State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0828

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Bobbie Christine Bishop,
Appellant.

Filed April 5, 2021
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-CR-18-1035

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michelle M. Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Benjamin G. A. Olson, Assistant County
Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this direct appeal from final judgme nt of conviction for aiding and abetting
second-degree unintentional murder, appellant ar gues that the district court abused its
discretion by refusing to gr ant a downward dispositiona l departure and imposing a

2
maximum presumptive sentence. The district court carefully considered the record in
response to appellant’s depart ure request before denying it, and the record reveals no
compelling circumstances to indicate that a maximum presumptive sentence was improper.
Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
The state charged appellant Bobbie Chris tine Bishop in 2018 with second-degree
murder (without intent), first-degree ma nslaughter, two counts of second-degree
manslaughter, and malicious punishment of a child (great bodily harm) following the death
of a six-year-old child in her care. The probable-cause portion of the complaint describes
the following events. Bishop br ought the child to an emergency room in Fergus Falls.
Wearing only a diaper at the time, the child was described by medical staff as
“unresponsive,” “limp,” “not breathing,” having “no pulse,” and being “cold to the touch.”
Examination of the child revealed several in fected wounds, sores, burns, and abrasions
across the child’s body . Following unsuccessful attempts at resuscitation, hospital staff
declared the child dead.
Bishop told investigators that she and another individual, W.W., had been watching
the child and the child’s brother since 2017 a nd that she brought the child to the ER after
discovering that the child was not breathing and blue in color. Both Bishop and W.W. told
investigators that they had punished the chil d in several ways including spanking him,
hitting him with a belt, and wrapping him in duct tape.

3
Bishop completed three rule 20.01 co mpetency examinations, after which the
district court determined that she was competent to stand trial. 1 Bishop pleaded guilty to
second-degree murder (without intent) pursuant to an Alford plea. 2 The district court
accepted the plea and entered judgment of conv iction. Bishop requested the court grant
her a downward dispositional departure or sentence her to a minimum presumptive
sentence of 128 months’ imprisonment. Th e state requested a mid-range presumptive
sentence of 150 months’ imprisonment. The district court imposed a maximum
presumptive sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment. Bishop appeals.
DECISION
Appellate courts reverse a district court’ s sentencing decision only if there was an
abuse of discretion. See State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014). “[A] court
abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an err oneous view of the law.” Id. at
308 n.1 (quotation om itted). “[T]o the extent a decision to depart turns on a question of
law,” such as whether the facts of a case are sufficiently s ubstantial and compelling so as
to support a departure, we review the legal question de novo. Id.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences for criminal
offenses. See Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2016) . For all criminal offenses, the
presumptive sentence is “presumed to be appropriate for all typical cases sharing criminal

1 Bishop does not challenge this finding of competency.
2 With an Alford plea, a defendant acknowledges that the state has suffici ent evidence to
obtain a conviction without e xpressly admitting guilt. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 37-38, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167-68 (1970); see also State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 759
(Minn. 1977).

4
history and offense severity characteristics.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1B.13 (Supp. 2017).
District courts must pronounce a sentence w ithin the presumptive range for the particular
offense “unless there exist identifiable, s ubstantial, and compelling circumstances to
support a departure.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (Supp. 2017); see also Soto, 855
N.W.2d at 308.
Particular amenability to probation is one such mitigating factor, and “will justify
departure in the form of a st ay of execution of a presump tively executed sentence.” Id.
(quotation omitted). However, the district court is not required to depart even if facts exist
that would support a finding of par ticular amenability to probation. See State v. Pegel ,
795 N.W.2d 251, 253-54 (Minn. App. 2011) (stating that the “mere fact that a mitigating
factor is present” does not require the district court to depart). A refusal to depart warrants
reversal only in “rare” circumstances. State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006).
In evaluating whether substantial and compelling circumstances for departure exist,
courts may consider the defendant’s age, pr ior criminal record, re morse, cooperation,
attitude in court, and suppor t from family or friends. State v. Trog , 323 N.W.2d 28, 31
(Minn. 1982). Bishop argues that her lack of criminal history, remorse, cooperation during
the plea hearing, and support from family and friends establish that she is particularly
amenable to probation.
The presentence investigation report (PS I) showed that Bishop had a criminal-
history score of zero, and the record dem onstrates that Bishop was remorseful and
cooperative during the plea hearing and had th e support of family. The district court
recognized these facts, stating that “Ms. Bishop may be amenable to probation.”

5
We next turn to whether the district cour t’s decision to reject Bishop’s request for a
downward dispositional departure was an abuse of discretion. Only if the record reflects
the absence of the exercise of discretion ma y we remand for a resentencing hearing to
consider the departure motion. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 253.
The district court carefully considered the record before imposing its sentence. The
district court reviewed the PSI which noted that second-degree murder is a severity-level-
ten offense and that the senten cing guidelines called for a presumptive sentence range of
120 to 180 months. The district court lis tened to a victim-impact statement from the
victim’s brother, considered sentencing argu ments from both parties, and listened to a
statement from Bishop explaining why she be lieved she was particularly amenable to
probation, pointing to her remorse.
In considering Bishop’s proffered reas ons for her particular amenability to
probation, the district court determined that the “circumstances are simply not adequately
addressed through probation.” The district court found Bishop’s role in the child’s death
was “significant” and that there were “weeks , perhaps months duri ng which [the victim]
was not provided adequate care physically, em otionally, or mentally.” We discern no
abuse of discretion in denying the departure request because the district court’s decision
was based on a careful review of the record and the sentence is w ithin the sentencing
guidelines range. In sum, the district court properly exercised its discretion in denying the
departure request.
Bishop also argues that the district court erred by imposing a sentence at the top of
the sentencing range. Our court gives great deference to a district court’s sentence “when

6
the sentence imposed is within the presumptive guidelines range.” State v. Delk ,
781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). We only
rarely reverse the imposition of a guidelines sentence, see State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6,
7 (Minn. 1981), and will not modify it “absent compelling circumstances,” State v. Freyer,
328 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Minn. 1982).
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines grid sets the presumptive sentencing range
for an offense of second-degree murder (unintentional) as 120 to 180 months with a mid-
range sentence of 150 months. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A (Supp. 2017). The supreme
court has stated that “[a]ll three numbers in any given cell constitute an acceptable sentence
based solely on the offense at issue and the offender’s criminal history score—the lowest
is not a downward departure, nor is the highest an upward departure.” State v. Jackson,
749 N.W.2d 353, 359 n.2 (Mi nn. 2008). Because the imposed sentence is within the
presumptive range provided by the sentenci ng guidelines and th e record reveals no
compelling circumstances requiring departure, the district court did not abuse its discretion
by imposing maximum presumptive sentence.
Affirmed.