State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0760

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Albert James Conant,
Appellant.

Filed May 24, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69HI-CR-19-191

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorn ey, Stacey M. Sundquist, Assistant County
Attorney, Hibbing, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant was convicted of first-degree burglary under Minn. Stat. § 609.582,
subd. 1(a) (2018), after a jury trial. In this direct appe al, he argues that the evidence is

2
insufficient to prove first-degree burglary. Because we conclude that the evidence is
sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, we affirm.
FACTS
The state charged appellant Albert James Conant with multiple criminal offenses,
including first-degree burglary, after Conant entered his father’s home in March 2019. The
following facts were established at trial.
In March 2019, Conant’s former girlfrie nd, G.P., was living with Conant’s 82-year-
old father. G.P. and Conant had previously lived together. G.P. broke up with Conant and
moved in with Conant’s father after her relationship with Conant “got physical.” Conant’s
father testified that he invited G.P. to live with him to help G.P. and “to keep [Conant] out
of jail because he was abusing [G.P.].”
Conant’s father further testified that C onant had been “torme nting” him and G.P.
for about a year and a half prior to March 2019. He said that Conant frequently called the
house and that Conant once “called 54 times in one day.” G.P. and Conant’s father changed
their phone number two or three times, but Conant “would find out what it [was] and then
start all over again.” Both Conant’s father and G.P. testified that Conant also frequently
came over to the house. G.P. te stified that Conant came to the house to try to talk to her
and win her back. Conant’s father said that he “kept telling [Conant] to leave us alone.”
Around 9:00 p.m. on Ma rch 14, 2019, Conant knocked on the kitchen window of
his father’s house. As Cona nt stood outside the window, hi s father and G.P. told him
several times to “go home.” Although he wa s told to go home, Conant walked to the
unlocked front door of the hous e and entered the living room with the aid of his walking

3
stick, closing the glass storm door behind him. Realizing that the front door may have been
unlocked, G.P. walked from the kitchen into the living room and discovered that Conant
was already inside the house. G.P. told Conant that he was not supposed to be in the house,
“that his dad [didn’t] want him in the house, and [that she] didn’t want him” in the house.
And she again told him to go home. Conant got mad and responded that he did not have
to leave. G.P. tried to get Conant to leave by backing him up toward the front door without
touching him. She testified that when she was doing so, Conant “just kept saying he didn’t
have to leave, and then he said ‘What, you don’t love me anymore?’”
At that point, Conant’s father came into the living room in his wheelchair and told
Conant to “[g]o home, go home,” and that he was not wanted in the house. Conant was
standing between the glass storm door and the inside front door at the time. He was pushing
on the inside door, and G.P. had her hip agai nst the door attempting to keep Conant from
coming further into the house. Conant then began swinging his walking stick at his father.
Conant struck G.P. on the top of her foot with his walking stick, leaving a three-inch-long
scratch mark. Conant’s father, who was al so carrying a walking stick, responded by
swinging his stick at Conant. Conant then pulled out an aerosol can from his sweatshirt
pocket and sprayed the substance from the can “all over” his father and “all over the living
room.”
G.P. called for help from a third person who was in the home. The three of them
successfully pushed Conant outside and locked the door. Once outside, Conant stood on
the front deck of the house. Conant then sprayed the aerosol substance in the direction of
the house and lit the substance on fire with a lighter. The su bstance ignited into a “four

4
foot” flame that shot towards the kitchen win dow. Conant repeated this conduct two or
three more times, spraying flames toward the wooden railing of the deck. His father
testified that Conant stood ou tside spraying the flames for six or seven minutes before
leaving the property. The flames ultimately did not cause any damage to the house.
The police arrested Conant the following day. They also obtained a warrant to
search Conant’s Jeep. In the front center console of the Jeep, the police found a lighter and
an aerosol can containing carburetor cleaner.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Co nant with five counts: (1) first-degree
burglary (occupied dwelling), (2) first- degree burglary (dangerous weapon),
(3) first-degree burglary (assault), (4) second-degree assault, and (5) first-degree attempted
arson. The district court held a jury trial on January 21–22, 2020. After the prosecution
rested, the district court granted Conant’s motion for a directed verdict on the first-degree
burglary (dangerous weapon) charge and the second-degree assault charge on the ground
that the state had not presented evidence to show that Conant’s walking stick or the can of
carburetor cleaner met the definition of a “d angerous weapon.” The court permitted the
state to add a charge for the lesser-included offense of fifth-degree assault. The following
day, the jury found Conant gu ilty of first-degree burglary (o ccupied dwelling). The jury
acquitted Conant on the remaining counts. The district court stayed imposition of Conant’s
sentence and placed Conant on probation for three years.
Conant appeals.

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DECISION
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the eviden ce is sufficient to
support the jury’s verdict of first-degree burglary (occupied dwelling). A person is guilty
of first-degree burglary of an occupied dwelling if the person
enters a building without consent and with intent to commit a
crime, or enters a building with out consent and commits a
crime while in the building . . . [and]:

(a) the building is a dwelling and another person, not an
accomplice, is present in it when the burglar enters or at any
time while the burglar is in the building.

Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(a) (emphasis added).
Conant does not dispute that the evidence is su fficient to prove that he entered a
building (his father’s home) without consent, that the building is a dwelling, and that
another person was present while he was inside the building. The only element that Conant
disputes on appeal is the intent element. He argues that the state failed to prove that he had
the intent to commit a crime when he entered his father’s home.
1
The supreme court has interpreted the phras e “enter[ed] a building . . . with intent”
to mean that the offender must possess the requisite intent at the time of entry .
State v. Davis, 864 N.W.2d 171, 178 (Minn. 2015 ) (interpreting the language of

1 The state appears to argue that the jury’s verdict could have been based on a finding that
Conant actually committed some crime while in the h ouse. But the st ate acknowledges
that the jury acquitted Conant of the assault and attempted arson charges, and the state does
not suggest what alternative crime Conant c ould have committed inside the house. And,
during the state’s closing argument, the pros ecutor argued that the first-degree burglary
charge was based only on Conant’s commission of assault and/or attempted arson inside
his father’s home. We are not persuaded that the jury could have concluded that Conant
actually committed a crime inside the house.

6
Minnesota’s third-degree burglary statute, Mi nn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 3 (2014)). The
crime the offender intends to commit at the time of entry must be some independent crime
other than trespass. State v. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d 449, 452 (Minn. 2002).
Due process requires the state to prove every element of the offense charged beyond
a reasonable doubt. State v. Cross , 577 N.W.2d 721, 726 (Minn. 1998). To determine
whether sufficient evidence exists to support a jury verdict, appellate courts “view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict and assume the fact-finder disbelieved any
testimony conflicting with that verdict.” State v. Chomnarith , 654 N.W.2d 660, 664
(Minn. 2003). We will not overturn a verdict “if, giving due regard to the presumption of
innocence and to the prosecution’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the
jury could reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” Id.
Here, the state offered only circumstantial evidence to prove the element of intent.
When the state relies on circumstantial evidence alone, we undertake a heightened two-step
analysis to review the suffi ciency of the evidence. State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469,
473 (Minn. 2010). First, we “ide ntify the circumstances proved.” State v. Balandin ,
944 N.W.2d 204, 213 (Minn. 2020). In doing so, we “giv[e] defere nce to the jury’s
acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that
conflicted with the circumstances proved by the [s]tate.” Id. (quotation omitted). Second,
we consider “the reasonable inferences th at might be drawn from the circumstances
proved.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 264 (Minn. 2016). With respect to this second
inquiry, we give no deference to the jury’s choice between any reasonable inferences. Id.
“The conviction is sustained if the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the

7
circumstances proved as a whol e are consistent with the hy pothesis that the accused is
guilty and inconsistent with any rationa l hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. If there is
any rational hypothesis pointin g to innocence, then the evid ence is insufficient and the
conviction should be overturned. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 474. We will not overturn a
conviction on the basis of mere conjecture. State v. Stein , 776 N.W.2d 709, 714
(Minn. 2010).
We begin our analysis by identifying the circumstances proved. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the circumstances proved are as follows.
In Conant’s prior relationship with G.P., he became “physical” or abusive towards her.
Conant had been “tormenting” his father and G.P. for a year and a half prior to March 2019
by repeatedly calling and coming over to the house. On March 14, 2019, Conant knocked
on the kitchen window of his fa ther’s house and both his father and G.P. told him to “go
home.” Despite being told to go home, Conant entered the house without consent. When
Conant entered the house, he had a can of fl ammable carburetor cleaner in his sweatshirt
pocket and a lighter. Once inside the house, Conant repeatedly stated that he did not have
to leave, and, at one point said to G.P., “What, you don’t love me anymore?” Conant both
verbally and physically resisted attempts to get him to leave the house. Conant swung his
walking stick at his father and hit G.P. on the top of the foot with the walking stick. While
inside the house, Conant sprayed the carbur etor cleaner throughout the living room and
“all over” his father. Outside the house, Conant sprayed the carburetor cleaner and lit it on
fire, causing flames to shoot toward the kitchen window of the house and toward the railing
of the deck.

8
We next consider whether these circum stances proved are consistent with the
hypothesis that Conant was guilty of firs t-degree burglary and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis other than guilt. Conant contends they are not.
Conant first argues that the circumstan ces proved do not support a rational
hypothesis that he intended to commit a crime when he entere d his father’s house. He
maintains that, because he “did not aggressively approach [G.P.] or [his father] after he
entered the house or attempt to light anythi ng on fire after he entered the house,” the
circumstances proved do not support a reasonable inference that he “entered the house to
harm anyone or start the house on fire.” We disagree.
Based on the circumstances proved, it is re asonable to infer that Conant entered his
father’s house with the intent to commit arson. 2 Conant is correct that the circumstances
show that he did not immedi ately make aggressive moves upon entering the house. But

2 We presume that the predicate offense for Conant’s first-degree burglary conviction was
arson and not assault. We reach this conclusion because the jury found Conant not guilty
of fifth-degree assault and first-degree burglary (assault). The district court instructed the
jury that first-degree burglary (assault) requir es the defendant to either assault a person
within the building or “enter[] or remain[] in the dwelling with the intent to commit the
crime of Fifth Degree Assault.” We note th at the jury instructio n was not an accurate
description of the elements of first-degree burglary (assault), which in actuality require the
defendant to “assault[] a pe rson within the building or on the building’s appurtenant
property.” Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c) (2018). The elements do not include intent to
commit assault. Id. But, keeping in mind the presumption that a jury will follow the district
court’s instructions, State v. Hall, 764 N.W.2d 837, 845 (Minn. 2009), we conclude that
the jury determined that Conant did not enter his father’s home w ith the intent to commit
assault. We therefore presume that the jury concluded that Conant entered his father’s
home with the intent to commit arson. Alternatively, in the event that Conant’s acquittal
of first-degree burglary (assault) was based on jury lenity, a ssault would also constitute a
predicate offense for Conant’s first-degree burglary (occupi ed dwelling) conviction. See
State v. Perkins, 353 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Minn. 1984) (defining jury lenity as “the power to
bring in a verdict of not guilty despite the law and the facts”).

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the circumstances proved do show that Conant entered his father’s house with a flammable
substance and a lighter on his person, equipped to commit arson. The circumstances also
show that he had previously been “physical” with G.P., that he had a history of harassing
his father and G.P., that he remained inside th e house after he was told to leave, and that
he sprayed the flammable substance inside the house and on his fa ther. Based on the
totality of these circumstances, it is rationa l to infer that Conant brought the flammable
substance and lighter with him to his father’s house and entered the house with the intent
to commit arson. The reasonableness of this inference does not depend on whether he
successfully completed the crime of arson or whether he was aggressive when he entered
the house. It is his intent at the time he entered the house that is determinative. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(a); see also Davis, 864 N.W.2d at 178 (interpreting the language
of Minnesota’s third-degree burglary statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 3).
Conant next argues that, even if the circumstances do support a rational hypothesis
that he intended to commit a crime when he entered the home, there is an alternative
rational hypothesis that is inconsistent with his guilt. Specifically, Conant argues that one
may reasonably infer from the circumstances proved that he “entered the house with only
the intent to speak with [G.P.] and to get her attention because he wanted to ‘win her back.’”
He contends that the following evidence supports this inference: Conant did not act in an
aggressive or violent manner toward G.P. upon entering the house; any altercation between
Conant and G.P. occurred later on while Cona nt was being pushed out of the house; after
Conant was told to leave multip le times, he stated to G.P ., “What, you don’t love me

10
anymore?”; and Conant never attempted to light the carburetor cleaner on fire while he was
inside the house. But his argument ignores other circumstances proved by the state.
Considered as a whole, the circum stances proved do not support Conant’s
alternative theory. First, the testimony indicates that Conant did not say much to G.P. while
he was inside his father’s home. G.P. testified that the only things she remembered Conant
saying while in the house were that he did not have to leave and “What, you don’t love me
anymore?” The few statements that Conant actually made once inside the house belie his
assertion that he entered with the intent to merely speak to G.P. Second, as discussed
above, Conant had previously been “physical” with G.P., and he had a history of harassing
G.P. and his father. These circumstances sh ow that Conant had a troubled relationship
with G.P. and his father, and they suggest that Conant was willing to harm G.P. Third,
Conant entered his father’s home when he kn ew he was not welcome, and he refused to
leave even after G.P. and his father repeatedly told him to go home. If Conant had entered
the house with only the intent to talk to G.P., one would reasonably assume that when it
became clear to him that G.P. was not willing to talk to him, he would leave. And fourth,
when Conant entered the house, he had an ae rosol can containing a flammable substance
and a lighter on his person. One does not typically carry th ese items together on their
person in the ordinary course of a day. Conant then sprayed the flammable substance inside
the house and on his father.
Based on Conant’s troubled history with G.P. and his father, as well as the items
that he brought with him into the house and his subsequent use of those items, it is not
rational to infer that Conant entered the house merely with the intent to speak to or attempt

11
to reconcile with G.P. Rather, given Conant ’s history with G.P. and his father, the only
rational hypothesis is that Conant entered the house with the intent to commit arson. There
is no other rational inference that can be dr awn from Conant’s entry into the house under
these circumstances.
In sum, the evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Conant
entered his father’s home with the intent to commit a crime. We therefore affirm Conant’s
first-degree-burglary conviction.
Affirmed.