State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0850

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Samantha Mary Jo Provost,
Appellant.

Filed April 26, 2021
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-19-1004

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, River D. Thelen, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Publi c Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
In this direct appeal from her conviction for first -degree damage to property,
appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the damage reduced the property’s value by more than $1,000. We affirm.

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FACTS
In 2018, B.D.O. was self-employed as a disc jockey (DJ) and karaoke provider. As
he prepared to provide entertainment at a bar in St. Cloud on November 23, 2018, B.D.O.
set his own laptop on a bar-height table, which was placed off to the side of the room. A t
some point that evening, B.D.O. noticed two women in the corner of the bar. After B.D.O.
recognized one of the women, E.L., and noticed her holding onto the bar and swaying, he
walked up to the other woman, appellant Samantha Mary Jo Provost, and said, “You guys
are, like, too drunk to be here. You should probably get [E.L.] home.” According to
B.D.O., Provost later approached him and said, “You have a big a ttitude for being just a
DJ.” B.D.O. and Provost continued to argue, but eventually Provost walk ed away and
returned to the bar.
B.D.O. testified that he then observed E.L. fall off of a bar stool, so he yelled to the
bartender, “I told you these people need to get out of the bar. It’s just going to be
problems.” B.D.O. testified that he also yelled, “They need to leave. They need to get out
of the bar.” According to B.D.O., “some time went by” before he saw Provost order a glass
of water from the bartender and then watched her dump “very intentionally, the entire glass
of water on [his] laptop.”
After receiving a report of property damage at the bar, St. Cloud Police Officer
Jeffrey Atkinson responded to the incident. Officer Atkinson spoke with B.D.O., who
stated that Provost had dumped water on his computer.
B.D.O. tried to turn on the laptop t he next day, and the screen flickered, but the
laptop was otherwise unresponsive. B.D.O. testified that the laptop—a 2015 MacBook Pro

3
with a 13-inch retina display—was in “[e]xcellent condition” before the water incident, but
afterward, it was “[d]estroyed.”
To replace his damaged laptop, B.D.O. purchased an “older used” model from a
Craigslist seller for $800, and he sold his damaged laptop to the Craigslist seller for $100.
B.D.O later testified that the replacement laptop was an “older model” that was “not in as
good of condition and not as nice” as the laptop that was damaged by appellant. According
to B.D.O., he had originally purchased the damaged laptop for approximately $2,576 in
2015. Officer Atkinson also testified that he “believe[d]” B.D.O’s computer was a “Mac
Pro” and explained that, according to his Google search, those laptops range in price from
$1,500 to $1,800.
In February 2019, the state charged Provost with first -degree criminal damage to
property in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.595 , subd. 1(4) (2018). According to the
complaint, Provost dumped water on B.D.O’s laptop while they were both at a bar in St.
Cloud, Minnesota, and the laptop was a total loss. At trial, B.D.O. and Atkinson testified,
but Provost did not. After the state rested, Provost moved for judgment of acquittal based
on the state’s failure to prove that the damage reduced the value of the laptop by more than
$1,000. Provost argued that the state never established that the 2015 laptop was worth
more than $1,000. The district court denied the motion.
The jury was instructed on the elements of first-degree damage to property and the
lesser-included offense of third-degree damage to property. The jury found Provost guilty
of first-degree damage to property and not guilty of third-degree damage to property. The

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district court then sentenced Provost to a stay of imposition and placed her on probation
for up to five years with numerous conditions. Provost appeals.
DECISION
When reviewing a case for sufficienc y of the evidence, our review “is limited to a
painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a
light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the
verdict which they did.” State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). We assume
that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”
State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). We will not reverse a conviction for
insufficient evidence if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence
and the necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the
defendant was guilty of the offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476–77 (Minn.
2004).
The jury found Provost guilty of first -degree criminal damage to property in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 1(4). Under the statute, a person is guilty of first-
degree criminal damage to property if she “intentionally causes damage to physical
property of another without the latter’s consent” and “the damage reduces the value of the
property by more than $1,000 measured by the cost of repair and replacement.” Id.
“[T]he owner of [personal] property . . . is presumptively acquainted with its value
and may testify as to its value.” Lehman v. Hansord Pontiac Co. , 74 N.W.2d 305, 309
(Minn. 1955). However, this rule is not without qualification. “[I]f there is an apparent
lack of knowledge on the part of the owner as to value of his property,” tha t lack of

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knowledge “goes to the weight of the testimony given but not to the competency of that
testimony.” Id. at 309–10. Any lack of foundation in the property owner’s testimony goes
to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the testimony. Jackson v. Buesgens , 186
N.W.2d 184, 186–87 (Minn. 1971).
Provost challenges neither the jury’s findings that she intentionally damaged the
laptop in question nor that she lacked consent to do so. Instead, the sole issue raised on
appeal is whether the state submitted sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict that
Provost caused more than $1,000 in damage to B.D.O.’s laptop. Provost contends that the
evidence presented at trial failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that either the value
of the laptop at the time of the offense or the cost to repair the laptop was more than $1,000.
In this case, both B.D.O. and Atkinson testified about the value of the damaged
MacBook Pro in terms of dollar amounts. B.D.O. testified that he had originally purchased
the MacBook Pro for approximately $2,576 in 2015. He also testified that he paid $800 to
purchase a replacement laptop that was older, less nice, and in worse condition than the
damaged laptop. Further, B.D.O. explained that he was unable to afford a replac ement
laptop that was the same quality as the damaged laptop. “A jury can properly accept an
owner’s testimony as to the value of his or her own property.” State v. Clipper, 429 N.W.2d
698, 700 (Minn. App. 1988). The jury could therefore accept B.D.O.’s testimony as to the
purchase prices of both laptops and reasonably infer that, because the $800 replacement
laptop is lower quality, older, and in worse condition than the original laptop, the current
replacement value of the damaged laptop exceeded $1,000.

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In addition, the jury heard Officer Atkinson testify that he conducted an internet
search to determine the replacement value of the damaged laptop and concluded that the
current value of B.D.O.’s laptop was approximately $1,500 to $1,800. Officer Atk inson
also testified that he was aware that the damaged laptop was a specific model —a “silver
Mac Pro.”
On appeal, Provost argues that the district court erred in admitting Officer
Atkinson’s testimony regarding the value of the damaged laptop. Provost co ntends that
Officer Atkinson’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay and that there was not sufficient
foundation establishing that Officer Atkinson had personal knowledge of the damaged
laptop’s value. However, Provost did not object to Officer Atkinson’s t estimony on this
issue at trial.
In order for a trial court to fully exercise its discretion to admit or exclude evidence,
it is imperative that a party wishing to challenge the admissibility of the evidence object to
the evidence. See State v. Pieschke, 295 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1980). In Pieschke, the
supreme court concluded that while the record did not “indisputably” establish that an out-
of-court statement fell within a hearsay exception, the district court did not abuse its
discretion because “de fense counsel’s failure to object . . . denied the trial court the
opportunity to evaluate his objection and denied the state the opportunity to provide
additional foundation for admitting the testimony if the court had deemed it necessary.”
Id. Therefore, we conclude that here, as in Pieschke, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting the now-challenged testimony.

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Provost also contends that the state failed to present any evidence about the cost to
repair the laptop, arguing that Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 1(4), requires the state to establish
both the cost of repair and the cost of replacement in order to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the damage reduced the original laptop’s value by more than $1,000. Provost’s argument
on this point involves an issue of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. State v. Stay,
935 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Minn. 2019). “Under the de novo standard, we do not defer to the
analysis of the courts below, but instead we exercise independent review.” Wheeler v. State,
909 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Minn. 2018). Our goal in statutory interpretation is to “ascertain and
effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” State v. Henderson , 907 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn.
2018). We presume that “the legislature does no t in tend a result that is absurd . . . or
unreasonable.” Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2020). Thus, we may interpret statutes “in a sensible
manner” to avoid such results. See Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Nishika Ltd., 565 N.W.2d 16,
20 (Minn. 1997).
Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 1(4) , requires that “the damage reduces the value of
the property by more than $1,000 measured by the cost of repair and replacement.”
Adopting Provost’s interpretation of the statute by requiring the state to establish both the
cost of repair and the cost of replacement would create an absurd result, since property that
is repaired is not generally replaced, and property that is replaced is not generally repaired.
Additionally, it would contradict our decision in State v. DeYoung, where we sustained a
conviction based on evidence of the cost of repair, despite the absence of any evidence
regarding the cost of replacement. 672 N.W.2d 208, 213 (Minn. App. 2003). Accordingly,
we interpret the conjunction “and” in Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 1(4) to mean that the

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state is allowed to use evidence of both the cost of repair and the cost of replacement to
establish the value of damaged property.
Ultimately, the jury heard admissible testimony that the purchase price of the
original laptop was approximately $2,576, that an equivalent replacement laptop would
cost between $1,500 and $1,800, and that the purchase price of a less-nice model in worse
condition was $800. The jury determined the weight and credibility of this testimony, and
we defer to the jury, which is “generally in the best position to weigh the credibility of the
evidence and thus determine which witnesses to believe and how much weight to give their
testimony.” State v. Hanson , 800 N.W.2d 618, 622 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).
B.D.O.’s testimony as to the approximate purchase price of the original laptop and a non -
equivalent replacement, coupled with Officer Atkinson’s testimony as to the present value
of an equivalent replacement, was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that the water
damage reduced the value of the original laptop by more than $1,000, measured by the cost
of repair and replacement.
Affirmed.