In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Nicholas Scott Thompson.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0805

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Nicholas Scott Thompson.

Filed November 9, 2020
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Jackson County District Court
File No. 32-PR-20-9

Jennifer Thon, Steven D. Winkler, Warren J. Maas, Jones Law Office, Mankato, Minnesota
(for appellant Nicholas Scott Thompson)

Thomas J. Prochazka, Acting Jackson C ounty Attorney, Jackson, Minnesota (for
respondent Des Moines Valley Health and Human Services)

Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Florey, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SEGAL, Chief Judge
Appellant challenges the findings in support of the district court’s order continuing
his commitment as a person with mental illness. Because the evidence is sufficient to
support his continued commitment, we affirm.
FACTS
In July 2018, an individual called 911 and informed dispatch that a person at the
address required assistance. Law enforcem ent responded and found appellant Nicholas

2
Scott Thompson’s mother deceased as a result of strangula tion. Thompson was charged
with second-degree murder, but was found not competent to stand trial due to mental
illness. In March 2019, Thom pson was civilly committed as mentally ill for a period of
six months. In September 2019, his comm itment was continued for an additional six
months based on a lack of progress and continued threatening behavior.
Thompson was initially housed at Anoka Metro Regional Treatment Center
(AMRTC). He remained at AMRTC from March 2019 until May 20 19, when he was
transferred to the Minnesota Security Ho spital (MSH). His discharge summary from
AMRTC indicates that he adamantly refuse d to participate in treatment, and was
transferred to MSH based on “alleged behaviors not appropriate for the AMRTC setting.”
These behaviors included “stirring up the other patients,” smearing feces on the wall, and
pitting the other patients against one another. He was transferred to MSH with a diagnosis
of delusional disorder, persecutory type.
At MSH, Thompson continued to refu se treatment and exhibited delusional
thinking, including a claim th at the police department and his family were conspiring
against him. Dr. John Franzen examined Thompson at MSH, and his report indicates that
Thompson made “a few odd statements that it would be legal to kill somebody in his home
if he felt threatened” and that Dr. Franzen “did not push that issue because Mr. Thompson
gets very irate very quickly and Mr. Thompson could very well be dangerous.” Thompson
was discharged from MSH to Jackson County Jail in December 2019, on the grounds that
he was at “baseline psychiatrically.”

3
In February 2020, respondent Des Moines Valley Health and Human Services (the
county) filed a petition to continue Thompson’ s commitment. The county alleged that
continued commitment was necessary becaus e Thompson still exhibited delusional and
paranoid thinking and had not participated in any services or taken medication for his
mental illness since his initial commitment. Dr. Charles Chmielewski and Dr. Tyler Dority
were appointed to examine T hompson. Both agreed that Thompson still suffered from
delusional disorder, persecutory type. Dr. Chmielewski supported Thompson’s continued
commitment, but Dr. Dority did not. Dr. Do rity acknowledged that Thompson “clearly
suffers from a delusional disorder and is ce rtainly in need of ongoing psychiatric and
psychological treatment toward long-term st abilization,” and may be a danger to himself
and others if he were released. Dr. Dor ity, however, opined that, because Thompson was
incarcerated at Jackson County Jail and would remain incarcerated until his criminal case
was concluded, he did not pose a danger to the public. Dr. Dority felt the more appropriate
course of action would be to wait until the conclusion of Th ompson’s criminal case and
then have the county re-f ile a commitment petition if Th ompson were acquitted of the
charges.
In April 2020, the district court conti nued Thompson’s commitment. The district
court determined that Thompson met the statutory definition of a mentally ill person, was
a risk to himself and others, and there were no less restrictive alte rnatives that would
adequately provide treatment and safeguard Thompson and others. This appeal follows.

4
D E C I S I O N
In reviewing a commitment order, we will no t reverse a district court’s findings of
fact unless they are clearly erroneous. In re McGaughey , 536 N.W.2d 621, 623 (Minn.
1995). The court reviews de novo whether the evidence is sufficient to meet the standard
of commitment. In re Thulin, 660 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. App. 2003).
An action to continue the commitment of an individual as mentally ill, after one six-
month continuance has already been granted, must be commenced by the filing of a new
petition. In re Brown, 640 N.W.2d 919, 922-23 (Minn. 200 2). A district court may not
grant the petition unless it is supported by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed
patient is mentally ill, as defined by statut e, and no suitable alte rnative to commitment
exists. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1(a) (2018); Brown, 640 N.W.2d at 922. The phrase
“person who is mentally ill” is defined in the statute to include a person with “a substantial
psychiatric disorder” which “grossly impairs” behavior or cognition, causes “grossly
disturbed behavior or faulty perceptions,” and “poses a subs tantial likelihood of physical
harm” to the person or others. Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13(a) (2018). A substantial
likelihood of harm may be demo nstrated by “a failure to ob tain necessary food, clothing,
shelter, or medical care as a result of the impairment.” Id., subd. 13(a)(1).
The district court determined that Thompson met the statutory criteria for continued
commitment based on his diagnosis and that th e “nature of Thompson’s disorder places
him at greater risk of harm to himself or other[s] and involuntary commitment is necessary
for the protection of Thompson or others.” The district court also found that there were no
less restrictive alternatives.

5
Thompson argues that the record does not s upport the determination that he meets
the standard for commitment. He first argues that the record lacks sufficient evidence that
commitment is necessary to prot ect himself or others. He points to Dr. Dority’s opinion
that he is not a risk to the pu blic because he remains incarcerated at Jackson County Jail.
But being incarcerated in jail does not mean that he does not interact with others, including
the jail staff. And as the district court note d, Thompson believes that the jail staff, police
and his family are conspiring against him and, as a result of his disorder, he may lash out
when he feels threatened. Mo reover, there is a pending cr iminal case against him that
alleges he murdered his mother, and he has allegedly attempted to strangle his father in the
past. Dr. Chmielewski opin ed that Thompson is “poten tially very dangerous, and
absolutely should not be released in his current untreated state.”
Thompson also meets the stat utory definition of a “per son with mental illness”
based on his refusal to participate in treatment for his illness. Under the statute, a “person
with a mental illness” includes an individual who has a substantial psychiatric disorder
which is manifested by instances of grossly disturbed behavior
or faulty perceptions and pose s a substantial likelihood of
physical harm to self or others as demonstrated by:

(1) a failure to obtain, . . . medical care as a result of the
impairment[.]

Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13(a)(1). Here, the record demonstrat es that, despite his
diagnosis, Thompson has conti nually denied that he has a mental illness, refused to
participate in treatment, and even alleged that he could “turn off” his delusions if needed.
Both Dr. Dority and Dr. Chmielewski opine d that Thompson plainl y required continued

6
psychiatric treatment, and Dr. Dority noted th at there is evidence that his psychiatric
disorder had hindered his ability to “obtain me dical care . . . or adhere to medication
suggestions.” The district court specifically noted that Thompson had been resistant to
treatment and that, without continued commitment, “it is unlikely that [Thompson] would
voluntarily participate in treatment.” Based on the evidence presented, the record supports
the district court’s determination that Thompson meets the statutory definition of a “person
who is mentally ill.”
Thompson next argues that the record does not support the determination that there
are no less restrictive alternatives. He argu es that dismissal of the petition is a less
restrictive alternative because he would remain incarcerate d. But we fail to see how
confinement in jail offers a “less restrictive alternative” to commitment at a psychiatric
hospital.
Finally, Thompson claims that, because there is a separate petition for commitment
pending to commit him as mentally ill and dangerous (MI&D), dismissing this petition is
a suitable, less restrictive alte rnative because the county co uld refile the petition if the
MI&D petition is denied. While this might be a path the c ounty could have chosen, this
does not alter the propriety of the district cour t’s order at issue here. Moreover, this path
is also not a less restrictive alternative becaus e the MI&D petition also seeks a
commitment. We therefore conclude that there are no less restrictive alternatives, and the
district court did not err in determining that Thompson met the criteria for continued
commitment.
Affirmed.