State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0822

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Allison Ann Mastin,
Appellant.

Filed April 12, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Faribault County District Court
File No. 22-CR-19-31

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn Karjala, Faribault County Attorney, Blue Earth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Gary A. Gittus, Gittus Law Offices, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Pres iding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Allison Ann Mastin seeks revers al of her conviction for perjury based on
insufficient evidence. Alternatively, she requests a new tr ial, arguing that her trial was
unfair because the district court allowed inadmissible evidence and the prosecutor failed to
disclose impeaching evidence. Because the evidence was sufficient to establish Mastin’s

2
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the district court did not err in its evidentiary ruling, and
any failure to disclose impeaching evidence did not prejudice Mastin, we affirm.
FACTS
The Winnebago Party
In October 2017, some high school foot ball players had a party at a house in
Winnebago where teens were drinking alcohol (the Winnebago party). During the party, a
group assaulted their teammate C.H. by punch ing him in the face. C.H. was then held
down, while one individual put his genitals on C.H.’s face.
One teen at the party was W.T., who wa s dating A.S., the teenaged daughter of
appellant Mastin. Winnebag o police officers interviewe d W.T. about the assault
approximately one month after the Winnebago party. W.T. told officers that he was at the
party and witnessed the assault, but he denied participating in the assault. W.T. did not say
that he went anywhere else on the night of the Winnebago party.
Mastin’s Testimony During W.T.’s Omnibus Hearing
W.T. was charged in connection with th e assault at the Winnebago party. His
attorney subpoenaed Mastin to testify at his omnibus hearing, which occurred about eight
months after the assault. At the hearing, Mastin testified under oath that W.T. had been at
her house on the night of the Winnebago party, arriving between 12:30 and 12:45 a.m. and
remaining until sometime between 3:00 and 3:30 a.m. She testified that her neighbor, a
Blue Earth police officer, “knew” that W.T. was there because he saw W.T.’s car parked
outside. When Mastin testified, she was unaware of W.T.’s statement to police admitting
that he had been at the Winnebago party and had witnessed the assault.

3
W.T. ultimately resolved his cr iminal case by entering an Alford plea 1 to third-
degree assault.
Mastin’s Statement to Winnebago police
Before W.T.’s plea, a Winn ebago police officer met with Mastin to discuss the alibi
that she had provided for W. T. The meeting occurred appr oximately three months after
Mastin’s testimony at W.T.’s omnibus hearing. During the meeting, which was recorded,
Mastin provided more details about the night of the Winnebago party. She told the officer
that she fell asleep soon after W.T. arrived at her house and did not see him leave. Mastin
volunteered that after W.T. left, he sent her daughter, A.S., a message confirming that he
was back at his own home.
Mastin’s Criminal Case and Trial
Based on Mastin’s omnibus-hearing testimony in W.T.’s case, respondent State of
Minnesota charged her with one count of perjury, Minn. Stat. § 609.48, subd. 1(1) (2016),
and one count of aiding an offender/obstructing investigation, Minn. Stat. § 609.495, subd.
3 (2016). Mastin pleaded not guilty to the charges and had a jury trial.
At the trial, the state called W.T., the Winnebago officer who interviewed W.T.,
Mastin’s daughter A.S., Mastin’s neighbor the Blue Earth police officer, the Winnebago
officer who interviewed Mastin, and the Winneb ago Police Chief. Th e state also offered
multiple exhibits, including transcripts of W.T .’s statement to police, Mastin’s testimony

1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970) (holding that under
certain circumstances, a court can accept a de fendant’s guilty plea while the defendant
maintains his innocence).

4
at W.T.’s omnibus hearing, and Mastin’s po lice interview; a message from A.S. to the
assault victim C.H. inquiring about W.T.’s involvement in the assault; A.S.’s written
statement to police; and messages exchanged between Mastin and W.T.’s mother.
During the police chief’s testimony, the pr osecutor sought permission—outside of
the jury’s presence—to presen t limited evidence about the pr etrial publicity surrounding
the assault at the Winnebago party. He stated that the evidence was necessary to show that
community members, including Mastin, were very familiar w ith the incident. Mastin’s
attorney objected, arguing that the district court had already excluded information from the
press about the incident. The district court ruled that the police chief could testify about
the general nature of the publicity surrounding th e case, but that he could not testify as to
any direct quotes that appeared in news outlets.
The defense did not offer any evidence.
While the jury was deliberating, Mastin learned that W.T. had met with the
prosecutor to prepare for her trial and had re corded the meeting with the prosecutor’s
consent. During that meeting, W.T. told th e prosecutor that his brain was “mush” after
having nine concussions. The prosecutor responded that he knew because he had seen
W.T.’s medical records. Although the pros ecutor had previously disclosed the meeting
with W.T. to the defense, he had not reveal ed W.T.’s statements about his brain and the
concussions. Because Mastin learned about the statements du ring jury deliberations, the
jury was not made aware of them.
The jury acquitted Mastin of aiding an offender/obstructi ng an investigation, but
found her guilty of perjury.

5
Mastin’s Motion for a New Trial
Mastin moved for a new trial, contending that the prosecutor committed misconduct
by failing to disclose W.T.’s statements, amon g other alleged trial errors. According to
Mastin, W.T.’s statements would have impeached his trial testimony and failing to disclose
them violated the Minnesota Rules of Crimin al Procedure. The prosecutor filed an
affidavit explaining his recorded comment ab out reviewing W.T.’s medical records. He
stated that W.T.’s at torney had accidentally provided W.T.’s me dical records to the
prosecutor and the records had been returned.
The district court observed that W.T.’s statements were not particularly probative
of W.T.’s memory. The court concluded that any failure to disclose W.T.’s statements did
not prejudice Mastin or affect the fairness of the trial.
After denying Mastin’s motion for a new trial, the district court sentenced her to a
stayed prison term of one year and one day, placed her on probation for two years, and
ordered her to serve 30 days in jail as a condition of probation.
Mastin appeals.
DECISION
I. The trial evidence was sufficient to support Mastin’s conviction for perjury.
Mastin first argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support her perjury
conviction.
An accused may be convicted only “upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crim e with which [s]he is charged.” In re Winship , 397
U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970). In a criminal trial, the state bears the burden

6
of proving guilt. See State v. Peterson, 673 N.W.2d 482, 486 (Minn. 2004). The state can
only overcome the presumption of innocenc e with proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every element of a charged offense. Id.
To convict Mastin of the offense of perj ury, the state was required to prove the
following elements: (1) Mastin made a statement under oath, (2) the statement was false,
(3) the statement was material , (4) Mastin did not believe the statement to be true,
(5) Mastin knew she was under oath when she gave the statement, and (6) Mastin’s act
occurred in July 2018 in Faribault County. See Minn. Stat. § 609.48, subd. 1(1); see also
10A Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 22.02 (2019). The state’s trial theory was that Mastin
knowingly gave false testimony about W.T.’s whereabouts on the night of the Winnebago
party. Mastin contends that the evidence was insu fficient to establish that she knew her
testimony was false.
In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, an appellate court performs “a
painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the conviction,” was su fficient to allow the ju ry to reach a guilty
verdict. State v. Ortega , 813 N.W.2d 86, 10 0 (Minn. 2012) (quo tation omitted). We
assume that “the jury believed the state’s w itnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the
contrary.” State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). And
the reviewing court “will not disturb the verdict if the jury, ac ting with due regard for the
presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could
reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Ortega, 813
N.W.2d at 100.

7
A conviction based on circumstantial evid ence receives “heightened scrutiny.”
State v. Al-Naseer , 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). If the evidence of one or more
elements of an offense is entirely circumstantial, the more rigorous circumstantial-evidence
standard of review applies to those elements. See id. at 473-75. Because the state’s
evidence of Mastin’s state of mind was ci rcumstantial, we apply the circumstantial-
evidence standard of review in considering her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying the knowledge element of the offense. See State v. Griffin , 887 N.W.2d 257,
264 (Minn. 2016) (applying standard of review for circumstantial evidence in considering
sufficiency of evidence of defendant’s intent).
The circumstantial-evidence test requires a two-step process. See id. First, the
appellate court must “identify the circumstance s proved” at trial, deferring “to the jury’s
acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that
conflicted with the circumstan ces proved by the State.” State v. Andersen , 784 N.W.2d
320, 329 (Minn. 2010) (quotations omitted ). In doing so, the appellate court must
“construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that
the jury believed the State’s witnesses a nd disbelieved the defense witnesses.” State v.
Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn. 2008). Second, the court must “independently
examine the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances
proved, including inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.” State v.
McAllister, 862 N.W.2d 49, 54 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). “In the second step, we
give no deference to the jury’s choice between reasonable inferences.” State v. Davenport,
947 N.W.2d 251, 266 (Minn. 2020).

8
The circumstances proved are as follows: In October 2017, Mastin and A.S. were
at a friend’s house when W.T., who was dating A.S., arrived and invited A.S. to a party in
Winnebago that night. Mastin to ld A.S. she could not go to th e party. W.T. went to the
party and brought alcohol. The assault of C.H. happened around 2:00 a.m. Later that night,
after 3:30 a.m., A.S. received a message from W.T. stating that he was at his house.
In November 2017, Winnebago police of ficers interviewed W.T. He admitted
attending the Winnebago party and witnessing C.H.’s assault, but he denied assaulting C.H.
W.T. did not tell the police he was at Mastin’s house or that he went anywhere else during
the Winnebago party. He said that, after the assault, he went straight home from the party.
The police arrested W.T. after the interview. On the day of W.T.’s arrest, A.S. gave a
statement to police stating that W.T. “stated th at before he left [the Winnebago party], he
helped [C.H.] and cleaned up his puke.”
Shortly after the Winnebago party, Mastin spoke with her ne ighbor, a Blue Earth
police officer, about the assault at the party. She told the neighbor that she thought W.T.
was at her house during the assault. The ne ighbor advised her to inform the Winnebago
police. Mastin never went to the police with this information.
In addition to discussing the case with the neighbor, on November 17, 2017, Mastin
texted W.T.’s mother. She stated, “[J]ust wanted to let you know I’m thinking about you.”
Mastin advised W.T.’s mother that she had fo und a text from the vic tim of the assault,
C.H., on her daughter A.S.’s phone, and offered to share the information.
In July 2018, Mastin testified under oath at W.T.’s omnibus hearing. She testified
that she knew W.T. attended the Winnebago party, but he was at her house starting around

9
“12:30 and 12:45 that night.” Mastin testif ied that W.T. and her daughter were “in the
garage for a little bit, and then probably 20 minut es later they came in, and we watched
[television], and we fell asleep, and he left around 3:00, 3:30.” During her testimony,
Mastin also testified that her neighbor, the Blue Earth police officer, knew that W.T. had
been at her house at the time of the Winneba go party because W.T.’s car was there. She
testified that she could not recall whether sh e had ever spoken with the neighbor about
W.T.’s whereabouts during the Winnebago party. On cross- examination, Mastin stated
that she knew nothing about the assault until W.T. was a rrested. Mastin agreed with the
prosecutor that she had not discussed the night of the assault with W.T. When asked
whether Mastin would accept W.T.’s word that he was in Wi nnebago, Mastin responded,
“No, he was at my house. . . . [He couldn’t have been in Winnebago] in that timeframe
that he was at my house.”
In October 2018, Mastin was interviewe d by a Winnebago police officer. Mastin
stated that the only time W.T. stayed at her house was the night of the Winnebago party.
Mastin told the officer that W.T. came to her house betw een 12:30 and 12:45 a.m. She
said that she fell asleep within 10 minutes to an hour of his arrival. According to Mastin,
she slept until she had to work the next day. Mastin told the officer that W.T. left at 3 a.m.;
she knew it was 3 a.m. because W.T. messaged A.S. letting A.S. know that he was home.
Next, with these circumstances in mind, we consider whether all reasonable
inferences are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than
guilt. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 331. More precisel y, we must determine whether the
reasonable inferences from th e circumstances proved only support the conclusion that

10
Mastin knew her statement was false when she testified at the omnibus hearing, and are
not consistent with some alternative theory of innocence. See id. at 329-30.
Mastin presents two alterna tive hypotheses of innocence. First, she contends that
W.T. could have been mistaken when he told police that he was at the Winnebago party,
and by extension, not at her h ouse. Second, Mastin argues that the evidence supports a
theory that she was simply mistaken when she testified that W.T. was at her house.
The circumstances proved do not support e ither of these theories. There is no
evidentiary support for a theory that W.T. was mistaken about his whereabouts on the night
of the incident. W.T. consistently acknowledged that he was at the party at the time of the
assault. He immediately confessed to being there during the incide nt, he was ultimately
convicted for committing the assa ult there, and he told Mastin ’s jury that he was at the
party. Beyond W.T.’s own statements about being at the Winnebago party, there was other
evidence indicating he was there. He invite d A.S. to come with him, but she was not
permitted to go. And in the early morning hour s, he sent A.S. a message to let her know
he was home. Conversely, there was abso lutely no evidence—ot her than Mastin’s
testimony at W.T.’s omnibus he aring and her statement to the police—that W.T. was at
Mastin’s house on the night of the Winnebago party.
The circumstances proved also do not support Mastin ’s second alternative
hypothesis of innocence—that sh e was mistaken when she testified that W.T. was at her
house at the time of the assault. Mastin’s sworn testimony about W.T.’s whereabouts was
unequivocal: W.T. was at her house and he could not have been anywhere else. And when
Mastin met with the Winnebago police officer following her testimony, she again did not

11
equivocate. She never suggested that she might have been mistaken about W.T.’s presence
at her house. Instead, she continued to insist that he was there, but claimed that she fell
asleep upon his arrival.
The circumstances proved are instead only consistent with the inference that Mastin
intentionally lied about W.T .’s whereabouts on the night of the Winnebago party.
Although Mastin told her ne ighbor that W.T. was at her house, and the neighbor
encouraged her to report th e information to the Winnebago poli ce, Mastin never
approached the police. Then, at W.T.’s omnibus hearing, Mastin testified that the neighbor
saw W.T.’s car at her house on the night of the Winnebago party; she could not recall,
however, whether she ever spoke with the ne ighbor about W.T.’s wh ereabouts. Mastin
also discussed the case with W.T.’s mother via text messages and evinced a willingness to
help W.T.
Based on our careful review of the reco rd, we determine that the circumstances
proved, and the inferences th erefrom, are inconsistent w ith any rational hypothesis of
innocence. The circumstances proved are cons istent with only one conclusion—Mastin
knowingly testified falsely at W.T.’s omnibus hearing when she claimed that W.T. was at
her house on the night of the Winnebago party. Because the evidence at trial established
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mastin committed perjury, we affirm her conviction.2

2 At oral argument, Mastin’s counsel stated that he was also cha llenging the jury’s guilty
verdict because it was legally and rationally inconsistent with the jury’s not-guilty verdict
for aiding an offender/obstructing an investigation. But Mastin’s counsel did not raise this
separate issue in his brief to this court. We accordingly determine that the issue was waived
and do not address it. See State v. Butcher , 563 N.W.2d 776, 780 (Minn. App. 1997),
review denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 1997); see also McKenzie v. State, 583 N.W.2d 744, 746 n.1

12
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to elicit
limited testimony about the publicit y surrounding the Winnebago party
assault.

Mastin next argues that the district court erred in permitting the Winnebago police
chief to testify that the assault case received publicity in the comm unity. Over defense
objection, the following exchange occurred during the police chief’s direct examination:
PROSECUTOR: Okay. And have you ever had a case . . . that
generated as much or . . . more publicity than the assault case
from October of 2017, arising out of Winnebago?
WITNESS: Never.
PROSECUTOR: Okay. Um, and was there a lot of media
attention paid to that case?
WITNESS: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: And what kind of media attention?
Television?
WITNESS: Television, um, newspaper.
PROSECUTOR: Newspaper?
WITNESS: Radio.
PROSECUTOR: Okay. And were you called on several times
to, uh, give press releases?
WITNESS: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: Okay. And if you stop for coffee in
Winnebago or Blue Earth, was it a common, uh, subject of
conversation in the communities?
WITNESS: Yes.

“Evidentiary rulings rest w ithin the sound discretion of the district court, and we
will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Ali, 855
N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is
based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State

(Minn. 1998) (applying the rule that arguments not briefed are waived in an appeal in which
the appellant “allude[d] to” an issue but “fail[ed] to address [it] in the argument portion of
his brief”).

13
v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). A new trial will not
be ordered unless the challenged evidence was so prejudicial that it substantially influenced
the jury’s decision to convict. State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981). The
party claiming the error bears the burden of showing both the error and the resulting
prejudice. Id. When an error is “of no vital consequence,” and does not “materially affect
the substantial rights of the accused”—and th ere is sufficient evidence to support the
verdict—we will not disturb the conviction. State v. Wofford, 114 N.W.2d 267, 272 (Minn.
1962).
Mastin contends that allo wing the evidence was erro r because it was a “stark
reversal” of the district court’s pretrial order concerning the admissibility of media
coverage of the case. Additionally, she argues that the testimony was irrelevant to Mastin’s
perjury charge.
We disagree. Before the trial, Mastin moved to exclude social media, broadcast
media, and local newspaper coverage of the Wi nnebago party assault. The district court
granted Mastin’s motion and excluded from evid ence any specific coverage that the case
had received in local newspapers or other me dia platforms. The court deferred ruling on
the admissibility of any particular social media posts until the evidence was offered at the
trial. Contrary to Mastin’s claim, the dist rict court’s pretrial or der did not address the
admissibility of testimony about general pub licity. We therefore see no inconsistency
between the pretrial order and the district c ourt’s ruling that the police chief could testify
generally about press coverage but not about specific articles or broadcasts.

14
Further, the limited testimony that the state elicited was relevant. “Relevant
evidence” is defined as “evidence having any te ndency to make the ex istence of any fact
that is of consequence to th e determination of the action mo re probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. Here, evidence that the assault
had received extensive publicity in the commun ity made it more likely that Mastin knew
the details of the incident. In turn, this knowledge made it more likely that she knew her
testimony about W.T.’s whereabouts was false. Because the evidence was relevant, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing it to be presented to the jury.
But even if the district court did err, the error was harmless. The erroneous
admission of evidence is harmless if there is no “reasonable possibility that the wrongfully
admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 691
(Minn. 2006). Because the police chief’s testimony was brief and limited, it could not have
had a significant impact on the jury’s verdict. See State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 n.2
(Minn. 1994) (discussing prejudice and consid ering whether the verdict would have been
more favorable to the defendant without the evidence).
III. Mastin is not entitled to a new trial based on the prosecutor’s failure to disclose
W.T.’s statements about his medical condition during a meeting with the
prosecutor.

Finally, Mastin argues that the prosecutor violated his duty under the Minnesota
Rules of Criminal Procedure to disclose evidence when he failed to notify the defense that
W.T. claimed, during a meeting to prepare his testimony for Mastin’s trial, that he had nine

15
prior concussions and that his brain was “mush.” 3 Although the prosecutor notified the
defense of the meeting with W.T., Mastin cont ends that W.T.’s specific statements about
his medical condition during that meeting also should have been disclosed. According to
Mastin, the statements were important impeachment evidence that the defense would have
used to undermine W.T.’s credibility at trial.4
Whether a prosecutor committed a discovery vi olation is an issue of law that is
reviewed de novo. State v. Scanlon, 719 N.W.2d 674, 685 (Minn. 2006). But a trial court’s
decision regarding the appropriate remedy for a discovery violation is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Id.
Under the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, a prosecutor must disclose any
statements that relate to a case. Minn. Rule . Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(2). This obligation
extends to witness statements, whether written or oral. Id. In the case of oral statements,
a prosecutor must disclose the substance of any statements. Id., subd. 1(2)(c).

3 Although the state’s brief applies th e constitutional analysis set forth in Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), in addressing Mastin’s claim, Mastin does
not cite Brady or similar authority and limits her argument to the prosecutor’s discovery
obligations under the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus, we focus our analysis
on the criminal procedure rules. See McKenzie, 583 N.W.2d at 746 n.1 (noting that issues
not briefed on appeal are waived).

4 Mastin also seems to suggest that she was entitled to W.T.’s medical records because they
were accidentally provided to the prosecutor by W.T.’s attorney. She does not explain why
she was entitled to these records or advance any theory for how they would have been
admissible in evidence at her trial. Because Mastin’s assertion regarding W.T.’s medical
records is not accompanied by any argumen t or authority, we do not address it. See
Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971) (“An
assignment of error based on mere assert ion and not supported by any argument or
authorities in appellant’s brief is waived an d will not be considered on appeal unless
prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.”).

16
A district court is in the best position to consider what remedy, if any, to impose for
an alleged discovery violation. See Scanlon, 719 N.W.2d at 685. In considering whether
to sanction or remedy a discovery violation, a district court should consider the reason for
the failure to disclose, any prejudice suffered, whether a continuance can remedy the
violation, and any othe r factors the district court deems relevant. Woodruff v. State, 608
N.W.2d 881, 886 (Minn. 2000).
“Generally, without a showing of prejudice to the defendant, the state’s violation of
a discovery rule will not result in a new trial.” State v. Palubicki, 700 N.W.2d 476, 489
(Minn. 2005). A prosecutor’s discovery-re lated misconduct is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt if the jury’s verdict was “surely unattributable to the error.” Scanlon, 719
N.W.2d at 685 (quotation omitted). An appellate court should only reverse a district court’s
decision regarding a discovery violati on where the prosecutor’s misconduct was
inexcusable and so prejudicial that the defendant did not receive a fair trial. Id.
Here, in denying Mastin’s motion for a new trial on the basis of the alleged
discovery violation, the district court conclu ded that W.T.’s statements about his medical
condition were “likely hyperbole” and that W.T. “appeared able to recall what was asked
of him at trial.” The district court also observed that when W.T. ultimately pleaded guilty
in his own case, he did not claim to suffer from memory problems. Ultimately, the district
court concluded that any failure to disclose W.T.’s statements was not prejudicial because
the statements would not have affected the trial or the jury ’s determination of Mastin’s
guilt.

17
We agree. Assuming without deciding that the prosecutor had some duty to disclose
the statements, Mastin cannot show prejudice. She argues that the statements could have
called W.T.’s memory into question, thereby undermining the statement he gave to police
where he admitted that he atte nded the Winnebago party and hi s later guilty plea. But as
the district court noted, there was no dispute that W.T. attended the Winnebago party.
Thus, showing the jury that he had a poor memory would not have made it any less likely
that he was there. Moreover, there was no cr edible evidence that W.T. was at Mastin’s
house on the night of the Winnebago party. Thus, attacking W.T.’s ability to remember
would have accomplished little. Even if the prosecution had some duty to disclose the
statements, the jury’s verdict was surely unattr ibutable to the error. The district court
therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Mastin’s motion for a new trial on the basis
of the alleged discovery violation.
In sum, the evidence was sufficient to support Mastin ’s perjury conviction, the
district court did not err in allowing limite d evidence regarding publicity surrounding the
assault at the Winnebago party, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Mastin a new trial based on the alleged discovery violation.
Affirmed.