In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: B. R., Mother.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0732

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: B. R., Mother.

Filed December 21, 2020
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-JV-19-891

Nicole S. Gronneberg, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant B.R.)

Robert M. Hamilton, Ramsey County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent
Ramsey County Human Services)

Lisa Lindstedt, St. Paul, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges the district court’s order terminating her parental
rights to her child on three grounds: (1) it abused its discretion in concluding that
termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interests; (2) it erred in finding that
respondent was not required to provide reasonable efforts for reunification once appellant

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successfully rebutted the presumption of palpable unfitness; and (3) it erred in finding that
respondent made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. We affirm.
FACTS
Previous Chil d Protection Matter and Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights
(TPR)

In April 2016, appellant -mother B.R. came to the attention of Ramsey County
Social Services Department ( RCSSD) after she gave birth to twins w ho were premature
and medically fragile. Appellant had chemical and mental-health issues, and domestic -
violence issues; did not cooperate with individuals who attempted to assist her in
understanding the infa nt twins’ complex medical needs; and she failed to engage with
RCSSD over the course of a year, to address her chemical -health issues, mental -health
issues, and domest ic-violence issues, to engage in parenting educat ion, and to attend the
twins’ medical appointments. A TPR petition was filed in February 2017, and her parental
rights to the twins and an older child were involuntarily terminated on April 5, 2017.
After the involuntary TPR, and before the birth of K.R. in May 2019, appellant
continued to engage in the same behaviors which led to the involuntary termination of her
parental rights in 2017. Her domestic -violence issues continued well into her pregnancy
with K.R.; when she was six months pregnant, she was involved in a violent altercation
with the father of her children after smoking crack cocaine. Her violent episodes were not
limited to domestic incidents. Appellant was also involved in numerous assaults with
strangers and acquaintances. For example, in April 2018, appellant assaulted a Hennepin
County Sheriff’s deputy. In December 2018, she set a man’s apartment on fire following

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an argument. Appellant’s mental -health and chemical-dependency issues also persisted.
In July 2018, she was hospitalized for an evaluation after police found her heavily
intoxicated a nd under the influence of drugs in public. Her alcohol and d rug use was
extensive; due to intoxication, she did not recall assaulting the Hennepin County Sheriff’s
deputy or setting fire to the apartment . Appellant’s drug use continued through her
pregnancy with K.R., as evidenced by positive drug tests for cocain e and marijuana at his
birth.
Birth of K.R. and Current Child Protection Matter
On May 19, 2019, appellant gave birth to K.R. Appellant tested positive for cocaine
and marijuana. K.R.’s meconium and urine also tested positive for cocaine and marijuana.
K.R. had significant medical conditions, including an inability to gain weight and to remain
hydrated, which led to at least three hospitalizations; he also had a flat portion on the back
of his skull that hindered brain development as well as frequent eating issues that were
attributed to stress and changes in his routine. To correct his skull, K.R. was required to
wear a helmet 23 hours a day. Training was required on how to apply and clean the helmet
properly. K.R.’s medical conditions required docto r appointments up to three times a
week.
Appellant’s domestic-violence problems continued after the birth of K.R. The day
after K.R. was born, appellant’s partner went to her hospital room in violation of a
domestic-abuse no contact order (DANCO). He a nd another male got into an altercation
over the paternity of K.R. The fight escalated, and the partner began throwing things and
threatened to shoot anyone who tried to intervene. Appellant’s drug use also continued

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after the birth of K.R. When K.R. was eight days old, police found appellant unresponsive;
she was under the influence of narcotics and required hospitalization and detoxification.
RCSSD placed an emergency protective hold on K.R. On May 23, 2019, RCSSD
filed an expedited petition to termi nate appellant’s parental r ights. A t a n emergency
protective-care hearing on May 28, 2019 , the district court found that RCSSD’s petition
stated a prima facie case that appellant had a prior involuntary termi nation of her parental
rights. Accordingly, the district court relieved RCSSD of its duty to provide reunification
and rehabilitation efforts pursuant to M inn. Stat. § 260.012(a)(2) (2018 ), and also found
that appellant was presumably palpably unfit to parent K.R. pursuant to Minn. Stat .
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2018). K.R. was placed in foster care. Despite being relieved
of the duty to provide efforts to rehabilitate and reunify, two RCSSD workers attempted to
meet with appellant at a detox center but she refused. T he assigned RCSSD caseworker
provided written contact information and upcoming court dates to detox staff so they could
pass this information to appellant. The dis trict court found that the case worker “credibly
testified that despite being relieved of reasonable efforts , she attempted to work with
[appellant] toward reunification. [Appellant] did not attempt to contact [the caseworker].”
In August 2019, a t the direction of her probation officer, appellant completed a
chemical use assessment . She was diagnosed with (1) alcohol use disorder – severe;
(2) cannabis use disorder – moderate; and (3) stimulant use disorder (cocaine) – severe.
According to the evaluator, “[appellant] failed to understand the negative impact of mental
health problems or substance abuse, and ha d no coping skills to address these issues or to
prevent relapse.” The evaluator recommended inpatient chemical dependency treatment.

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When the caseworker and a guardian ad litem (GAL) tried to meet with appellant after a
pretrial hearing on the matter, she refused to meet with them. A short conversation ensued
in which the case worker was able to inform appellant that RCSSD’s most immediate
concern was her drug use and to provide her with information for an urgent crisis center
that provides free assessments and resources for housing and food . The case worker
developed a case plan encapsulating the brief conversation she had with appellant, but she
was unable to locate appellant to gi ve her a copy or have her sign it. The district court
noted that the case worker “c redibly testified that she attempted to contact [appellant]
through the telephone number [appellant] provided, [appellant’s] probation officer and
[appellant’s] outpatient t reatment program, which was [appellant ’s] last reported
residence.”
Treatment Pending Trial
In September 2019, a ppellant was cited for drinking alcohol in public. On
September 11, 2019, she entered a 30-day inpatient treatment program. From K.R.’s birth
on May 19 until she entered the program , appellant was homeless. In October 2019, she
completed the inpatient treatment program and was discharged. Her mental health was
stable. Her prognosis was “good” but she lacked understanding about relapse issues a nd
coping skills. The treatment provider recommended outpatient treatment. On October 14,
2019, appellant entered outpatient treatment with sober lodging, but she left the sober house
and relapsed on October 26, 2019.

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Trial Day 1 - October 31, 2019
Trial began on the expedited TPR petition on October 31, 2019 . Appellant
acknowledged that she had chemical -dependency issues, but testified that she had
successfully completed inpatient treatment, was currently in outpatient treatment, and was
sober. She did not disclose her relapse to the district court. She admitted that she had not
reached out to the caseworker or anyone else at RCSSD since K.R.’s birth five months
earlier and that she had not seen him since his birth. Appellant testified her focus was on
attending support groups to help her develop coping skills , and outpatient treatment to
address her mental-health issues. RCSSD presented no evidence to contradict appellant’s
statements, and the district court found that she rebutted the pr esumption of palp able
unfitness under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. (b)(4).
After trial, the case worker met with appellant, who s igned a release giving the
caseworker access to appellant’s treat ment records and permission to speak with
appellant’s treatment providers. The caseworker and appellant also discussed tasks for
reunification; appellant understood that addressing her chemical dependency was the
primary concern. A hearing was scheduled for November 21, 2019 for RCSSD to
determine whether to continue with trial.
November 2019 – January 2020 Proceedings
At the hearing, RCSSD provided no eviden ce to rebut appellant’s October 31
testimony that she had re mained sober and in treatment and RCSSD agreed to work with
her toward reunification. Appellant failed to appear because she was in the midst of another
relapse which had not yet been disclosed. The matter was continued to January 16, 2020.

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Following her relapse on October 26, appellant was placed on a two-week restriction at the
outpatient program, with increased attendance requirements at support help groups. The
restriction was l ifted on November 13, 2019 , and appellant relapsed the next day. She
returned to the sober home under such heavy influence of crack cocaine and alcohol that
she needed to be transported to detox. Appellant never returned to the sober home after
detox and was discharged from the program on November 18, 2019. Appellant’s discharge
prognosis at this time was poor.
In December 2019, a ppellant contacted the case worker after entering anothe r
inpatient treatment program. The caseworker coordinated meetings with appellant and her
treatment counselor on Decembe r 11, 2019 , and January 8, 2020. The parties discussed
treatment progress, reviewed expectations, and answered appellant’s questions. Appellant
requested bus cards at the January 8 meeting; the caseworker received authorization but
was unable to deliver the cards because appellant was discharged and was again out of
contact.
At the January 16, 2020 , hearing, RCSSD inform ed the court of appellant’s
misrepresentations on the first day of trial, October 31, 2019. RCSSD did not file a motion
to vacate the October 31 order based on appellant’s misrepresentations to the court.
Appellant failed to appear at this trial, and the matter was continued to February 24, 2020.
Trial Day 2 – February 24, 2020
Appellant appeared at trial. She admitted to her relapses in October and November
2019. Appellant also testified that she considered her October 31 testimony truthful. She
reasoned that since her drug of choice was cocaine, she did not consider the use of alcohol

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on October 26, 2019, to be a relapse. Appellant continued to lack stable housing. She had
mental health services while in treatment but had not received ongoing care following
discharge. She was scheduled to meet with a therapist the week that she was discharged
from treatment in January 2020.
RCSSD alleged two statutory grounds for appellant’s TPR pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1 (2018): (1) appellant has substantially, continuously or repeatedly
refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon her by the parent and child
relationship under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2); and (2) appellant is palpably unfit
to parent K.R. because of a consistent pattern of specific conduct before the child or of
specific conditions relating to the parent-child relationship, either of which are of a duration
or nature that renders appellant unable to care appropriately for the child’s physical, mental,
or emotion al needs for the reasonably foreseeable fu ture, pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4).
Statutory Ground 1: Neglect of Parental Duties
When evaluating compliance with Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), the issue
is whether the parent is presently able to assume the responsibilities of caring for the child.
The district court made several findings on this matter. First, appellant has been absent for
the majority of K.R.’s life – she repeatedly rejected or avoided efforts from RCSSD to help
reunite her with K.R.; she did not ask about his welfare for the first six months of his life;
she has not seen him; and she has failed to provide any care since birth, including care for
his physical, mental, or emotional health. Second, appellant’s unaddressed chemical and
mental-health issues have made it impossible for her to obtain stable housing. Aside from

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completing one 30 -day inpatient program, appellant has not successfully completed any
treatment program, and she has relapsed on numerous occasions. The district court found
that “[t]he one program that [appellant] completed determined that she failed to grasp the
underlying reasons for her use and was at risk to relapse. Unfortunately, she did relapse…”
immediately after being discharged. Finally, the district court stated , “[t]hese long -
persistent and continuing chemical health, mental health, domestic violence, and housing
issues – and the volatility and instability that they cause – demonstrate [appellant’s]
substantial, continuous and repeated neglect of her duties toward [K.R.], his basic needs
and his specific needs for his medical issues.”
The district court concluded that “RCSSD has established by clear and convincing
evidence that [appellant] has substantially, continuously and repeatedly refused and
neglected to comply with the duties imposed on her as a parent of [K.R.], within the
meaning of Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2).”
Statutory Ground 2: Palpably Unfit
A parent is palpably unfit if a court determines that there is a consistent pattern of
specific conduct or conditions directly relating to the child -parent relationship that render
the parent unable to care appropriately for the child. Minn. Stat. § 260C.302, subd. 1(b)(4).
“If a parent’s behavior is likely to be detrimental to a child’s physical or mental health, the
parent may be found to be palpably unfit.” In re Children of Vasquez , 658 N.W.2d 249,
255 (Minn. App. 2003). The district court considered appellant’s behavior since her prior
TPR. It concluded that appellant “has been involved in numerous incidents where her
chemical or mental health resulted in” violence, arrests, and intervention. Appellant’s

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“chemical and mental health issues are severe and persistent…[s]he has been incapable of
addressing these condit ions.” The district court went on to make a number of findings
regarding appellant’s inability to stay sober, to find stable housing, to meaningfully engage
in treatment, and to understand the reasons for her condition and probability for relapse .
Appellant’s behavior and conditions “render her unable to safely and appropriately care for
[K.R.]” and “are likely to be detrimental to [K.R.]’s physical or mental he alth.” K.R.
requires stability and consistency, and appellant’s ongoing issues “render her unstable and
unpredictable.”
The district court concluded that
RCSSD has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence
that [appellant] is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and
child relationship with [K.R.]. Specific conditions dire ctly
relating to the parent and child relationship, in particular
[appellant’s] chemical and mental health, are of a duration and
nature that render [appellant] unable for the reasonably
foreseeable future to care appropriately for the ongoing
physical, mental, or emotional needs of her child within the
meaning of Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4).

This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Parental rights may be terminated only for “grave and weighty reasons.” In re Child
of P.T., 657 N.W.2d 577, 591 (Minn. App. 2003) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn.
Apr. 15, 2003). To terminate parental rights, there must be clear and convincing evidence
that at least one statutory basis for termination exists, and the termination must be in the
best interests of the child. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn.
2008). “[T]ermination of parental rights is always discretionary with the [district] court.”

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In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L. , 853 N.W.2d 127, 136 (Minn. 2014). An appellate court
will sustain the district court’s factual findings that a statutory ground for termination of
parental rights exist unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Welfare of A.D., 535 N.W.2d
643, 648 (Minn. 1995). We review the district court’s decision that termination is in a
child’s best interests for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Children of D.F. , 752
N.W.2d 88, 95 (Minn. App. 2008).
K.R.’s Best Interests

Appellant asserts that the court erred in finding that terminating her parental rights
is in K.R.’s best interests. Even if a statutory basis for TPR exists, a district court cannot
terminate parental rights unless it is in the best interests of the child . In re Welfare of
Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6,
2012). “In analyzing the best interests of the child, the court must balance three factors:
(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent -child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest
in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.” In
re Welfare of R.T.B. , 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992). “Competing interests include
such things as a stable environmen t, health considerations and the child’s preferences.”
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905. If a statutory basis to terminate parental rights under Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1 exists, and the interests of the parent and the child compete, the
child’s interests are paramount. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2018). “[D]etermination
of a child’s best interests is generally not susceptible to an appellate court’s global review
of a record, and . . . an appellate court’s combing through the record to determine bes t

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interests is inappropriate because it involves credibility determinations.” In re Welfare of
Child of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 546 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotations omitted).
Here, the district court cited the R.T.B. factors and concluded that the terminat ion
of B.R.’s parental rights served the best interests of K.R. Regarding appellant’s interest in
maintaining the relationship, the district court found that while she testified “that she has
an interest in parenting” K.R., she did not ask to see him or attempt to learn about his needs
for the first seven months of his life. During that time, appellant failed to address her
chemical dependency or meaningfully engage in treatment. She only entered treatment
when “ordered to do so by her probation officer under the threat of incarceration.”
Accordingly, “it is not in [K.R.’s] interest to preserve the parent and child relationship.”
These findings are supported by the record.
It is also clear that the interests of the parent and the child conflict in this case, and
K.R.’s interest must be paramount. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7. K.R. requires a stable
environment, and he has medical needs that require special and consistent care. Appellant
is unable to provide safety and consistency due to her chemical dependency and mental
health issues, and the district court found that “she has not demonstrated the basic skills
necessary to adequately parent him now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.” K.R. has
been residing in a non biological foster home with his three older siblings, and his
emotional, physical, and developmental needs are being met. The district court found that,
because the “issues that brought [appellant] to the attention of child protection in 2016 and
that led to the termination of her parental rights in 2017 remain unaddressed,” it is in K.R.’s

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best interests to be “adopted by a caregiver who is able to protect him, provide a safe and
healthy home environment, and meet his needs.”
Appellant does not dispute the district court’s findings on the R.T.B. factors.
Instead, she relies on the notion that the district court, in making the findings above,
“completely disregarded its own findings in its November 21, 2019 , order.” Appellant
cites two of the district court’s statements: (1) RCSSD will file a CHIPS Petition enabling
appellant to work a case plan toward reunification and (2) that there was goo d cause to
continue the case and that a continuance was “in the best interests of the child so that his
mother ma y work toward reunification.” Appellant argues that the district court has
“invalidated its own prior order without following any processes to amend its earlier
order.” This argument fails.
First, the statements referred to by appellant were made by the district court when
it was unaware that appellant had misrepresented her sobriety and her enrollment in
treatment. In compliance with the district court’s finding that K.R.’s best interests would
be served by allowing appellant to work towards reunification, RC SSD continued to
attempt to work with appellant. However, as respondent RCSSD noted, “[a]ppellant
continued engaging in the same patte rns of behavior she had shown over the case’s first
six months, including not communicating with RCSSD, being discharged from multiple
treatment programs, collecting multiple warrants, and showing minimal in terest in K.R.’s
well-being.” Moreover, appellan t’s arguments are largely based on reasonable efforts,
which RCSSD was not required to offer. In light of appellant’s patterns of behavior and

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K.R.’s unique needs, the district court did not err by determining that termination was in
the child’s best interests.
RCSSD was properly relieved of the reasonable-effort requirement
Appellant argues that , pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, RCSSD should have been required to provide reasonable efforts to reunify
her with K.R. “following her successful rebuttal of the presumption of palpable unfitness.”
She also argues that, “if a parent successfully rebuts the presumption of palpable unfitness
under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, s ubd. 1(b)(4), that parent has an equal -protection right to
reasonable efforts to reunify.”
The district court rejected appellant’s argument . First, “[n]o statutory language
requires reasonable efforts where a parent is found to have rebutted the presumption of
palpable unfitness.” See Minn. Stat. § 260. 012(a) (2018); Minn. Stat . § 260C.001, subd.
3(3) (2018). Second, appellant’s argument is not supported by caselaw. She relies on In
re Welfare of Child of R.D.L ., 853 N.W.2d 127, 133, 136 -38 (Minn. 2014). (Holding, in
relevant part, that the presumption of palpable unfitness that attaches to a parent following
an involuntary termination of parental rights does not violate equal protection because the
presumption is easily overcome) . Appellant states that “[t]he logical inference to be
drawn” from R.D.L “is that a higher bar for rebutting the presumption of palpable unfitness
would render [the presumption] a violation of [equal protection].” Even if this court were
to accept appellant’s interpretation of the law, the argument still must fail.
The district court found that appellant did not successfully rebut the presumption of
palpable unfitness. As the district court stated, the ruling that appellant “rebutted the

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presumption” was based on her misrepresentations to the court regarding her sobriety an d
treatment. The district court noted that appellant “does not stand in the same shoes as a
parent who has actually made meaningful changes in their life to overcome the
presumption,” and to find otherwise would “encourage dishonesty” and “would not be in
the best interest of a child needing an able parent, particularly when the subject of the
parent’s misrepresentation is a material reason” for the child’s out-of-home placement.
RCSSD provided reasonable efforts
In any event, we conclude that reasonable efforts were made. Generally, if statutory
grounds for terminating parental rights exist and termination is in the best interests of the
child, there must also be clear and convincing evid ence that the county made efforts to
reunite the family. In re Children of T.A.A ., 702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2005). The
district court found that, d espite being relieved of the obligation to provide reunification
efforts based on appellant’s prior involuntary TPR, RCSSD made reasonable efforts “from
the beginning of the case through [appellant’s] discharge from her second treatmen t
program” and listed seven specific reunification efforts made by the caseworker beginning
in May 2019.
These efforts inclu ded providing appellant with contact information for the social
worker, as well as emergency services that could provide, free of charge, the services that
appellant most needed, including chemical health, mental health, and housing assistance.
The caseworker developed a written case plan but was unable to reach appellant despite
contacting the number appellant provided and the possible locations where she could have
been residing. Once appellant contacted the caseworker in December 2019, they met on

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two occasions where appellant’s questions and needs were addressed. Reasonable efforts
also included obtaining and acting on information about K.R. to provide him with safe
housing and critical medical care. The district court found, and we agree, that “RCSS D
established by clear and convincing evidence that its efforts were reasonably directed to
reuniting [K.R. and appellant], despite [appellant’s] failure to meaningfully engage in these
efforts.”
Because terminating appellant’s rights is in the best interests of K.R. and the record
shows that RCSSD provided reasonable efforts to reunify, although it had been relieved of
that obligation, the district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating appellant’s
parental rights to K.R.
Affirmed.