A20-0837

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0835
A20-0837

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Christopher Charles Clinton Ames,
Appellant.

Filed March 22, 2021
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Worke, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File Nos. 18-CR-18-894, 18-CR-19-3849

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wi ng County Attorney, Canda ce Prigge, Assistant County
Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Kalitowski,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
In this consolidated appeal from the judgment of conviction in one matter and an
associated probation revocation, appellant argues that the district court (1) miscalculated
his criminal-history score, (2) abused its discretion by denying his request for a downward
dispositional departure, (3) abused its di scretion by revoking his probation, and
(4) erroneously added a conditiona l-release term to his sentence . We affirm the district
court’s decisions to deny appellant’s motion for a sentencing depart ure and revoke his
probation. But we reverse and remand the de termination of appellant’s criminal-history
score and imposition of the conditional-release term.
FACTS
A20-0835
In April 2018, appellant Christopher Ch arles Clinton Ames pleaded guilty to
violating the requirements for registering as a predatory offender. The presumptive
sentence was 30 months in prison, and th e sentencing worksheet noted a ten-year
conditional-release term was required if the sentence was executed.
Ames sought a dispositional departure be cause he “want[ed] to do something
different with [his] life.” The prosecutor stat ed that she was familiar with Ames since he
was “a kid” and that he had to be “getting tired of this.” She stated that, even though the
state agreed to a departure, she did not kn ow if Ames was partic ularly amenable to
probation, but hoped that he would take advantage of it. The district court sentenced Ames
to 36 months in prison, but stayed execution for five years. Ames’s probation included the

3
following conditions: remain la w abiding, no use or possessi on of alcohol or controlled
substances, comply with the ru les of probation, and successf ully complete treatment at
Teen Challenge. The district court told Ames “I want to emphasize . . . it’s time to change
the direction of your life.”
In October 2019, probation alleged that Am es violated his probation by failing to
refrain from the use of controlled substanc es and remain law ab iding. A probation-
violation report discussed Ames’s experience on probation. First, Ames requested to
transfer out of Teen Challenge because he did not “like the rules.” Ames was allowed to
transition to another program, but was discharg ed due to poor attendance. Next, Ames
requested to transfer to a program to be ne ar family and friends. Probation approved the
transfer, but Ames failed to meet with his agent and was restructured for failing to maintain
contact. When Ames finally met with his ag ent, he submitted a urinalysis that tested
positive for methamphetamine. Ames was rest ructured for using a controlled substance
and was directed to meet with his agent. Ames failed to meet his agent and was again
restructured for failing to maintain contact. Finally, in September 2019, Ames received
new criminal charges.
At a probation-violation hearing, Ames ad mitted that he failed to refrain from the
use of controlled substances, and the district court took judicial notice that Ames pleaded
guilty to the new offenses. Th e district court scheduled a di sposition hearing to occur at
Ames’s sentencing on the new offenses.

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A20-0837
In September 2019, Ames was char ged with fifth-degree possession of
methamphetamine and fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle. According to the
complaint, Ames evaded law enforcement by traveling at excessive speeds and ignoring
stop signs. Deputies had to deploy stop sticks to flatten the vehicle’s tires. Officers arrested
Ames and found methamphetamine on him. Ames pleaded guilty to the offenses.
A sentencing worksheet showed that Ames had six criminal-history points. Ames
moved to correct his criminal-history score, claiming that it incorrectly assigned one point
for a receiving-stolen-property conviction, which is a seve rity-level-two offense that
should have been assigned one-half of a point . Thus, he asserted that, because no partial
points are given, his criminal-history score was five. The state countered that the offense
involved a stolen motor vehicle, and motor-ve hicle theft is a severity-level-three offense
that is assigned one point; thus, Ames’s six-point criminal-history score was correct.
Ames also moved for a downward dispositional departure. Ames argued that he is
an addict who would benefit from programming and that his addiction explained his new
offenses. He asserted that he experienced abuse and tragedy in his childhood that resulted
in him suffering from post-traumatic stress di sorder. Finally, Ames claimed to accept
responsibility, expressed that he desired change , and stated that he would participate in
Teen Challenge.
A presentence investigation (PSI) report not ed that the presumptive sentence was
21 months in prison for the possession offens e and 19 months in prison for the fleeing
offense. The PSI report noted that the curre nt offense showed that Ames was a danger to

5
himself, the passenger in the vehicle at the tim e of the offense, an d the community. The
PSI report concluded that, becau se Ames had a long history of violations while in the
community, he was not particularly amenable to probation and should be incarcerated for
as long as possible.
Combined disposition and sentencing
The district court entered an order conc luding that Ames’s six-point criminal-
history score was correct because the receiving-stolen-property conviction was a severity-
level-three offense that is assigned one point. The district court denied Ames’s request for
a downward dispositional departure and senten ced him to 21 months in prison for the
possession conviction, and a concurrent 19 mont hs in prison for the fleeing conviction.
The district court also revoked Ames’s probation, executed his 36-month prison sentence,
and added a ten-year conditional-release term. This consolidated appeal followed.
DECISION
Criminal-history score
Ames first challenges his criminal-history sc ore. The district court determined that
Ames’s six-point criminal-history score wa s correct, agreeing with the state that the
receiving-stolen-property conviction is a sever ity-level-three offense that is assigned one
point. When the assignment of a criminal-history point turns on interpreting the sentencing
guidelines, this court reviews the district court’s determination of a criminal-history score
de novo. State v. Strobel, 932 N.W.2d 303, 306 (Minn. 2019).
According to the complaint f iled in 2009, Ames crashed a stolen vehicle. Ames
pleaded guilty to receiving stol en property under Minn. Stat . § 609.53, subd. 1 (2008).

6
Under section 609.53, subdivision 1, a “person who receives, possesses, transfers, buys or
conceals any stolen pr operty or property obtained by ro bbery, knowing or having reason
to know the property was stolen or obtained by robbery, ma y be sentenced in accordance
with the provisions of section 609.52, subdiv ision 3.” Under Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd.
3(3)(d)(v) (2008), whoever commits a theft may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more
than five years or to payment of a fine up to $10,000, or both, if th e value of the stolen
property is not more than $1,000, and is a motor vehicle.
Ames argues that a conviction for receivi ng stolen property valu ed at less than
$5,000 is a severity-level-two offense that is assigned one-half of a point. Ames is correct.
See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.1. a, 5.A (Supp. 2009). The state counters that Ames
pleaded guilty to an un ranked offense, and so we shoul d look to a ranked offense with
similar conduct to ascertain the correct sever ity level. The state asserts that Ames’s
admitted-to conduct is the same as using a motor vehicle without the owner’s permission,
which is a severity-level-three offense assigned one point. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines
2.B.1.a, 5.A. But Ames did no t plead guilty to unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. He
pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property valued less than $5,000, and as such, the district
court erred in calculating Ames’s criminal-histo ry score. We reverse the district court’s
conclusion that Ames’s crim inal-history score is six and remand for recalculation
consistent with this opinion.1

1 Recalculation of Ames’s crim inal-history score will like ly change the presumptive
sentences for the current offenses and require a resentencing hearing.

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Dispositional departure
Ames next argues that the district cour t abused its discretion by denying his motion
for a downward dispositional departure.
A sentence that is prescribed by th e sentencing guidelines is “presumed”
appropriate. State v. Soto , 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). A
district court may depart from a presumptive sentence only if “identifiable, substantial, and
compelling circumstances” warrant a departure. State v. Solberg , 882 N.W.2d 618, 623
(Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted ). Appellate courts “afford the [district] court great
discretion in the imposition of sentences a nd reverse . . . only for an abuse of that
discretion.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 307-08 (quotation om itted). “[I]t would be a rare case
which would warrant reversal of the refusal to depart.” State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7
(Minn. 1981).
In considering a motion for a downward di spositional departure, a district court
focuses on the defend ant and whether he is particular ly amenable to probation. State v.
Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1 982) (stating that in assessing whether a defendant is
particularly amenable to probation, a district court may consider age, prior record, remorse,
cooperation, attitude in court, and support of family and friends ). But, even if the record
shows that the defendant would be amenable to probation, a district court is not required
to depart from a presumptive sentence. State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Minn.
App. 2009).
Ames claims that he is entitled to probation because he is young, he took
accountability, he planned to return to Teen Challenge, he was respectful and cooperative,

8
and he has been successful on probation. He also claims that departures have been granted
in cases with similar mitigating circumstances, such as for defendants who, like him, have
experienced childhood trauma and suffer from mental illness.
The record supports the district court’s de nial of Ames’s motion for a departure.
First, although Ames was 30 years old at th e time of sentencing, he has an extensive
criminal history. When the prosecutor ag reed to a dispositional departure on the
registration-violation offense, she noted her familiarity with Ames and stated that she was
uncertain as to whether Ames was particularly amenable to probation. At that point, the
district court emphasized that Ames needed to change his life. But Ames ultimately
violated the terms of his probation.
Ames claims that he has shown success on probation, but he failed to comply with
previous conditions—he used methamphetamine and he pleaded guilty to new charges.
Ames claims that he will enter Teen Challenge, but he previously requested to transfer out
of Teen Challenge, claiming that the program did not align with his beliefs. He then failed
to attend the new program.
The PSI report noted that the possession an d fleeing offenses showed that Ames was
dangerous to himself and the community. It also noted th at Ames had many violations
while on probation and numerous restructures, which showed that he was not particularly
amenable to probation and re quired incarceration. The di strict court stated that it
considered “all of the evidence, recommendations, and arguments” before concluding that
“there are no substantial and compelling reasons that justify departure in the matter.” The

9
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ames’s mo tion for a dispositional
departure.
Probation revocation
Ames argues that the district court abus ed its discretion by revoking his probation
because the policies favoring pr obation are not outweighed by th e need for confinement.
He argues that the district court even stated: “In light of the evidence presented, the policies
favoring probation are not outweighed by the need for confinement.” (Emphasis added.)
The district court stated:
The violations [of using a cont rolled substance and failing to
remain law abiding] . . . are found to be in tentional and
inexcusable. In light of the evidence presented, the policies
favoring probation are not outweighed by the need for
confinement. [Ames] received a dispositional departure and
had been given an opportunity to complete treatment at a
facility of his choosing. [Ame s] quit attending the treatment
program, failed to stay in cont act with his agent as requested,
and used drugs for four months before being charged with two
new felony level offenses.

(Emphasis added.) Considering the district court’s statements and decision, the inclusion
of the word “not” in that location was a clerical error.
2
Ames argues that even if it was a cleric al error, the district court still abused its
discretion by revoking his probation because it failed to balance his constitutional interest
in freedom and the interests of rehabilitation with the interests of public safety.
The district court has broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence
to revoke probation. State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980). To revoke

2 This clerical error should be corrected on remand.

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probation, a district court must “1) designate the specific condition or conditions that were
violated; 2) find that the violation was intentio nal or inexcusable; and 3) find that [the]
need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.” Id. at 250. The burden
of proof is on the state to establish each element by clear and convincing evidence. Minn.
R. Crim. P. 27.04, subds. 2(1 )(c)b, 3(1). We review de n ovo whether the district court
made the findings required fo r revocation of probation. State v. Modtland , 695 N.W.2d
602, 605 (Minn. 2005).
Ames challenges only the third Austin factor—that the need for confinement
outweighs the policies favoring probation. In considering the third Austin factor, relevant
circumstances include whether (1) confinement is necessary to protect the public, (2) the
offender is in need of correctional treatment most effectively provided institutionally, and
(3) the seriousness of the violations would be unduly depreciated if probation were not
revoked. 295 N.W.2d at 251.
The district court stated that Ames ha d previously been on probation and was
unsuccessful, failed to attend treatment, and used drugs for months. The district court also
observed that, while on prob ation, Ames committed two felonies. These comments
indicate that Ames requires treatment that will be more effective in prison because he failed
treatment while on probation. Also, noting the felony-level charges that were detailed in
the PSI report indicates that confinement is necessary to protect the public, and the
seriousness of the violations w ould be unduly depreciated if probation were not revoked.
The PSI report noted that the current offenses showed that Ames was a danger to himself

11
and the community, and that he should be in carcerated after numerous restructures while
on probation. The district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Ames’s probation.
Conditional-release term
Finally, Ames argues that the district c ourt erred by adding a ten-year conditional-
release term to his registration-violation sentence because conditional-release terms apply
only to level-three registrants and there was no evidence that he was a level-three registrant.
The state agrees. And the parties are correct. A district court may not impose a ten-year
conditional-release term for a conviction of failing to register as a predatory offender absent
a jury’s finding, or the defendant’s admission, that he was a level-three offender at the time
of the violation. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5a (2016); State v. Her, 862 N.W.2d 692,
693 (Minn. 2015). There is neither a jury fi nding nor an admission by Ames that he is a
level-three offender. Accord ingly, we reverse the impositi on of the conditional-release
term and remand for the district court to vacate the conditional-release term.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.