State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0825

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Latese Capree Hudson,
Appellant.

Filed July 19, 2021
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-14127

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorn ey, Adam E. Petras , Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judg e; Ross, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant Latese Capree Hudson argues that his conviction for
third-degree murder must be reversed and remanded for a new trial because the district
court erred by allowing respondent State of Minnesota to introduce three pieces of evidence
2
during trial. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence,
we affirm.
FACTS
The following facts were established in th e jury trial in this case. On March 19,
2017, Hudson and S.W. connected over the phone before ending up together in an alley in
Minneapolis. While Hudson and S.W. were in the alley, a witness saw Hudson give S.W.
drugs that S.W. immediately used. S.W. had an adverse reaction to the drugs and fell to the
ground. Hudson fled. After someone called 911, officers arrived and found S.W. lying face
down in the alley with mucus all over his nose and mouth. S.W. died in the hospital two
days later due to what was de termined to be an overdose of a mixture of cocaine and
carfentanil.
The initial investigation into S.W.’s death went cold. Thirteen months after S.W.’s
death, in April 2018, Hudson was pulled ov er by police in connection with a robbery
investigation. As part of that investigation, police recovered three cell phones belonging to
Hudson. The cell phones containe d S.W.’s contact information. Pursuant to a search
warrant, officers obtained Hudson’s cell-phone records. The records showed calls from
S.W. to Hudson on the day of S.W.’s death. The records also showed texts between Hudson
and another man, A.H., discussing S.W.’s deat h a couple of weeks after S.W. died. The
records also contained other, earlier texts between Hudson, A.H., and S.W., discussing
Hudson’s drug sales to A.H. and S.W. In Ap ril 2017, the month following S.W.’s death,
A.H. also died of an overdose.
3
In May 2018, after reviewing the phone records, officers interviewed Hudson.
During that interview, Hudson claimed that, on the day S.W. di ed, he and S.W. agreed to
split the cost of a bag of heroin. Hudson claimed that they bought the heroin from a dealer
at a nearby carwash and that th ey then used the heroin t ogether in the alley. Hudson
admitted that S.W. had an adverse reaction to the drugs and claimed that he offered to get
S.W. help, but that S.W. refused. Hudson denied ever selling drugs in Minnesota.
The state ultimately charged Hudson with third-degree murder in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.195(b) (2016).
Before trial, the state moved to admit Spreigl evidence in support of its case. This
evidence included (1) testimony that, on a sepa rate occasion three mo nths before S.W.’s
death, Hudson provided S.W. with drugs that led to S.W. overdosing and needing
hospitalization; (2) testimony regarding th e investigation into A.H.’s death; and
(3) testimony that Hudson sold drugs to other individuals in addition to S.W. The district
court ruled before trial that evidence of H udson’s role in S.W.’s overdose three months
before S.W.’s death was admissible Spreigl evidence. With respect to the investigation into
A.H.’s death, the district court excluded Spreigl evidence suggesting that Hudson sold
narcotics to A.H. on the day of A.H.’s death, concluding that Hudson’s identity as the seller
of those drugs was not proved by clear and convincing evidence. However, the district
court ruled that the state’s witnesses could refe r to “the investigation into A.H.’s death”
when describing the source of cell-phone evidence derived from Hudson’s phones. During
trial, the district court allowed as Spreigl evidence witness testimony about Hudson’s
history of selling drugs to other persons.
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Following a six-day trial, the jury found Hudson guilty , and the district court
sentenced him to 99 months in prison.1
Hudson appeals.
DECISION
The only issue on appeal is whether th e district court erred by admitting the
challenged evidence. Hudson argues each of the three pieces of evidence was inadmissible
propensity evidence and unfairly prejudicial.
We review a district court’s decision to admit evidence of other bad acts for an abuse
of discretion. See State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 261 (Minn. 2016). “Evidentiary errors
warrant reversal if there is any reasonable doubt the result would have been different had
the evidence not been admitted.” State v. Grayson , 546 N.W.2d 731, 736 (Minn. 1996)
(quotation omitted). Hudson bears the burden of showing that an error occurred and that
he was prejudiced as a result. See Griffin, 887 N.W.2d at 261.
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b) govern s the admissibility of evidence of other
crimes or bad acts, commonly referred to as “ Spreigl evidence.” State v. Kennedy , 585
N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998) (citing State v. Spreigl , 139 N.W.2d 167, 172 (Minn.
1965)). Evidence of other bad acts is not admissible to prove that a person acted in
conformity with those acts. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). But the evidence may be admissible for
another purpose, includi ng “showing motive, intent, k nowledge, identity , absence of
mistake or accident, or a common scheme or plan.” State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685

1 Hudson also pleaded guilty to a felon-in-possession-of-a -firearm charge for which the
district court imposed a concurrent 60-month sentence.
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(Minn. 2006). For the evidence to be admissible, the following conditions must be satisfied:
(1) the state must give notice of its intent to admit the evidence;
(2) the state must clearly indi cate what the evidence will be
offered to prove; (3) there must be clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant participated in the prior act; (4) the
evidence must be relevant and material to the state’s case; and
(5) the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed
by its potential prejudice to the defendant.

Id. at 686. Hudson’s arguments center on the fourth and fift h prongs—that the state used
each piece of evidence for an im proper purpose and that the ri sk that the evidence would
cause unfair prejudice outweighed its probative value.
With this background, we address each contested piece of evidence in turn.
1. Evidence Regarding S.W.’s Previous Overdose

Hudson challenges the admission of evidence regarding S.W.’s previous overdose.
About three months before his death, S.W. overdosed and was hospitalized. The night of
the overdose, S.W. and Hudson had gone to a friend’s apartment. Once there, Hudson sold
S.W. drugs that S.W. injected into his arm. S.W. began acting erratically—taking off his
clothes, spitting on the friend, and kicking the friend’s furniture. The friend tried and failed
to calm S.W. down and, according to his tria l testimony, had never seen S.W. react to a
drug this way. Hudson left the apartment afte r asking, “What’s wrong with that fool[?]”
The friend called Hudson and asked him to return to help with S.W. Hudson said that he
would return but never did. The friend eventually called 911, and officers took S.W. to the
hospital.
The state offered evidence of S.W.’s prior overdose through the friend’s testimony.
The district court adm itted this testimony as Spreigl evidence, ruling that it constituted
6
evidence of a common scheme or plan. On appeal, Hudson argues that the two events were
merely “generic” offenses that were not si milar enough to indicate a common scheme or
plan.
Evidence of other acts tending to show a common scheme or plan is relevant to
show that the act in the char ged offense actually occurred. Id. at 688. Courts evaluate
whether another act tends to show a common scheme or plan based on similarities of time,
place, and modus operandi. Id. While the charged offense and the other incident must be
markedly similar, id., “[a]bsolute similarity betwee n the charged offense and the Spreigl
incident is not required to establish relevancy,” State v. Berry, 484 N.W.2d 14, 17 (Minn.
1992).
The district court determined that the prior incident “share[d] numerous similarities
with the charged offense.” The district court highlighted the facts that (1) Hudson provided
S.W. the drugs leading to the overdose, (2) when S.W. began acting erratically after taking
the drugs, Hudson abandoned him, and (3) S. W. was ultimately hospitalized. The district
court concluded that, given these commonalities, the incidents were markedly similar.
Hudson advances two arguments why th e two incidents were not sufficiently
similar. First, Hudson argues that the first ove rdose was caused by heroin and the second
was caused by a combination of cocaine and carfe ntanil, so the two acts are not similar.
But there is nothing in the reco rd establishing that S.W. took heroin the night of his first
overdose; the testifying friend me rely assumed that S.W. took heroin the night of S.W.’s
first overdose because that was the only drug the friend ever saw S.W. use. Hudson’s first
argument therefore fails.
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Second, Hudson argues that the incidents differed in location because S.W.’s first
overdose took place in a friend’s apartment wh ile the second overdose took place in an
alley. But Spreigl evidence “need not be identical in every way to the charged crime” and
need only be substantially si milar to be admissible as evid ence of a common scheme or
plan. Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 688 (quotation omitted). The specific place where S.W. ingested
the drugs supplied by Hudson is not determin ative of the similarity between the two
incidents, especially given the similarities between the two.
Hudson also argues that the district c ourt abused its discretion by admitting the
evidence because the district court did not identify the specific disputed fact to which the
evidence is relevant. “One of the requirements for admitting Spreigl evidence is that the
district court must identify the pr ecise disputed fact to which the Spreigl evidence would
be relevant.” State v. Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d 609, 615 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).
The “precise disputed fact” in this case was the identity of the person who supplied the
drugs to S.W. the day of his fatal overdose. The state presented evidence that Hudson
provided the drugs that caused S.W.’s previ ous overdose for the purp ose of proving that
Hudson was the person who provided the drugs that caused S.W.’s fatal overdose. The
district court order permitting the evidence a ppropriately identified the disputed fact of
who provided the drugs to S.W. as the reason that the state wanted to introduce the Spreigl
evidence.
Hudson next argues that the district court improperly determined that the probative
value of S.W.’s earlier overdose was not outw eighed by its potentia l unfair prejudice.
Unfair prejudice “is not merely damaging ev idence, even severely damaging evidence;
8
rather, unfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate means, giving one party
an unfair advantage.” State v. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d 474, 478 (Minn. 2005). In balancing the
probative value of Spreigl evidence against its potential prejudicial effect, courts balance
the relevance of the prior bad act and “the St ate’s need to strengthen weak or inadequate
proof in the case” against the risk that the jury will use the evidence as propensity evidence.
State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 319 (Minn. 2009).
Hudson argues that the Spreigl evidence of S.W.’s initial overdose had little
probative value because it was not relevant to th e state’s case, and that the risk of unfair
prejudice was strong because the jury would likely use the evidence as propensity evidence.
But Hudson previously supplying drugs to S.W. is highly relevant to establish that Hudson
was the one who gave S.W. the drugs that caused his death. This is especially so given that
Hudson denied ever selling dr ugs in Minnesota. Further, the district court mitigated the
evidence’s prejudicial impact by giving a cau tionary instruction be fore the evidence’s
introduction during trial.2

2 Hudson argues that this cautionary instruction and the other limiting instructions that the
district court gave regarding Spreigl evidence improperly highlighted the Spreigl evidence
and made it more likely that the jury improperly relied on it during its deliberation. But, on
appeal, we assume that jurors listened to an d followed all instructi ons from the district
court. See State v. Ferguson, 581 N.W.2d 824, 835 (Minn. 1998). In addition, the limiting
instructions were not plainly erroneous. Because Hudson did not object to the instructions
during trial, we review the instructions for plain error. See State v. Griller , 583 N.W.2d
736, 740 (Minn. 1998). The supreme cour t has affirmed the use of the pattern Spreigl
limiting instructions used in this case. See Ture v. State, 681 N.W.2d 9, 18-19 (Minn. 2004).
Thus, the district court’s use of the limiting instructions was not plain error.

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2. Evidence Regarding the Investigation into A.H.’s Death
Hudson also argues that the district court erred by allowing the state’s witnesses to
refer to “the investigation into A.H.’s death” when discussing certain cell-phone evidence.
He contends that the phrase implied that H udson was involved in A.H.’s death and that it
was inadmissible Spreigl evidence.
Hudson’s argument is unpersuasive. Spreigl evidence is “[e]vidence of another
crime, wrong, or act.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Here, the evidence that Hudson challenges
is the description of how police found eviden ce connecting Hudson to S.W.’s death; the
district court excluded evidence purporting to link Hudson to A.H.’s death. The evidence
explaining the source of the cell-phone records was not evid ence of another bad act by
Hudson. Moreover, the district court reasonably determined that introducing the fact that
A.H. had died was necessary to explain to th e jury why A.H. did not appear in court to
testify about his text messages with Hudson. Even if the evidence were considered Spreigl
evidence, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it because the evidence
was probative of Hudson as the source of drugs to S.W. and the district court’s careful
limitations on the evidence regarding A.H.’s death mitigated any unfairly prejudicial
impact.
3. Evidence that Hudson Sold Drugs to Multiple People
Hudson contends that evidence that he sold drugs to multiple people was also
improper propensity evidence. Du ring trial, the state sought to introduce testimony from
three persons to whom Hudson sold heroin around the time of S.W.’s death. The state also
sought to introduce text messages between Hudson and A.H. arranging heroin sales to A.H.
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by Hudson. The district court ruled that the witness testimony and the text messages with
A.H. were admissible Spreigl evidence because the evidence tended to prove Hudson’s
identity as the supplier of drugs to S.W. on March 19, 2017.
Hudson argues that this Spreigl evidence was not probative of Hudson’s identity as
the person who supplied the drugs to S.W. because each witness testified that Hudson sold
them heroin and not a mixture of cocaine and carfentanil, which is what killed S.W. This
argument misconstrues how the state used the Spreigl evidence to prove Hudson’s identity.
The state argued that Hudson did not realize that he sold S.W. cocaine and carfentanil, and
not heroin, the night that S.W. overdosed. Thus, the fact th at Hudson sold cocaine and
carfentanil to S.W. and heroin to the three testifying witn esses and to A.H. is not
inconsistent with the state’s case.
The probative value of this evidence was not outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudicial impact. Again, Hudson supplying drugs to S.W. and several others in Minnesota
around the same time that S.W. died was highly relevant to proving the identity of S.W.’s
supplier on March 19, 2017, especially b ecause Hudson denied ev er selling drugs in
Minnesota. And the district court provided a cautionary instruction each time the evidence
was admitted and again during its final jury instructions, reducing the risk of unfair
prejudice.
In sum, the district court did not abus e its discretion by ad mitting the evidence
challenged by Hudson. Because there was no e rror, we need not determine whether any
prejudice resulted.
Affirmed.