Markhel D’John Harris-Franklin, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0770

Markhel D’John Harris-Franklin, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed March 22, 2021
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-16-7308

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appel late Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Jeffrey A. Wald, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, arguing that
the district court should have suspended the underlying criminal proceedings and ordered
a competency evaluation, sua sponte, and that his waiver of counsel and guilty plea were
invalid. We affirm.
FACTS
This appeal stems from proceedings related to respondent State of Minnesota ’s
October 2016 charge of simple robbery against appellant Markhel D’John Harris-Franklin.
The Omnibus Hearing
On November 9, 2016 , the district court held an omnibus hearing on the charge .
Harris-Franklin was represented by a public defender at that hearing, but he requested to
discharge that attorney and represent him self. When the presiding judge asked Harris-
Franklin why he wanted to represent himself, he responded, “Because [the public defender]
had these people shackling me up and threaten me while I was down in the unit.” The
judge informed Harris -Franklin that the deputies, and not the public defender, were
responsible for those actions and again asked him why he wanted to represent himself.
Harris-Franklin said, “Because he’s not official. Period.” Later, when the district court
asked Harris-Franklin what he meant by “official,” he explained, “That means he do all
kind of other stuff that I just told you and you not believing, obviously, so there’s no point
in getting to it.”

3
The judge questioned Harris-Franklin, and he confirmed that he understood his right
to an attorney, the charges against him, and the various procedures he would have to follow
if he represented himself. The judge discharged the public defender and indicated that it
would appoint advisory counsel. The judge then began to review a petition to proceed pro
se with Harris-Franklin.
While discussing that petition, Harris-Franklin initially indicated that he had never
been treated for a mental-health or nervous condition. But later, he stated that he had been
hospitalized for mental -health conditions. The judge inquired about Harris -Franklin’s
mental health.
THE COURT: I do want to clarify something. You said you
do not have a mental health diagnosis.
HARRIS-FRANKLIN: I do. I got a lot of them.
THE COURT: Okay.
HARRIS-FRANKLIN: I’ve been in the hospital for them.
THE COURT: Do they get in your way of understanding what
you’re doing today?
HARRIS-FRANKLIN: Yeah.
THE COURT: They get in your way? So you don’t know what
you’re doing?
HARRIS-FRANKLIN: No.
THE COURT: So you don’t want to represent yourself?
HARRIS-FRANKLIN: I don’t want him representing me.
THE COURT: Okay. I’m talking to you about your request to
represent yourself. Do you want to represent yourself?
HARRIS-FRANKLIN: Mm-hmm.

Based on that exchange, the judge decided to “change gears” and to give Harris -Franklin
the petition to proceed pro se, so he could read it on his own. The judge told Harris -
Franklin that if he clearly wanted to represent himself after he had read the petition, then

4
the court could recall the case. Alternatively, Harris-Franklin could submit the petition at
the scheduled pretrial hearing.
The Pretrial Hearing
On December 5, 2016, the district court held a pretrial hearing, before a different
district court judge. Harris -Franklin sub mitted his petition to proceed pro se at the
beginning of that hearing. In the petition, Harris -Franklin indicated that he had been a
patient in a mental hospital, had been treated by a psychiatrist or other person for a nervous
or mental condition, had been ill recently, and had been taking pills or medicine recently.
The pretrial judge inquired about Harris-Franklin’s mental health:
THE COURT: Okay. So you have been a patient in a mental
hospital?
HARRIS-FRANKLIN: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. And where was that, sir?
HARRIS-FRANKLIN: Years ago, two or three years ago.
THE COURT: What were you there for?
HARRIS-FRANKLIN: Commit suicide attempted.
THE COURT: And you have been treated by a psychiatrist for
the same thing?
HARRIS-FRANKLIN: (Nods head.)
THE COURT: Is that a “yes”?
HARRIS-FRANKLIN: Yes.
THE COURT: Have you been ill recently?
HARRIS-FRANKLIN: No.
THE COURT: On any medications?
HARRIS-FRANKLIN: No.
THE COURT: Okay. Are you supposed to be on any
medications?
HARRIS-FRANKLIN: No.
THE COURT: All right. So you understand what’s going on,
right?
HARRIS-FRANKLIN: Yes.

5
Harris-Franklin’s responses to the district court’s questions about being ill recently and
taking medications contradicted his answers in the petition.
The pretrial judge further questioned Harris-Franklin, who stated that he understood
the various re sponsibilities he would have if he were to represent himself, as well as the
maximum sentence for the charged offense. The district court accepted the petition to
proceed pro se, finding that Harris -Franklin had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived his right to counsel.
The Plea Hearing
On January 4, 2017 , the parties appeared for trial before the same judge who had
presided over the pretrial hearing. The p rosecutor informed the district court that the
parties had reached a plea agreement, in which Harris -Franklin would plead guilty to the
amended charge of theft from person, in exchange for a downward dispositional departure,
a 300 -day cap on jail time, and a stayed top -of-the-box sentence. Additionally, the
prosecutor stated that Harris -Franklin had told him that he has an insomnia disorder and
that he “suffers from a bipolar or manic -depressive disorder for which he claims to have
not been receiving medic ation in the jail.” Nevertheless, according to the prosecutor,
Harris-Franklin stated that he “feels competent and able to enter a plea.”
The presiding judge questioned Harris-Franklin about the plea agreement and his
rights. Harris -Franklin said tha t he was familiar with the sentencing guidelines and
criminal-history system, knew that his criminal -history score was four, understood the
terms of the plea agreement, and had no questions about the agreement. The judge then
discussed Harris-Franklin’s mental-health issues:

6
THE COURT: Now, there is a portion of [the plea petition]
that mentions having been either treated by a psychiatrist or a
psychologist or being under some medications. You say
you’re under some medications now?
HARRIS-FRANKLIN: I’m not receiving them but, yeah, I’m
supposed to be.
THE COURT: Okay. You seem, as I’m speaking to you now,
you seem to understand everything that’s going on now.
HARRIS-FRANKLIN: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Do you feel like you are clear
headed?
HARRIS-FRANKLIN: Yes.
THE COURT: Anything obstructing your ability to kind of
reason or understand what’s going on here?
HARRIS-FRANKLIN: No.
THE COURT: Okay. Anything in that document you did not
understand?
HARRIS-FRANKLIN: Nope.

Harris-Franklin stated that he understood the various rights he was giving up by pleading
guilty, submitted the plea petition, and entered a factual basis for his guilty plea . The
district court accepted the guilty plea, ordered a presentence investigatio n report (PSI),
conditionally released Harris-Franklin, and scheduled a sentencing hearing.
The ensuing PSI extensively discussed Harris-Franklin’s mental health. It reported
that Harris-Franklin dropped out of school in the 11th grade and functions at an age-nine
intellectual level. He was civilly committed as mentally ill and chemically dependent from
December 2013 to June 2015. At the time of the PSI, he was receiving case management
services from Mental Health Resources. He had not taken medication since May 2016 and
“reported feeling symptomatic.” He had received Social Security Disability in the past,
though he had not received any since September 2016. The PSI described a suicide attempt
by Harris-Franklin while he was in custody on the under lying charge, in which he “was

7
naked and had his jumpsuit tied in a knot around his neck.” The suicide attempt occurred
on November 9, 2016, the same day that Harris-Franklin appeared for the omnibus hearing.
The Sentencing Hearing
On March 30, 2017, the district court held a sentencing hearing before a third district
court judge. Harris-Franklin was also scheduled to be sentenced for a separate offense of
fourth-degree assault, and a public defender represented him in those proceedings. 1 The
public defender agreed to represent Harris -Franklin on both of the pending charges at the
sentencing hearing. The district court judge who presided over the sentencing hearing had
also presided over the proceedings in Harris-Franklin’s fourth-degree assault case.
During the sentencing hearing, the public defender mentioned Harris -Franklin’s
mental-health issues, but he did so to argue that a downward dispositional departure was
appropriate. The district court sentenced Harris -Franklin to 28 month s in prison, granted
a downward dispositional departure consistent with the plea agreement, and placed him on
probation for seven years. The court eventually revoked Harris-Franklin’s probation and
executed the sentence based on probation violations.
The Postconviction Proceeding
In March 2019, nearly two years after sentencing, Harris -Franklin petitioned for
postconviction relief. He asserted that his conviction must be reversed because his waiver
of counsel and guilty plea were invalid. He also ass erted that the district court erred by

1 The charge for fourth -degree assault arose when Harris -Franklin spat on a corrections
officer who was restraining him after he attempted to commit suicide. Harris -Franklin
pleaded guilty to that offense.

8
failing to suspend the proceedings and order a competency evaluation, sua sponte. Harris-
Franklin attached an affidavit to his petiti on in which he described his mental -health
problems and declared that he was “not t hinking clearly” when he decided to represent
himself and to plead guilty.
In November 2019, the postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing on Harris-
Franklin’s petition. The presiding judge was the same judge who presided over the
sentencing hea ring and the proceedings in Harris -Franklin’s fourth -degree assault case .
Harris-Franklin did not testify, call witnesses, or present any evidence at that hearing .
Instead, he relied on the evidence that he had submitted with his petition. The
postconviction court denied Harris -Franklin’s petition, concluding that his waiver of
counsel and guilty plea were valid , and that the district court did not err by failing to
suspend the proceedings and order a competency evaluation sua sponte.
Harris-Franklin appeals.
DECISION
Minnesota’s postconviction statute enables “a person convicted of a crime” to seek
postconviction relief by filing a petition claiming that the conviction “violated the person’s
rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of the state.” Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2020). “The person seeking postconviction relief bears the burden of
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that his claims merit relief.” Crow v. State,
923 N.W.2d 2, 10 (Minn. 2019). We review the denial of a postconviction petition for an
abuse of discretion. Pearson v. State , 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). In doing so,
we review legal issues de novo and factual findings for clear error. Id.

9
I.
Harris-Franklin contends that there was reason to doubt his competency during the
underlying criminal proceedings and that the district court therefore should have suspended
the proceedings and ordered a competency evaluation. “A defendant has a due process
right not to be tried or convicted of a criminal charge if he or she is legally incompetent.”
Bonga v. State, 797 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 2011). An incompetent defendant must not
plead, be tried, or be sentenced. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 2. A defendant is
incompetent when, “due to mental illness or cognitive impairment,” he lacks the ability
either to “rationally consult with counsel” or to “understand the proceedings or participate
in the defense.” Id. If the district court doubts the defendant’s competency at any time, it
must raise the issue on its own. Id., subd. 3. Specifically, if the district court determines
that “reason exists to doubt the defendant’s competency,” then the court must suspend the
criminal proceedings and “order an examination of the defendant’s mental condition.” Id.
Relevant factors for determining whether further inquiry into competency is
necessary include “a defendant’s ‘irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior
medical opinion on competence to stand trial.’” Bonga, 797 N.W.2d at 719 (quoting Drope
v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180, 95 S. Ct. 896, 908 (1975)). “‘There are, of course, no fixed
or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine
fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of
manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated .’” Id. (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 180,
95 S. Ct. at 908).

10
Whether the court “observed procedures adequate to protect a defendant’s right not
to be tried or convicted while incompetent” is a narrower question than whether the
defendant is incompetent ; the issue is only whether the district court, “in fulfilling its
protective duty, should have conducted further inquiry.” Id. at 718 (quotation omitted).
When the evidence relevant to the defendant’s mental condition is undisputed, we “review
the record to determine whether the district court gave proper weight to the information
suggesting incompetence” when it concluded that there was not sufficient doubt of the
defendant’s competency to require further inquiry. Id. at 720 (quotation omitted). For the
following reasons, we conclude that the district court here gave proper weight to the
information suggesting incompetence.
Clearly, circumstances arose during the proceedings that could have caused one to
question Harris-Franklin’s competency. At the omnibus hearing, Harris-Franklin told the
district court that he had mental-health diagnoses and had been hospitalized for them. He
also told the district court that he wanted to discharge the public defender because the
attorney “had these people shackling [him] up and threaten [him] while [he] was down in
the unit.” Later, in response to the district court’s questions, he suggested that his mental-
health diagnoses prevented him from understanding what he was doing. In his petition to
proceed pro se, Harri s-Franklin indicated that he had been a patient in a mental hospital,
had been treated by a psychiatrist or other person for a nervous or mental condition, had
been ill recently, and had been taking pills or medicine recently.
At the plea hearing, the prosecutor told the district court that Harris -Franklin had
said that he has an insomnia disorder and “suffers from a bipolar or manic -depressive

11
disorder for which he claims to have not been receiving medication in the jail.” And the
PSI identified sever al other mental -health concerns, including that Harris -Franklin was
civilly committed from 2013 to 2015, had received Social Security Disability in the past,
was receiving case management services from Mental Health Resources, functions at an
age-nine intellectual level, and attempted to commit suicide on November 9, 2016. That
suicide attempt occurred on the same day as the omnibus hearing in the underlying case.2
The supreme court has stated that a defendant’s suicide attempt during a criminal
proceeding is evidence of irrational behavior. Id. But the supreme court has also stated
that if the district court, prosecutor, and defense counsel have the opportunity to observe
the defendant in the context of the criminal proceeding after the suicide attempt , they can
gauge whether the defendant meets the competency standard. Id. Those are the
circumstances here.
Moreover, a defendant is not incompetent simply because he has a mental illness or
cognitive impairmen t. Instead, the defendant must lack the abi lity either to “rationally
consult with counsel” or to “understand the proceedings or participate in the defense” as a
result of mental illness or cognitive impairment. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 2. Several
circumstances indicated that Harris-Franklin could rationally consult with counsel,
understand the proceedings, and participate in the defense . For example, Harris-Franklin
asked the district court to explain the meaning of probable cause, demonstrating that he
could ask appropriate questions if he did not understand certain legal concepts.

2 It is not clear from the record whether the suicide attempt occurred before or after Harris-
Franklin appeared in court for the omnibus hearing.

12
While representing himself, Harris -Franklin negotiated a plea agreement in which
he would plead guilty to the amended, lesser charge of theft from person and would receive
a downward dispositional departure. Harris-Franklin discussed the effect of that plea
agreement with the district court at the plea hearing . He said that he understood the
sentencing guidelines, the meaning of a “top -of-the-box” sentence, his criminal -history
score, and how his sentence under the plea agreement differed from the sentence he would
otherwise receive if he were found guilty . Harris-Franklin’s ability to negotiate a plea
agreement with the prosecutor a nd to converse with the district court about the terms of
that agreement strongly suggested that he could rationally consult with an attorney and that
he understood the proceedings and could participate in his defense , despite his mental
illness. Indeed, during the plea hearing, the district court observed that Harris -Franklin
seemed “to understand everything that’s going on now,” and Harris-Franklin responded,
“Yes.” Harris -Franklin also said that he felt “clear headed” and that nothing was
obstructing his ability to understand the proceedings.
We note that three different district court judges presided over the proceedin gs at
various points during the case and had the opportunity to observe Harris-Franklin’s
demeanor. And Harris-Franklin was represented by a public defender at the sentencing
hearing, who was familiar with his mental-health conditions. As a result, the judges and
the public defender could gauge from Harris-Franklin’s demeanor whether he was able to
rationally consult with his attorney, capable of understanding the proceedings, and capable
of participating in his defense. Although the public defender mentioned some of Harris-
Franklin’s mental -health concerns to the court , he did so as support for a downward

13
dispositional departure, and not to suggest that Harris-Franklin was legally incompetent.
Indeed, the public defender did not voice concern that Harris-Franklin was incompetent at
any point during the sentencing hearing.3
The fact that none of the three judges who presided over the hearings in the
underlying case, nor the public defender who represented Harris-Franklin at the sentencing
hearing and in another pending criminal case, expressed doubt regarding Harris-Franklin’s
competency strongly suggests that he act ed rationally overall and underst ood the
proceedings.
In sum, given the legal standard for competency and all the circumstances of this
case, we cannot say that the district court improperl y weighed the information suggesting
incompetence. The district court therefore did not err by failing to suspend the criminal
proceedings, sua sponte, for the purpose of obtaining a formal competency evaluation.
II.
Harris-Franklin also contends that his waiver of counsel and guilty plea were
invalid. He argues that the district court did not adequately inquire into whether his mental-
health issues prevented him from entering a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel and
a valid guilty plea.

3 Harris-Franklin contends that it does not matter whether the public defender raised th e
issue of competency because the district court must independently determine whether there
is reason to doubt competency, even if neither party raises that issue. He is correct
regarding that point, but the defendant’s demeanor in court is an important f actor in
determining whether the district court properly weighed inform ation suggesting
incompetence.

14
Waiver of Counsel
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions grant criminal defendants the right
to the assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. A defendant’s
waiver of the right to counsel must be “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” State v. Jones,
772 N.W.2d 496, 504 (Minn. 2009). If the relevant facts are undisputed, we review de
novo whether a waiver of counsel wa s knowing and intelligent. State v. Rhoads , 813
N.W.2d 880, 885 (Minn. 2012).
Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4), governs the procedure that district courts must
follow when a defendant charged with a felony wishes to waive his right to counsel. The
defendant must “enter on the record a voluntary and intelligent written waiver of t he right
to counsel.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4). Before accepting the waiver, the district
court must advise the defendant of the “nature of the charges,” “all offenses included within
the charges,” the “range of allowable punishments,” the fact that “there may be defenses”
and that “mitigating circumstances may exist,” and “all other facts essential to a broad
understanding of the consequences of the waiver of the right to counsel, including the
advantages and disadvantages of the decision to waive counsel.” Id., subd. 1(4)(a)-(f).
Harris-Franklin argues that the district court was aware of his mental -health issues
and did not sufficiently inquire into whether those issues prevented him from “fully
evaluating the risks of self-representation.”
At the omnibus hearing, the district court asked Harris-Franklin if he understood the
charge against him and that a person with prior convictions could face a longer prison
sentence. The district court also asked whether he understood the various proc edures he

15
would have to comply with if he were to represent himself, such as picking a jury,
responding to the state’s legal arguments, subpoenaing witnesses to testify in his defense,
deciding whether to testify himself, following the rules of evidence, a nd proposing jury
instructions.
The district court reviewed some of those pro cedures at the pretrial hearing and
informed Harris-Franklin that he would have to prepare for trial, adhere to the same rules
as an attorney, and be bound by the decisions he would make. The district court also
informed Harris-Franklin of the charge and asked whether he knew the maximum sentence
for that charge. Harris-Franklin answered, “Yes.” In sum, the district court followed the
requirements of Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, su bd. 1(4), and ensured that Harris -Franklin
understood the charges against him and the disadvantages of self-representation.
At the pretrial hearing, t he district court also inquired about Harris -Franklin’s
mental-health conditions in detail, and the court confirmed that he understood what was
happening during the proceedings . By doing so, t he district court ensured that Harris-
Franklin’s waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent despite his mental-health issues.
Harris-Franklin argues that the district court should have inquired further regarding
his waiver of counsel after the court received the PSI. But Harris-Franklin was represented
by a public defender at the sentencing hearing, and the public defender did not raise any
concerns about his competency or his previous ability to knowingly and intelligently waive
his right to counsel. As discussed above, the fact that the public defender did not raise the
competency issue suggests that he did not have any concerns about Harris -Franklin’s

16
competency. That fact also indicates that the district court reasonably did not question
whether Harris-Franklin’s earlier waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent.
In sum, on this record we are satisfied that Harris-Franklin’s waiver of counsel was
knowing and intelligent and therefore valid.
Guilty Plea
At any time, the court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea when
withdrawal “is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd.
1. A manifest injustice exists when a guilty plea is not valid. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d
90, 94 (Minn. 2010). “To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate,
voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. The defendant has the burden to show that his plea was
invalid. Id. The validity of a guilty plea is a question of law that we review de novo. Id.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1, governs the procedures that the district court must
follow in felony cases before accepting a guilty plea from a defendant. One requirement
is that the district court must determine whether the defendant “has a mental disability” or
“is undergoing medical or psychiatric treatment.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1(5)(b)-
(c). It also must ensure that the defendant understands the rights he is giving up by pleading
guilty. Id., subd. 1(6).
Harris-Franklin argues that “the district court lacked sufficient facts to evaluate
whether [his] mental disability was severe enough to prevent an intelligent waiver of trial
rights and guilty plea.” The intelligence requirement ensures that the defendant
understands the charges, the rights he is waiving by pleading guilty, and the consequences
of his plea. State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983).

17
Here, in response to the district court’s questions, Harris-Franklin indicated that he
understood the charge against him, the potential sentence for the charged offense based on
his criminal -history score and the sentencing guidelines, and the effect of the plea
agreement. The district court questioned Harris-Franklin to ensure that he understood the
rights that he was giving up by pleading guilty, including the right to challenge the state’s
evidence and the right to a jury trial. The district court questioned Harris-Franklin and
established that if the case proceeded to trial, he would be presumed innocent, the state
would have to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury would have to find him
guilty unanimously, and he would have the opportunity to cross -examine the state’s
witnesses, challenge the state’s evidence, present his own witnesses, and testify in his own
defense. Harris-Franklin stated that he understood that he was giving up all of those rights
by pleading guilty.
The district court also inquired about Harris-Franklin’s mental-health conditions in
detail at the plea hearing, as described in section I of this opinion. By doing so, the district
court ensured that Harris-Franklin’s waiver of trial rights and guilty plea w as intelligent
despite his mental-health issues.
Harris-Franklin argues that the district court should have further inquired regarding
his pro se guilty plea after the PSI provided detailed information about his mental -health
issues and cognitive limitations. But once again, Harr is-Franklin was represented by a
public defender at the sentencing hearing, and the public defender did not raise any
concerns about his competency or the validity of his previous guilty plea. As discussed
above, the fact that the public defender did not raise a competency issue suggests that he

18
did not have any concerns about Harris -Franklin’s competency. That fact also indicates
that the district court reasonably did not question whether Harris -Franklin’s earlier guilty
plea was valid.
In his affidavit attached to his postconviction petition, Harris -Franklin said, “I was
not thinking clearly when I decided to plead guilty. I did not understand the consequences
of my guilty plea. I did not understand the rights I was giving up by pleading guilty.” The
postconviction court observed that Harris-Franklin’s affidavit contradicted his statements
at the plea hearing. Indeed, during the plea hearing, Harris-Franklin told the district court
that he understood all the rights he was giving up by pleading guilt y, that he was clear
headed, and that he understood everything that was happening.
A postconviction court d oes not err by rejecting a defendant’s claim that h is plea
was unintelligent if his argument that he did not understand the charges is refuted by h is
own testimony in the record. Williams v. State , 760 N.W.2d 8, 15 (Minn. App. 2009),
review denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 2009). Here, Harris -Franklin’s affidavit contradicts his
statements at the plea hearing. Moreover, the affidavit does not explain his assertion that
he was not thinking clearly at the time of his guilty plea. On this record, Harris-Franklin
fails to establish that his trial waiver and guilty plea were unintelligent and therefore
invalid.
Conclusion
We are sympathetic to Harris -Franklin’s mental -health issues and cognitive
limitations. But those circumstances d o not necessarily indicate that he wa s likely
incompetent under the relevant standard. The record shows that each of the judges who

19
interacted with Harris -Franklin took appropriate steps to ensure that he understood the
proceedings and that he made informed decisions. Indeed, the three experienced district
court judges handled the situation exceptionally well. In addition, the postconviction judge
had presided over the proceedings in Harris-Franklin’s separate fourth-degree assault case.
Thus, the postconviction judge had the benefit of several first-hand interactions with, and
observations of , Harris-Franklin during the underlying proceedings . Moreover, the
postconviction c ourt provided Harris -Franklin an opportunity to provide additional
evidence in support of his claims at a postconviction hearing . On this record, we discern
no basis to conclude that the postconviction court abused its discretion in denying relief.
Affirmed.