Elfonzo Dyrell Shelby, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0724

Elfonzo Dyrell Shelby, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed January 25, 2021
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-17-3404

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Je ffrey A. Wald, Assistan t County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Elfonzo Dyrell Shelby entered a straight plea to id entity theft and theft
by swindle. Shelby admitted that he obtai ned personal information from incarcerated
persons and then used that information to apply for welfare benefits. Two years after

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sentencing, despite entering a straight plea to both counts, Shelby asserted in a petition for
postconviction relief that his guilty pleas were involuntary because the state failed to fulfill
a purported plea agreement. The postconviction court denied Shelby’s petition, concluding
that the record does not support his claim that a plea agreement existed. Because the record
supports the postconviction court’s decision, we affirm.
FACTS
The state charged Shelby with one count of identity theft and one count of theft by
swindle. Shelby pleaded guilty to both counts. He admitted that he had sent surveys to
incarcerated persons that aske d for identifying information. Unbeknownst to those who
completed the surveys, Shelby used the information he gathered to apply for (and receive)
thousands of dollars in welfare benefits un der fictitious names. At the plea hearing,
Shelby’s attorney stated th at Shelby would enter a “str aight plea” and argue for a
downward durational departure. Shelby and his attorney discussed on the record the fact
that he was entering a straight plea:
Q: And Mr. Shelby, you unders tand that we don’t have a
specific agreement in these cases, you understand that?
A: I understand.
Q: So straight plea , that’s what that means. You
understand the meaning of that?
A: Yes.
Q: So what we are going to do is we are going to come to
court with no promises from the state, no promises from
the judge, in terms of how you’re going to be sentenced?
A: Yes.
Q: And what we are going to ask the court to do is to
sentence you for less time than what’s called for by the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Do you understand
how that’s going to work?
A: Yes.

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(Emphasis added.) Shelby also submitted a plea petition indicating that he understood that
he would be entering a “straight plea,” an d that the “defense wi ll seek [a] downward
departure.” The district court accepted Shelby’s guilty pleas.
Before sentencing, a presentence investiga tion report (PSI) was completed. The PSI
recommended that the district court impose the presumptive sentence according to the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. The PSI indicated that Shel by told the PSI writer that
he had cooperated with the prosecution by providing information about ongoing fraud
cases.
At sentencing, Shelby asked for a durational departure from the sentencing
guidelines for both counts, arguing primarily that he showed remorse and took
responsibility for his actions. Notably, Shel by asserted that he had shown remorse by
“meeting with the prosecution al ong with the police investigat ors to provide information
about other individuals who were involved in this scheme.” The state opposed the motion
for a downward durational departure, arguing that there were no substantial and compelling
reasons to depart. The state acknowledged th at the investigators in this case took
information from Shelby about “possible other participants in this scheme or schemes like
it,” but noted that the investigators “were unabl e to find any value in that information.”
The district court denied Shelby’s motion for a durational departure and sentenced him to
the presumptive sentence under the guidelines for both counts.
Two years after sentencing, Shelby file d a petition for postconviction relief asking
to withdraw his guilty plea. Shelby argued that his guilty plea was not voluntary because

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he had reached an agreement with the state that the state did not fulfill. Specifically, in his
supporting affidavit, Shelby claimed that he reached an agreement with the prosecutor to
provide information to law enforcement about the technical aspects of his crimes and other
participants who had not yet been charged. In exchange, the prosecutor purportedly agreed
that if Shelby pleaded guilty to the offenses, the state w ould recommend (or not oppose)
Shelby’s request for a downward durational departure. Shelby claimed that he would not
have pleaded guilty without the agreement with the state.
The postconviction court deni ed the petition, concluding that Shelby’s assertion that
he had an agreement with the state was “not su pported by the transcripts” of the plea and
sentencing hearings.
Shelby appeals.
DECISION
Shelby argues that the postconviction co urt abused its discretion by denying his
petition for postconviction relief. We review the denial of a petition for postconviction
relief for an abuse of discretion. Rhodes v. State, 875 N.W.2d 779, 786 (Minn. 2016).1
In his postconviction petiti on, Shelby asked the postconv iction court to allow him
to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not valid. A postconviction court must allow a

1 We observe that Shelby did not request that the postconviction court hold an evidentiary
hearing on his petition. And although Shelby references the lack of an evidentiary hearing
in a heading in his appellate brief, Shelby makes no substant ive argument on appeal that
the postconviction court abused its disc retion by denying the petition without first
conducting an evidentiary hearing. Thus, we do not address whether the postconviction
court erred by failing to hold an evid entiary hearing on Sh elby’s petition. See
State v. Krosch, 642 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn. 2002) (indicating that assertions without
“argument or citation to legal authority in support of the allegations” are deemed waived).

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defendant to withdraw his guilty plea if “withdrawal is nece ssary to correct a manifest
injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest in justice exists if a guilty plea
is not valid.” State v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). A valid plea must be
accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Id.
Shelby claims that his plea was not volun tary. The purpose of requiring guilty pleas
to be voluntary is to ensure that the defendant “is not pleading guilty because of improper
pressures.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). The state applies improper
pressure if it “induce[s] a guilty plea base d on a promise by the prosecutor that goes
unfulfilled or was unfulf illable from the start.” Dikken v. State , 896 N.W.2d 873,
877 (Minn. 2017). Shelby maintains that the state applied improper pressure to induce him
to plead guilty here by making a promise that went unfulfilled—a promise to support or
not oppose Shelby’s downward-departure motion.
The postconviction court concluded that there was “nothing in the record” to support
the state’s purported promis e. On appeal, Shelby co ntends that the record does contain
evidence to support his invalid-plea claim—namely, Shelby’s affidavit and indications in
the record consistent with his assertion th at he cooperated with law enforcement.
Consequently, Shelby argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying
his petition for postconviction relief. Because the record belies Shelby’s claim, we are not
persuaded.
A postconviction court may deny a petition for postconviction relief when the record
“directly refute[s]” the a llegations in the petition. Williams v. State , 760 N.W.2d 8,
14 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 2009). Here, Shelby’s testimony at

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the plea hearing and his failure to object at the sentencing hearing directly refute the
existence of the purported agreement with the state.
A straight plea is a plea with no “agreement regarding sentencing.”
State v. Sanchez-Sanchez, 879 N.W.2d 324, 327 (Minn. 2016). Shelby explicitly stated at
the plea hearing that he understood that he was entering a straight plea. And he
acknowledged that he had no “specific agreement,” and “no promises from the state” when
he pleaded guilty, demonstrating that he understood the implication of entering a straight
plea. To the contrary, Shelby agreed that he intended to argue for a downward durational
departure at sentencing. An argument is not an agreement. Shelby’s clear and
unambiguous statements at the plea hearing u ndercut his claim that he reached a plea
agreement with the state.
Nor did Shelby object at sentencing when the state voiced its opposition to a
downward durational departure. The Minne sota Supreme Court has observed that a
defendant’s failure to object at sentencing to a purported breach of a plea agreement may
support an inference as to the defendant’s understanding of the agreement. State v. Rhodes,
675 N.W.2d 323, 327 (Minn. 2004). And Shelby made no attempt to withdraw his guilty
plea for two years. Shelby’s failure to object to the state’ s sentencing arguments further
supports the postconviction court’s conclusion that Shelby knew that he had no agreement
with the state as to sentencing.2

2 It is clear from th e record, and the state has neve r disputed, that Shelby provided
information to law enfo rcement. But the fact that Sh elby provided information to law
enforcement is not indicative as to whether Shelby reached a plea agreement with the state.
We also observe that the plea hearing occurred after Shelby’s meeting with law

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Ultimately, we discern no abuse of discretion in the postconviction court’s decision
to deny Shelby’s petition for relief. The court acted well within its discretion in concluding
that Shelby’s plea was voluntary, and therefore valid, and in denying the petition.3
Affirmed.

enforcement. As discussed above, Shelby agreed at the plea hearing that he pleaded guilty
with “no promises from the st ate.” Shelby’s plea-hearing testimony demonstrates that,
even after he provided information to law en forcement, he understood that he had not
reached a plea agreement with the state.

3 Shelby also submitted a supplem ental pro se brief in this a ppeal. His arguments in the
supplemental brief are consistent with thos e made in his primary brief, and we have
addressed those arguments above.