State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0731

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Dorale Dominique Brooks,
Appellant.

Filed June 1, 2021
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-19-1726

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Je ffrey A. Wald, Assistan t County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina D. Schulz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from final judgme nt, appellant Dorale Dominique Brooks
argues that he is entitled to a new trial beca use the district court erroneously denied his
request for substitute counsel without conducting a searching inquiry into the basis for his
request. Because any request by Brooks for substitute counsel was untimely and
unsupported by assertions of exceptional circumstances warranting substitute counsel, the
district court did not abuse its discretion. We affirm.
FACTS
The facts underlying the charges in this case were established in a bench trial. On
March 5, 2019, Brooks broke into the apartment of his ex-girlfriend and entered her home
while she was in the shower. After she grabbed her handgun, he wrested it from her, hit
her with the gun while choking her, and then fl ed. Two days later, respondent State of
Minnesota charged Brooks with first-degree burglary and with second-degree assault.
At an April 15 omnibus hearing, Brooks, represented by a public defender, pleaded
not guilty to both charges and demanded a speedy trial. Tria l was set for June 10. At a
May 6 pretrial hearing, Brooks asked to remove his public defender. The district court did
not rule on the request but indicated to Brooks that it had not “heard or seen” circumstances
warranting the appointment of substitute counsel.
At the next hearing on May 14, Brooks’s public defender informed the district court
that Brooks did not want to be represente d by the public defender’s office. Brooks
submitted a petition to proceed pro se. In questi oning before the district court, Brooks’s
3
counsel went through the petiti on with him, and Br ooks confirmed that he wished to
represent himself and to have the public de fender’s office discharged. The district court
accepted Brooks’s petition.
The parties appeared before the district court on June 10. The district court informed
the parties that trial would begin the following day and aske d Brooks whether he still
intended to proceed pro se. Brooks suggested that he thought he was going to be given “co-
counsel or something like that.” The district court explained that Brooks had petitioned to
represent himself, and the appellant confirmed, “Yeah, I want to represent myself, then.”
The district court explained to Brooks that it had appointed a public defender to represent
him and that it did not find grounds to appoint substitute counsel. It explained that Brooks
had knowingly and volunt arily petitioned to represent hi mself. Appellant said, “That’s
cool.”
The parties appeared for trial on June 11 . The proceedings began with the state’s
motions in limine. Brooks complained that he had not been fully informed about the
consequences of proceeding pro se with resp ect to representation on appeal. The district
court reminded Brooks that he had chosen to represent himself and that the trial would go
forward, and it addressed the motions in limine and other evidentiary issues. After a brief
recess, Brooks decided to waive his right to trial, and he pleaded guilty to first-degree
burglary.
Brooks subsequently wrote three letters to the district court, seeking to withdraw his
plea. The district court held a hearing on August 23. The district court questioned Brooks
as to how he would pr oceed if the motion to withdraw his plea was gran ted, and Brooks
4
raised several complaints regarding his previous public defender. At a subsequent hearing
on September 6, the district court granted Brooks ’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
reasoning that his petition to proceed pro se in accurately suggested that Brooks would be
appointed advisory counsel. The district cour t reappointed the public defender and told
Brooks that, if he wanted to represent himself, it was a decision he would have to make.
At a September 24 pretrial hearing, Brooks again articulated his belief that the state
lacked “evidence to support a conviction.” After contending that there was no evidence of
an assault, Brooks said that he would like to “fire” his public defender and “procure [his]
own lawyer.” The district court informed Br ooks that the judge assigned to preside over
Brooks’s trial would address that issue.
The parties appeared before the district court on October 28 for a trial roll call.
Brooks’s counsel requested a continuance to permit Brooks to hire private counsel. The
district court denied a continuance. Brooks stated that he “can’t use the Public Defender’s
Office” and that his counsel “ha[d] not done anyt hing that [he] asked him to do.” He also
again contended that there was no evidence to support the state’s case.
The parties appeared for trial on November 4. Bro oks made several motions,
including for discharge of his public defe nder and substitute counsel from the public
defender’s office. Brooks was given the opportunity to expl ain why he wanted substitute
counsel, and he complained th at his lawyer had not filed any motions on his behalf. In
response, the district court explained that his counsel is obligated to do what is appropriate
as a lawyer and not everything that Brooks wants him to do. Brooks said that he understood
and that he “just wanted him to look into certain things and he’s never looked into [them].”
5
The district court said that was “a separate issue” and said that they were scheduled for
trial. The district court denied Brooks’s request for substitute counsel. Brooks waived his
right to a jury, and a bench trial ensued.
Following two days of trial, the district court found Brooks guilty as charged and
sentenced him to 86 months’ imprisonment. This appeal follows.
DECISION
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the
right to the assistance of coun sel for one’s defense. U.S. C onst. amend. VI; Minn. Const.
art. I, § 6. If unable to afford counsel, a criminal defendant has the right to court-appointed
counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U.S. 335, 33 9-45, 83 S. Ct. 792, 794-97 (1963).
However, the right to court-appointed “counsel does not give [a de fendant] the unbridled
right to be represented by coun sel of [their] own choosing.” State v. Gillam, 629 N.W.2d
440, 449 (Minn. 2001) (quotatio n omitted). A defendant’s reque st for substitute counsel
must be granted only if “exceptional circum stances exist and the demand is timely and
reasonably made.” State v. Clark, 722 N.W.2d 460, 464 (Minn. 2006) (quotations omitted).
Exceptional circumstances are those that “aff ect a court-appointed attorney’s ability or
competence to represent the client.” Gillam, 629 N.W.2d at 449. If a defendant “voices
serious allegations of inadequate represen tation,” the district court must conduct a
“searching inquiry” to determine whethe r exceptional circumstances are present. Clark,
722 N.W.2d at 464. Motions for substitute counsel are not timely and reasonably made
when they are made on the day of trial. See State v. Worthy , 583 N.W.2d 270, 278-79
(Minn. 1998).
6
Appellate courts review the decision to deny a request for substitute counsel for an
abuse of discretion. Clark, 722 N.W.2d at 464.
A. Brooks’s request for substitute counsel was untimely.
Brooks argues that he tim ely and reasonably requested substitute counsel because
he “started asking for substitute counsel at the very beginning of the case and renewed his
motion at almost every opportunity.” The stat e counters that Brooks’s assertion that he
“repeatedly asked for substitute counsel” is not supported by the record and that he did not
request substitute counsel until November 4—the day trial was scheduled to begin.
Brooks points first to the May 6 pretrial hearing when he asked to “remove” his
public defender. The district court informed Br ooks of his right to hire an attorney and
represent himself. The district court further explained that, while there was a required legal
analysis for a motion for substitute counsel, wh ich it was not going to do “on the fly,” it
had not “heard or seen” circumstances warra nting the appointment of substitute counsel.
Despite this explanation, Broo ks did not follow up with a request for substitute counsel.
Instead, at the next hearing on May 14, Brooks petitioned to represent himself. The district
court clarified with Brooks, “What I’m hearing is that you don’t want to take advantage of
the public defender’s office,” to which Brooks replied, “No, sir.” Brooks’s counsel told the
district court that Brooks did not want the pub lic defender’s office to represent him and
that Brooks was “adamant” that he wished the entire office to be discharged. The district
court granted Brooks’s petition to proceed pro se. On this record, Brooks did not request
substitute counsel in May.
7
Brooks also points to the hearing on September 24, following withdrawal of his
guilty plea and the reappo intment of his public defender. At this hearing, Brooks asked,
“Your honor, can I put a motion to fire him? I don’t want him. He ’s not on my side.”
Brooks said that he would like to “procure [his] own lawyer.” The district court informed
Brooks that the judge assigned to preside ov er Brooks’s trial would address that issue.
Brooks did not request substitute counsel.
Brooks also cites the hearing on October 28. At that hearing, Brooks requested a
continuance for the purposes of hiring private counsel, stating that “[he] c[ould]n’t use the
Public Defender’s Office.” Again, he did not request substitute counsel.
While Brooks expressed dissatisfaction with his representation and sought variously
to represent himself or to have time to hire private counsel, he did not “repeatedly ask[] for
substitute counsel.” He first requested that another lawyer from the public defender’s office
be appointed to represent him on November 4. But trial was set to begin on that date, and
a motion made at such a late date is not timely. See Worthy, 583 N.W.2d at 278-79. The
district court did not abuse its discre tion by denying Brooks’s untimely motion for
substitute counsel.
B. Brooks’s request for substitute co unsel did not demonstrate exceptional
circumstances.

Even if Brooks’s motion for substitute coun sel had been timely, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by denying it because Brooks fa iled to allege exceptional
circumstances.
8
Brooks argues that that the district c ourt did not sufficiently inquire into his
complaints to ascertain whet her exceptional circumstances ju stified the appointment of
substitute counsel. He asserts that he did not mere ly indicate dissatisfaction with counsel
but instead made serious allegations of inade quate representation. The state counters that
Brooks was given ample opportunity to express his concerns on November 4 and that the
concerns he expressed did not rise to the level of exceptional circumstances.
At the August 23 hearing to withdraw his guilty plea, when Brooks was representing
himself and therefore no motion for substitute counsel was before the district court, the
district court heard Brooks’s allegations that his public defender had not filed motions on
his behalf. When asked how he would proceed if the distri ct court granted his plea
withdrawal, Brooks asserted:
[Counsel] could have put in a simple motion of evidence, you
know what I’m saying, and m itigated this whole thing, you
know what I’m saying? But he never once came, once, to help
me out. He came and sat in my face and told me I wasn’t going
nowhere. When it’s clearly stated , there is no assault that had
happened.

. . . .

Do you know what I’m saying? There’s no assault that
happened, there’s no weapon, do you know what I’m saying?
There’s no fingerprints. You know what I’m saying? So
where’s the evidence being rec ited on record that holds me
accountable to this charge?

Thus, Brooks complained to the district court that his public defender had not filed a pretrial
motion to “mitigate” his charge s and tied this complaint to his assertion, repeated
throughout the pretrial proc eedings, that no assault had occurred based on the evidence.
9
After hearing Brooks’s complaints, the district court reappointed Brooks’s public defender
and stated that Brooks had “a fundamental misunderstanding of the elements of [his] case.”
No further inquiry was required to understand Brooks’s complaints that defense counsel
was not filing appropriate motions.
At the November 4 hearing—the day the trial was to begin—Brooks asserted in
support of his motion for substitute counsel:
[Counsel] has not been represen t[ing] me right. A number of
things. But he has never done anything that I asked him to do.
I asked him to file motions on my behalf. He has not filed
motions on my behalf at all. An y motions that I have filed, I
have filed them myself. [The public defender] have never did
nothin’—I fired him back in—uh, uh, I believe that was, uh,
uh, May?

The district court responded:
All I could tell you that the attorney who is appointed to
represent you has the obligation to represent you to the best of
his ability. He does not have to do everything th at you want
him to do. His obligation as a lawyer is to do what he believes
is appropriate to do so as a la wyer, not what you want him to
do.

Brooks then stated he wanted his counsel “to look into certain things and he’s never looked
into [them].” Brooks immediately began again contesting the underlying facts of the case
and contending that no assault occurred. Th e district court had al ready, on previous
occasions, extensively explained to Brooks th e statutory elements of the charges, and
Brooks had strenuously contende d that there was no evidence or facts that supported the
charges. It is evident that his complaints were an expre ssion of his general unhappiness
10
with the charges against him rather than a llegations about the ability or competence of
counsel.
Brooks also told the district court on November 4, “Like a lotta times you don’t feel
like they’re doin’ something—wh en they get up in front of the—yeah, you know.” This
vague statement did not challenge counsel’s competence. Brooks also questioned why his
counsel had been “[un]able to obtain witnesses in [his] favor.” He said, “I fired him. And
I messed up my whole other trial and stuff . . . . I don’t know how to—I couldn’t obtain no
witnesses. Once he got re-appointed, I told him that my daughter—what my daughter and
stuff told me.” Brooks’s public defender stated at this hearing that he was “unable to reach
the witness” that Brooks had directed him to contact but indicated that he would “continue
to try” to reach this witness. Given the public defender’s explanation, the district court did
not abuse its discretion by determining that substitute counsel was not warranted.
“Personal tension” between attorney and client does not constitute an exceptional
circumstance warranting substitute counsel, see State v. Voorhees , 596 N.W.2d 241, 255
(Minn. 1999), nor does general dissatisfacti on with counsel’s “assessment of the case,”
Worthy, 583 N.W.2d at 279; see also State v. Munt, 831 N.W.2d 569, 586-87 (Minn. 2013)
(concluding that statement that counsel “didn’ t represent [his] interest” did not establish
exceptional circumstances warranting furt her inquiry). Though Brooks on several
occasions voiced complaints about his lawyer, the concerns he expressed did not rise to the
level of serious challenges to his counsel’s competence. The district court did not abuse its
discretion by not appointing substitute counsel.
Affirmed.