In re the Marriage of: Rupam Sinha, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0838

In re the Marriage of: Rupam Sinha, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Deepak Kademani,
Appellant.

Filed May 17, 2021
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Reilly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-17-7011

William R. Skolnick, Amy D. Joyce, Samuel M. Johnson, Skolnick & Joyce, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Kay Nord Hunt, Michelle K. Kuhl, Lommen Abdo, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Brian L. Sobol, McGrann Sh ea Carnival Straughn & Lamb , Chartered, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Florey, Pres iding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
In this contentious marital-dissolution di spute, appellant-husband and respondent-
wife challenge multiple aspects of the distri ct court’s dissolution decree relating to the
division of marital property, spousal main tenance, and the awar d of need-based and

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conduct-based attorney fees. Appellant also challenges the district court’s denial of his
postjudgment motion and related award of conduct-based attorney fees to wife. We affirm
most of the district court’s decisions. But, we reverse and remand for the district court to
divide appellant’s 2017 bonus equitably between the parties, and we reverse the award of
conduct-based fees against appellant resulting from the denial of his postjudgment motion.
FACTS
Appellant Dr. Deepak Kademani (husband) and respondent Dr. Rupam Sinha (wife)
married in 1998. They had two children together, one of whom was a minor at the time of
the dissolution. Wife petitioned for dissolution of marriage in October 2017. The district
court held the dissolution trial over the course of four days in June and July 2019. In
October 2019, the district court issued its find ings of fact, conclusi ons of law, order for
judgment, and judgment and decree, which disso lved the parties’ marri age. The district
court later issued amended findings of fact and conclusions of law in May 2020.1
The district court considered the partie s’ marital and nonm arital assets, and it
divided the marital property be tween the parties. It awar ded husband about $2.7 million
in assets and wife about $1.9 million in a ssets, and it ordered husb and to pay wife an
equalizer payment of $400,470.20 to ensure an equal division. The district court awarded
temporary spousal maintenance to wife, ordering husband to pay her $6,000 per month for
the next four years. The district court also awarded payment of attorney fees on several

1 Because of the number and complexity of th e issues on appeal, we explain the evidence
presented at trial and the district court’s findi ngs relating to each issue in greater detail in
the decision section.

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bases. It ordered husband to pay wife $100,000 in need-based fees and $15,590 in conduct-
based fees.
After the district court issued its origin al judgment and decree in October 2019,
husband brought a postjudgment motion in Decem ber 2019. The district court denied
husband’s motion and ordered him to pay condu ct-based fees to wife, concluding that
husband’s motion was baseless and caused wife to incur additional attorney fees to respond
to his motion.
Husband appeals from the district court’s dissolution decree and from the denial of
his postjudgment motion. Wife cross-appeals.
DECISION
Husband and wife each raise multiple ar guments on appeal relating to various
aspects of the district court’s dissolution decree and postjudgment order. We have divided
the parties’ arguments into four categories: (1 ) the classification of property as marital or
nonmarital, (2) spousal maintenance, (3) need-based and conduct-based attorney fees, and
(4) the denial of husband’s postjudgment motion.
I. Classification of Property as Marital or Nonmarital
Husband and wife both challenge the distri ct court’s division of property, arguing
that the division was improper because the district court erred in its classification of certain
assets as marital or nonmarital.
“All property acquired by either spouse subs equent to the marriage and before the
valuation date is presumed to be marital property, regard less of whether title is held
individually or by the spouses in a form of co-ownership.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b

4
(2020). Nonmarital property includes proper ty acquired by either spouse before the
marriage. Id., subd. 3b(b). It also includes prope rty acquired before, during, or after
marriage that is “acquired as a gift, bequest, devise or inheritance made by a third party to
one but not to the other spouse.” Id., subd. 3b(a). For a party to overcome the presumption
that property acquired during the marriage is marital, the party must prove that the property
in question is nonmarital by a preponderance of the evidence. Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d
797, 800 (Minn. 1997). Whether property is marital or nonmarital is a question of law,
which we review de novo. Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn. 2018). But we defer
to the district court’s underlying factual fi ndings and will not set them aside unless they
are clearly erroneous. Id.
The parties make these arguments: (A) husba nd argues that the district court erred
by classifying as marital property two bank accounts and a condominium bought with funds
from one of the accounts; (B) husband argues that the district court erred by classifying as
nonmarital property a flat in Birmingham, England, that wife kept during the marriage; and
(C) wife argues that the district court e rred by classifying husba nd’s 2017 bonus as
nonmarital. We examine each argument in turn.
A. The district court did not err by cl assifying the funds in husband’s two
Fidelity bank accounts and a condominium bought using funds from one of
the accounts as marital property.
First, husband argues that the district court improperly classified funds in two
Fidelity bank accou nts (ending in 6320 and 5237) an d a condominium (unit 1513) as
marital property. Husband main tains that these assets belo nged to husband’s father and
that the district court therefore erred by dividing them between the parties.

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The two Fidelity accounts were titled in the names of husband and his father as joint
account holders. Husband’s father testified about his bank accounts generally, saying that,
despite husband’s name being listed on some of the accounts, husband never put money
into any of the acco unts and did not have an interest in them. Husband’s father said that
he added his children’s names to the bank acco unts for estate-planning purposes. As for
the two Fidelity accounts, husband introduced a document prepared by a financial-services
company showing that husband’s father, ra ther than husband, made all deposits and
withdrawals. The condominium was bought in September 2017 using funds from one of
the Fidelity accounts. According to husband, his parents bought the condominium for him
after he separated from wife. Husband lived in the condominium and paid his parents rent.
Husband testified that his parents owned unit 1513, but that he later bought an adjacent
unit with his own funds and combined the two into a single unit.
While the district court found that funds in some of the bank accounts held by
husband and his father were nonmarital property, the district court found that the funds in
the two Fidelity accounts were marital property. In reaching this conclusion, the district
court reasoned that husband opened the accounts during the marriage and was listed as the
primary account holder, and that income fro m the accounts was listed on husband and
wife’s tax returns. Although husband’s father was the source of the funds, the district court
determined that the funds were a gift and that husband failed to show that the accounts
were a gift to husband alone, rather than to both husband and wife. The district court
rejected husband’s testimony that the accounts were listed on the tax returns by mistake,
finding the testimony not credible. Likewise , the district court determined that the

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condominium was also marita l property because husband used funds from one of the
accounts to buy the condominium.
We first address the proper framing of th e issue on appeal. The district court
determined that, because the accounts were opened during the marriage, husband bore the
burden to prove that the funds in the accounts were nonmarital. Husband, however, urges
us to apply a different standard. He mainta ins that the two accounts belong to husband’s
father. Citing Minn. Stat. § 524.6-203(a) (2020), husband argues that, because husband’s
father deposited all the funds into the acco unts, the funds belonged entirely to him, and
wife had the burden to show clear and convi ncing evidence of a different intent. But
husband did not make this argument before the district court, either in his posttrial
memorandum or in his motion for amended findings. Issues that were not presented to and
considered by the district court are not properly before this court. Thiele v. Stich , 425
N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Nor, on appeal, may a party raise “the same general issue
litigated below but on a different theory.” Id. Here, while husband did argue to the district
court that the funds in the accounts belonged to his father, he did not present this argument
based on Minn. Stat. § 524.6-203(a), nor did he argue that wi fe needed to show clear and
convincing evidence of a differe nt intent by husband’s fathe r. And the district court did
not “consider” husband’s argument on the theory he now argues on appeal. Thus, this
question is not properly before us, and we will not consider husband’s theory for the first
time on appeal.
Instead, we analyze the issue using the same framework as the district court. We
must accept the district court’s finding that the funds in the two accounts were a gift from

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husband’s father and, as such, were husband’s property. The question is therefore whether
the accounts were husband’s marital or nonmar ital property. The record shows that
husband opened the accounts in 2013 or 2014 , which was during the marriage. Because
husband acquired the accounts during the ma rriage, they are presumptively marital
property. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b. This means that husband bore the burden to
prove that the funds in the accounts were non marital by a preponderance of the evidence.
Olsen, 562 N.W.2d at 800.
We conclude that several facts in th e record support the district court’s
determination that husband failed to rebut th e presumption that the funds in the accounts
were marital property. Husband was the one who opened the accounts, and he was listed
as the primary account holder. Wife testified that husband controlled many of the financial
aspects of the marriage. And funds from one of the accounts were used to buy the
condominium that husband moved into after separating from wife. Moreover, husband and
wife listed income from the two accounts on their tax return s from 2014 to 2017. Wife
presented evidence further showing that husband’s father did not pay taxes on income from
the Fidelity accounts for 2016 or 2017. While we recogni ze that tax returns are not
determinative as to ownership of an account, they are useful here because the district court
heard evidence about husband’s care in prepar ing his tax returns. During a pretrial
deposition, husband stated, “If they’re repo rted on our accounts, I would imagine that
they’re our funds.” Husband also said that, if there were accounts in other people’s names,
he would not list them on his tax returns. The evidence showing that the parties treated the

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funds in their accounts as belonging to them supports the district court’s determination that
the funds were marital property.
In affirming the district court’s finding, we emphasize the district court’s superior
position to weigh the evidence and judge the cr edibility of witnesses. Although husband
presented testimony at trial to support his a ssertion that the funds in the accounts were
intended for husband’s father, the district court rejected this testimony as not credible. And
we defer to the district court on matters of witn ess credibility. Sefkow v. Sefkow , 427
N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). We add that, while the district court found the funds in
the two Fidelity accounts to be marital property, it found that funds in other bank accounts
held jointly by husband and his father were not marital property. We therefore are satisfied
that the district court did not blindly assume that the funds in the Fidelity accounts were
marital property simply because husband’s na me was listed on the accounts. Rather, the
district court carefully consid ered the evidence and came to its decision based on facts
particular to those two accounts. Thus, we conc lude that the district court did not err by
classifying the funds in the two Fidelity accounts as marital property.
We likewise reject husband’s argument that the district court erred by classifying
the condominium as marital pr operty. Husband does not di spute that the condominium
was bought using $556,000 in funds from one of the Fidelity accounts. Assets bought with
marital property are also marital property. Gottsacker v. Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d 848, 860
(Minn. 2003). Because the funds in the accounts are marital property, then the
condominium is also marital pr operty. For these reasons, we conclude that the district

9
court did not err by classifying either the funds in the two Fide lity accounts or the
condominium as marital property and including them in the division of property.
B. The district court did not err by cla ssifying wife’s Birmingham flat and
rental income from the flat as her nonmarital property.
Husband next argues that the district c ourt erred by classifying wife’s flat in
Birmingham, England, as her nonmarital property. The district court classified the flat as
wife’s nonmarital property because wife bought the flat before the marriage and there was
no evidence that she managed the flat or received income from it during the marriage.
Wife testified that she bought the flat in 1996 or 1997, which was before the parties
married. She said that she bou ght the flat with funds from her father and that she lived
there only briefly. Because wife acquired the flat before the marriage, the flat is nonmarital
property. See Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b(b). Husband argues, however, that the flat
should be considered a marital asset because wife earned in come from the flat during the
marriage. Husband correctly notes that, generally, income from a nonmarital asset that is
earned during the marriage is marital property. Wiegers v. Wiegers, 467 N.W.2d 342, 344
(Minn. App. 1991). Thus, the income ea rned from the flat during the marriage was
presumptively marital property, and wife bore the burden to rebut this presumption by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Olsen, 562 N.W.2d at 800. In classifying the income
from the flat as nonmarital property, the dist rict court apparently determined, albeit
implicitly, that wife rebutted th e presumption. The record su pports the district court’s
implicit findings on this matter. See Vettleson v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 361 N.W.2d 425,
428 (Minn. App. 1985) (reviewing implicit findings of fact for clear error).

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Wife testified that she owned the flat for many years but did not pay rent, make
payments towards the mortgage , or pay for utilities. She did not receive income from
renters who lived in the flat, nor did she list the property as an asset on her tax returns.
Wife’s brother testified that he managed the flat after wife came to the United States and
that wife gave him power of attorney over her interests that sh e owned in the United
Kingdom. The brother said that he made payments on the mortgage for the flat using either
his own funds or his father’s. He also testified that he collected rent payments from various
renters of the flat. He denied receiving fu nds from wife for any of the payments and
maintained that he never sent her any income he received from the flat. The brother insisted
that wife “had nothing to do with the propert y.” Wife transferred the property out of her
name in October 2016.
The testimony of wife and her brother support the district court’s findings that wife
made no payments towards the flat during th e marriage and that she did not receive any
income from it. Their testimony suggested that, despite wife’s ownership of the flat, wife
had virtually no connection to the flat during the marriage. The district court credited the
testimony of wife and her brot her on this point, and we defer to the district court’s
credibility determinations. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210. Based on this evidence, the district
court could conclude that wife had sufficien tly rebutted the presumption that any income
earned from the flat was marital property. Th e district court therefore did not err by
classifying the Birmingham flat and rental income as nonmarital property.

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C. The district court erred by failing to include husband’s 2017 bonus as a
marital asset to be divided between the parties.
Wife argues that the district court erred by not classifying husband’s 2017 year-end
bonus as marital property. We agree that husband’s bonus should have been classified as
a marital asset and included in the division of the marital estate.
Following the district cour t’s issuance of the origin al dissolution decree, wife
moved for amended findings in December 2019 in which she argued, among other things,
that husband received a bonus of $86,721.35 in 2018 for work that he performed in 2017.
Wife argued that the district court failed to include the bonus in th e division of property
and urged the court to amend its decree to di vide the bonus equally between the parties.
The district court denied wife’s request for amended findings on this issue, reasoning that
no “specific testimony” was offered about the 2017 bonus and that the evidence wife cited
did not show that husband received a bonus. The district court therefore declined to amend
its dissolution decree to include husband’s bonus in the division of property.
We conclude that the district court clearl y erred in this findi ng. Wife submitted a
pay stub that husband received on February 23, 2018, showing that husband earned
$169,958 in additional pay. This amount was marked as “Phys Incentive.” Wife also
submitted husband’s Wells Farg o banking statement showin g that husband deposited
$86,721.35 into his checking account on the same day. In fact, the district court
acknowledged the existence of the bonus in other parts of its dissolution decree, finding,
for spousal-maintenance purposes, that hus band “earned $86,721.35 in bonuses for the
calendar year of 2017.” And, at oral argument, husband’s counsel candidly acknowledged

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that husband was paid the bonus. Consistent with the parties’ understanding, we conclude
that the record established that husband received a bonus of $86,721.35 in February 2018
based on his work in 2017. The district court’s finding to the contrary was clearly
erroneous.
Having determined that the district court erred by finding that insufficient evidence
proved that husband was paid a bonus, we now turn to whether the bonus should be
included in the marital estate. We conclude that it should. Th e district court is to value
marital assets for the purpose of division between the parties based on a set valuation date.
Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2 020). And property acquired be fore the valuation date is
presumptively marital property. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b. Here, the district court
set a valuation date of December 31, 2017. Although husband received the bonus in
February 2018, it depended on his work for 201 7. Because it was in 2017 that husband
performed the work that earned him the bonus, we believe the bonus should be considered
acquired during the marriage and therefore subject to division.
We are not persuaded otherwise by husba nd’s contention that, because the district
court already accounted for the bonus when determining husband’s ability to pay spousal
maintenance, it would be improper to include the bonus as marital property subject to
division. The district court did not include husband’s bonu s in his gross income when
determining spousal maintenance in the disso lution decree. Instead, husband’s argument
is based on the district court’s spousal-mai ntenance calculation in the 2018 temporary-
spousal-maintenance order. And in that orde r, the district court considered husband’s
bonus when determining that husband had the ability to pay spousal maintenance based on

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his annual income of more than $600,000. The district cour t could have concluded that
husband had ample ability to pay spousal ma intenance no matter if it accounted for his
bonus. We reject husband’s argument that his bonus cannot now be treated as marital
property.
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court erred by failing to include
husband’s 2017 bonus as a marital asset subject to division. We reverse this portion of the
district court’s decision, and we remand with instructions for the district court to divide the
$86,721.35 bonus equitably between the parties after considering the relevant factors under
Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1.2
II. Spousal Maintenance
Husband and wife both argue that the distri ct court erred in certain aspects of its
spousal-maintenance decision. The district court ordered husband to pay wife $6,000 per
month in temporary spousal maintenance for four years. The district court reached this
amount by imputing an annual gr oss income of $40,000 to wife for each of the next four
years. After four years, the district court de termined, wife should be able to increase her
work hours and grow her dental practice so that she could earn a salary of $170,000.
We first address the appropriate standa rds for the district court’s spousal-
maintenance determination. Minn. Stat. § 5 18.552 (2020) governs s pousal maintenance.

2 Wife contends that husband’s bonus should be valued at $107,073.54, which is the gross
amount of his bonus before dedu ctions. We disagree. Because the record reflects that
husband received $86,721.35, and this was the amount the district court found for purposes
of temporary spousal maintenan ce, we believe this is the appropriate amount to divide
between the parties.

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A district court may grant spousal maintena nce if it finds that the spouse seeking
maintenance satisfies one of two requirements: (1) she “lacks sufficient property, including
marital property apportioned to the spouse, to pr ovide for reasonable needs of the spouse
considering the standard of living establis hed during the marriage”; or (2) she “is unable
to provide adequate self-support, after considering the standard of living established during
the marriage and all relevant circumstances, through appropriate employment.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.552, subd. 1; see also Lyon v. Lyon, 439 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Minn. 1989) (providing that
a maintenance award depends on a showing of need). If spousal maintenance is
appropriate, the district court must set main tenance “in amounts and for periods of time,
either temporary or permanent, as the court deems just,” after considering several factors.
Id., subd. 2. The weighing of the factors essen tially requires the district court to conduct
“a balancing of the recipient’s need ag ainst the obligor’s ability to pay.” Prahl v. Prahl,
627 N.W.2d 698, 702 (Minn. App. 2001) (citing Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36,
39-40 (Minn. 1982)). We review a district court’s award of spousal maintenance for an
abuse of discretion. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d at 38. And we review a district court’s factual
findings underlying a spousal-main tenance award for clear error. Maiers v. Maiers, 775
N.W.2d 666, 668 (Minn. App. 2009). With these standards in mind, we turn to the parties’
arguments.
The parties urge this court to reverse the district court’s spousal-maintenance award
for four reasons: (A) husband argues that the district court understated wife’s income;
(B) wife argues that the district court overstated her income by ignoring tax implications;
(C) wife argues that the district court unders tated her expenses; and (D) wife argues that

15
the district court should have granted her permanent maintenance instead of temporary
maintenance. We conclude that none of the arguments are a basis for reversal.
A. The district court did not clearly err by imputing an annual income of
$40,000 to wife for the next four years.
Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding wife $6,000
per month in temporary spousal maintenance. He maintains that the district court erred in
its findings on wife’s income. The district court imputed a gross income of $40,000 per
year to wife, based on its findings that she was working only part time and that her income
in each of the past ten years was no higher than $39,000. Husband argues that the district
court should have calculated wife’s income to be much higher than $40,000.
The trial testimony established these facts about wife’s income. Wife worked as a
dentist and owned her own dent al clinic, Robbinsdale Dental, PLLC. According to wife,
husband was heavily involved in the management of the clin ic. When wife bought the
clinic, it was open only two-and-a-half days a week, but at husband’s insistence, it
eventually increased to four days a week. Husband also worked sometimes at the clinic as
an oral surgeon. Wife testified that husband made the financial decisions at the clinic,
handled most of the accounting, and set wife ’s salary, although wi fe dealt with the
bookkeeping and oversaw the office personnel. Wife also testified that, from 2010 to the
time of the dissolution trial, she worked only two days a week. She claimed that her current
gross annual income was $40,000. This was the amount reflected on the tax form 1125-E
for Robbinsdale Dental as th e compensation wife received for 2017. Th is evidence

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supports the district court’s finding that wife was earning $40,000 at the time of the
dissolution trial and that this was a reasonable starting annual salary for her.
We are not persuaded that these findings are clearly erroneous by husband’s
contention that, based on Robbins dale Dental’s current revenu es, wife should be able to
earn an annual income of at least $200,000 immediately if she worked full time. When
considering wife’s eventual earning capacity, the district cour t reasoned that “it will take
[wife] some time to increase her hours and expand her practice.” The record supports the
district court’s concerns on this point. According to wife, husba nd made most of the
financial decisions at the clinic. Wife al so testified that the clinic benefitted from
husband’s oral-surgery practice, which was no longer a source of revenue after the parties’
separation. While husband’s vocational expert opined that wife had an earning capacity
between $191,000 and $300,000 annually, the district court did not find this testimony
credible. And we defer to the district court’s cr edibility determinations. Sefkow, 427
N.W.2d at 210. The record evidence supports the district court’s finding that it would take
a few years for wife to increase her work hours and gain the necessary experience managing
the clinic so that she could earn closer to $170,000 per year.
Husband also argues that the district court understated wife’s income by refusing to
attribute to wife the income earned by Robbinsdale Dental as a subchapter S corporation.
The 2017 tax return for Robbinsdale Dental reflected that the business earned $20,851 in
ordinary business income that year. Husband argues that , because the district court
awarded wife 100% ownership of Robbinsdal e Dental, it should have added the $20,851
of subchapter S income to wife’s personal income of $40,000. The district court declined

17
to attribute this income to wife, reasoning that wife was not involved in the business
operations at the clinic, and th at it would not be “fair to de termine Robbinsdale Dental’s
gross income in the future based on information as to its income when [husband] was
running it.”
We conclude that the district court acted within its discretion by not attributing the
subchapter S income to wife. Husband co rrectly notes that a person’s gross income
includes income earned from the person’s owne rship of a subchapter S corporation.
Haefele v. Haefele , 837 N.W.2d 703, 711 (Minn. 2013). 3 But, while the district court’s
maintenance analysis begins with the calcula tion of a spouse’s gross income, the district
court must also consider several spousal-mai ntenance factors, including the recipient’s
financial resources. See Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(a). The district court’s decision
not to include the income from Robbinsdale Dental to wife was part of its consideration of
wife’s financial resources. And the record supports the district court’s finding that husband
was heavily involved in the operation of the business to wi fe’s exclusion. We therefore
see no error in the district court’s decision not to include the $20,851 in subchapter S
income as part of wife’s income.
Finally, we reject husband’s argument that the district court should have accounted
for evidence showing th at the parties deliberately kept wi fe’s salary low to limit her tax
obligations and that the parties transferred funds from Robbinsdale Dental to support their

3 Although Haefele involved the calculation of gross income in the context of child support,
the same definition of gross income applies to child support and spousal maintenance. Lee
v. Lee, 775 N.W.2d 631, 635 n.5 (Minn. 2009).

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retirement plans. Wife testif ied that husband was the one who set her salary. Husband
now argues that her salary does not accurately reflect her true income. Given husband’s
manipulation of wife’s income from the clinic, we see no impropriety in the district court
calculating husband’s spousal-maintenance obligation based on the income that he set for
her during the marriage.
For these reasons, we conclude that the di strict court’s findings regarding wife’s
income are not clearly erroneous, and that it did not err by setting wife’s income at $40,000
per year for the first four years.
B. Any error in the district court’s calculation of the tax implications of wife’s
income is de minimis.
Wife argues that the district court erre d in calculating her income for spousal-
maintenance purposes. She ma intains that the district court miscalculated the tax
implications when determining her income. The district court found that, based on wife’s
gross income of $40,000, she would have to pay $2,000 in federal and state taxes. The
district court therefore imputed a net income of $38,000 to wife fo r spousal-maintenance
purposes. Wife insists that her taxes amount to $2,601 and that the district court should
have reduced her income by that amount instead of just $2,000.
Even if we accept wife’s argument that her taxes totaled $2,601, we need not reverse
the district court’s spousal-maintenance determination. This court has declined to reverse
and remand in marital-dissolution cases when the district court’s error was de minimis and
did not prejudice the parties. See, e.g., Risk ex rel. Miller v. Stark , 787 N.W.2d 690, 694
n.1 (Minn. App. 2010) (determi ning that an error was de minimis when the district court

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inadvertently failed to address $400 when the land at issue was worth $99,900), review
denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010); Duffney v. Duffney , 625 N.W.2d 839, 843 (Minn. App.
2001) (holding that the district court’s failure to include $20 to $25 in the calculation of a
party’s monthly income was “de minimis and does not warrant a remand”). Here, the
district court awarded wife $6,000 per month in spousal maintenance. The district court’s
alleged error was failing to subtract an add itional $601 from wife’s net annual income.
This would create a difference of about $50 per month. Because this amount is a fraction
of the total amount of maintenance wife recei ves per month, we believe that any error by
the district court in calculating the tax implications of wife’s income is de minimis. For
these reasons, we decline to remand on this basis.
C. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by reducing wife’s monthly
expenses.
Wife argues that the district court abus ed its discretion by reducing her monthly
budget. At trial, wife presented a propos ed monthly budget that included $12,059 in
personal expenses. The district court found wife’s budget unreasonable and reduced her
personal expenses by $3,000 to reach a monthly budget of $9,059.
We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision. 4 The district court
explained its rationale for finding some of wi fe’s proposed expenses unreasonable: wife

4 We note that a district court’s determination of a party’s expenses for purposes of spousal
maintenance is typically a factual finding that we review for clear error. See McCulloch v.
McCulloch, 435 N.W.2d 564, 566 (Minn. App. 1989 ) (recognizing that findings of fact
underlying a spousal-mainten ance decision “must be upheld unless clearly erroneous”
(quotation omitted)). But because the district court reduce d wife’s expenses based on its
determination that wife’s proposed expenses were unreasonable, we will review that
decision for an abuse of discretion.

20
did not provide receipts or other evidence show ing that her need for those expenses were
as high as she claimed. The district cour t reduced wife’s expens es accordingly to an
amount that it deemed reasonable. We observe that the district cour t did not arbitrarily
limit wife’s expenses, but based its decisi on on wife’s failure to provide evidence
supporting her claimed expenses. Thus, the district court di d not abuse its discretion by
reducing wife’s monthly expenses.
D. The district court did not err by denying permanent spousal maintenance.
Wife argues that the district court erred by awarding temporary spousal
maintenance, and she insists that it should have awarded permanent maintenance instead.
The district court reasoned that permanent maintenance was unnecessary because wife was
able to increase her income and could become self-supporting.
The spousal-maintenance statute provides the following directiv e on whether the
district court is to set permanent or temporary spousal maintenance:
Nothing in this section sha ll be construed to favor a
temporary award of maintena nce over a permanent award,
where the factors under subdivision 2 justify a permanent
award.
Where there is some uncertainty as to the necessity of a
permanent award, the court sh all order a permanent award
leaving its order open for later modification.
Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 3. Wife cont ends that there is “substantial uncertainty
regarding [her] ability to earn $170,000” within four years and that permanent maintenance
is therefore appropriate. We disagree.

21
A review of relevant caselaw shows that whether temporary or permanent
maintenance is appropriate depends heavily on the spouse’s education, employment
history, and other prospects of a ttaining suitable employment. In Nardini v. Nardini, the
supreme court held that the wife was entitled to permanent maintenance when she had not
been in the labor market for almost 30 year s, had only a high school education, and
possessed no special employment skills. 414 N.W.2d 184, 197 (Minn. 1987). In contrast,
this court in Aaker v. Aaker determined that the district court did not err by awarding
temporary rather than permanent maintenance. 447 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Minn. App. 1989),
review denied (Minn. Jan. 12, 1990). In reaching this conclusion, this court highlighted
that the wife was only 39 years old, she had a bachelor’s degree and could obtain another
degree in business within the next three year s, and the evidence sh owed that she could
obtain a comfortable entry-level salary once she obtained her degree, with a likelihood that
her salary would increase afterwards. Id.
Here, we believe that wife’s situation is more like that in Aaker than in Nardini.
Wife is well educated, having obtained a B achelor of Dental Surgery and completed a
Doctor of Dental Medicine. She worked as a dentist continually throughout the marriage.
Even under the figures provided by wife’s own vocational expert, she was expected to be
capable of earning up to $170,000 per year within a few years. This income figure reflected
the amount wife earned for some years in the mid-2000s, before she bought Robbinsdale
Dental. Given wife’s education, ownership of a dental clinic, and past job experience, there
was ample support for the district court’s determination that wife could become fully self-
supporting and attain an annual income of $170,000 soon. Because the record supports the

22
district court’s finding that wife could increase her income significantly in a few years, the
district court did not err by rejecting wife ’s request for permanent maintenance and
awarding temporary spousal maintenance instead.
III. Need-Based and Conduct-Based Attorney Fees
Husband argues that the district court abus ed its discretion by awarding attorney
fees to wife. The district court ordered hu sband to pay $100,000 to wife in need-based
attorney fees, and $15,590 to wife in conduct-based attorn ey fees. Husband challenges
three of the district court’s attorney-fee awards: (A) the award of need-based fees, (B) the
award of conduct-based fees resulting from the trial extending to a fourth day, and (C) the
award of conduct-based fees relating to hus band’s 2018 pretrial motion to amend the
temporary maintenance order.
5 We conclude that none of the attorney-fee awards
constitute an abuse of discretion.
A. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by ordering husband to pay
$100,000 in need-based attorney fees.
Husband first argues that the district cour t abused its discreti on by awarding wife
need-based attorney fees. The district court ordered $1 00,000 in need-based fees,
concluding that husband had the ability to pa y this amount of wife’s attorney fees.
Although wife requested about $ 375,000 in attorney fees, the district court declined to
order husband to pay all of her attorney fees.

5 The district court’s award of $15,590 in conduct-based fees was based on several grounds,
but husband challenges only two grounds on appeal.

23
A district court “shall award attorney fees , costs, and disbursements in an amount
necessary to enable a party to carry on or contest the pro ceeding” if it finds that three
elements are met: (1) “that the fees are necessary for the good faith assertion of the party’s
rights in the proceeding and will not contribute unnecessarily to the length and expense of
the proceeding;” (2) that the party from whom fees are sought “has the means to pay them;”
and (3) that the party seeking fees “does not have the means to pay them.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.14, subd. 1 (2020). We review a district court’s decision whether to award attorney
fees for an abuse of discretion. Kielley v. Kielley, 674 N.W.2d 770, 780 (Minn. App. 2004).
A district court abuses its discretion if its decision contradicts logic or the facts in the
record. Id. at 775.
Husband challenges only the third element of the statute, that the recipient lacks the
means to pay attorney fees. His argument is based largely on the same assertion he made
about spousal maintenance—that wife’s income is greater than the $40,000 that the district
court imputed to her. As explained above, the record supports the district court’s
determination that wife’s income will be $40,000 for the next four years, until she has time
to build up her dental practice. We therefor e reject husband’s argument that wife had the
means to pay her attorney fees for the same reason.
Husband also maintains that the distri ct court did not account for the $400,000
equalizer payment that wife received from husband. We disagree with this characterization
of the district court’s decision. Although the district court did not specifically mention the
equalizer payment, it recognized that “[b]as ed upon the division of assets in this
dissolution, each party shall be receiving sign ificant cash and assets.” And the district

24
court determined that husband did not have the ability to pay all of wife’s attorney fees, so
it instead ordered him to pay just a portion of the fees. Based on these considerations, we
are satisfied that the district court appropriat ely accounted for the assets that each party
would receive in the dissolution. The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding
wife need-based attorney fees.
B. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by ordering husband to pay
conduct-based attorney fees because there was a fourth day of trial.
Husband argues that the district court ab used its discretion by awarding wife
$10,375 in conduct-based attorney fees that she incurred in preparing for and attending the
fourth day of trial.
Under Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1, “Nothing in this section . . . precludes the court
from awarding, in its discretion, additional f ees, costs, and disbursements against a party
who unreasonably contributes to the le ngth or expense of the proceeding.” 6 The party
seeking conduct-based fees has the burden to show that the other party unreasonably
increased the length or expense of the proceeding. Baertsch v. Baertsch, 886 N.W.2d 235,
238 (Minn. App. 2016). We review a district court’s award of conduct-based fees for an
abuse of discretion. Sharp v. Bilbro , 614 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. App. 2000), review
denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2000). A district court abuses its discretion if its decision is against
logic and the facts in the record. Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997).

6 Neither party challenges whether Minn. Stat. § 518.14 provides a substantive basis for an
award of conduct-based attorney fees , given the supreme court’s order in Anderson v.
Anderson, No. A16-2006 (Minn. Aug. 6, 2018) (order). For purposes of this appeal, we
assume without deciding that the statute provides a proper basis for the award. See Madden
v. Madden, 923 N.W.2d 688, 702 (Minn. App. 2019) (taking this approach).

25
In awarding conduct-based fees due to the trial extending to a fourth day, the district
court noted that the order for trial provided that the trial would last three days and that each
party would be allowed half of the time allotte d to present their case. The district court
found that husband’s counsel us ed the majority of the time during the first three days of
trial and that it had reminded co unsel to watch their time many times. For these reasons,
the district court found that conduct-based fees against husband were appropriate.
The record supports the district c ourt’s findings that husband was largely
responsible for the need for a fourth day of tria l. The district court told the parties at the
outset that they would have the chance to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law with the court, and it urged them to focus on the evidence that they believed needed to
come in during the trial. The district court reminded husband’s counsel of this fact in the
middle of the trial, and it suggested that hi s line of questioning “may not have been a
prudent use of one’s time.” On the second da y of trial, the district court noted that
husband’s counsel had used four hours of ti me, while wife’s counse l had used only one-
and-a-half hours. After the third day, hu sband’s counsel had used almost ten hours,
compared to just over five hours by wife’s counsel—nearly twice as much time, despite
the district court’s directive that the parties were to split their time evenly. While husband
contends that wife’s counsel dominated the trial time on the fourth day of trial, the proper
focus before the district court was whether a f ourth day was necessary in the first place.
Moreover, as wife points out, husband’s couns el could have saved trial time in several
ways, such as by stipulating to the admission of certain exhibits before trial, as he ended
up not objecting to those exhibits during trial. We are satisfied that the record supports the

26
district court’s finding that husband’s counsel’s actions unnecessarily increased the length
of trial and contributed to the need for a fourth day.
We are not persuaded otherwise by husband’s suggestion that the trial presentation
was stymied by the district court’s imposition of time limits. The district court did not cut
off witnesses or prevent the parties from introducing evidence. Rather, it merely reminded
the parties to use their time reasonably. “Rulings on . . . the conduct of trial are left to the
discretion of the [district] cour t and will not be reversed abse nt an abuse of discretion.”
Lundman v. McKown , 530 N.W.2d 807, 829 (Minn. App. 1995), review denied (Minn.
May 31, 1995). We believe that the district court’s setting the trial for three days was a
reasonable method of ensuring efficiency and that this limitation did not unfairly prevent
the parties from presenting necessary evidence to the court.
In affirming the district court’s award of conduct-based fees, we recognize that this
was a complex case that necessarily required time for the parties to introduce extensive
evidence to prove their cases. Based on our review of the r ecord, it does not appear that
husband’s counsel acted in bad faith at trial or was trying to cause delays. But it is
unnecessary to show that a pa rty acted in bad faith before a district court may award
conduct-based fees. Geske v. Marcolina , 624 N.W.2d 813, 818-19 (Minn. App. 2001).
Rather, wife needed to show only that husband’s failure to use his trial time efficiently
unreasonably contributed to the length of the proceeding. See Baertsch, 886 N.W.2d at
238. The district court was in a better positi on than we are to judge how the parties used
their respective time at trial and whether husband’s actions necessitated a fourth day of

27
trial. Because of the district court’s discretion on this matter, we do not find that the district
court’s award of conduct-based fees on this basis was improper.
C. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by ordering husband to pay
conduct-based attorney fees because of his unsuccessful pretrial motion to
amend the 2018 temporary spousal maintenance order.
Husband also argues that the district cour t abused its discreti on by awarding wife
$3,240 in conduct-based attorney fees relating to his pret rial motion to amend the district
court’s temporary maintenance and child support order. Husband maintains that his 2018
motion was proper and that the district court should not have awarded conduct-based fees
just because the motion did not succeed.
The motion at issue was husband’s pretrial motion asking the district court to amend
its findings in the July 25, 2018 temporary maintenance a nd child support order. The
district court denied that motion. In doing so, the district court reasoned that husband failed
to meet the standards for am endment and that the motion, in substance, was one for
reconsideration because husband merely reargued his position based on the same evidence.
In the dissolution decree, the district court cited these reasons as the basis for awarding
conduct-based fees.
The record shows that husband ’s 2018 motion pointed to several specific findings
that it asked the district court to amend. But the motion largely rehashed the same
arguments husband made originally. Thus, the district court accurately characterized the
substance of husband’s motion as one for reconsideration. And the district court correctly
noted that husband did not follow the proper procedures for a motion for reconsideration.
See Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.11 (providing that a party may make a motion to reconsider

28
only with the district court’s express permission). Although husband insists that his motion
to amend was proper because it alleged an erro r on the district court’s part in awarding
retroactive maintenance, we note that the re troactivity argument was a small part of
husband’s motion. The majority of the motio n asked the district court to reconsider
arguments that it had rejected before, meaning that most of the motion was functionally a
motion to reconsider. The nominal reference to the question of retroactivity did not render
the motion proper.
Because the district court did not err by determining that husband’s 2018 motion
failed to meet the proper standard for ame ndment, we see no abuse of discretion in the
district court awarding conduct-based fees fo r this reason. A district court may award
conduct-based fees when a party brin gs frivolous or bad-faith claims. Baertsch, 886
N.W.2d at 239. Husband’s 2018 motion was not merely unsuccessful; most of it was a
procedurally improper attempt to reargue qu estions husband had al ready lost. And the
motion contributed to the length and expense of the proceedings by requiring wife to
respond to the motion and the dist rict court to address it. We therefore conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding conduct-based attorney fees because
of husband’s improper motion to amend the temporary maintenance order.
IV. Denial of Postjudgment Motion and Award of Conduct-Based Fees
Finally, husband challenges the district cour t’s denial of his postjudgment motion.
Husband filed the motion in December 2019, aski ng the district cour t to hold wife in
contempt and to reopen the record. The dist rict court denied husband’s motion in an
April 13, 2020 order. The district court also granted wife’s request to award conduct-based

29
attorney fees that wife incu rred in responding to his motion. Husband challenges three
aspects of the district court’s order: (A) the denial of the motion to hold wife in contempt,
(B) the denial of the motion to reopen the record, and (C) the award of conduct-based fees.
We address each argument in turn.
A. The district court did not err by de nying husband’s motion for contempt,
despite its legal error regarding the need to seek an order to show cause.
Husband first argues that the district c ourt erroneously denied his motion to hold
wife in contempt. We agree with husband that the district court committed an error of law
when denying his motion. But we affirm the district court’s decision because its denial of
the contempt motion can rest on an alternative ground.
Husband’s motion asked the district court to hold wife “in Cont empt of Court for
failing to meet her responsibility of getting the parties’ minor child to weekly visits,” in
violation of the dissolution decr ee. Husband submitted an affi davit stating that the child
had missed all her weekly vis its and maintaining that wife was refusing to support his
relationship with the child. In denying husb and’s motion for contempt, the district court
noted that husband did not specify whether the motion was for criminal or civil contempt,
and he failed to cite relevant statutes. The district court reasoned that, even if it construed
husband’s motion as seeking constructive civil contempt, husband failed to follow statutory
procedures because he did not seek an order to show cause.
Husband argues that the district court mi sapplied the law by determining that his
contempt motion was procedurally defective for his failure to seek an order to show cause.
Assuming, as the district court did, that husband’s motion was for constructive civil

30
contempt, we agree that the district court erre d in its application of the law. The statute
governing constructive contempt provides that “the court or officer” may bring the alleged
contemnor to answer “upon notice, or upon an order to show cause.” Minn. Stat.
§ 588.04(a) (2020) (emphasis added). Like wise, the general rules of practice allow
contempt proceedings to be “initia ted by notice of motion and motion or by an order to
show cause.” Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 309.01(a) (emphasis added). The district court therefore
erred by concluding that husband was required to seek an order to show cause.7
Despite the district court’s erroneous application of the law, we do not believe that
the error requires reversal because the distri ct court provided othe r reasons for denying
husband’s motion. The district court found that wife “provided cr edible information,
corroborated by therapists . . . that she is doing the best she can to encourage [the child] to
attend parenting time with [husband] and that any failure to attend parenting time on [the
child’s] behalf, is not ‘willful disobedience’ or ‘resistance willfu lly offered.’” The
evidence provided at the motion hearing and in wife’s declaration supp orts this finding.
And husband’s affidavit in support of his motion provided meager allegations, saying only
that the child had missed her scheduled visitati ons and generally attributing this behavior
to wife. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of husband’s motion for contempt,

7 Wife maintains that husband conceded at the motion hearing that he was required to seek
an order to show cause. We do not believe th is accurately characte rizes the statements
made by husband’s counsel at the motion hear ing. Although husb and’s counsel did not
dispute that he did not bring an order to show cause, he took the same position that he does
on appeal—that an order to show cause is not necessary for a party to initiate contempt
proceedings.

31
despite the district court’s legal error. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring courts to ignore
harmless error).
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying husband’s motion
to reopen the record.
Husband also argues that the district cour t abused its discretion when it denied his
motion to reopen the record. Husband asked the district court to reopen the record to allow
him to introduce evidence ab out the ownership of the condo minium (unit 1513) that the
district court classified as ma rital property, as well as eviden ce about the costs of health
insurance for the children. Th e district court denied the motion, reasoning that husband
had ample opportunity to introduce the relevant evidence at trial.
The district court may relieve a party from a judgment and decree for one of several
reasons, including “mistake, inadvertence, surp rise, or excusable neglect.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.145, subd. 2(1) (2020). The party moving to reopen a judgment and decree bears the
burden of proof and must prove at least one of the statutory grounds by a preponderance
of the evidence. Knapp v. Knapp, 883 N.W.2d 833, 835 (Minn. App. 2016). We review a
district court’s decision not to reopen a judgme nt and decree for an abuse of discretion.
Kornberg v. Kornberg, 542 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn. 1996).
Husband asked the district court to reopen the record based mainly on the ground of
surprise. Although Minnesota caselaw has not defined “surprise” in the context of a motion
to reopen the record, one definition is “[a] n occurrence for which there is no adequate
warning or that affects someone in an unexpected way.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1672
(10th ed. 2014). The record supports the dist rict court’s determination that husband did

32
not make an adequate showing of surprise. Husband knew that the Fidelity accounts (from
which funds were taken to buy the condominium) would be at issue, given that wife listed
the application and accounts statements as exhibits on her trial exhibit list. And caselaw is
clear that the proceeds of marital pr operty are also marital property. Gill, 919 N.W.2d at
303. Here, husband introduced evidence at tr ial about both the Fidelity accounts and the
condominium. Husband therefore had adequate warning that wife would likely argue the
marital character of the Fidelity accounts a nd the resulting character of the condominium
bought with funds from one account, and he had the opportunity at trial to present evidence
to oppose wife’s claims. As the district court pointed out, husband’s assertion that he was
surprised that the district court found that the condominium belonged to him was merely a
statement that he was surprised at the outcome of the proceeding, not that he did not have
adequate warning that this would be an issue at trial.
Additionally, husband’s request to introduce more evidence about healthcare costs
for the children appears to have been simply an attempt to provide evidence that he did not
adequately cover at trial. The statute does no t allow a district court to reopen the record
merely so that a party can seek a mulligan on issues that the district court decided against
that party originally. We see no error in the district court’s determination that husband did
not make an adequate showing of surprise so as to justify reopening the record. For these
reasons, we conclude that the district c ourt did not abuse its discretion by denying
husband’s motion to reopen the record.

33
C. The district court abused its discret ion by awarding $9,569 in conduct-
based attorney fees based on the denial of husband’s postjudgment motion.
Finally, husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding
conduct-based attorney fees when denying his postjudgment motion. The district court
ordered husband to pay wife $9,569 in conduct-based fees.
As for the denial of husband’s motion for contempt, the district court’s reason for
granting conduct-based fees wa s that “he failed to follow statutory procedure.” As
explained above, this determination was legally erroneous. And even though we affirm the
denial of the motion for contempt on the alternative basis explained above, we observe that
the district court’s sole reason for awarding conduct-based fees was because of his failure
to file an order to show cause. Because the district court’s attorney-fee award rested on an
error of law, we conclude that it was an abuse of discretion. See Sinda v. Sinda , 949
N.W.2d 170, 175 (Minn. App. 2020) (noting that a district court abuses its discretion if it
misapplies the law).
While we do not necessarily see any abuse of discretion in the district court’s award
of conduct-based fees relating to husband’s motion to reopen th e record, we note that the
district court did not differentiate between the fees wife incurred responding to husband’s
request to hold wife in contempt and his request to reopen the record. Nor do the
submissions by wife’s counsel in support of wife’s motion for conduct-based fees delineate
between the expenses related to each of hu sband’s arguments. For these reasons, we

34
reverse the district court’s entire award of $9, 569 in conduct-based a ttorney fees to wife
arising from the denial of husband’s postjudgment motion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.