In re the Matter of: Madeline Jane McGill, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0727

In re the Matter of: Madeline Jane McGill,
Respondent,

vs.

Elton James Curtis,
Appellant.

Filed February 22, 2021
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Cass County District Court
File No. 11-FA-20-251

Michael D. Undem, Undem Law Office, Walker, Minnesota (for respondent)

Elton Curtis, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Florey, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this appeal from the issuance of an order for protection (OFP), appellant argues
that the district court violated his due process rights by declining to transport him to the
hearing so he could appear in person. Had he appeared at the hearing, appellant would
have contested the statements in the petition regarding his attempts to contact the petitioner
after the expiration of a prior OFP in 2019. Because the district court issued the OFP based
on appellant’s three criminal convictions for violating previous OFPs and not based on

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appellant’s attempted contacts , we conclude that the claimed constitutional error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and we affirm the district court.
FACTS
In 2007, appellant Elton Curtis sexually assaulted respondent Madeline McGill,
resulting in multiple OFPs and his eventual incarceration. On February 7, 2020, McGill
petitioned for an OFP against Curtis. The petition listed two prior OFPs protecting McGill
from Curtis that had expired. In addition, the petition alleged that Curtis had called McGill
from prison on January 8, 2020, and again on February 6, 2020. The district court issued
the ex parte OFP on February 7, 2020. On February 10, 2020, Curtis received notice of
the ex parte OFP. Curtis requested a hearing and included a letter to the district court judge
explaining that he attempted to call McGill three times since the expiration of the last OFP
in 2019. He asserted that he never threatened McGill in these calls and invited the district
court “to get those calls from [the jail]” because they are recorded. Curtis also stated that
McGill “never picked up” when he tried to call her. In closing, Curtis wrote that “the court
will have to come get me to appear for the hearing.”
The district court set the hearing for F ebruary 24, 2020, and informed Curtis in a
hand-written Post-it note affixed to the hearing notice that “[t]he court does not transfer for
this type of hearing. If it is allowed, you’d need to arrange this with the correctional
facility.”1 Prior to the h earing, Curtis submitted an affidavit alleging that the petition

1 Curtis submitted a photo copy of the hearing notice with the Post -it note as part of his
addendum. The documentary record submitted from the district court does not include the
Post-it note on the hearing notice. For purposes of this appeal, we refer to the version of
the hearing notice included in the addendum.

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included false statements regarding his attempts to contact McGill after the expiration of
the most recent prior OFP in 2019. On the day of the hearing, Curtis filed a memorandum
and a second affidavit. In the memorandum, he argued that the district court’s refusal to
allow him to appear in person violated his due -process rights. Curtis requested that the
district court dismiss the OFP or continue the hearing until the district court complies with
his request for transportation. In the affidavit, Curtis again asserted that his phone contacts
since the expiration of the most recent prior OFP in 2019 cannot support an OFP because
McGill “was ‘OK’ with me calling her” and because McGill never answered his phone
calls. Curtis did not appear at the hearing either in person or by phone. 2
The district court found that Curtis had “reasonable notice and opportunity to be
heard” and that the statutory procedu res for service were followed. At the hearing, the
district court received three certificates of conviction showing that Curtis violated prior
OFPs in April 2008, July 2008, and June 2016. The district court issued an OFP based on
Minnesota Statutes section 518B.01, subdivision 6a(b)(1) (S upp. 2019), finding that
McGill “has already had an [OFP] against [Curtis], and [Curtis] violated the order, ” and
that exhibits 1, 2, and 3 established multiple prior violations of OFPs. Citing Minnesota

2 Curtis included some additional facts in his memorandum before this court. Curtis asserts
that his case manager made statements to a district court clerk in a telephone conversation
regarding the possibility of continuing the hearing. Curtis does not argue that the case
manager’s request was a motion to continue the hearing or that the district court violated
his due-process rights in denying the request. Because Curtis does not raise this issue, and
because there is no decision for us to review, we need not address whether Curtis’s due-
process rights were affected by the district court’s scheduling decision.

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Statutes section 518B.01, subdivision 6a(c)(1) (Sup p. 2019), the district court issued the
OFP for 50 years. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Curtis argues that the district court violated his due-process right to appear in person
at an OFP hearing. Because t he district court issued the OFP based on Curtis’ s prior
violations, and Curtis does not challenge th is basis, we conclude that any alleged
constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution provide that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. Not every due process violation, however,
warrants reversal. “[P]rejudice as a result of the alleged violation is an essential component
of the due process analysis.” In re Child of B.J.-M. & H.W., 744 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Minn.
2008); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring this court to disregard harmless error) ;
Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr. Inc ., 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1975) (requiring an
appellant to establish both error and resultant prejudice).
The Domestic Abuse Act governs issuance of an OFP. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01 (2018
& Supp. 2019). The statute provides specific bases for an initial OFP, id., subds. 2, 4, 6,
and separate bases for a subsequent OFP, id., subd. 6a(a) (“the court may extend the relief
granted in an existing [OFP] or, if a petitioner’ s [OFP] is no longer in effect when an
application for subsequent relief is made, grant a new order ”). If an OFP is no longer in
effect, the district court may grant a new order upon a showing that the respondent has
violated a prior OFP. Id., subd. 6a(b)(1). “A petitioner does not need to show that physical

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harm is imminent to obtain an extension or a subsequent order under this subdivision.” Id.,
subd. 6a(b); see also Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764, 776 (Minn. 2014) (“Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01, subd. 6a, does not require a district court to make a finding of ‘domestic abuse’
before it extends an OFP.”) . In addition, the district court may issue a subsequent or
extended OFP “for a period of up to 50 years, if the court finds: (1) the respondent has
violated a prior or existing [OFP] on two or more occasions ; or (2) the petitioner has had
two or more [OFPs] in effect against the same respondent.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd.
6a(c).
In this case, the district court issued a subsequent, 50 -year OFP. The district court
found that Curtis had three prior convictions for OFP violations. The certified convictions
admitted as exhibits 1, 2, and 3, are sufficient under section 518B.01, subdivision 6a(b)(1),
to issue a subsequent OFP and sufficient under subdivision 6a (c)(1) to issue a 50 -year
order. Curtis does not challenge these findings on appeal. Nor does he argue that he would
have challenged evidence of his prior violations had he appeared in person at the hearing.3
Instead, Curtis argues that, had he been at the hearing, he would have presented testimony
regarding the facts of his attempts to contact McGill after the expiration of the most recent
prior OFP in 2019. Because such evidence does not relate to the statutory bases for the
district court’ s decision , Curtis’s presence at the hearing would not have changed the

3 The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that a person has no protected due-process interest
in the opportunity “to collaterally attack facts that a court has found in a prior judicial
proceeding—such as the three previous findings that [appellant] had violated an OFP .”
Rew, 845 N.W.2d at 787. Thus, even if Curtis appeared in person, the district court would
not have violated Curtis’ s due -process rights had it prevented him from collaterally
attacking the prior convictions.

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outcome. Curtis has not identified a reversible error , and under these circumstances, we
conclude that any alleged error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Affirmed.