Taofeek Ishola, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0853

Taofeek Ishola,
Appellant,

vs.

Lab Drugs & Medical-Trans-Supplies LLC,
d/b/a Polar Pharmacy & Medical Supplies, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed January 4, 2021
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-19-1843

Taofeek Ishola, Brooklyn Center, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Michael Fondungallah, Fondungallah & Ki gham, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
respondents)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Coch ran, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this appeal challenging the dismi ssal of his declaratory-judgment action,
appellant argues that the district court erred in concluding that he failed to demonstrate he
is entitled to an equal distribution of the vehi cle’s value. Because the district court was

2
correct in concluding that ap pellant failed to establish the existence of a valid contract
which entitles him to one-half of the vehicle’s value, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2012, while appellant Taofeek Ishol a was living with his former spouse,
respondent Lola Ishola (the owner of re spondent Lab Drugs & Medical-Trans-Supplies
LLC), a new Toyota Land Cruiser was purchased. The vehicle was titled in the names of
appellant and respondent Lab Drugs and each signed the retail installment sales contract to
obtain financing of the vehicle. In 2019, approximately one and one-half years after
appellant had moved out of re spondent’s home, appellant, a self-represented litigant,
commenced this declaratory-judgment acti on seeking possession of the vehicle. The
complaint requested that the district court order respondents to transfer the vehicle and title
to appellant so that appellant could sell th e vehicle and pay off the vehicle loan, with
appellant ultimately receiving one-half of the proceeds.
During the court trial, the district court heard testimony from appellant, who
continued to appear pro se. Following appellant’s testim ony, the district court granted
respondents’ motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(b).1 The
district court concluded that although appellant’s name was on the vehicle title and the
retail installment sales contract, appellant had “failed to submit any evidence regarding an

1 Respondents made an oral motion for a judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Minn. R.
Civ. P. 50.01(a). However, the district court correctly noted that such motions are only
appropriate in the context of jury trials and the court-trial equivalent is pursuant to rule 41.

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offer between himself and [respondents] that he is entitled to half the interest in the
vehicle.” The district court dismissed appellant’s complaint. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant argues that the district cour t erred in dismissing his complaint.
Specifically, appellant argues that the loan agreement and title record unambiguously
establish that he is an owner of the vehicle and that the district court therefore should have
both declared his ownership rights to the ve hicle and granted him one -half equity of the
vehicle. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree.
Appellate courts “review a district cour t’s application of the law de novo.” Harlow
v. State, Dep’t of Human Servs. , 883 N.W.2d 561, 568 (Minn. 2016). When the district
court correctly interprets and applies the law, an appellate court “evaluate[s] the district
court’s” dismissal pursuant to Minn. R. Ci v. P. 41.02 “under an abuse of discretion
standard.” Modrow v. JP Foodservice, Inc., 656 N.W.2d 389, 395 (Minn. 2003).
Though not specifically pl eaded in appellant’s compla int, the district court
considered appellant’s action as asserting a claim for breach of contract. The record
supports the district court’s conclusion. Appe llant testified that his goal was to “cash out
[his] interest” in the vehicle, implying that there was an arrangement entitling him to such
payment. The district court correctly noted that the declaratory-judgment statute allowed
it to consider whether a contract existed entitling appellant to the relief requested: “Any
person interested under a . . . written c ontract, or other writings constituting a
contract . . . may have determined any ques tion of construction or validity arising under

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the . . . contract . . . and obtain a declaratio n of rights, status, or other legal relations
thereunder.” Minn. Stat. § 555.02 (2018).
The district court found that there was no contract between appellant and
respondent, and determined dismis sal to be appropriate. The existence of a contract is a
question of fact. Morrisette v. Harrison Int’l Corp., 486 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Minn. 1992).
The issue of contractual formation is decided objectively by the words and actions of the
parties, not by their subjective mental intent. Hill v. Okay Constr. Co. , 252 N.W.2d 107,
114 (Minn. 1977). For a contract to be bindi ng, there must be an offer, acceptance, and
consideration. See Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 117 N.W.2d 213, 219-221 (Minn. 1962).
The district court correctly determined th at the retail installm ent sales contract,
though properly executed and signed by appellant and respondent Lab Drugs, was a
contract between appellant and respondents as borrowers and Toyota as the lender and,
thus, not a contract between the parties. Furthermore, the district court found—on the basis
of appellant’s testimony and all the evidence submitted at trial—that no written or oral
contract existed between appellant and re spondents regarding a purported right by
appellant to demand a court-ordered sale of the vehicle and to receive a one-half value in
the net sale proceeds.
This finding was supported by the record and, therefore, not erroneous. Appellant
testified that he made no down payment on the vehicle and th at respondent Lola Ishola
traded in her former vehicle at the time of purchase. Appella nt testified that respondents
made the majority of vehicle payments an d appellant’s bank records showed only two
payments made by appellant. Based upon appellant’s te stimony that he was the

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“breadwinner” and was expected to pay a number of household and utility expenses while
living with respondent, the district court f ound that the two vehicle payments made by
appellant towards the vehicle were “house hold payments” and not part of a purported
contract between appellant and respondents. Indeed, appellant testified that there was no
explicit agreement between appellant and respondents regarding appellant making
payments for the vehicle or other household expenses that would entitle him to the interest
he seeks in the vehicle.
We conclude that the district court did no t err in finding that there was no evidence
of a contract between appellant and respondents entitling appellant to receive one-half the
value of the vehicle through a court-ordered sale. The district c ourt did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing appellant’s claim. 2
Affirmed.

2 Appellant argues that, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 168A.10 (2018), the presence of his name
on the title constitutes conclusive evidence that he is an owner of the vehicle, and that the
district court erred in concluding the opposite. Am. Nat. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Solum ,
641 N.W.2d 891, 896-97 (Minn. 2002). However, whether appellant is an owner of the
vehicle is irrelevant to the ultimate remedy he seeks and therefor e does not affect our
decision.