State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0812

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Roosevelt Montgomery,
Appellant.

Filed November 9, 2020
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-13-2586

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jordan W. Rude, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard A. Schmitz, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M. , Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant, convicted of violating the predatory -offender registration requirements,
challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to correct his sentence, arguing that the
ten-year conditional-release term is illegal because appellant did not waive his jury -trial
rights on factors used to enhance his sentence before he admitted that he had a risk -level
of three. Because appellant’s sentence was not unauthorized by law and there was no abuse
of discretion in the district court’s denial of appellant’s motion, we affirm.
FACTS
In March 2013, a ppellant Roosevelt Montgomery pleaded guilty to violating the
predatory-offender registration statute. At the plea hearing, he replied, “Yes” when asked
if he had been given a risk factor and if his risk factor was three. His plea agreement did
not mention conditional release. Appellant was sentenced to a year and a day in prison and
ten years of conditional release. He did not file a direct appeal, and his sentence became
final in June 2013.
In December 2019, appellant moved to correct his sentence by vacating the ten-year
conditional-release term. The district court denied his mo tion. H e appeals, arguing that
his sentence was not authorized by law because he had not waived his right to a jury trial
on factors enhancing his sentence when he admitted his risk level three status.
D E C I S I O N
“This court will not reverse the dis trict court’s denial of a motion brough t under
[Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9] to correct a sentence, unless the district court abused its

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discretion or the original sentence was unauthorized by law.” State v. Amundson , 828
N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. App. 2013).
“A person convicted of failing to register as a predatory offender is subject to a
[ten]-year period of conditional release if the offender was a risk -level-III offender at the
time of the offense.” State v. Meger, 901 N.W.2d 418, 420 (Minn. 2017). Appellant argues
that his admission of his risk -level-three status at the plea hearing cannot be used to
enhance his sentence because he did not know about the ten-year conditional release when
he made the admission. B ut the district court noted, and the transcript reflects, that when
the prosecutor asked , “ [Y]ou were a level three risk factor; is that correct?” appellant
replied, “Yes.” The prosecutor then said, “I have no other questions. . . I do have to note
now. . . that [appellant] needs to be given a ten -year conditional release term on this, that
is part of the statutory requirement.”
In accordance with appellant’s wish, the district court imposed the agreed -on
sentence at the hearing and asked appellant if he had any questions. Appellant asked, “Why
is it a ten -year mandatory registration?” The district court said, “I think it’s conditional
release”; the prosecutor said , “It is”; and appellant said , “I understand that.” The district
court clarified that the ten -year registration related to appellant’s current offense, not his
earlier offense, and appellant again said, “I understand.” The district court said, “Maybe
you’ve had a chance to talk to [your attorney] about what that means ,” and appellant said,
“Yes.” The district court asked, “You want to go forward with [the sentence] as well then?”
and appellant said, “Yes”; he said “No” when asked a final time if he wanted to say
anything else.

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The district court concluded:
I will accept the sentence that you have discussed and that is to
sentence you to one year and one day in the custody of the
Department of Corrections. You [addressing appellant’s
attorney] may want to help me [with] that when you express
the conditions, with th e ten -year conditional release period
following that, is that what we [said]?

Appellant’s attorney said, “That [the ten-year conditional-release period] follows that [the
executed sentence], yes.” The transcript supports the district court’s conclusion t hat
appellant “accurately, voluntarily, and intelligently entered a plea of guilty and, at a level
three risk factor, agreed to a ten -year conditional release term. [His] plea to being a level
three risk factor was valid.”
Appellant relies on State v. Her, 862 N.W.2d 692, 696 -97 (Minn. 2015) ( holding
that a district court may not impose a ten-year conditional-release term for failure to register
unless either the defendant admits or a jury finds that the defendant was a risk -level-III
offender at the time of the failure to register). But Meger, which also concerned a sentence
that was final before Her was decided , concluded that “ Her is a new rule that is not
retroactive to [an] amended sentence” and that therefore “[the] period of conditional release
was not unlawful at the time it was imposed.” 901 N.W.2d at 425. The district court quoted
this language in Meger and concluded that, “[As in] Meger, Her cannot retroactively apply
to [appellant].
Appellant argues that Her does apply to his case “notwithstanding the holding of
State v. Meger ” and that this court should take “a fresh look at the underpinnings that
provided the legal foundation for the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Her” and

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produce “a new review of the issue [that] compels” the opposite conclusion. But this court,
like the district court, “is bound by supreme court precedent” and cannot reverse a district-
court decision that follows an explicit holding of the supreme court. State v. Curtis, 921
N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018). Deciding that Her can be applied retroactively would
violate the supreme court’s explicit holding in Meger.
The district court also noted that, even if Her did apply to appellant’s case, his
sentence would still be authorized by law because, under Her, whether a person is a level-
three offender “must be admitted by the [person] or found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt” before a ten -year conditional -release period can be imposed and “[appellant]
admitted on the record, during his guilty plea, that he was a level-three offender at the time
of the violation in this case.” See Her, 862 N.W.2d at 693. We agree. The district court
did not err in concluding that appellant’s sentence was not unauthorized by law. See
Amundson, 828 N.W.2d at 752.
Affirmed.