State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0735

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Deandre ONeil Jackman,
Appellant.

Filed April 5, 2021
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-24589

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Craig E. Cascarano, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
In this direct appeal from his judgment of conviction and sentence, appellant argues
that the district court abused its discretion by denying (1) his request for an evidentia ry
hearing and (2) his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.
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FACTS
In September 2018, police officers executed a search warr ant at the residence of
B.E.L., appellant Deandre ONeil Jackman ’s girlfriend, where appellant spent time while
on work -release from jail. Officers found oxycodone, marijuana, a handgun, and cash
during the search . Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant in an amended
complaint with two counts of fifth -degree controlled-substance crime under Minn. Stat.
§ 152.025 (2018), and one count of third-degree possession of narcotics under Minn. Stat.
§ 152.023, subd. 2(a)(3) (2018).
The state also charged B.E.L. with similar offenses. B.E.L. pleaded guilty on July
8, 2019.
The district court set a ppellant’s jury trial for July 15, 2019, but on July 10 , he
sought a continuance due to his claimed involvement in a car accident rendering him
physically unable to sit through a jury trial. On October 7, 2019, appellant pleaded guilty
to third-degree possession of narcotics. He admitted to the third-degree charge based on
possession of oxycodone and possessing a firearm, and agreed to the 36-month mandatory
minimum sentence due to the sentencing enhancement under Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd. 5
(2018), for the presence of a firearm. The state agreed to dismiss the remaining charges in
this matter as well as charges in a separate, unrelated case.
After pleading guilty, and against his first attorney’s advice, appellant te stified at
B.E.L.’s sentencing hearing on November 21, 2019 . The same district court judge that
presided over appellant’s plea hearing presided over B.E.L.’s sentencing hearing, and the
judge warned appellant that his statements could and would be used against him. Id.
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Appellant nevertheless testified that he pleaded guilty to all of the same charges as B.E.L.
and took “full responsibility for what happened.” The district court sentenced B.E.L. to a
stayed 36-month sentence and placed her on probation for three years.
Due to appellant’s claimed involvement in another car accident, his first attorney
requested a continuance of his sentencing hearing set for December 11, 2019 , which the
district court granted o ver the state’s objection. Appellant failed to appear at the
rescheduled hearing on January 13, 2020 . Over the state’s objection, the district court
again granted a continuance due to appellant’s admission to the hospital the previous night.
Appellant again failed to appear for a r escheduled hearing on January 17, 2020 . Due to
another hospital admission, appellant’s first attorney sought a continuance, to which the
state objected. The district court issued a bench warrant, and appellant was taken into
custody on March 11, 2020.
Appellant, represented by a second attorney, moved to withdraw his guilty plea on
March 20, 2020. He alleged that his first attorney misadvised him and that he would not
have pleaded guilty but for that advice . Additionally, appellant’s second attorney stated
that, due to COVID-19 restrictions at the Hennepin County Jail, he could not obtain
appellant’s affidavit in support of the motion. He therefore r equested an evidentiary
hearing to allow appellant to testify in lieu of an affidavit.
The district court denied appellant’s request for an evidentiary hearing but allowed
a short hearing to have appellant brought from jail to sign an affidavit, which he did .
Appellant’s affidavit reiterated the grounds for plea withdrawal consistent with his motion
and asserted that he would not have pleaded guilty but for his first attorney’s advice.
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In a detailed order, t he d istrict court denied appellant’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. The district court sentenced appellant to 36 months in prison and dismissed
the other charges consistent with the plea agreement. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s request
for an evidentiary hearing on his presentence motion to withdraw his plea.

Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his req uest
for an evidentiary hearing and asks us to adopt the post conviction standard for whether a
district court should grant an evidentiary hearing on a motion to withdraw a plea prior to
sentencing. We are not persuaded.
We review the district court’s denial of a pretrial request for an evidentiary hearing
for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Fellegy , 819 N.W.2d 700, 707-08 (Minn. App.
2012) (reviewing request for evidentiary hearing on pretrial motion to dismiss charges) ,
review denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2012). Here, appellant requested an evidentiary hearing for
the sole purpose of having appellant testify in lieu of filing an affidavit, citing difficulty
obtaining an affidavit due to COVID-19 restrictions at the jail . The district court denied
appellant’s request but acknowledged the restriction on exchanging physical paper between
attorneys and clients. It therefore held “a short hearing for the express purpose of having
the defendant sign his completed affidavit . . . under oath” as an accommodation. The
district court’s reasonable accommodation made an evidentiary hearing unnecessary. We
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s request
for an evidentiary hearing.
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Appellant asks us to adopt a new rule establishing a right to an evidentiary hearing
on a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea, but cites no authority or rationale for
this new rule. Moreover, the only reason advanced for an evidentiary hearing was to enable
appellant to testify regarding the reasons for withdrawal, and the district court
accommodated that request. Because we are an error-correcting court, we decline to adopt
a new rule in this context. See State v. Adkins , 706 N.W.2d 59, 63 (Minn. App. 2005)
(declining to adopt a new rule in context of out-of-court identifications).
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s
presentence motion to withdraw his plea.

Appellant argues that he is entitled to withdraw his plea because his allegations that
his first attorney misadvised him are unrebutted and entitle him to relief. We disagree.
We review the district court’s denial of a presentence plea withdrawal for an abuse
of discretion, and reverse only in the rare case. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn.
2010). A district court “abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous
view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d
162, 167 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
“A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it.”
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 93. Instead, the defendant must meet one of two standards. First,
a district court “must allow” a defendant to withdraw a plea at any time if it is necessary to

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correct a “manifest injustice.”1 Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Second, a district court
“may allow” a defendant to withdraw a plea befor e sentencing “if it is fair and just to do
so.” Id., subd. 2.
Appellant argues that he is entitled to relief under the fair-and-just standard, which
is less demanding than the manifest-injustice standard, but does not permit withdrawal for
simply any reason. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted).
In considering whether to allow a defendant to withdraw a plea, the district court must give
“due consideratio n” to (1) “the reasons advanced by the defendant in support of the
motion” and (2) “any prejudice the granting of the motion would cause” the state. Minn.
R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. The defendant bears the burden of advancing fair and just
reasons for withdrawal, but the state bears the burden of showing prejudice if withdrawal
is allowed. State v. Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 527 (Minn. 2003).
As an initial matter, the district court appears to have implicitly found appellant’s
affidavit not credible . Because this determination is based primarily on documentary
evidence in the form of affidavits, we need not defer to it. Cf. State v. Powell, 357 N.W.2d
146, 149 (Minn. App. 1984) (stating that no deference given to district court’s finding
based on documentary evidence), review denied (Minn. Jan. 15, 1984). We consider the
entire context in whic h appellant’s plea occurred . State v. Lopez , 794 N.W.2d 379, 382
(Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted). Here, that context includes that the district court

1 We note that the district court also analyzed and denied appellant’s claims under the
manifest-injustice standard, but we need not reach that issue because appellant failed to
raise it before the district court or on appeal. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn.
1988).
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presided over all proceedings in appellant’s case as well as B.E.L.’s sentencing hearing, at
which appellant admitted guilt despite his first attorney’s advice not to do so and the district
court’s warnings. In testifying, appellant demonstrated that he did not unquestioningly
follow his first attorney’s advice. This undermines his assertion that he relied on his first
attorney’s advice in pleading guilty , which in turn generally undermines his credibility.
We agree with the district court’s implicit credibility determination.
Appellant appears to argue that his first attorney misadvised him in four ways. First,
he asserts that his first attorney told him that the state “would seek an upward departure in
excess of a 36-month mandatory sentence provided by Minn. Stat. § 609.11” if he went to
trial, even though no Blakely motion2 had been filed and it seemed unlikely that the state
could prevail on such a motion. But the district court correctly noted that it may, for good
cause and if it wi ll not unfairly prejudice the defendant, permit the state to file a Blakely
motion at any time. Minn. R. Crim. P. 7.03. Thus, had appellant not pleaded guilty, the
state could have filed a Blakely motion. Appellant’s first attorney’s advice regarding that
possibility is not unreasonable. We agree with the district court.
Second, appellant alleges that his first attorney told him that the state did not find
his DNA on the firearm , but would nevertheless use DNA evidence against appellant at
trial. The state countered that it found a mixture of DNA on the firearm and therefore could
not interpret it, but could still use the firearm as evidence against appellant. The district

2 Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (establishing notice
requirements for prosecutor to initiate proceedings seeking aggravated sentence); see also
Minn. R. Crim. P. 7.03.
8
court concluded that appellant’s first attorney did not improperly advise appellant about
the possibility that the state could use the firearm against him at trial. The district court’s
reasoning here is sound.
Third, appellant alleges that his first attorney told him that he “should plead guilty
prior to the co -defendant. If [B.E.L.] subsequently [pleaded] guilty and admitted
possession of the firearm, he could and would be able to withdraw his plea of guilty,” and
therefore be able to use B.E.L.’s testimony at his trial. The district court found this
allegation factually in correct because B.E.L. pleaded guilty first, appellant knew of
B.E.L.’s plea, and appellant still pleaded guilty. The district court noted that appellant
faced no pressure to plead before B.E.L. Appellant therefore cannot claim reliance on this
advice in pleading guilty. Further, t he questionable factual basis of this allegation
undermines the credibility of appellant’s other allegations.
Fourth, and closely related to appellant’s third argument , appellant asserts that his
first attorney never informed h im that he could call B.E.L. to testify on his behalf if she
pleaded guilty before he went to trial. As the district court concluded, this advice concerns
who appellant could and should call as a witness at trial, which is a matter of trial strategy.
State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224, 236 (Minn. 1986) (noting that deciding which witnesses
to call and which information to present at trial are strategic matters for trial counsel) . In
any event, this allegation conflicts with appellant’s allegation that his first attorney told
him to plead guilty and call B.E.L. as a witness if she pleads guilty and he later withdraws
his own plea, which would indicate that appellant knew he could call B.E.L. as a witness.
Appellant’s inconsistent allegation s here further u ndermine his credibility. In sum, the
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district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that appellant did not establish fair
and just reasons warranting plea withdrawal. We therefore need not address whether the
district court abused its discretion by determining that allowing appellant to withdraw his
plea would prejudice the state. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 98 (affirming denial of motion to
withdraw because defendant failed to allege fair and just reasons for withdrawal).
Affirmed.