 825,
834 (Minn. App. 2015) (recognizing that “[ p]roximity is an important consideration
in assessing constructive possession”) (quotation omitted); see also
State v. Simon, 275 N.W.2d 51, 52 (Minn. 1979) (c oncluding defendant constructively
possessed drugs, found near his passport, located in a bedroom of a shared home). While
Mindermann is correct that mere proximity is not enough to es tablish constructive
possession, we are still not persuaded that the circumstances proved support Mindermann’s
alternative hypothesis.
Given wife’s statement to Mindermann’ s probation officer that Mindermann
possessed firearms in the house, it is not rati onal to conclude that Mindermann’s nephew
(or someone other than Mindermann) exercised exclusive dominion and control over the
firearms found in Mindermann’s bedroom. There is no basis for inferring that Mindermann
did not have dominion and control over fi rearms found in his own bedroom. At a
minimum, the circumstances proved provide a strong inference that Mindermann exercised
joint dominion and control over the firearms in his bedroo m. And, as discussed above,
possession may be joint or exclusive. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601. Consequently, the only
rational hypothesis based on the circumstances proved is that Mindermann constructively
possessed the firearms found in his bedroom. In sum, the evidence is sufficient to support
Mindermann’s unlawful-possession convictions re lated to the five firearms found in his
bedroom.

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ii. The evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that
Mindermann possessed the two firea rms recovered from the storage
area.
With respect to the two storage-area fire arm convictions, the relevant circumstances
proved are as follows: (1) police recovered two firearms from the stairwell storage area of
the house; (2) Mindermann and his nephew lived in the house; (3) a metal cabinet in
Mindermann’s bedroom contained ammunition co rresponding to one of the storage-area
firearms; (4) police recovered five other firearms from Mindermann’s bedroom; and
(5) wife reported to the probation officer that Mindermann had guns in the residence.
These circumstances proved support th e inference that Mindermann exercised
dominion and control over the two storage-area fi rearms. First, wife told the probation
officer that Mindermann possessed firearms in the house. Second, the metal cabinet in
Mindermann’s bedroom contained ammunition for one of the storage-area firearms,
strongly indicating that Minderm ann exercised dominion and control over that firearm.
And because Mindermann exerci sed dominion and control over one of the storage-area
firearms, it is reasonable to infer that he exercised dominion and control over both of the
storage-area firearms. Therefore, we conclude that the circumstances proved regarding the
storage-area firearms are consistent with guilt.
We next consider whether the circumstance s proved are consistent with a rational
hypothesis other than guilt. Mindermann makes the same alternative hypothesis argument
with regard to the storage-area firearms as he makes with regard to the bedroom firearms.
He contends that there is a rational inference that he did not exercise dominion and control
over the storage-area firearms and someone else did. We acknowledge that this argument

12
presents a closer question than for the bedroo m firearms, but we ultimately conclude that
Mindermann has not set forth a rational alternative hypothesis.
We reach this conclusion for several reasons . First, wife reported to the probation
officer that Mindermann was in possession of firearms at the house. Second, the probation
officer visited the residence and observed firearms in both the storage area and
Mindermann’s bedroom. At no point did wife tell the probation officer that the firearms
belonged to anyone other than Mindermann. Third, the storage of ammunition in
Mindermann’s bedroom for one of the st orage-area guns is inconsistent with
Mindermann’s hypothesis because it demonstrates that he possessed the means to use one
of the storage-area firearms i ndependently of anyone else. While it is possible that his
dominion and control may have been joint w ith someone else given the location of the
storage-area firearms, possession ca n be joint or exclusive. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601 .
There is no rational basis to conclude that he was not was exercising dominion and control
over the two firearms. In sum, the circumstances proved at trial regarding the storage-area
firearm convictions are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis
except that of guilt.
B. The evidence is sufficient to support Mindermann’s conviction of fifth-degree
sale of marijuana.

Mindermann next argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction
of fifth-degree sale of marijuana. A person is guilty of fifth-degree sale of marijuana if he
(1) sold one or more mixtures containing ma rijuana, and (2) knew or believed that the
substance sold contained marijuana. Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1(1); Florine,

13
226 N.W.2d at 610. The definition of “sell” in this statute includes possessing marijuana
with intent to sell. Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 15a (2016). It also includes manufacturing
marijuana. Id., subd. 15a(1). Manufacturing “includes the production, cultivation . . . [or]
packing” of a controlled substance. Id., subd. 7 (2016). Growin g marijuana constitutes
cultivation. State v. Hanson, 468 N.W.2d 77, 77 (Minn. App. 1991), review denied (Minn.
June 3, 1991). And a person harvesting marijuana and “d oing any other acts generally
deemed necessary to prepare it for smoking” is manufacturing marijuana under section
152.01, subdivision 7. State v. Vogel, 385 N.W.2d 35, 37-38 (Minn. App. 1986). At trial,
Mindermann stipulated that the substanc e recovered from his home was marijuana
weighing 49.96 grams.
The record reflects that the state offere d circumstantial evidence to prove the
fifth-degree sale of marijuana. Accordingly, we analyze the sufficiency of the evidence of
the fifth-degree marijuana sale conviction under the circumstantial evidence test.
Viewing the evidence in th e light most favorable to th e verdict, the circumstances
proved are as follows: (1) police found 49.96 grams of dried and packaged marijuana inside
Mindermann’s home; (2) the only other person who lived in the home at the time besides
Mindermann was his nephew; (3) marijuana wa s recovered in a crisper drawer in the
refrigerator and in another kitchen drawer; (4 ) police found $5,811 cash in a drawer near
the marijuana in the k itchen; (5) police found a scale with leafy residue and a number of
small plastic baggies; (6) police found five mature marijuana plants outside the home;
(7) police found several immature marijuana plants inside the home; and (8) wife reported
to the probation officer that Mindermann was growing marijuana at the home.

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These circumstances proved are suffici ent to support the hypothesis that
Mindermann “sold” marijuana within the mean ing of the statute by “manufacturing” or
cultivating it. First, Minderma nn’s wife told the probation officer that he was “growing
marijuana.” Second, the mature and immature marijuana plants growing on the property
strongly support the inference that Mi ndermann was manufacturing marijuana by
cultivating it. And that dried marijuana was recovered in the home suggests that
Mindermann was aware that the substance was marijuana because he was actively
harvesting and storing it. Further, the dr ied marijuana indicates that Mindermann
processed the plants by harvesting, drying, and otherwise preparing the marijuana to be
smoked. Moreover, the quantity of mariju ana recovered from the home was consistent
with manufacture for purposes of sale and in consistent with personal use. Thus, the
circumstances as a whole are consistent with the hypothesis that Mindermann is guilty of
fifth-degree sale of marijuana by manufactu re. The circumstances proved also provide
strong support for guilt based on possession with the intent to sell, but we need not consider
that alternative means of selli ng marijuana to conclude that the circumstances proved are
consistent with the hypothesis of sale of marijuana by means of manufacturing.
Mindermann argues that there is a rati onal alternative hypoth esis of innocence—
namely, that “the marijuana inside the house and the plants being grown outside the house
were instead manufactured by someone else, such as his brother or nephew.” We are not
persuaded. This hypothesis is contrary to wife’s statemen t to the probation officer that
Mindermann was growing marijuana. And, at no point did wife tell the probation officer
that the marijuana belonged to anyone else. Given the extensive presence of marijuana at

15
the home and wife’s statement that Mind ermann was growing marijuana, it is not
reasonable to conclude that Mindermann wa s not involved in the cultivation of the
marijuana. See State v. Denison , 607 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Min n. App. 2000) (affirming
conviction for possession of marijuana recovered from common spaces in close proximity
to defendant’s personal effects), review denied (Minn. June 13, 2000). Thus, the
circumstances proved at trial are consiste nt with the conclusion that Mindermann
knowingly manufactured marijuana and are inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other
than guilt.1
II. The district court erred by imposing sentences for all seven firearm-possession
offenses.
Mindermann argues that, even if the evidence at trial was sufficient to support his
convictions, the district court erred by se ntencing him on all seve n counts of unlawful
possession of a firearm. Minderm ann contends that the distri ct court should only have
sentenced him on one of the seven counts becaus e all seven counts were part of the same
behavioral incident. The state concedes that all seven charges of unlawful possession of a
firearm were part of the same behavioral incident, but it argues that the “firearms
exception” allowed the district court to se ntence Mindermann for all counts. We agree
with Mindermann.

1 Mindermann also argues that the state “had to pr ove actual possession” to show that he
“possessed [the marijuana] with intent to se ll or distribute.” But the state argued that
Mindermann both possessed the mariju ana with intent to sell and, in the alternative, that
Mindermann manufactured the marijuana. Becau se we conclude that the evidence is
sufficient to prove that Mindermann manufa ctured the marijuan a by cultivating and
harvesting it, we do not reach his argument conc erning the state’s burden to show that he
possessed it.

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Minnesota law “generally pr ohibits multiple sentences, even concurrent sentences,
for two or more offenses that were committed as part of a single behavioral incident.”
State v. Ferguson, 808 N.W.2d 586, 589 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted); see also Minn.
Stat. § 609.035 (2016). “[I] f a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under
the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1. This statute pr ecludes multiple sentences to avoid unfairly
exaggerating the criminality of the defendant’s conduct. State v. Hill , 918 N.W.2d 237,
242 (Minn. App. 2018). The statute also includes certain limited exceptions to this general
rule. Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subds. 3-6. One such exceptio n, the firearms exception,
provides that “a prosecution for or convicti on of . . . [unlawful possession of a firearm
under] section . . . 624.713, subdivision 1, clause (2), is not a bar to conviction of or
punishment for any other crime committed by the defendant as part of the same conduct.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 3 (emphasis added).
The question before us is whether the fi rearms exception of section 609.035,
subdivision 3, allows the district court to impose more than one sentence for multiple
convictions of unlawful possession of a firearm arising out of the same behavioral incident.
This court reviews de novo whether a district court erred by entering multiple convictions
or sentences. State v. Barthman, 938 N.W.2d 257, 265 (Minn. 2020).
This issue turns on the ph rase “any other crime” as used in section 609.035,
subdivision 3. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.
Roberts v. State, 945 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Minn. 2020). The goal of statutory interpretation
is to “effectuate the [l]egislature’s intent.” State v. Bowen , 921 N.W.2d 763, 765

17
(Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). If the legislature’s intent is apparent from the “plain and
unambiguous” language of the statute, this cour t does not engage in any further statutory
construction. State v. Townsend, 941 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. 2020).
Mindermann cites State v. Holmes to support his argument that the firearms
exception does not authorize the multiple sentences imposed by the district court here.
778 N.W.2d 336 (Minn. 2010). The Holmes court construed the phrase “any other crime”
as used in Minn. Stat. § 609.585 (2008) in the context of a first-degree-burglary conviction
under Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c) (2008). Id. at 340-41. Section 609.585 states that
a burglary conviction “is not a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime
committed on entering or while in the building entered.” (Emphasis added.) The supreme
court interpreted the phrase “any other crime” as used in section 609.585 to mean “a crime
that requires proof of different statutory elements” than the offense for which the defendant
had been convicted. Id. at 341.
We recently applied the reasoning from Holmes to a case in volving two
convictions: unlawful possession of a firearm and unlawful possession of ammunition.
State v. Nowels, 941 N.W.2d 430, 435 (Minn. App. 2020), review denied (Minn. June 16,
2020). The district court sentence d the defendant for both offenses. Id. at 436. We
concluded that because “the two possession crimes charged re quire proof of the same
elements,” the firearms exception did not appl y and the district court erred by imposing
sentences for both offenses. Id. at 442-43. Here, because the seven possession crimes
charged all arise under the same statute and therefore all require proof of the same statutory

18
elements, we conclude that the firearms exception does not apply to Mindermann’s seven
sentences.
The state argues that Holmes does not support Minde rmann’s position because
unlike burglary, an element of which may be “a predicate crime that is wholly encompassed
within the elements of burgl ary, possession of two separate firearms constitutes two
separate criminal offenses.” The state conte nds that we should look to whether proof of
one offense necessarily proves another. But Nowels rejected this argument because the
possession of a firearm does not necessarily fall within the factual elements of the
possession of ammunition—a person can possess one without the other. See id. at 442-43.
And where the statutory elements of the two offenses are identical, Minn. Stat. § 609.035
prohibits the district court from impos ing sentences for both offenses. Id. Therefore,
because the district court erred when it se ntenced Mindermann on more than one firearm
offense arising out of the same behavioral incident, we reverse and remand with respect to
the firearm-possession offenses for the district court to vacate six of his seven sentences.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.