In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Caleb M. Coleman.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0752

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Caleb M. Coleman.

Filed November 2, 2020
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-MH-PR-19-117

Mark Gray, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant Caleb M. Coleman)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Annsara Lovejoy Elasky, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Human Services)

Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SEGAL, Chief Judge
Caleb M. Coleman challenges his initial a nd continued commitments as mentally ill
and dangerous. He argues that the district court’s findings of fact are insufficient because
they merely recite the testimony, are conclusory and are not connected to the conclusions
of law. Because the district court’s findings are sufficiently particular, we affirm.

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FACTS
At age 12, Coleman was hospitalized because he was having hallucinations that told
him to kill himself. Later, Coleman was subject to additional hospitalizations and
treatments for violent thoughts and behavior s, psychological problems, and chemical
abuse. Coleman admits that he “has a signi ficant history of trau ma, conduct issues, and
mental health symptoms,” “an extensive history of substance use,” and that he entered the
correctional system at age 16 in 2016 for first degree arson and for domestic assault. He
was charged with these crimes because he had disabled a smoke detector and set his
mother’s bed on fire while she was sleeping on it. He said that “the voice in his head made
him do it.” Coleman admitted to the resulting arson charge, and cons ented to being an
Extended Jurisdiction J uvenile (EJJ). Coleman was in itially housed at the Red Wing
facility but his EJJ status was revoked, hi s placement at the Red Wing facility was
terminated, and his adult criminal sentence was executed because of his “ongoing negative
behaviors.”
Coleman was later placed in the Yout hful Offender Program at the Lino Lakes
facility, where he made some progress. When he reached age 18, however, he was
transferred to adult detenti on, where he regressed. Co leman admitted to “displaying
concerning mental health symptoms,” and he was then transferred to the mental health unit
of the Oak Park Heights correctional facility.
In a November 2018 order, the district c ourt committed Coleman as mentally ill and,
when Coleman reached his release date from prison in January 2019, he was transferred

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from the Oak Park Heights fa cility to the Anoka Metro Regional Treatment Center
(AMRTC). While at AMRTC, Coleman enga ged in behaviors that included grabbing
people, giving staff “bear hugs,” and smea ring and consuming feces . In March 2019,
Coleman was transferred to the Minnesota Security Hospital (MSH) because his behavior
required a more secure environment.
Hennepin County filed a petition with th e district court to commit Coleman as
mentally ill and dangerous (MI&D). Follow ing a two-day hearing, the district court
granted the county’s petition, and committe d Coleman to the commissioner of human
services as MI&D. After a three-day review hearing, the district court noted that Coleman
showed “substantial improvement” over his pr evious conduct, but continued Coleman’s
commitment as MI&D for an indeterminate period of time. Coleman appeals, challenging
the district court’s findings of fact in both the order initially committing him as MI&D, and
the order continuing that commitment.
D E C I S I O N
To commit a person as MI&D, the person mu st be both “mentally ill,” and, as a
result of that illness, “dangerous.” Minn. St at. § 253B.02, subd. 17(a) (2018). Coleman
argues in this appeal that the district court’s findings of fact are insufficient to support the
determination that he is mentally ill. He does not challenge the district court’s
determination that he is “dangerous” within the meaning of the commitment statute.
Appellate courts review de novo whether a di strict court’s findings of fact satisfy the

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statutory criteria for commitment. In re Civil Commitment of Spicer, 853 N.W.2d 803, 807
(Minn. App. 2014).
Coleman bases his argument on this court’s opinion in Spicer. There, this court
found three types of deficiencies in the district court’s findi ngs of fact: (1) the findings
were mere summaries or recitations of the testimony presented at trial “without
commenting independently either upon [the expe rt’s] opinions or the foundation for their
opinions or the relative credibility of the various witnesses;” (2) “nearly all” of the district
court’s “true findings” were stated in a conclu sory manner and, as a result, this court was
“unable to determine which portions of which experts’ opinions the district court relied on
when making findings of fact and conclusi ons of law;” and (3) the findings were “not
meaningfully tied to its conclusions of law.” Id. at 810-11 (citations and other internal
quotations omitted). As a consequence, the case was reversed in part and remanded on the
ground that the commitment order was not supported by sufficiently particular findings of
fact. Coleman claims that the district court committed these same three errors in its orders
in this case and that reversal is required. We disagree.
Coleman’s lengthy and complex psychiatric hi story is detailed in the record. At the
initial commitment trial, four psychiatric witnesses testified, including two court-appointed
experts, Dr. Mary Marth and Dr. Michael Thompson, along with Dr. Matthew Kruse from
AMRTC and Dr. Joshua Griffiths, the Medical Director of MSH.
While it is true that the district court reviewed and summarized the expert testimony
in its findings of fact, the court also set out its independent evaluation of the testimony and

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reports from these four experts. For exampl e, with regard to Dr. Marth’s testimony and
report, the district court stated that “[a] lthough Dr. Marth indicated this was her first
[MI&D] Evaluation, [her report is] thoroughly prepared and her testimony credible.” As
to Dr. Thompson’s report, the district court explicitly noted Coleman’s criticisms of that
report and weighed those criticisms when it reviewed the report, stating as follows: “[t]he
court agrees [with Coleman] that it would ha ve been helpful for Dr. Thompson to have
listed in his report the documents he reviewed and [the court] recognizes that [Dr.
Thompson’s] report contains some mistakes, and the Court has taken this into consideration
when reviewing his report.”
Finally, as to the testimony of Drs. Kruse and Griffiths, the district court notes the
disagreements between the two on Coleman’s st atus as mentally ill and the appropriate
placement for him, but concludes that it “gives more weight to Dr. Kruse’s testimony than
Dr. Griffiths’ as Dr. Griffiths only observed [Coleman] since March 2019 when [Coleman]
arrived at [MSH]; whereas Dr. Kruse witn essed [Coleman’s] behavior firsthand at
AMRTC.” These statements set out the distri ct court’s reasons for assessing the relative
credibility of these witnesses and their reports, and thus di stinguish this case from the
deficiencies of the findings in Spicer.
At the trial for the continued or i ndeterminate commitment order, there was
testimony again from Dr. Griff iths; along with testimony by Dr. Joanna Hachtel, who
authored the 60-day forensic evaluation report; Dr. Andrea Lovett, an expert retained by
the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office; and Coleman. The district court’s findings again

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summarize the evidence and testimony presented, but the findings go on to explain the
district court’s assessment of the relative credibility of the witne sses in light of the
consistency of those assessments with the rest of the record:
[T]he court finds the testimony and opinion of Dr. Lovett to be
the most persuasive with regard to [Coleman’s] diagnoses and
a finding that [Coleman] re mains [MI&D]. Dr. Lovett’s
qualifications and experience were influential to the court in
making this finding. The cour t recognizes and respects the
opinions of Dr. Griffiths and Dr. Hachtel, but it must review
the evidence as a whole and the credibility of the professional
reports and witnesses. In do ing so, the court cannot ignore
[Coleman’s] past behavior and finds that Dr. Lovett’s opinion
is the most convincing in this matter.

Thus, the findings regarding these experts go further than the findings we found deficient
in Spicer and contain sufficient analysis for appellate review.
Coleman also argues that the findings of fact are not meaningfully connected to the
conclusions of law. This argument, however, focuses just on the paragraphs in the findings
that summarize the testimony and evidence and ignores later paragraphs that set out the
basis for the district court’s findings. For example, with regard to the district court’s
conclusion in the initial commitment order that Coleman has a mental illness, finding five
of the order states as follows: “The court finds that although there [are] varying diagnoses
for [Coleman], [Coleman] is mentally ill with a substantial disorder of his thought, which
grossly impairs his judgment and behavior.” Th e district court’s findings go on to state
that “[Coleman’s] mental illness is manifested by instances of grossly disturbed behavior
and faulty perceptions.” The court then identifies specific examples of both, setting out

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those examples affirmatively and in detail, and not as a mere summary or recitation of the
submissions from the experts.
Turning to the continued commitmen t order, one of the findings states:
The court finds that [Coleman ] continues to be a person
who is [MI&D] to the public. [Coleman] has improved since
being at [MSH], and he is currently exhibiting fewer symptoms
of his mental illness. However, after considering the evidence
as a whole, the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence,
that [Coleman] meets the requirements of a person that
continues to be [MI&D].

The order then summarizes the history of Co leman’s case, focusing on events since the
initial commitment order, stating that these ev ents show that “[a]lthough [Coleman’s]
behavior has improved, he continues to demonstrate periods of assaultive, threatening, and
aggressive behaviors, in spite of the fact that he understands such behavior will jeopardize
his chances of release and a finding that he is no longer [MI&D].” The district court also
acknowledged Coleman’s “improvement while at [MSH] without the use of neuroleptics”
but went on to state that it “cannot ignore the evidence before it, which has shown by clear
and convincing evidence that [Coleman] conti nues to be a person who is [MI&D].” The
findings in the continued commitment order identify the evidence the district court found
persuasive, which facts it found important, and which factors were significant in reaching
its conclusions of law.
We, therefore, conclude that both the in itial and the continued commitment orders
contain sufficient findings of fact and satisfy the standards articulated in Spicer.
Affirmed.