In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0781

In re the Marriage of:

David Gordon Wingad, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Janet Marie Wingad,
Appellant.

Filed September 27, 2021
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-FA-18-144

David Gordon Wingad, Lakeville, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Janet Marie Wingad, Eagan, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Pr esiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this marital-dissolution appeal, appellant argues that the district court erred (1) by
denying her request for spousal maintenance and by not reserving the issue, (2) by
improperly calculating her nonmarital interest in the parties’ real property, (3) by ordering
the sale of the marital homestead, (4) in its treatment of a life-insurance policy, and (5) by
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not including two loans in its division of ma rital debts. Appellant also argues that the
district court judge was biased against her. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent David Gordon Wingad (husba nd) and appellant Janet Marie Wingad
(wife) married in 1982. The parties separated in June 2015, and husband filed a petition for
dissolution of marriage in Marc h 2018. They had no joint minor childre n at the time of
dissolution.
In August 2019, following a trial, the district court entered its judgment and decree.
Wife moved for amended findings or a new trial. After a hearing, the district court granted
wife’s motion in part and denied her motion in part in an amended judgment and decree
(the J&D).
Several provisions of the J&D are at issue here and are more fully discussed below.
Briefly, the district court denied wife’s re quest for spousal maintenance and denied her
request to reserve jurisdiction over the issue. In addition, the district court made awards of
nonmarital and marital property interests with respect to two pieces of real estate—the
parties’ marital homestead and rental property in Faribault that the parties owned. The
district court also ordered the sale of the marital homestead to relieve husband of his
mortgage obligation. The district court divided the parties’ life insurance policies based on
the named policyholder and stated that the pa rties are “under no obligation to name the
other party as beneficiary of any life insurance policy.” The district court also apportioned
the marital debts according to the party who incurred the debts.
Wife appeals.
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DECISION
Wife represents herself in this appeal. As a pro se appellant, wife is given some
leeway in complyin g with court rules but “is still not re lieved of the burden of, at least,
adequately communicating to the court what it is [she] wants accomplished and by whom.”
Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc., 400 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. 1987) (citation omitted). We do
not presume that the district court has erred; the party asserting error has the burden of
showing it. Horodenski v. Lyndale Green Townhome Ass’n, 804 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Minn.
App. 2011). Wife thus has the burden of demonstrating error, and reversal is inappropriate
unless she does so. See Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (Minn. 1944).
From wife’s brief, we discern six categorie s of alleged error, which we address in
turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying spousal maintenance.

Wife argues that the district court e rred by denying her request for spousal
maintenance. We review a district court’s decision regarding spousal maintenance for an
abuse of discretion. See Erlandson v. Erlandson , 318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn. 1982). And
we review a district court’s factual finding s underlying a spousal-maintenance award for
clear error. Maiers v. Maiers , 775 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Minn. App. 2009). A district court
clearly errs when there is no reasonable evidence in the record to support the district court’s
findings. Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013).
A district court may grant a request for spousal maintenance if it finds that the
spouse seeking maintenance either (1) “lac ks sufficient property , including marital
property apportioned to the spouse, to provide for reas onable needs of the spouse
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considering the standard of living establishe d during the marriage”; or (2) “is unable to
provide adequate self-support, after consideri ng the standard of livin g established during
the marriage and all relevant circumstances, through appropriate employment.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.552, subd. 1 (2020); see also Lyon v. Lyon, 439 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Minn. 1989) (stating
that an award of maintenance depends on a showing of need). If spousal maintenance is
appropriate, the district court must set maintenance, after considering several factors, “in
amounts and for periods of time, either temporary or permanent, as the court deems just.”
Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2020).1 Weighing the factors requires the district court to
conduct “a balancing of the recipient’s need against the obligor’s ability to pay.” Prahl v.
Prahl, 627 N.W.2d 698, 702 (Minn. App. 2001).
The district court denied wife’s request for spousal maintenance for several reasons.
First, wife provided neither a proposed amount of spousal maintenance nor a written
budget. Second, the district court found that wife can meet her reasonable monthly needs.
Third, the district court found that husband could not afford paying a spousal-maintenance
obligation due to his own expenses.

1 These factors include: (1) the financial re sources of the requesting party, (2) the time
necessary for and the probability of the requesting party to find employment and become
self-supporting, (3) the standard of living du ring the marriage, (4) the duration of the
marriage and the length of any absence from em ployment by the requesting party, (5) the
loss of earnings, seniority, retirement benefits, and other employment opportunities by the
requesting party, (6) the age and health of the requesting party, (7) the ability of the paying
spouse to afford spousal maintenance, (8) each party’s role in the acquisition, preservation,
depreciation, or appreciation in the amount of value of the marital property. Minn. Stat.
§ 518.552, subd. 2.
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Wife makes five arguments challenging the denial of her request for spousal
maintenance. We address each in turn.
A. The district court made a harmless error calculating husband’s income.
Wife argues that the district court e rred when calculating husband’s monthly
income. A district court’s determination of income is a finding of fact that will not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous. Peterka v. Peterka , 675 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn. App.
2004).
The district court determined that husba nd’s monthly income was $5,179.78. That
determination was based on a spreadsheet submitted by husband and his testimony at trial.
Part of that income calculation was $172.65 per month from husband’s federal government
retirement annuity. This was the correct amount until March 2018, when husband stopped
paying for a life-insurance policy with the pr oceeds from the annuity . But, the record
shows, and husband does not dispute, that after cancelation of the life-insurance policy the
amount husband received each month from the federal government retirement annuity
increased to $471. This $298.35 increase to husband’s income changed husband’s monthly
income to $5,478.13. Thus, th e district court’s finding regarding husband’s income was
clearly erroneous.
While the district court did err, wife did not meet her burden of showing the error
prejudiced her. “Although error may exist, unless the error is prejudicial, no grounds exist
for reversal.” Kallio v. Ford Motor Co. , 407 N.W.2d 92, 98 (Minn. 1987); see Sinda v.
Sinda, 949 N.W.2d 170, 176 (Minn. App. 2020) (applying this concept in a maintenance
dispute and noting that the burden to show prejudice is on the party seeking relief); Minn.
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R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmle ss error to be ignored). One of the district court’s reasons
for denying wife’s request for spousal ma intenance was husband’s inability to pay. See
Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(g). The district court based this determination on husband’s
debt and his inability to increase his income due to health issues—determinations that wife
does not contest. Wife has not shown that the district court’s error in calculating husband’s
income should change the ultimate determina tion that husband cannot afford spousal
maintenance. Thus, wife has not met her burden of showing this error prejudices her.
B. Wife did not establish error regarding her income.

Wife next argues that the district cour t erred when calculating her income. The
district court found that wife’s monthly income was between $3,300.33 and $3,383.67. The
district court based this determination on wife’s work earnings and her receipt of regular,
periodic gifts from her mother. Wife claims the district court erred in three ways.
First, wife claims the district court mi scalculated what she earns as a special
education paraprofessional. The district court determined that wife earns $2,957 per month
during the school year, which, when prorat ed over twelve months, equals $2,217 per
month. This amount equals ea rnings of $26,604 per year. Wi fe argues that the district
court’s determination is not supported by the re cord because her Social Security earnings
record shows wife earned a maximum of $24,422 per year, and that the district court did
not properly determine which or how many days of the year she works.
An income determination need only be within a “reasonable range of figures.”
Schreifels v. Schreifels , 450 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Minn. Ap p. 1990) (quotation omitted).
Evidence in the reco rd shows that the district court’s determination of wife’s income is
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reasonable. Wife’s Social Secu rity earnings record shows a consistent increase in her
earnings of around $1,000 per year from 2005 to 2017, with an exception between 2011
and 2013. Also, wife testified at trial that, while they are not guaranteed, she is subject to
pay raises based on her tenure at the school. The district cour t’s determination that wife
earned $26,604 in 2019 is cons istent with this steady increase in wife’s earnings over the
previous decade. Thus, the district court’s de termination of wife’s earned income is not
clear error.
Second, wife argues that the district court erred by including the $1,300 she receives
from the Faribault rental property in her monthly income. But the district court explicitly
found that this amount was not part of wife’s monthly income.
Third, wife argues that the district court erred by including in her income annual
payments of $13,000 to $14,000 that she r eceives from her mother. The district court
determined that, because wife had received these payments since 2013 and the amount did
not significantly change year to year, the pa yments constituted a “si gnificant and regular
source of funds” for wife. Wife argues that th e district court should have classified these
payments as gifts rather than a source of income.
When money is periodically paid to an individual, it is considered income. See
Minn. Stat. § 518A.26, subds. 1, 8 (2020) (defining gross income according to Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.29 for purposes of Chapters 518 and 51 8A of Minnesota Statutes); Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.29(a) (2020) (stating that gross income “includes any form of periodic payment to
an individual”). We have held that a gift that is “regularly received from a dependable
source” may be considered income when dete rmining a party’s child -support obligation.
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Barnier v. Wells, 476 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Minn. App. 1991). Because the same definition of
gross income applies to both child-support obligations and spousal maintenance, our
holding in Barnier applies to this case.
Wife testified at trial that she received gift money from her mother every year since
2013 with the exce ption of 2015. Wife also testified that she received $14,000 each year
from 2016 to 2018 and $ 13,000 a year in 2013 and 2014. Thus, the district court’s
determination that the periodic payments from her mother are income was not clear error.
Wife also argues that the district court erred because she testified that her mother
would no longer be giving her this money. Because we defer to the district court on matters
of witness credibility and the weight given to evidence, see Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d
203, 210 (Minn. 1988), this argument fails.
C. The district court did not err by de termining that wife could meet her
monthly budget.

Wife next argues that the district court erred by determining that her income was
sufficient to meet her monthly budget. Wife makes two arguments.
First, wife argues that the district court improperly calculated her monthly expenses.
Wife did not submit a detailed monthly budget , so the district court relied on wife’s
testimony to determine her monthly budget. Wife testified that her expenses total $2,345.66
per month. 2 The district court determined that this testimony was “consistent with a

2 Wife testified to the following expenses : $1,391 in mortgage payments, $120 for
electricity on the homestead, $ 120 for other utilities, $383 in car payments, $75 in gas,
$130 for groceries, $21.66 in water and sewage costs, $55 for her cell phone plan, and $50
in general expenses.

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monthly budget being met with the income found herein, based upon what was known.”
This determination is supported by the record. Although wife’s expenses are slightly above
her monthly income, the district court determ ined that wife’s consistent on-time payment
of bills, coupled with her sp ending additional money on ho me repairs and improvements
both before and during the parties’ separation, indicates that wife has sufficient income to
meet her monthly expenses.
Second, wife argues that her monthly expenses do not meet her marital standard of
living. The standard of living established duri ng the marriage is a factor to be considered
in crafting maintenance orders. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1. Wh en awarding spousal
maintenance, a district court must structure it to maintain both parties’ marital standard of
living as closely as is equitable under the circumstances. Peterka, 675 N.W.2d at 358.
But, here, wife did not testify about her marital standard of living nor did she testify
as to how much spousal maintenance was required to meet that marital standard of living.3
Because we cannot find facts on appeal, wife’s argument fails. Kucera v. Kucera , 146
N.W.2d 181, 183 (Minn. 1966).
D. The district court did not err by denying wife’s request for lump-sum
payment of a portion of husband’s disability benefits.

Wife also argues that she was entitled to a lump sum of money representing a portion
of the disability payments from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) that husband
received while the parties were married. As part of his VA disab ility benefits, husband

3 On appeal, wife suggests $1,500 per month as an appr opriate amount of spousal
maintenance, but she did not raise that amount to the district court.
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received an additional $147 per month because he was married. Wife argues she is entitled
to this additional money for the time period that the parties were married but separated—a
total of $7,056. The district court denied this request.
As the district court recognized, the disa bility payments were part of husband’s
income. Wife has not advanced a convincing argument for why she is entitled to a property
award for any portion of the funds from the disability payments made to husband while the
parties were married, before or after the valuation date. See Horodenski, 804 N.W.2d at
372 (stating that the appellant bears the burde n of proving error on a ppeal). The district
court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting wife’s argument that she was entitled to such
a property award.
E. The district court did not err by not retaining jurisdiction over spousal
maintenance.

Finally, wife argues that the district court erred by not reserving the issue of spousal
maintenance. The district court denied wife ’s request to reserve spousal maintenance
because she did not raise the issue prior to her posttrial mo tion for amended findings. An
issue raised for the first time in a motion for amended findings is raised “too late.” Allen v.
Cent. Motors, Inc., 283 N.W. 490, 492 (Minn. 1939); see Antonson v. Ekvall, 186 N.W.2d
187, 189 (Minn. 1971) (stating that an issue is raised “too late” if it is first raised in a
motion for a new trial); see also Grigsby v. Grigsby , 648 N.W.2d 716, 726 (Minn. App.
2002) (citing these aspects of Allen and Antonson in a family-law appeal), rev. denied
(Minn. Oct. 15, 2002). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying wife’s
request to reserve spousal maintenance.
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion when allocating the parties’ real
property.

Wife next argues that the district court abused its discretion in allocating the parties’
real property. “Whether property is marital or nonmarital is a question of law, but a
reviewing court must defer to the [district] court’s underlying findings of fact,” absent clear
error. Olsen v. Olsen , 562 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1997). A district court has broad
discretion in the division of marital property during a ma rital dissolution proceeding.
Antone v. Antone , 645 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. 2002). We will affirm the district court’s
division of marital property “if it had an acceptable basis in fact and principle even though
we might have taken a different approach.” Id.
A. The district court did not err when valuing wife’s nonmarital interest in
the parties’ Faribault rental property.

Wife first argues that the district court erred in valuing her nonmarital interest in the
parties’ Faribault rental property. Specifi cally, wife argues that the district court
erroneously failed to calculate the increase of her nonmarital interest in the property due to
market forces.
All property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be marital property,
regardless of whether the title to the property is held by onl y one of the spouses. Minn.
Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b (2020). However, when an asset has both marital and nonmarital
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interests, the district court apportions the value of the asset between marital and nonmarital
interests using the Schmitz formula. Antone, 645 N.W.2d at 102.4
Here, neither party disputes that wife used $27,000 of her nonmarital funds as a
down payment on the Faribault rental proper ty. The district court awarded wife that
nonmarital interest in the property. But the district court rejected wife’s argument that she
was entitled to an additional award for an increase in value of her nonmarital interest under
the Schmitz formula. The district court did so because it found that the property had
decreased in value from the time the parties purchased the property to the valuation date.
It found that the value of the Faribault rental property at the time of purchase was $181,700
and that the value as of the valuation date was $180,900.
Wife argues that the district court’s dete rmination of a decrease in the property’s
value is based on an error in determining the value of the property at the time of purchase.
She argues that the district c ourt should have valued the pr operty at $146,500, which she
asserts was the purchase price, rather than $181,700. But the district court’s determination
is supported by the record. Wi fe did not testify to a purcha se price of $146,500, and she

4 In Nardini v. Nardini, the supreme court summarized the Schmitz formula as follows:
The present value of a nonmarital asset used in the acquisition
of marital property is the proportion the net equity or
contribution at the time of acqui sition bore to the value of the
property at the time of purchase multiplied by the value of the
property at the time of separa tion. The remainder of equity
increase is characterized as marital property and is distributed
according to Minn. Stat. § 518.58 (1980).

414 N.W.2d 184, 191 (Minn. 1987).
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submitted, and testified that she agreed to, the property’s 2016 property tax valuation,
which was $181,700. The district court did not clearly err in its factual determinations and,
because the value of the property decreased after purchase, did not err by rejecting wife’s
argument for an additional nonmarital interest in the property under the Schmitz formula.
B. The district court did not err by not gi ving wife all of the equity in the
marital homestead.

Wife next argues that the district court should have awarded her all of the equity in
the parties’ homestead.
The parties purchased the marital homestead in 1997. In allo cating the parties’
interests in the homestead, the district court awarded wife $20,000, describing the sum, in
quotation marks, as her “non-marital” interest in the marital homestead. This “non-marital”
interest arose in 2017 when wife used $20,000 of the proceeds from the sale of the parties’
cabin to extinguish the $86,528 debt then ow ing under the parties’ home equity line of
credit (HELOC). Wife argued to the district court, and seems to argue here, that she is also
entitled either to the entire incr ease in equity in the homest ead because she “rescued” the
homestead or to the first $66,528 of proceed s from the sale of the homestead because
husband “should not benefit from” the loan forgiveness that she achieved.
Although the district court used the term “non-marital” (again, in quotation marks)
in giving credit to wife for $20,000 worth of equity in the homeste ad, it presumably was
exercising its authority under Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2020), to divide marital
property. This statute allows the district court, when dividing marital property, to consider
“the contribution of each [p arty] in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation or
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appreciation in the amount or value of the marital property.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1
(emphasis added). While wife disagrees with the district court’s determination, the district
court’s decision to return to wife the money used to preserve the marital homestead and
extinguish the HELOC was with in its broad discretion in dividing marital property. See
Antone, 645 N.W.2d at 100.
III. The district court did not err by ordering the sale of the marital homestead.
Wife next argues that the district court erred by ordering the sale of the marital
homestead following the judgment and decree. Pending the sale, wife is the sole occupant
of the home and is responsible for all costs involved with the homestead until it is sold.
A district court has broad discretion in the division of marital property. Antone, 645
N.W.2d at 100. The district court’s discretion may extend to ordering the sale of a marital
homestead. Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 96 N.W.2d 14, 24-25 (Minn. 1959).
We discern no abuse of discretion in the di strict court’s order to sell the marital
homestead. The district court found that, if the homestead were sold, husband’s obligations
under the mortgage would be extinguished and provide him the ability to purchase a home
more suited to his health need s. This conclusion is supported by the record. Husband has
congestive heart failure and cannot walk up many stairs. He is considered 100% disabled
by the VA. Husband also was denied a mortgage on a new home due to insufficient income
and excessive obligations. Requiring the sale of the homestead would relieve husband of
the homestead’s mortgage obligations while also providing him with part of the remaining
proceeds of the sale to put towards a new home. Thus, the district court’s order to sell the
marital homestead is supported by the record and within the district court’s discretion.
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Wife argues that selling the house would un fairly force her to move. Though wife
will have to move, we defer to the district court’s division of property and the orders to sell
marital property. Id. Wife also argues that the district court’s decision is against logic
because husband has since been able to purchase a home before the sale of the homestead.
But that information is outside of the record both for wife’s motion to amend findings and
on appeal, and we will not consider an ar gument based on extra-record materials. See
Zander v. Zander, 720 N.W.2d 360, 364 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 14,
2006); Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (defining the record on appeal).
IV. Wife forfeited her argument regarding husband’s life-insurance policy.

Wife next argues, for the first time on appeal, that husband improperly disposed of
an asset when he cancelled his option B univers al life insurance policy listing wife as the
beneficiary while the divorce was pending. Generally, a party to a divorce has a fiduciary
duty to the other party “for any profit or loss derived by the party, without the consent of
the other, from a transaction or from any use by the party of the marital assets.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.58, subd. 1a (2020). Wife construes husband’s life-insurance policy as a marital
asset, which would in turn mean that, by removing her as a beneficiary, husband improperly
disposed of a marital asset without her consent. However, because wife raises this issue for
the first time on appeal, the issue is forfeited. See Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582
(Minn. 1988); Bedner v. Bedner, 946 N.W.2d 921, 926 (Minn. App. 2020) (applying this
aspect of Thiele in a family-law appeal).
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V. The district court did not err by not apportioning two debts asserted by wife.

Wife next argues that the district court erred because it did not include two alleged
debts in its allocation of marital debts. These alleged debts are $15,000 to wife’s friend and
$14,000 to wife’s mother.
Because wife did not present ev idence of either debt before or at trial, the district
court was not notified of these debts and th erefore could not apportion them. A motion to
amend findings must be based on the files, e xhibits, and evidence pr esented during trial,
not on evidence outside the record. Zander, 720 N.W.2d at 364.
There is nothing in the record before tria l listing the $15,000 debt to wife’s friend.
At trial, wife did testify that the friend gave her a “gift” of $15,000, but that is the only
time wife mentioned this debt. Because there is no record of the debt to wife’s friend before
trial and the only reference to this debt at tria l characterized it as a gift, the district court
properly declined to allocate part of this debt to husband. See id.
Similarly, there is no reference to the $14,0 00 debt to wife’s mother before trial. At
trial, wife mentioned a $14,000 payment to her by her mother during trial and mentioned
how her mother paid for certain renovations at the Faribault rental property. However, wife
never explicitly connected any of her mother’s $14,000 gifts to wife as the money used for
these renovations. Because there was no evidence of the debt owed to wife’s mother, the
district court could not allocate that debt. Id.
VI. There is no evidence that the district court judge was biased against wife.
Finally, wife alludes to the district court judge being biased against her.
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An appellate court presumes that the dist rict court judge discharged all judicial
duties in a proper manner. McKenzie v. State , 583 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1998). The
appellate court objectively reviews the fact s and circumstances surrounding a claim of
judicial bias. State v. Burrell, 743 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Minn. 2008). The presumption that a
judge discharged all judicial duties in an objective and ne utral manner may be overcome
only if the party alleging bias offers evidence of favoritism or antagonism. Id.
Wife’s claim of bias fails because she did no t raise the issue of judicial bias to the
district court. We consider “only those issu es that the record s hows were presented and
considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” Gummow v. Gummow, 375
N.W.2d 30, 34 (Minn. App. 1985) (quotation omitted) (observing that appellant raised no
objections that the district court was biased against her and did not move the district court
to recuse himself). Because wife did not raise he r claims of bias to the district court, the
argument is forfeited on appeal. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582.
Even were wife’s claims properly pres ented on appeal, we see no evidence of
judicial bias by the district court judge. Wife seems to argue that the judge was biased
against her because the district court rejected several of her requests during the separation
proceedings. However, adverse rulings are not a basis for imputing bias to a judge. Olson
v. Olson, 392 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. App. 1986).
Affirmed.