State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0733

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Randy Joel Bade,
Appellant.

Filed May 17, 2021
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-CR-17-3442

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Patrick R. McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Susan B. DeVos, Assistant County
Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Ju dge; Bryan, Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from judgment of conviction for first-degree controlled-
substance sale, appellant challenges the accurac y of his guilty plea a nd the denial of his
motion for a downward dispositional departure. Because the parties established a factual
basis for each element of the offense, we conclude that appellant entered an accurate guilty
plea. In addition, because the district court gave appropriate weight to each of the relevant
factors, we conclude that th e district court did not abuse its sentencing discretion in
determining that appellant was not particularly amenable to probation.
FACTS
In September 2017, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Randy Bade
with three counts of first-degree sale of a c ontrolled substance: sale of 17 grams or more
of cocaine or methamphetamine within a 90-day period, aiding and abetting that sale, and
conspiracy to commit that sale . The state amended the comp laint in April 2018 to add
three additional counts of first-degree contro lled-substance sale. The complaint alleged
that police officers executed a search warrant on Bade’s shop, where they discovered drug
paraphernalia, evidence of drug sale, and 282 grams of methamphetamine.
In November 2019, Bade agreed to enter an Alford plea.1 The agreement called for
a guilty plea to on e count of first-degree sale of methamphetamine, in exchange for a

1 An Alford plea allows the defendant to enter a gu ilty plea, while maintaining a claim of
innocence. State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1977) (adopting North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970)).

3
dismissal of the remaining five counts. At the same time, Bade also signed a plea petition
and an addendum summarizing the state’s evidence against him. The addendum stated, “I
have reviewed the evidence that the state will offer against me if I have a trial,” and “I
believe that there is a substantial likelihood that I will be found guilty, beyond a reasonable
doubt, of the offense to which I am pleading if the following state’s evidence is presented
against me at trial.” The addendum then ge nerally described the state’s anticipated trial
evidence:
The State would call witnesse s that would testify to the
following: On or about Septem ber 12, 2017, the Minnesota
River Valley Drug Task [Force] (“DTF”) spoke with an
individual who stated they had purchased methamphetamine
from me on September 11, 2017, in Mankato, MN. The DTF
then obtained a search warrant for my shop located at 1800 6th
Avenue in Mankato, Minnesota and executed that search
warrant on September 12, 2017. During the search of my shop,
law enforcement found mo re than 17 grams of
methamphetamine, as well as drug paraphernalia and evidence
consistent with methamphetami ne sales. The suspected
controlled substance found by DTF in my shop was later tested
by a scientist at the Minnesota BCA, which revealed the
presence of methamphetamine in a mixture weighing over
17 grams. DTF also obtained a search warrant for my
cellphone records and Verizon provided those pursuant to the
warrant. The text message re cords included conversations
indicative of narcotics sales. It is expected that the State would
call co-defendants that would te stify I was involved in the
possession and sale of methamphetamine at my shop. I agree
that if a jury heard and believed the foregoing evidence,
considering the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
and the presumption of innoce nce, there is a substantial
likelihood the jury would find me guilty of 1st Degree Sale of
a Controlled Substance.
At the plea hearing, the district court questioned Bade about the plea petition and
Alford addendum. The district court confirmed that Bade had been given the opportunity

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to review the criminal complaint, police reports, and other relevant documents. Bade also
acknowledged that the addendum contained a summary of the evidence the jury would hear
if the matter proceeded to a jury trial. The district cour t asked Bade if he believed “that
the evidence the [s]tate would likely offer against [him] . . . at trial, such as in the summary,
would be sufficient for the jury to find [him] guilty of the offense of first degree controlled
substance sale beyond a reasona ble doubt.” Bade testified th at he believed that the jury
would find him guilty based on the anticipated evidence. Re lying on this testimony, the
district court found that Bade voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered his plea. In
addition, based on the facts offered to support the plea, including Bade’s testimony and the
summary of the evid ence in the addendum, the district co urt agreed with the parties that
there was sufficient evid ence to support a guilty verdict. The district court ordered a
presentence investigation (PSI) report and set the matter for sentencing.
The PSI report recommended that Bade receive a presumptive 65-month prison
sentence. Bade moved for a downward dis positional departure, arguing that he was
particularly amenable to probation. Along with his sentencing memorandum, Bade
submitted multiple letters of support from fam ily and friends. Bade emphasized that he
had no criminal record, had cooperated with the legal proceedings, and received plenty of
support from his friends and family memb ers. The state opp osed the downward-
dispositional-departure motion, asking for imposition of the presumptive sentence.
The district court explained its considera tion of the factors that weighed for and
against a downward dispositional departure. It found that Bade’s lack of criminal history
and the support of his family and friends favored a downward dispositional departure. But

5
the district court found that most factors we ighed in favor of the presumptive sentence,
including Bade’s age (35 years old), his lack of remorse as evidence d by his entering an
Alford plea rather than an ordinary guilty plea, his attitude in court, which the district court
described as “nothing particularly remark able,” and his failure to demonstrate any
“particular cooperation.” The district court concluded that Bade failed to show that the
overall weight of these factors warranted a downward dispositional departure. The district
court sentenced Bade to 65 months in prison. Bade appeals his conviction and sentence.
DECISION
I. Accuracy of Bade’s Alford Plea
Bade first argues that his Alford plea was inaccurate beca use it lacked a sufficient
factual basis.2 Because the plea colloquy and adden dum established a factual basis for
each element of the offense, we conclude that the plea was accurate, and therefore, valid.
For a plea to be constitutionally valid, it must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.
State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). The validity of a guilty plea is a question
of law, which we review de novo. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). This
appeal only concerns the accu racy of Bade’s guilty plea. The accuracy requirement is
meant “to protect a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he could
be convicted of were he to in sist on his right to trial.” Trott, 338 N.W.2d at 251. For a

2 Bade also raises various arguments in a pro se supplemental brief. He lists multiple issues
generally, including “lack of evidence, exculpatory evidence, withholding Brady material,
inadmissible hearsay, improper search and se izure, ineffective assistance of counsel,
malicious prosecution, and deprivation of rights under color of law.” Because Bade does
not include any legal authority to support his arguments, we deem them forfeited and
decline to address them. See State v. Krosch, 642 N.W.2d 713, 719-20 (Minn. 2002).

6
guilty plea to be accurate, a proper factual basis must be established. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d
at 94. “[B]ecause of the inherent conflict in pleading guilty while maintaining innocence,”
the factual basis for an Alford plea must “provide the court with a basis to independently
conclude that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the
charge to which he pleaded guilty.” State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. 2007).
Parties can satisfy this requirement by having a discussion about the anticipated evidence
on the record at the plea hearing:
[T]he better practice is for the factual basis to be based on
evidence discussed with the defendant on the record . . . . This
discussion may occur through an interrogation of the defendant
about the underlying conduct and the evidence that would
likely be presented at trial, the introduction at the plea hearing
of witness statements or other documents, . . . the presentation
of abbreviated testimony from witnesses likely to testify at
trial, or a stipulation by both parties to a factual statement in
one or more documen ts submitted to the court at the plea
hearing.

Id. (citations omitted). In additi on, the defendant must agree that the evidence the state
would likely offer against him at trial is sufficient to convict him of the offense. Id.
Here, Bade entered a guilty plea to first-degree sale of a controlled substance, which
has the following essential elements: (1) the defendant sold one or more mixtures of at least
17 grams containing methamphetamine; (2) th e defendant knew or believed that the
substance was a controlled substance; (3) th e sale was without lawful authority; and
(4) venue. Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2016); see also 10A Minnesota Practice,
CRIMJIG 20.02 (2020). Bade challenges the factual basis of his Alford plea, arguing that

7
the summary of the anticipated evidence offered in support of the plea could not establish
the second and third elements. We are not persuaded.
Bade first argues that there was an insuffici ent factual basis to show that he knew
or believed that the substance involved in th e sales was a controlled substance. Bade
correctly notes that the Alford addendum does not specifically say that he knew that the
substance was methamphetamine. But knowle dge generally must be inferred from the
evidence, State v. Mattson, 359 N.W.2d 616, 617 (Minn. 1984), and the addendum includes
a sufficient basis to infer knowledge that the substance was methamphetamine. For
example, the addendum described anticipated evidence that included Bade’s text messages
containing “conversations indicative of narc otics sales.” In addition, the addendum
referred to codefendants as anticipated trial witnesses for the state who would testify that
Bade sold methamphetamine in his shop. The addendum also references an informant who
gave a statement to law enfo rcement claiming to have purchased methamphetamine from
Bade. Finally, the addendum included the st ate’s anticipated evidence recovered from
Bade’s shop, including more than 17 grams of methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and
other “evidence consistent with methamphetamine sales.” Given this anticipated evidence,
including Bade’s own text messages, the district court had a sufficient basis from which to
conclude that a jury would find that Bade must have known or believed that the substance
was methamphetamine. Thus, the Alford plea was accurate regarding the second element
of the offense.
Bade also argues that the factual basis faile d to establish that Bade lacked lawful
authority to sell methamphetami ne. Again, Bade is correct that the addendum does not

8
specifically state that Bade lacked lawful au thority to sell methamphetamine. But, this
does not require reversal. Bade cites to no au thority, and this court is aware of none that
authorizes anyone to sell more than 17 grams of methamphetamine. The element is not
one that is typically at issue in methampheta mine cases, and Bade fa ils to explain why it
would have been at issue in this case. In ad dition, and more importantly, a lack of lawful
authority may be inferred from the circumstances and the nature of the methamphetamine
transactions described in the state’s summary of anticipated trial evidence. The sales
occurred at Bade’s “shop,” not a pharmacy or some other location where controlled
substances are lawfully sold. The district court could also infer from the description of the
anticipated testimony of the codefendants an d of the informant that the nature of the
methamphetamine sales would convince a jury beyond a reasonable dou bt that Bade did
not sell methamphetamine under any lawful aut hority. Thus, we conclude that the plea
was also accurate as to the third element of the offense.
Finally, the addendum and the colloquy included Bade’s own assessment of the
evidence. In writing and in person, Bade stat ed he had reviewed the evidence that would
be offered against him if there were a trial, and that he believed there was a “substantial
likelihood” that he would be found guilty based on the state’s evidence. Because there was
a strong factual basis for all elements of th e offense, and because Bade agreed that the
evidence was suffici ent to support his conviction, his Alford plea was accurate and
constitutionally valid.

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II. Downward Dispositional Departure
Bade also challenges the denial of his departure motion at sentencing. Because the
district court gave appropriate weight to each of the relevant factors, we affirm the district
court’s sentencing decision.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guid elines establish sentences that are presumptively
appropriate. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (Supp. 2017). The district court must
pronounce a presumptive sentence “unless th ere exist identifiable, substantial, and
compelling circumstances to support a departure.” Id. The guidelines provide a
nonexclusive list of factors that may be used to suppor t a departure. Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.D.3 (Supp. 2017). Bade argue d for a downward dispositional departure,
which “places the offender in a different setti ng than that called for by the presumptive
guidelines sentence”—such as proba tion instead of imprisonment. State v. Solberg , 882
N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). We review the denial of a dispositional departure request
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014). A district
court is not required to grant a departure even if there are grounds th at would support it.
State v. Bertsch , 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006); Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3
(providing that the factors “may” be used to depart). Only in a “rare case” will an appellate
court reverse a district court’s refusal to depart. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn.
1981).
Bade argued for a downward dispositiona l departure based on his particular
amenability to individualized treatment in a probationary setting. Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.D.3.a.(7). For a departure to be warranted on th is basis, the defendant must

10
be particularly amenable to probatio n—meaning that “the de fendant’s amenability to
probation distinguishes the defendant from most others and truly presents the substantial
and compelling circumstances that are necessary to justify a departure.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d
at 309 (quotation omitted). In State v. Trog, the supreme court listed several factors that
are relevant to whether a defendant is particularly amenable to probation: “the defendant’s
age, his prior record, his remo rse, his cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the
support of his friends and/or family.” 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). Here, the district
court denied Bade’s departure reque st after considering each of the Trog factors and
determining that most factors weighed against a departure. On appeal, Bade challenges the
district court’s weighing of the Trog factors, arguing that the factors weighed in favor of a
finding that he was particularly amenable to probation. For the following reasons, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its weighing of the factors.
The district court determined that two Trog factors weighed in favor of a downward
departure. Bade had very little criminal hi story, and many friends and family members
submitted letters of support to the district court. While both weighed in favor of departure,
the district court discounted the support of fa mily and friends because at least one family
member insisted that Bade was innocent. We discern no error in the district court’s
weighing of these factors.
The district court determined that the other applicable Trog factors compelled denial
of Bade’s departure motion. First, afte r considering the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
analysis in Soto, the district court determined that Bade’s age (35) weighed against
departure. See Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 310 (holding that the district court erred by finding

11
that a defendant’s age made him particularly amenable to probation when he was 37 years
old, which was older than 60 percent of defendants convicted of the same crime). Second,
the district court determined that Bade’s lack of remorse, lack of cooperation, and attitude
in court also weighed against a departure. Bade demonstrated “absolutely no remorse for
the criminal enterprise in wh ich he perpetuated.” The dist rict court acted within its
discretion when it reasoned that maintaining one’s innocence is inconsistent with showing
remorse. Likewise, Bade “demonstrated no particular cooperation.” Although Bade
asserts that he was cooperative and respectful to the district court, the district court
correctly noted that “showing up at hearings is the bottom of the expectation.”3 The district
court did not abuse its discretion in requiring more than mere attendance to show sufficient
cooperation to justify a dispositional departure. Similarly, the district court acted within
its discretion when it reasoned that avoiding trial through a guilty plea, by itself, does not
show that a person has been particularly cooperative with la w enforcement or the state.
The district court also commented that there was “nothing particularly remarkable” about
Bade’s attitude in court that could support a departure. Again, the district court acted
within its discretion in requiring Bade to disp lay an attitude that was somehow different
from other defendants.

3 We observe that Bade does not assign erro r to the district court’s factual findings
underlying its reasoning. Instead, Bade challenges the decision by the district court that a
given factor weighed in favor or against his motion. To the extent that Bade impliedly
disputes the district court’s characterizations or factual findings, however, we conclude
that the record supports the district court’s findings.

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In sum, this is not that “rare case” requiring reversal. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7.
We discern no abuse of discre tion because the district court carefully considered the
applicable factors and approp riately weighed those that fa vored departure against those
that did not. We affirm the district court’s denial of Bade’s departure motion.
Affirmed.