State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0832

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jeffrey Bond Troyer,
Appellant.

Filed May 10, 2021
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19WS-CR-18-6093

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Acting Dakota County Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota; and

Cassandra C. Wolfgram, Bridget M. Nason, LeVander, Gillen & Miller, P.A., South
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Jeffrey S. Sheridan, Sheridan & Dulas, P.A., Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant seeks to reverse the final judgment of conviction for fourth-degree driving
while impaired (DWI) and argues the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
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the breath-test results. Appellant contends that, even though he timely requested that
respondent preserve the video recording of the breath-test procedure (“booking-room
video”), it was destroyed by an automated process, which violated his due-process rights
under the Minnesota Constitution. We first conclude that the district court’s decision
followed existing case law under the federal Due Process Cl ause because appellant does
not claim that the destroyed evidence was exculpatory, nor does he claim that respondent
acted in bad faith. We also conclude that the Minnesota Constitution’s Due Process Clause
does not require a different result. Thus, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jeffrey Bond Troyer with
fourth-degree DWI under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (2018) (alcohol concentration
of 0.08 or more), along with three other impaired-driving offenses. The following
summarizes the facts found by the district court based on the evidence and testimony
received at the omnibus hearing.
On February 22, 2018, at about 2:00 a.m., a police officer stopped Troyer for
speeding in Inver Grove Heights. The officer observed that Troyer had bloodshot, watery
eyes. Troyer told the officer he was returning from a tavern where he had consumed “two
tall beers.” Troyer failed field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test. The officer
arrested Troyer and brought him to the police station.
At the station, the officer read Troyer the breath-test advisory and gave him time to
speak with an attorney. Troyer agreed to submit to the breath test. The arresting officer
observed a second officer administer the DataMaster breath test to Troyer and follow
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required procedures. Troyer’s breath samples showed an alcohol concentration of at least
0.16.
After the state served its complaint, Troyer filed a timely discovery request for,
among other things, the “video recordings made regarding this case,” including the video
of his booking and breath-test procedure. The state could not produce the requested
booking-room video because it had been automatically destroyed. Troyer moved to
suppress “all evidence that would have been contained” on the booking-room video “had
the video been preserved as requested” by Troyer. The state opposed the motion to
suppress.
At the omnibus hearing, the arresting officer testified that Troyer’s breath test was
captured on the video- recording system installed in the station. The officer agreed that
while he does not “remember exactly what happened,” Troyer’s entire breath-testing
process would have been preserved on the booking-room video.
After the omnibus hearing, the district court issued written findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a memorandum. Together with the facts summarized above, the
district court found the police station “has working cameras in its booking spaces,” and
explained that “[t]hese camera s record at all times and would have recorded [Troyer’s]
breath test and other interactions” with police. The recordings are retained on the police
department’s server for 90 days. After 90 days, the recordings are “automatically deleted
by the system.” The department will “save the footage or override the scheduled
destruction, with proper notice.”
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The district court found that, on “April 12, 2018—within the 90 -day retention
timeframe—[Troyer’s] counsel submitted a discovery request to the Inver Grove Heights
City Attorney’s Office.” The discovery request sought “[c]opies of any audio or video
recordings made regarding this case including any recordings made by the officers,
dispatchers or jailers.” But the “City Attorney’s Office did not immediately request the
booking footage.” Rather, on “December 19, 2018 —beyond the 90-day retention
timeframe, the City Attorney’s Office requested the booking footage” from the police
department. Despite the department’s efforts to retrieve the booking -room video, it “was
already deleted by the server.”
In its written memorandum following the omnibus hearing, the district court
determined that, in response to Troyer’s discovery request, the state produced: “1) audio
recordings of [the officer] giving [Troyer] the breath advisory and Miranda warning during
booking; 2) the printed breath test advisory form for this case; 3) the DataMaster test results
printout; and 4) [the officer’s] squad vehicle footage of the incident.”
The district court next determined that the booking-room video “was potentially
useful evidence,” and the state’s “failure to request its preservation immediately after
receipt of [Troyer’s] discovery request was likely inadvertent.” The district court
emphasized its earlier finding that the booking-room video “was destroyed by the server’s
automatic process,” which followed the record-retention schedule. The district court finally
determined that the booking-room video “was not material, and was not destroyed
intentionally or in bad faith.” Based on these determinations, the district court concluded
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that “[Troyer’s] due process rights were not violated” and denied his motion to suppress
evidence.
The parties agreed to a stipulated-evidence court trial under Minn. R. Crim.
P. 26.01, subd. 4, to obtain an appellate ruling on the pretrial order denying Troyer’s
motion to suppress. After a court trial, the district court convicted Troyer of fourth-degree
DWI, and stayed the imposition of sentence on the condition that Troyer complete one year
of probation.
Troyer appeals. After filing his notice of appeal, Troyer petitioned the supreme court
for accelerated review, which the supreme court denied.
DECISION
Troyer argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the
evidence of his breath test, including the test results, because the state violated his
due-process rights by destroying the booking- room video. Troyer contends, first, that the
Minnesota Constitution’s Due Process Clause provides greater protection than the U.S.
Constitution. Troyer contends, second, that under the Minnesota Constitution, this court
should suppress all related evidence when the state destroys evidence in its possession after
a defendant makes a timely request to preserve the evidence, even with no claim that the
destroyed evidence is exculpatory or that the state acted in bad faith. The state argues that
the district court properly denied Troyer’s motion under existing law and that this court
should reject Troyer’s proposed rule under the Minnesota Constitution.
On appeal of a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, this
court reviews “the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and
6
the district court’s legal determinations de novo.” State v. Jordan, 742 N.W.2d 149, 152
(Minn. 2007). Troyer does not contend that the district court’s findings of fact were clearly
erroneous. Troyer’s sole argument for reversal rests on whether the state’s destruction of
evidence violated his due-process rights. Whether a due-process violation has occurred
poses a question of constitutional law, which we review de novo. State v. Beecroft,
813 N.W.2d 814, 836 (Minn. 2012). “The interpretation and application of the Minnesota
Constitution is a legal question that we review de novo.” State v. Castillo- Alvarez,
836 N.W.2d 527, 534 (Minn. 2013).
Relevant precedent
We begin by summarizing the applicable law on the state’s duty to preserve
evidence under the federal Due Process Clause. In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court
held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct.
1194, 1196-97 (1963). In Arizona v. Youngblood, the Supreme Court refined its holding
from Brady by adding a bad-faith requirement where the destroyed evidence is not
exculpatory. 488 U.S. 51, 57-58, 109 S. Ct. 333, 337 (1988). The Court differentiated
between “potentially useful evidence” and “material exculpatory evidence.” Id. The Court
ruled that “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure
to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.”
Id. at 58, 109 S. Ct. at 337.
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In Illinois v. Fisher, the Supreme Court analyzed whether a timely discovery request
by a defendant alters the due-process analysis for the state’s destruction of potentially
useful evidence. 540 U.S. 544, 545, 124 S. Ct. 1200, 1200 (2004). The Court held that a
defendant’s discovery request does not negate the bad-faith requirement adopted in
Youngblood:
We have never held or suggested that the existence of a
pending discovery request eliminates the necessity of showing
bad faith on the part of police. Indeed, the result reached in this
case demonstrates why such a per se rule would negate the very
reason we adopted the bad-faith requirement in the first place:
to limit the extent of the police’s obligation to preserve
evidence to reasonable grounds and confine it to that class of
cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it.

Id. at 548, 124 S. Ct. at 1202 (quotation omitted).
In State v. Hawkinson, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered facts very similar
to those in Troyer’s case. 829 N.W.2d 367 (Minn. 2013). The supreme court reversed a
district court’s decision to suppress evidence in a DWI prosecution after the state had
destroyed the appellant’s blood sample while following its retention policy but after the
appellant had made a timely request to preserve the evidence. Id. at 369. After summarizing
Brady and noting that it had previously followed Youngblood, the supreme court
determined that the appellant’s blood sample was not exculpatory evidence and was only
“potentially useful evidence,” so the bad-faith requirement from Youngblood applied. Id.
at 371-73.1 After examining the record under existing case law, the supreme court

1 The supreme court next identified two “indices of bad faith”: “(1) whether the State
purposefully destroyed evidence favorable to a defendant so as to hide it”; and “(2) whether
the State failed to follow standard procedures when it destroyed the evidence.” Id. at 374.
8
determined that the state had “no motive” to destroy the blood sample, which was
inculpatory, and “followed its normal procedure” when it destroyed the sample, and that
these determinations “undermine[d]” appellant’s bad-faith claim. Id. at 374.
The supreme court next considered the effect of appellant’s request to preserve the
blood sample, which it described as “a matter of first impression.” Id . The supreme court
rejected a “per se rule,” which it described as: “once a request for preservation has been
made, the evidence must be preserved and if it is not preserved, then it will be suppressed.”
Id. at 375. In rejecting this rule, the supreme court relied on Fisher. Id. The court concluded
that, while a request to preserve evidence “can be considered when assessing whether bad
faith played a role in the State’s destruction of the evidence,” it does not, alone, “negate
the requirement that a defendant show bad faith.” Id. After analyzing the record evidence
on the appellant’s request, the supreme court held that the state’s destruction of the blood
sample did not violate appellant’s due-process rights. Id. at 377.
We are troubled that Troyer’s brief to this court does not cite Hawkinson or Fisher.
Minnesota appellate courts may decline to reach an issue in the absence of adequate
briefing. In re Civil Commitment of Kropp , 895 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Minn. App. 2017),
review denied (Minn. June 20, 2017). When a party “does not cite to applicable law,
nor . . . engage in an analysis of the law to substantiate her claims that errors of law actually
occurred,” these ar guments may be deemed inadequate. In re Conduct of Karasov,
805 N.W.2d 255, 271 (Minn. 2011). Troyer does not analyze the most applicable
Minnesota precedent on a defendant’s due-process rights in the context of evidence
destruction: Hawkinson.
9
Still, we recognize that the supreme court in Hawkinson did not decide whether the
Minnesota Constitution’s Due Process Clause provides greater protection than the federal
Constitution, as Troyer argues here. Troyer’s brief describes the district court’s ruling on
his motion to suppress, which cited Hawkinson, as “a relatively accurate statement of the
law.” Troyer argues that “it is that very standard this appeal seeks to change.” In district
court, Troyer also argued for a change in the law. Because we conclude that Troyer’s brief
to this court cites some relevant legal authority for his position, even if he overlooks the
most applicable caselaw, we address the issue on appeal.
Authority of the court of appeals
Troyer contends that the issue is “beyond the purview of the Minnesota Court of
Appeals” in his petition for accelerated review to the supreme court. We disagree. It is true
that we are “bound by supreme court precedent.” State v. Curtis, 921 N.W.2d 342, 346
(Minn. 2018); State v. Final Exit Network, Inc., 889 N.W.2d 296, 303 (Minn. App. 2016).
This court, however, may decide issues of first impression. In re Trusteeship of Tr. of
Williams, 631 N.W.2d 398, 410 (Minn. App. 2001) (“Only when there are no statutory or
judicial precedents to follow will the Court of Appeals make new law.”), review denied
(Minn. Sept. 25, 2001); see also State v. McCormick, 835 N.W.2d 498, 510 (Minn. App.
2013), review denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2013). “We acknowledge that we are primarily an
error-correcting court. Where our appellate courts have not clearly addressed the central
issue in a case, however, it is our duty to note the direction of developments and to
anticipate changes in the law.” Anderson v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. , 465 N.W.2d 68, 72
(Minn. App. 1991) (citation omitted), aff’d, 481 N.W.2d 48 (Minn. 1992). See also Sam
10
Hanson, “The Minnesota Court of Appeals: Arguing to, and Limitations of, an
Error-correcting Court,” 35 William Mitchell L. Rev. 1261, 1264 (2009) (noting that this
court, “just as the district court, must decide the case before it” and sometimes must “decide
issues of first impression, some of which require it to resolve competing public-policy
interests”).
Thus, to resolve this appeal, we first consider whether the district court’s decision
followed existing law and then decide whether the Minnesota Due Process Clause requires
reversal. The state argues, without opposition from Troyer, that the district court followed
existing precedent under the federal Due Process Clause. We agree with the state.
The supreme court in Hawkinson held that “when a defendant seeks to suppress test
results from evidence that was: (1) merely potentially useful; (2) subject to a request to
preserve; and (3) was destroyed by the State; the defendant must show that the State
destroyed the evidence in bad faith” before there is a due-process violation. 829 N.W.2d at
376. The district court found that the booking-room video “was potentially useful evidence
and the State’s failure to request its preservation immediately after receipt of [Troyer’s]
discovery request was likely inadvertent.” The district court concluded, “Since the booking
video footage was not material, and was not destroyed intentionally or in bad faith,
[Troyer’s] due process rights were not violated.” The district court correctly applied
Hawkinson to the facts in this case.
Minnesota due-process analysis
Turning to Troyer’s claim under the Minnesota Due Process Clause, we recognize
that Minnesota courts “can and will interpret our state constitution to afford greater
11
protections of individual civil and political rights than does the federal constitution.” Kahn
v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn. 2005). An appellate court approaches “this task
with restraint and some delicacy” and “will not, on some slight implication and vague
conjecture, depart from federal precedent or the general principle that favors uniformity
with the federal constitution.” Id.
When considering whether to expand state constitutional rights beyond those of the
federal constitution, “the issue is whether we have a clear and strong conviction that there
is a principled basis” for the court to interpret the Minnesota Constitution to provide greater
protections than the U.S. Constitution. State v. McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686, 691 ( Minn.
2015) (quotation omitted). The supreme court has held that it will not interpret the
Minnesota Constitution to reject the interpretation of a similar provision in the U.S.
Constitution “merely because one prefers the opposite result.” State v. Wicklund,
589 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted).
We see no principled basis for Troyer’s view of the Minnesota Due Process Clause
based on its text. The Minnesota Constitution provides, “No person shall be held to answer
for a criminal offense without due process of law . . . n or be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.” Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. The Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution similarly provides, “No state shall . . . deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The
state and federal Due Process Clauses are textually similar, and the supreme court has
described the scope of their protections as “identical.” Turner v. Comm’r of Revenue,
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840 N.W.2d 205, 209 (Minn. 2013); see also State v. LeDoux, 770 N.W.2d 504, 512 (Minn.
2009).
Troyer cites no caselaw in which the supreme court has previously interpreted the
state Due Process Clause differently from the federal Due Process Clause, and we can find
none.2 Despite the lack of precedent f or doing so, Troyer argues that this court should
interpret the state Due Process Clause differently from the federal Due Process Clause. He
contends that “Minnesota should adopt a bright line rule under our state constitutional due
process and fair trial clauses that if evidence in the exclusive possession or control of the
state is lost or destroyed, any evidence that would have been preserved cannot be offered
against the accused.”
Troyer offers two rationales, which we discuss in turn. First, Troyer contends that
the proposed bright-line rule is akin to the standard Minnesota applies to destroyed
evidence in civil cases. But Troyer mischaracterizes Minnesota civil law on the spoliation
of evidence. It is true that, in civil cases, a party need not establish bad faith in the
destruction of evidence before seeking sanctions. See, e.g. , Himes v. Woodings-Verona
Tool Works, Inc. 565 N.W.2d 469, 471 (Minn. App. 1997) (upholding sanctions for

2 As the state points out, the supreme court has interpreted the state constitution to provide
greater protections than the federal constitution almost exclusively for Fourth Amendment
searches and seizures. See, e.g., State v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d 149, 156 (Minn. 2020)
(holding search of hotel guest registry violated Minn. Const. art I, § 10 because it “provides
greater protection against suspicionless law enforcement conduct” than the U.S.
Constitution); State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 210 (Minn. 2005) (holding random use of
drug-detection dog violated Minn. Const. art I, § 10); Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety,
519 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Minn. 1994) (holding suspicionless seizures using DWI roadblocks
violated Minn. Const. art I, § 10).
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negligent loss of evidence), review denied (Minn. Aug. 26, 1997). Civil law does not,
however, embrace a per se rule, as is proposed by Troyer. A district court may impose
sanctions against a party for the loss or destruction of evidence only when it finds prejudice
to the moving party. See Patton v. Newmar Corp., 538 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. 1995)
(holding district court “has the inherent power to impose sanctions” for evidence spoliation
and in doing so must determine “the impact of the spoliation—the prejudice to the opposing
party”). “Implicit in that standard is the need to examine the nature of the item lost in the
context of the claims asserted and the potential for remediation of the prejudice.” Id.
Contrary to Troyer’s argument, the civil analysis for evidence spoliation is
analogous to Hawkinson’s analysis for a due -process violation. A district court deciding
whether to sanction a party for evidence s poliation considers the prejudice occasioned by
the destroyed evidence. Patton, 538 N.W.2d at 119. Hawkinson similarly analyzed whether
the destroyed evidence was material and exculpatory or only “potentially useful.”
829 N.W.2d at 372-73.3 We thus reject Troyer’s claim that his proposed rule is necessary
to put criminal defendants on equal footing with civil litigants.
Even more to the point, the supreme court in Hawkinson rejected a per se rule like
the one proposed by Troyer. Id. at 375. The supreme court relied on Fisher and reasoned
that the bad-faith requirement is necessary to “limit the extent of the police’s obligation to

3 We also note that Troyer’s proposed rule raises unanswered questions: (1) d oes the
proposed rule apply to the destruction of any evidence by the state or only to material
evidence or evidence for which the defendant can articulate prejudice? And (2) how does
the court decide when and what evidence to suppress or whether dismissal is the more
appropriate sanction?
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preserve evidence to reasonable grounds and confine it to that class of cases where the
interests of justice most clearly require it.” Id. at 376 (quoting Fisher, 540 U.S. at 547-48,
124 S. Ct. at 1202). Thus, Hawkinson recognized that there are public policy reasons
unique to the criminal process that support preserving the bad-faith requirement. Troyer
never discusses the public policy analysis in Hawkinson, which obviously carries great
weight when applied to the Minnesota Due Process Clause.
Second, Troyer argues that a bright-line rule is necessary to avoid the outcome in
Youngblood. According to Troyer, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Youngblood, which
adopted the bad-faith requirement, “did not protect Youngblood’s due process rights”
because “he was later exonerated” when the evidence that was damaged by police during
storage “was tested using new, sophisticated DNA technology.” Even if we assume,
without deciding, that Troyer’s description of Youngblood’s case is accurate, his argument
is unpersuasive.
Troyer does not argue that the booking-room video is exculpatory, as was argued in
Youngblood. Just as the supreme court determined that the destroyed blood sample in
Hawkinson was potentially useful evidence and not exculpatory , the district court
determined that the destroyed booking-room video was potentially useful because it was
“not material and was not the only source of the evidence.” Troyer does not contest this
determination on appeal. And, unlike Youngblood, Troyer obtained other evidence from
the state regarding his breath test —audio recordings, the printed breath-test advisory, the
DataMaster test results, and the squad vehicle footage. Other evidence, therefore, mitigated
15
any prejudice to Troyer from the state’s inadvertent destruction of the booking-room video.
Thus, we reject Troyer’s reliance on the outcome in Youngblood’s case.
In sum, Troyer fails to discuss the relevant caselaw about the federal Due Process
Clause and has articulated no principled basis for this court to interpret the Minnesota Due
Process Clause to provide greater protection than the federal Due Process Clause. The two
clauses are textually similar and supreme court precedent in other contexts has held their
protections are “identical.” Turner, 840 N.W.2d at 209. W e conclude that the Minnesota
Constitution’s Due Process Clause does not require the suppression of evidence related to
the destroyed booking-room video because the evidence was merely potentially useful and
not exculpatory, and the state did not act in bad faith.
Affirmed.