In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: H. R. B. and T. L., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0761

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: H. R. B. and T. L., Parents.

Filed October 19, 2020
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-JV-18-433

Lucas J.M. Dawson, Halberg Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant,
H.R.B.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anthony C. Palumbo, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County Attorney, An oka, Minnesota
(for respondent Anoka County Social Services)

Sara McKlugell, Minneapolis, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
On appeal from the termination of her parenta l rights (TPR) after a prior remand,
appellant-mother argues that: (1) she was denied due process of law when the district court
did not hold a hearing on remand; (2) the record does not support the district court’s
revocation of the stay of a termination of her parental rights on the basis that she was a

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palpably unfit parent at the time of the termination; (3) the record does not support that
TPR is in the child’s best interests; and (4) the county failed to make reasonable efforts to
reunite the family. We affirm.
FACTS
The underlying facts giving rise to the initial termination of appellant -mother
H.R.B.’s parental rights are set forth in this court’s order opinion issued on April 8, 2020.
In re Welfare of Child of H.R.B. , No. A19 -1866 (Minn. App. Apr. 8, 2020) (order op.).
However, it is necessary to set forth the procedural history that resulted in that opinion in
order to situate the present appeal.
On April 9, 2018, respondent Anoka County Social Services (ACSS) fi led its
original petition to terminate H.R.B.’s parental rights based on six statutory bases,
including H.R.B.’s palpable unfitness to parent. The district court held a trial on that TPR
petition in October and December 2018, and February 2019. Testimony was then
suspended, and the matter was set for a review hearing to allow the parties to enter into a
settlement agreement.
At the review hearing, H.R.B. entered the following admission:
Anoka County child protection was involved with
[H.R.B.] and [M.I.B.] fro m August 6, 2014 to April 7, 2017.
As part of that , [M.I.B.] was in out -of-home placement for
approximately 13 months. One basis for the reunification was
[H.R.B.’s] compliance with her mental health needs, including
medication. Following closure of the case and reunification,
[H.R.B.] stopped taking her prescribed medications in July of
2017, contrary to the closing safety plan. This caused others
to be concerned about [H.R.B.’s] mental health which led to a
72-hr hospital hold for [H.R.B.] on April 4, 2018.

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[H.R.B.] agrees that her medication compliance is
necessary for [M.I.B.’s] physical, mental, and emotional well-
being. [H.R.B.] is committed to taking her medication as
prescribed going forward. Not following the recommendations
of her mental h ealth providers including stopping her
medications is good cause to [terminate] parental rights.

H.R.B. also testified that this statement would be accepted by the district court as the factual
basis for TPR.
The district court found that clear and conv incing evidence existed to support TPR
on the basis that H.R.B. was palpably unfit to parent M.I.B. Pursuant to the parties’
agreement, the district court stayed entry of adjudication for up to 180 days on the condition
that H.R.B. fully cooperate and comply with conditions set forth in Exhibit A to the district
court’s order. The district court also provided that “[a]ny final entry of adjudication as to
[H.R.B.] must occur after a hearing before the [c]ourt or by a voluntary petition filed by
[H.R.B.]”
ACSS moved to revoke the stay in August 2019 due to H.R.B.’s failure to comply
with the conditions of Exhibit A. ACSS’s motion to revoke was primarily based on two
related incidents that occurred on July 26, 2019. In the first incident, H.R.B. became
agitated and confrontational during a parent-teacher conference at M.I.B.’s school. During
the conference, H.R.B. made disconcerting comments about “the system,” slammed a pen
or pencil on the table, paced around the room, and used profanity to wards M.I.B.’s foster
mother. H.R.B. ended the conference early and left with M.I.B., who was crying.
In response to this first incident, a social worker and the guardian ad litem (GAL)
visited H.R.B. at her home later that day. H .R.B. displayed similar behavior , this time

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using profanity towards the social worker and M.I.B. When H.R.B. would not deescalate
her behavior, the social worker and GAL removed M.I.B. from the home.
Following hearings on ACSS’s revocation motion, the district court revoked the stay
and terminated H.R.B.’s parental rights. H.R.B. appealed, asserting that the district court
violated her right to due process and made clearly erroneous findings of fact. During oral
argument on H.R.B.’s first appeal, she asserted that the district court incorrectly applied a
presumption of palpable unfitness. We agreed, noting that the presumption applied when
a parent has had their parental rights to other children involuntarily terminated, which did
not occur here.
We noted that, due to the district court’s error, we could not determine based on the
record whether clear and convincing evidence supported TPR on the basis of H.R.B.’s
palpable unfitness. Accordingly, we reversed and remanded in order “for the district court
to make findings consistent with [the order] opinion and to reopen the record if, in its
discretion, it believes it necessary to make the required findings of fact.” Due to the
dispositive nature of the district court’s error, we did not re ach the other issues H.R.B.
raised in her initial appeal.
Following remand, the district court ordered additional briefing from the parties
regarding whether the district court should reopen the record, and if so, what additional
evidence—along with an offer of proof—the parties proposed to submit. In her brief to the
district court, H.R.B. took the position that “the record is complete and does not need to be
reopened.” ACSS took the same position. Therefore, the district court issued amended

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findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which it terminated H.R.B.’s parental rights on
the statutory basis that she was palpably unfit to parent M.I.B. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
I. Due process
H.R.B. first argues that the district court denied her right to due process by not
holding an evidentiary hearing de novo following remand from this court. “The due
process standard in parental-termination proceedings embodies the notion of fundamental
fairness. Fundamental fairness guarantees a parent facing termination proceedings a right
to a meaningful adversarial hearing.” In re Child of P.T., 657 N.W.2d 577, 587-88 (Minn.
App. 2003) (citation omitted), review denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 2003). Whether the district
court violated H.R.B.’s right to due process presents a question of law, which we review
de novo. In re Welfare of Children of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 97 (Minn. App. 2008) (citation
omitted).
H.R.B. takes the position that when this court reversed and remanded to the district
court for additional findings, her parental rights were effectively restored. Therefore, a
new trial needed to be held before her parental rights could be terminated. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.307, subd. 2 (2018) (stating that “[t]he terminati on of parental rights . . . shall be
made only after a hearing before the court”). However, H.R.B. does not accurately
construe the effect of our prior order opinion.
We did not direct the district court to hold a new trial on ACSS’s TPR petition.
Instead, we directed the district court “to make findings consistent with this opinion and to
reopen the record if, in its discretion, it believes it necessary to make the required findings

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of fact . . . However, by our decision, we do not suggest that the dist rict court should alter
[M.I.B.’s] out-of-home placement.”
In the preceding paragraph of the order, after reciting that we could still affirm the
TPR if clear and convincing evidence supported the statutory basis for termination, we
stated that “[w]e can not determine on this record whether the county met this burden
without the presumption that the district court applied.” Therefore, we did not vacate the
prior proceedings, but instead directed the district court to make additional findings that
did not apply the presumption of palpable unfitness. Because the termination of H.R.B.’s
parental rights occurred after a meaningful adversarial hearing, her right to due process
was not violated.
II. Revocation and termination
H.R.B. next argues that the district court erred by revoking her stay of adjudication
and finding that TPR was warranted on the statutory basis that she is palpably unfit to
parent. If a district court determines that a parent has violated the conditions of a stay of
termination, it must next determine “whether the violation warrants revocation.” D.F., 752
N.W.2d at 95. We review the district court’s finding that H.R.B. violated the terms of the
stay for clear error. See id. at 96. “ [W]e will not reverse the district court’s decisio n to
revoke a conditional stay of a voluntary termination of parental rights absent an abuse of
that discretion.” Id. at 95.1

1 In D.F., we treated the stay as a voluntary termination because the parents admitted to the
factual basis and agreed to TPR on that admitted basis. 752 N.W.2d at 95.

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A. Revocation
The district court found by clear and convincing evidence that H.R.B. violated the
conditions of the stay. While the district court did not specifically identify the terms H.R.B.
violated, it found that “[b]ased off of the events that took place on July 26, 2019 and
[H.R.B.’s] own testimony, it is clear that [H.R.B.] was not compliant with the terms of the
agreement.” In a previous finding, the district court stated that H.R.B. “is compliant with
her medication and continues to struggle with consistent basic cooperation with service
providers as evidenced by the July 26, 2019 meeting at Headstart and [H.R.B.’s] behavior
with [the social worker] and [GAL] later that day.”
Under the terms of the stay of adjudication, H.R.B. agreed to “[w]ork cooperatively
with ACSS and GAL” and also agreed to “[r ]espectfully communicate with [M.I.B.’s]
teachers at Headstart.” B ecause it is established in the record that H.R.B. acted
disrespectfully at the parent-teacher conference at Headstart and did not cooperate with the
social worker and GAL later that day, the district court did not clearly err by finding that
H.R.B.’s behavior on July 26 constituted a violation of the terms of the stay.
B. Timing of revocation
H.R.B. next claims that the district court abused its discretion by terminating her
parental rights because it did not find that the conditions supporting terminatio n existed at
the time of the hearing . “[R]evocation of a stay requires a sufficient evidentiary basis to
establish the existence of conditions that satisfy a statutory ground for termination of
parental rights when the revocation occurs.” Id. at 94.

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Because of the remand for additional findings, H.R.B. asserts that the district court
needed to make findings that TPR was warranted as of the time the matter was remanded
to the district court. H.R.B. relies on In re Welfare of Chosa for the proposition t hat
“evidence relating to termination must address conditions that exist at the time of the
hearing.” 290 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1980).
In its amended TPR order issued following remand, the district court noted that it
held evidentiary hearings on Sept ember 11, September 26, and Oct ober 23, 2019. The
district court then observed that following remand both ACSS and H.R.B. argued that the
record should not be reopened, and the district court accordingly ordered that the record
was closed as of April 23, 2020 —the date that H.R.B. submitted her argument that the
record should not be reopened. Therefore, consistent with Welfare of Chosa, the district
court’s amended order terminating H.R.B.’s parental rights was based on evidence existing
at the time of the termination hearings, which were held in September and October 2019.
C. Palpable Unfitness
H.R.B. argues that the district court’s order terminating her parental rights on the
statutory basis of palpable unfitness was not based on clear and convincing evidence.
Appellate courts “defer to the district court’s decision to terminate parental rights.
Therefore, if at least one statutory ground alleged in the petition is supported by clear and
convincing evidence and termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests,
[appellate courts] will affirm.” In re Welfare of Chil dren of T.R. , 750 N.W.2d 656, 661
(Minn. 2008) (citation omitted). Appellate courts review the district court’s findings of

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fact for clear error, and whether a statutory basis for TPR exists for an abuse of discretion.
In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012).
In essence, H.R.B. claims that the district court based its determination entirely on
the July 26 incident, which she asserts is insufficient to support a palpable -unfitness
determination. A district court may order TPR on the basis that
a parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child
relationship because of a consistent pattern of specific conduct
before the child or of specific conditions directly relating to the
parent and child relationship either of which are determined by
the court to be of a duration or nature that renders the parent
unable, for the reasonably foreseeable future, to care
appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental, or emotional
needs of the child.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2018).
The district court based its determination that H.R.B. was palpably unfit to be a
party to the parent -child relationship on the following findings. “Despite [H.R.B.’s]
compliance with her medication, therapy, psychiatry, and all other recommended services,
[the social worker and GAL] both remain concerned about [H.R.B.’s] mental health.
[H.R.B.] still experiences struggles with her mental health that significantly affect her
ability to parent” M.I.B. M.I.B. “has consistently reported to [the GAL] and others that
she does not want to return to” H.R.B.
The social worker testified that “she does not believe that [H.R.B.] has addressed
the issues that would allow [M.I.B.] to be brought back int o” H.R.B’s care. H.R.B. “is
focused on her own needs and not [M.I.B.’s] specific and important needs.” “Despite [the]
years of services she has received, [H.R.B.] has not progressed and still is unable to manage

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her mental health.” H.R.B.’s “inability to control her physical and verbal reactions i n
moments of mental health stress are detrimental to her relationship with” M.I.B.
Ultimately, the district court concluded that H.R.B. “is unable to care appropriately
for the ongoing physical, mental or emotional needs of [M.I.B.] There is substantial
evidence that [H.R.B.’s] mental health impedes her ability to parent” M.I.B., and that
H.R.B.’s “inability to realize the impact her behavior has on [M.I.B.] will likely persist into
the reasonably foreseeable future.”
These findings adequately support th e statutory criteria for TPR on the basis of
palpable unfitness, namely, that specific conditions directly relating to the parent and child
relationship render H.R.B. unable to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental ,
or emotional needs of M.I. B. for the reasonably foreseeable future. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
terminating H.R.B.’s parental rights on the basis of her palpable unfitn ess to be a party to
the parent-child relationship.
D. M.I.B.’s best interests
H.R.B. also asserts that the district court erred by determining that TPR is in
M.I.B.’s best interests. “[D]etermination of a child’s best interests is generally not
susceptible to an appellate court’s global rev iew of a record, and . . . an appellate court’s
combing through the record to determine best interests is inappropriate because it involves
credibility determinations.” In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 546 (Minn.
App. 2009) (quotations omitted). Appellate courts review a district court’s determination

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that TPR is in a child’s best interests for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of
A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 657 (Minn. App. 2018).
H.R.B. argues that the district court failed to make specific findings and improperly
relied on M.I.B.’s preferences because M.I.B. was five years old at the time of the hearings.
See In re Klugman, 97 N.W.2d 425, 431 (Minn. 1959) (“The preference of a child who is
of sufficient age to exercise discretion in choosing its custodian is entitled to considerable
weight . . . but it is not controlling. Where the child is too young to choose with discretion,
its preferences have little or no weight.” (quotation omitted.)). Here, the district court made
multiple findings that M.I.B.’s interest in TPR outweighed H.R.B.’s interest in preserving
the parent-child relationship, which were based largely on credibility determinations.
The GAL testified that it is in M.I.B.’s best interests that H.R.B.’s rights b e
terminated. The social worker also testified that termination is in M.I.B.’s best interests.
The district court stated that despite H.R.B.’s “clear interest in continuing to parent
[M.I.B.,] the [c]ourt finds the testimony regarding [M.I.B.’s] interest s in termination [of]
parental rights more compelling.” If, as here, a statutory basis for the TPR exists, M.I.B.’s
best interests become the paramount consideration. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7
(2018). Therefore, the district court did not abuse it s discretion by determining that TPR
is in M.I.B.’s best interests.
III. Reasonable Efforts
Finally, H.R.B. argues that ACSS did not make reasonable efforts to reunify the
family. Appellate courts will affirm a district court’s TPR order “when at least one
statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence and

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termination is in the best interests of the child, provided that the county has made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family.” In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d
381, 385 (Minn. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2018). We
review the district court’s determination that ACSS made reasonable efforts to reunite the
family for an abuse of discretion. See In re Welfare of Child of D.L .D., 865 N.W.2d 315,
323 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2015).
H.R.B. argues that the district court abused its discretion because ACSS: did not
communicate with H.R.B.’s mental-health workers; stopped providing services following
the July 26 incident; and did not allow H.R.B. to have lengthy visits with M.I.B. District
courts are required to consider the following factors to determine whether the services
provided were: “(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet
the needs of the child and family; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and accessible;
(5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under the circumstances.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260.012(h) (2018).
Here, the district court made numerous findings regarding ACSS’s efforts to reunify
the family. The district court found that ACSS “has recommended medication
management, therapies, and other services for [H.R.B. ]. [ACSS,] through the
recommendations and conditions outlined in Exhibit A, reas onably targeted services and
recommendations for the family to be reunified. The [c]ourt finds that these efforts were
adequate to meet the needs of this family.”
In addition, the district court found that “ACSS and [the] GAL have exhausted all
available resources and services in an effort to reunite” the family. The district court found

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that H.R.B. regularly met with her social worker and the GAL, and that all three met with
H.R.B.’s psychiatrist in a group setting. The district court also found that “[t]o address her
mental health, [H.R.B.] uses Bridgeview; works with an ARMHS Worker, with whom she
is currently doing DBT skills; sees her therapist and psychiatrist; takes her medi cation . . .
and has regular contact with her mental health case manager.”
The district court acknowledged H.R.B.’s testimony that ACSS and the GAL do not
promptly respond to her, but then found that the social worker testified that “she responds
to [H.R.B.’s] emails and texts as soon as she can and has done everything that she can to
respect [H.R.B’s] beliefs and opinions,” and noted that copies of responses to some of
H.R.B.’s communications were offered into evidence. The district court noted that a trial
home visit was set to take place in August, 2019, but that pla n was altered by the July 26
incident. Finally, regarding H.R.B.’s contention that ACSS stopped services, the district
court found that H.R.B. “continues to engage in services” and that H.R.B. “has services in
place but nothing is helping.” In light of these findings, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by finding that ACSS provided reasonable efforts to reunify the family.
Affirmed.