State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0736

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kimberly JoAnn Denne,
Appellant.

Filed April 26, 2021
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69VI-CR-19-699

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota; and

Christopher J. Florey, Assistant County Attorney, Virginia, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea M. Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges her convictions for felony threats of violence in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1(1) (2018), and misdemeanor domestic assault in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609. 2242, subd. 1(1) (2018). She argues that the district court erred by
admitting certain relationship evidence because (1) the evidence is not “domestic conduct”
under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2018), and (2) the probative value of the evidence was
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Kimberly JoAnn Denne and her ex -husband, J.W., lived together for
approximately 18 years. They had a son , J.T., in 2002 . By February 2018, t heir
relationship had deteriorated and became volatile. Appellant moved out of the home and
filed for divorce. She continued to drive her burgundy Chevy Equinox (the Equinox).
According to J.W., J.T. made it clear to both his parents that he wanted to live with
J.W. However, he lived with appella nt until J.W. obtained joint custody. At a May 2019
family-court hearing, J.T. told the judge, in appellant’s presence, that he wanted to live
with J.W.
About a week later, on May 22, 2019, J.T. and J.W. encountered appellant as they
were exiting a store. J.W. testified that, as they were walking across traffic lanes to their
vehicle, he heard the sound of “someone laying on their horn honking and revving the
engine.” He turned and saw the Equinox in the lane behind him. The store’s surveillance-
camera footage showed the Equinox driving in the wrong lane, which was the lane closest

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to J.W. and J.T., before it went back into the correct lane. J.W. testified that the Equinox
came within “half a fo ot to a foot” of himself and J.T. and that the incident happened so
fast that he did not have time to react. J.W. further testified that he saw appellant in the
Equinox and that he was able to identify the Equinox as hers because it had the “same
stickers [and s]ame vent visors.” As J.W. and J.T. drove out of the parking lot, they passed
the Equinox and saw appellant sitting in it. J.W. then drove to the sheriff’s office to report
what happened.
The state charged appellant with two counts of felony threats of violence in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1(1), and two counts of misdemeanor domestic assault
(fear) in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1).
Prior to trial, t he state sought to a dmit relationship evidence of a December 2018
incident in which a ppellant went to J.T.’s school , chased him through the hallways,
screamed at him, and attempted to grab him in front of his peers (the December 2018
incident). The state’s purpose in introducing the evidence was to illuminate the hostile
relationship between appellant and J.T. on May 22, 2019. The district court admitted the
evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 because it “fits squarely into the relationship evidence
such that it would assist the t rier of fact in . . . illuminating the nature of the relationship
and, perhaps, why there may have been anger . . . on May 22, 2019[.]” J.T. testified about
the incident at trial, and the district-court record includes two police reports of it.
The jury found appellant guilty of all charges. The district court sentenced him to
twelve months and one day in prison on count one and to 15 months in prison on count

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two. The district court stayed execution of the se sentences and placed appellant o n
probation for three years. No sentence was pronounced for the misdemeanor convictions.
Appellant challenges the admission of the relationship evidence, arguing that it did
not meet the statutory criteria and that it was unduly prejudicial.
DECISION
Challenges to the admission of evidence as contrary to the plain meaning of the
statutory provision that governs the admissibility of that evidence presents a question of
statutory interpretation that we review de novo. State v. Barnslater, 786 N.W.2d 646, 650
(Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 2010).
An appellate court reviews a district court’s decision to admit relationship evidence
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Andersen, 900 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Minn. App. 2017). A
district court abuses its discretion “when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the
law or is against logic and the fa cts in the record.” Riley v. State , 792 N.W.2d 83 1, 833
(Minn. 2011). This court “will not overturn a district court’s evidentiary rulings unless
appellant shows a clear abuse of discretion and that this abuse resulted in prejudice to
[appellant].” State v. Steward, 645 N.W.2d 115, 120 (Minn. 2002).
I. The relationship evidence satisfies Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
Minn. Stat. § 634.20 states:
Evidence of domestic conduct by the accused against the
victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or
household members, is admissible unless the probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulativ e evidence. “Domestic conduct”

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includes, but is not limited to, evidence of domestic abuse,
violation of an order for protection under section 518B.01;
violation of a harassment restraining order under section
609.748; violation of a domestic abuse no con tact order under
section 629.75; or violation of section 609 .749 or 609.79,
subdivision 1. “Domestic abuse” and “family or household
members” have the meanings given under section 518B.01,
subdivision 2.

(Emphasis added).
Appellant argues that evidence of the December 2018 incident adm itted by the
district court did not constitute “domestic conduct” because her behavior did not involve
assaultive behavior, threatening behavior, or the v iolation of a protective order. Her
argument is unpersuasive.
“A court interprets a statute to discern legislative intent.” State v. Lindsey , 755
N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2008). When
analyzing legislative intent, courts “attempt to avoid interpretations that would render a
word or phrase superfluous, void, or insignificant, thereby ensuring each word in a statute
is given effect.” State v. Thompson, 950 N.W.2d 65, 69 (Minn. 2020).
The plain language of the statute states that “‘domestic conduct’ includes, but is not
limited to, evidence of domestic abuse, violation of an order for protection . . . violation of
a harassment restraining order. . . .” Minn. Stat. § 634.20. The phrase “but is not limited
to” signals that the following examples are not the only ways in which an act can constitute
“domestic conduct.” To interpret the statute otherwise would render the phrase “but is not
limited to” superfluous.

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Furthermore, legislative history supports the position that “domestic conduct” is not
limited to domestic abuse or violation of a protective order. The statute formerly permitted
evidence of “similar conduct” that included but was not limited to domestic abuse and
violation of protection orders. See Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2012). The legislature amended
that language to include the broader phrase “domestic conduct ,” which includes domestic
behavior even if it is not necessarily “similar” to abuse or violation of a court order. See
Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2018).
Minnesota caselaw also supports the view that “domestic co nduct” includes more
than just domestic abuse or violation of a protective order. See State v. McCurry , 770
N.W.2d 553, 560 (Minn. App. 2009) (stating that “the ‘not limited to’ language is more
likely meant to encompass general testimony about the relati onship”), review denied
(Minn. Oct. 28, 2009). In Andersen, this court found that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by admitting evidence pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20 of Andersen’s attempt
to “manipulate, control, and restrain” the victim. Andersen, 900 N.W.2d at 441.
Here, the December 2018 incident is within the bounds of Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
Appellant and J.T. are family members; this satisfies the “domestic” requirement. The
conduct involved was of a nature that scared J.T. , and it caused such a disruption at the
school that two police officers had to assist in removing appellant from the hallways and
placing her in a private room until she calmed down. This conduct sheds light on the
relationship between appellant and J.T. , and the evidence was admitted for that purpose.
Because legislative intent, legislative history, and caselaw support the position that
the relationship evidence here meets the definition of “domestic conduct” under Minn. Stat.

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§ 634.20, the district cou rt did not err when it admitted evidence of the December 2018
incident.
II. The admission of the relationship evidence was not unduly prejudicial.
The district court did not err by admitting the relationship evidence because its
probative value was not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice.
Unfair prejudice is “the capacity of some . . . evidence to lure the fact-finder into declaring
guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.” State v. Smith, 749
N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. App. 2008). Unlike evidence admitted under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b),
evidence of prior domestic conduct is admissible under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 to shed light
on the relationship of the parties so that jurors can put the crime in context and better judge
the credibility of the principals. State v. Word , 755 N.W.2d 776, 783 -84 (Minn. App.
2008).
The evidence was admitted for the sole purpose of shedding light on the relationship
between appellant and J.T. at the time of the charged o ffenses. Appellant argues that this
evidence was not “needed,” but necessity is not the standard for admissibility of evidence
of domestic conduct. The relationship evidence here illustrated the hostile attitude that
appellant has towards J.T., especiall y as it related to J.T.’s preference to reside with J.W.
This clearly aided the jurors in putting the charged crime into context as well as in judging
the credibility of appellant, J.T., and J.W.
Moreover, the district court took three steps to ensure that the evidence would not
result in unfair prejudice. First, the testimony regarding the incident makes up only about
three pages of the trial transcript and was a very small portion of what the jury heard.

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Second, the district court directed that the Dece mber 2018 incident not be mentioned in
opening statements, which minimized any potential prejudice developing at the beginning
of the trial. Third, the district court used limiting instructions and denied the admission of
the evidence as Spreigl evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). All three steps illustrate the
sound exercise of the district court’s discretion and minimized the potential for the
relationship evidence to be overly prejudicial.
Even if this court concluded that the district court had abused its discretion by
admitting the relationship evidence, any error was harmless. To find otherwise, the court
would be required to conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully
admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict. State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 n.2
(Minn. 1994). The evidence against appellant was overwhelming. Both the testimony of
J.W. and J.T. and the surveillance camera footage from the store clearly show that appellant
was purposely driving in a dangerous manner to scare J.W. and J.T. For all these reasons,
we conclude that there is not a reasonable probability that the relationship evidence
significantly affected the verdict.
Affirmed.