In the Matter of Reba Mitchell’s Termination of Section 8 Benefits.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0740

In the Matter of Reba Mitchell’s Termination of Section 8 Benefits.

Filed February 22, 2021
Reversed
Hooten, Judge
Dissenting, Smith, Tracy M., Judge

St. Paul Public Housing Agency

Tara Skar, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc., St. Paul, Minnesota (for
relator Reba Mitchell)

Lyndsey M. Olson, St. Paul City Attorney, K. Meghan Kisch, Assistant City Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Public Housing Agency of the City of St. Paul)

Considered and decided by Frisch , Presiding Judge; Hooten , Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
In this certiorari appeal from the termination of her section 8 public housin g
assistance, relator argues that respondent Public Housing Agency of the City of St. Paul
(PHA) erred as a matter of law in upholding the termination of her benefits because it was
premised on an improper eviction . Relator also argues that the conclusion that she was
evicted for a serious violation of her lease was not supported by substantial evidence.
Because the conclusion that relator was evicted for a serious violation of her lease is not
supported by substantial evidence, we reverse.

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FACTS
The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ’s section 8
housing choice voucher program provides qualifying participants with funds to subsidize
their monthly rent payments. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o) (2018); 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a) (2018).
Under the prog ram, a participant chooses a rental unit, and if the unit is approved, rent
subsidy payments are made directly to the landlord on the participant’s behalf. 24 C.F.R.
§ 982.1(a)(2). The amount of these subsidy payments can be as much as 100 % of a
participant’s monthly rent obligation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o). Local government
agencies in Minnesota are authorized to administer the voucher choice p rogram. Peterson
v. Washington Cty. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. , 805 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. App.
2011), review denied (Minn. Oct. 26, 2011). In the City of St. Paul, the program is
administered by PHA.
On December 19, 2015, relator Reba Mitchell signed a residential lease for a
property located in the city of St. Paul. Under the terms of the lease, relator was obligated
to make monthly rent payments. The lease also stated that relator was responsible for all
expenses related to plumbing issues that she caused.
On September 30, 2019 , relator signed a section 8 family obligations certificatio n
as part of the process of applying for a section 8 rent subsidy. As a condition of her receipt
of section 8 assistance, this certification required relator not to commit any serious or
repeated violations of her residential lease. The certification also stated: “I further
understand that if any serious or repeated lease violation results in a court-ordered evictio n,
the PHA must terminate my section 8 assistance.” Relator also signed a section 8 housing

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choice voucher program agreement on December 30, 2019 . This a greement likewise
required relator not to commit any serious or repeated violations of her lease.
Meanwhile, on December 20, 2019, relator’s landlord filed an eviction complaint
against her. The complaint alleged that relator had committed lease violatio ns, includ ing
failure to pay rent; failure to pay costs associated with a clogged main plumbing line; and
failure to pay other fees and expenses. The allegedly -unpaid amounts totaled $3,742.50.
The district court issued an eviction summons on December 24 , 2019, and set an initial
hearing for January 7, 2020. Relator appeared at the initial hearing without legal
representation; her landlord was represented by counsel. It also appears that the father of
relator’s children, who lived with her at the proper ty, was unable to appear at the initial
hearing because he was hospitalized with “an illness related to working for the landlord.”
After this initial hearing, the parties reached a settlement agreement under which
relator was obligated to pay $4,202 by J anuary 22, 2020 and to vacate the premises by
January 31, 2020. This settlement agreement indicated that if its terms were violated,
“judgment may be entered and [landlord] will obtain a Writ of Recovery, upon filing of an
affidavit establishing the viola tion and an Affidavit of Service.” Importantly, the
settlement agreement did not include any admission by relator that she had committed any
violation of her lease. The district court adopted the parties’ settlement agreement on
January 15, 2020. On the form it used to do so, the district court did not check the box to
indicate that the allegations of the complaint were true.
On January 22, 2020, relator’s landlord filed an affidavit stating that relator had
failed to comply with the settlement agreemen t by failing to pay any amount toward the

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$4,202 settlement. This affidavit did not state that relator had committed any serious lease
violation. That same day, the district court issued a writ of recovery ordering relator’s
eviction. In doing so, the district court did not make any finding that relator had committed
any serious lease violation . The Ramsey County Sheriff’s Office posted the writ of
recovery at the premises on January 23, 2020. There is no indication in the record that
relator appealed from her eviction.
On February 5, 2020, PHA notified relator that her section 8 assistance would “be
terminated for serious or repeated violations of the lease resulting in an eviction.” The next
day, relator petitioned for review of the termination of her assistance. On March 11, 2020,
a hearing officer held an informal hearing to review PHA’s termination of relator’s section
8 assistance. At the hearing, relator was again without legal representation. Relator
presented her testimony, along with that o f the father of her children and her case manager
who worked with the family. The hearing officer also heard testimony from an assistant
manager of PHA.
On March 23, 2020, the hearing officer issued an order concluding that relator was
evicted for a serious violation of her lease. Accordingly, the hearing officer upheld PHA’s
decision to terminate relator’s section 8 assistance. Relator made a request for
reconsideration on May 11, 2020. That request appears to have been denied. Mitchell now
appeals the termination of her assistance by writ of certiorari.
DECISION
“We will uphold a housing authority’ s quasi -judicial deci sion to terminate a
participant’s housing be nefits unless we conclude that the authority’s decision is

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unconstitutional, outside [the P HA’s] jurisdiction, procedurally defective, based on an
erroneous legal theory, unsupported by substantial evidence, or arbitrary and capricious. ”
Peterson, 805 N.W.2d at 561 (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence is defined as (1)
such relevant evid ence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion; (2) more than a scintilla of evidence; (3) more than some evidence; (4) more
than any evidence; or (5) the evidence considered in its entirety.” Cannon v. Minneapolis
Police Dep’t, 783 N.W.2d 182, 189 (Minn. App. 2010) (quotation omitted).
PHA and the hearing officer both concluded that relator was evicted for a serious
violation of her lease. In reaching that conclusion, the hearing officer did not find that
relator had failed to pay her rent when it was due. Nor did the hearing officer f ind that
relator had failed to pay for any tenant-caused damage to the property. In fact, the hearing
officer found credible the testimony presented by relator at the review hearing—testimo ny
which contradicted the lease violations alleged in the original eviction complaint. The
hearing officer appears to have relied solely on the fact that relator was evicted after failing
to comply with the settlement agreement as establishing that relator was evicted for a
serious violation of her lease.
Relator argues that the PHA’s decision to terminate her assistance is unsupported
by substantial evidence. Specifically, relator contends that there is no evidence in the
record that she violated her lease and that her assistance was instead terminated because
she failed to make the payment required by the settlement agreement reached with her
landlord. Respondent asserts that relator “made a tacit admission” to the allegations in the
original eviction complaint “by entering into a settlement agreement to pay for al l of the

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items listed in the complaint, plus an additional $459.50.” Respondent further maintains
that, because relator tacitly admitted to a serious violation of her lease and because the
district court issued a writ of recovery after relator failed to comply with the settlement that
allegedly included that tacit admission, relator was in fact evicted for a serious violation of
her lease.
On the particular facts of this case, the conclusion that relator was evicted for a
serious violation of her lease is not supported by substantial evidence. The eviction action
began when relator’s landlord filed an eviction complaint alleging failure to pay rent and
other fees and charges. Importantly, the allegations in such a complaint are not evidence,
let alone s ubstantial evidence. Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minnesota , 848
N.W.2d 224, 230 (Minn. 2014), reh’g granted, opinion modified , 855 N.W.2d 233 (Minn.
2014). The parties then entered into a settlement agreement that was adopted by the district
court. This agreement did not contain any explicit admission by relator to the allegatio ns
in the eviction complaint. We also decline to treat relator’s entry into this settlement
agreement—made without the benefit of legal representation and while under th e threat of
eviction during January in Minnesota —as an implicit admission to the allegations in the
eviction complaint.
After relator failed to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement, her
landlord filed an affidavit to that effect. A writ of re covery was then issued and posted.
Importantly, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the district court ever found that
relator had committed any of the lease violations alleged in the original eviction complaint.
As is noted above, the distric t court did not check the box to indicate that the allegatio ns

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of the complaint were true on the form it used to adopt the parties’ settlement agreement.
As such, relator appears to have been evicted solely because of her failure to comply with
the parties’ settlement agreement, not because of any violation of her lease.
If the settlement agreement had included an admission by relator that she had
committed a serious violation of her lease, the outcome here would be different. Likewise,
if the district court had made a finding that relator had committed a serious violation of her
lease, there would be evidence in the record to support the conclusion of the PHA and the
hearing officer that relator had been evicted for such a violation. And if PHA had presented
any evidence at the review hearing tending to corroborate the allegations in the evictio n
complaint, we would be forced to consider whether such evidence was “substantial”
enough to support the conclusion that relator had been evicted for a serious lease violatio n.
But PHA should not have terminated relator’s assistance solely on the basis of allegatio ns
in the eviction complaint , which are not evidence . Leiendecker, 848 N.W.2d at 230.
Because the settlement agreement did not contain any admission by relator that she had
violated her lease, because the district court did not make any finding that relator had
violated her lease, and because there is no evidence whatsoever in the record that relator
violated her lease, PHA’s conclusion that relator wa s evicted for a serious violation of her
lease is unsupported by substantial evidence.
Relator also argues that PHA erred as a matter of law in terminating her section 8
assistance. Specifically, relator contends that her eviction itself was improper, bo th
because her landlord was barred from seeking to evict her for unpaid rent after accepting
subsequent rent payments from PHA and because the unpaid repair charges alleged in the

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eviction complaint were not incurred as a result of tenant-caused damage. R elator goes on
to assert that by terminating her section 8 assistance because of a failure to comply with
this settlement agreement, which itself followed from an improper eviction complaint,
PHA erred as a matter of law. In raising this argument, relator essentially attempts to
relitigate the propriety of her eviction, both before the PHA and before this court. Because
we conclude PHA’s conclusion that relator was evicted for a serious violation of her lease
is not supported by substantial evidence, we n eed not reach relator’s second argument.
Reversed.

D-1
SMITH, TRACY M. , Judge (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that substantial evidence
does not support the conclusion that relator was evicted for a serious violation of the lease.
Because I conclude that substantial evidence supports the decision by respondent Public
Housing Agency of the City of St. Paul (PHA), and that the decision was not based on an
erroneous legal theory, I would affirm the termination of relator Reba Mitchell’s housing
benefits.
Federal regulations mandate the termination of section 8 housing benefits when a
participant is evicted for a serious violation of the lease. 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(b)(2) (2018).
(“The PHA must terminate program assistance for a family evicted from housing assisted
under the program for serious violation of the lease. ”). Termination is not discretionary.
When a public-housing authority receives evidence, hears testimony, and makes a
determination to deny an individual section 8 benefits, it act s in a quasi-judicial capacity.
Carter v. Olmsted Cty. Hous. & Redev. Auth., 574 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. App. 1998). In
a certiorari appeal from a quasi -judicial decision, our standard of review is limited. “An
agency’s quasi -judicial determinations will be upheld unless they are uncon stitutio nal,
outside the agency’ s jurisdiction, procedurally defective, based on an erroneous legal
theory, unsupported by substantial evidence , or arbitrary and cap ricious.” Id. Substantial
evidence is “(1) such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequa te to
support a conclusion; (2) more than a scintilla of evidence; (3) more than some evidence;
(4) more than any evidence; or (5) the evidence considered in its entirety.” Minn. Ctr. for
Envtl. Advocacy v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency , 644 N.W.2d 457, 466 (Minn. 2002).

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Here, relator’s landlord filed an eviction complaint in December 2019 alleging
failure to pay rent, failure to pay costs associat ed with a clogged main plumbing line, and
failure to pay other fees and expenses. These allegations constitute serious violations of the
lease. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.310(a)(1) (2018) (defining, for purposes of lease terminatio n,
“serious violation” to include without limitation “failure to pay rent or ot her amounts due
under the lease” and “repeated violation of the terms and conditions of the lease”); see also
Cole v. Metro. Council HRA, 686 N.W.2d 334, 337 (Minn. App. 2004) (applying 24 C.F.R.
§ 982.310(a)(1) to determine whether lease violation was a “serious violation” for purposes
of benefits termination under 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(b)(2)).
An initial hearing in the eviction action was held on January 7, 2020. On January 15,
before trial, the parties informed the district court that they had settled the eviction action. 1
Under the terms of the settlement agreement filed with the district court on January 15,
relator agreed to pay an amount approximating the amount allegedly in arrears by noon on
January 22 and to move out by January 31. If relator satisfied the terms of the settlement

1 The majority correctly notes that relator was self-represented in court, while landlord (an
LLC) had counsel. The eviction summons explains:

If you want a lawyer, you must get one right away.

Attorneys may be available at the courthouse to provide legal
advice regarding your hearing, if you are income eligible. Plan
to arrive by 8:15a.m. if you wish to speak to an attorney right
before your hearing. The attorneys will meet with clients on a
first-come, first-serve basis.

A corporation or LLC must be represented by an attorney in
District Court. This includes having an attorney sign court
papers on behalf of the client corporation or LLC.

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agreement, landlord would not oppose expungement of the eviction record. If relator
violated the terms of the settlement agreement, j udgment would be entered and a writ of
recovery issued.
When payment was not received by January 22, landlord filed an affidavit stating
that relator had failed to make the required payment, and the district court entered judgment
and issued the writ. Rel ator did not appeal the eviction judgment. See Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.371, subd. 2 (2018) (providing for appeal to this court from eviction judgment).
In sum, judgment was entered against relator in a breach -of-lease eviction action in
which the alleged violations were serious. I would conclude, based on this record, that there
is “more than a scintilla,” “some,” or “any” evidence that relator was evicted for a serious
violation of the lease. Cf. Cole, 686 N.W.2d at 337 (concluding default judgment in breach-
of-lease eviction action was sufficient to support termination of benefits based on serious
violation of lease).
The majority highlights the absence of certain evidence in the record . It observes
that the settlement agreement does not contain an admission of a lease violation. But the
court form for landlord-tenant settlements that was used by the parties does not include a
field for admission of liability. Nor would I expect parties to supplement the court form
with the tenant’s admission of having committ ed a serious lease violation when
expungement is anticipated upon satisfaction of the agreement’s terms. Similarly, I am not
surprised by the absence of a factual finding by the district court that relator violated the

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lease; because the case settled befor e trial, any factual finding by the district court would
have been procedurally improper.2
Moreover, the issue before this court is not whether relator committed a serious
violation of the lease; rather, it is whether relator was evicted for a serious violation of the
lease. Whether relator committed a lease violation was at issue in the eviction action. That
question was beyond the scope of the termination proceedings, which began after the
eviction judgment became final, and is therefore beyond the scope of this appeal. The issue
before us is what the basis for the eviction judgment was, not whether the judgment was
warranted or correct. See State v. Joseph , 636 N.W.2d 322, 329 n.4 (Minn. 2001) (“We
have held that, in considering whether a judgment may preclude litigation of the same claim
in a subsequent proceeding, it is immaterial whether a judgment on the merits unappealed
from was right or wrong. ”). And, again, in my view, substantial evidence supports the
PHA’s determination that the eviction judgment was based on serious lease violations.
I am sympathetic to relator’s plight. Termination of housing benefits has serious
ramifications for the entire household. But even if policy reasons were an appropriate
consideration for this intermediate appellate court, they weigh in both directions here.
Settlements in eviction actions are common and can be beneficial to both parties. It cannot

2 The majority concludes that relator was evicted for breach of the settlement agreement .
Although breach of the settlement agreement precipitated entry of judgment, there is no
indication in the record that the complaint alleging breach of lease was amended to include
breach of the settlement agreement or was dismissed. And breach-of-settlement-agreement
is not an independent statutory ground for eviction. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § § 504B.285,
.291, .301 (2018) (identifying grounds for eviction).

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be in tenants’ best interests for landlords participating in the section 8 program to be
encouraged to go to trial in eviction actions in order to get judicial findings of serious lease
violations or to demand that tenants admit liability as a condition of settlement. Given
PHA’s obligations and the lengthy waiting lists for benefits, this could be the natural result
of the majority’s reasoning. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(b)(2) (requiring termination when
relator is evicted for serious violation of lease); Awnuh v. Pub. Hous. Agency of City of
St. Paul, No. 19-CV-2765, 2019 WL 6492465, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 3, 2019) (explaining
that “there are approximately 3,000 applicants on the current waitlist” for housing vouchers
administered by PHA).
In sum, I would conclude that substantial evidence supports the determination that
relator was evicted for a serious violation of the lease and that termination was not based
on an erroneous legal theory. I would therefore affirm the decision.