Sandra Theis-Walz, et al., Appellants,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0855

Sandra Theis-Walz, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

Coborn’s, Inc., et al.,
Respondents,
James Roberts,
Respondent.

Filed March 22, 2021
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File Nos. 73-CV-20-792;
73-CV-17-5711; 73-CV-20-837

Gregory S. Walz, Walz Law Office, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for appellants)

James Roberts, St. Cloud, Minnesota (self-represented attorney)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant-attorney argues that the district court erred by (1) establishing an attorney
lien for respondent-attorney before it approved a global mediated settlement agreement;
(2) not c onsidering his breach-of-fiduciary-duty and various professional -misconduct

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allegations against respondent-attorney when it established the attorney lien ; (3) not
finding the joint-representation agreements unenforceable between the attorneys under
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.8(a) and 1.5(e); and (4) using underlying findings of fact that are
not supported by the record in calculating the attorney lien. We affirm.
FACTS
In May 2017, minor C.L.W. died in a car accident that also injured appellants Joseph
Walz and C.A.W. Shortly thereafter, respondent-attorney James Roberts and appellant-
attorney Gregory S. Walz (Walz), the paternal grandfather of C.L.W., entered into
contingent-fee agreement s for joint representation (representation agreements) with the
heirs and next of kin of C.L.W. to pursue a wrongful -death case against respondents
Coborn’s, Inc. and Jeffrey Ditlefsen. The representation agreements did not divide labor
or responsibility between Walz and Roberts, nor did they specify how fees would be
divided between the two. The district court appointed Sandra Theis-Walz, Walz’s wife, as
trustee for the heirs and next of kin of C.L.W.
On December 2, 2019 , the parties settled the matter at mediation and executed a
global mediated settlement agreement. Roberts drafted a petition for distribution of funds
of the wrongful -death settlement and petition for approval of minor’s settlement. On
December 19, 2019, Walz requested that Roberts not perform any more work for appellants
regarding the case and stated that this communication came from Theis-Walz. On January
10, 2020 , Walz emailed Roberts an amended petition for distri bution of funds of the
wrongful-death settlement and petition for approval of minor’s settlement (the amended

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petitions) that significantly reduced Roberts’s attorney fees and increased Walz’s attorney
fees.
On January 27, 2020, Walz filed a petition on behalf of appellants seeking expedited
administrative approval of the settlement agreements on the terms contained in the
amended petitions (settlement approval action). On January 29, 2020, Roberts commenced
an action to establish a lien for attorney fees (attorney-lien action).
On May 19 , 2020 , the district court issued an order in 73 -CV-20-837 dividing
attorney fees between Roberts and Walz and establishing Roberts’s requested attorney lien.
This appeal follows.1
DECISION
I. Walz forfeited his argument that the district court err ed by establishing
Roberts’s attorney lien before formally approving the global mediated
settlement agreement.

Walz asserts that the district court erred by establishing Roberts’ s attorney lien
because it is “contingent, derivative and dependent on the approval of the Global Mediated
Settlement Agreement,” which had been executed but not yet adopted by the district court
at the time the lien was established . Because Walz’s assertion lacks analysis or legal
support, we conclude that Walz forfeited this argument. Schoepke v. Alexander Smith &
Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971).

1 On July 21, 2020, this court issued an order limiting the appeal to review of the district
court’s May 20, 2020 and June 2, 2020 judgments in district court file number 73 -CV-20-
837.

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II. The district court did not err by establishing Roberts’s attorney lien without
considering Walz’s allegations of breach of fiduciary duty and professional
misconduct against Roberts.

Walz argues that the district court erred by not considering his allegations of
professional misconduct against Roberts at the attorney-lien summary proceeding .2 We
are not persuaded.
A summary proceeding is any proceeding by which a district court can settle a
controversy promptly without the aid of a jury. Thomas A. Foster & Assocs., Ltd. v.
Paulson, 699 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. App. 2005) . In Foster, the plaintiffs alleged their
attorney committed malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, deceit, and
collusion, and therefore contested his claimed attorney lien. Id. at 4. Because an attorney
lien is established in a summary proceeding, we held that “the practicalities of a summary
proceeding do not support the notion that a district court must transform an attorney -lien
proceeding into a legal -malpractice trial.” Id. at 7. But “[l]itigating the number of hours
worked, the reasonableness of an hourly fee, or the existence of a contract in the first
instance is not unduly burdensome in a summary proceeding before a district court.” Id.
at 7-8.

2 Walz alleges that Roberts has been “secretly” representing an adverse party and is
therefore “disqualified.” Walz alleges that Roberts “continues to represent
Appellants/Plaintiffs in other cases,” but does not specify which cases or why they have
retained Roberts for those cases if they are dissatisfied with his work. Walz also alleges
Roberts is guilty of “creating false documents, . . . a false order, . . . [and] making false
statements about what work [Roberts] did” without specificity or any explanation.
Additionally, Walz did not raise these arguments below, and therefore, we do not consider
them. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). And to the extent that we do
not address some of Walz’s allegations of professional misconduct in this section, we are
unable to discern them.

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Walz alleges breach of fiduciary duty and professional misconduct. Similar to the
allegations in Foster, Walz does not dispute the hours worked or the reasonableness of the
fee, but rather he is “dissatisfied with the quality of the services” and “sought to litigate
complex questions of professional misconduct and legal malpractice.” 699 N.W.2d at 8.
But “[c]onsideration of complex questions of professional negligence in the lien action is
contrary to the legislative intent expressed in the language of [Minn. Stat. § 481.13].” Id.
These claims are inappropriate for resolution in an attorney-lien summary proceeding, and
the district court did not err by establishing Roberts’s attorney lien without considering
these allegations.
Walz also alleges that Roberts failed to produce proof of his work, even though he
does not dispute any of the hours or costs that Roberts sub mitted to the district court. To
the contrary, the record shows Roberts submitted hours with descriptions of the nature of
the work he com pleted and the dates on which he completed the work. Roberts also
submitted an expense repo rt showing costs of $11,435.03 , with receipts and invoices to
confirm those costs. It is undisputed that the global settlement agreement bears Roberts’ s
signature, not Walz’s. The record also includes emails proving that Roberts was
responsible for the majority of communications to medical -health providers, opposing
counsel, and the county. The district court appropriately considered these documents in
calculating the amount of Roberts’s attorney lien as discussed in Part IV.

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III. The district court did not err by finding that the representation agreements
were enforceable.

Walz argues that the re presentation agreements are unenforceable between the
attorneys without separate writings as required by Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.8(a) and 1.5(e).
Walz’s argument lacks merit.
A. Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.8(a)
Rule 1.8(a) governs business transactio ns between attorneys and current clients .
Although generally a “lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action,”
there are two exceptions: a “lawyer may: (1) acquire a lien authorized by law to secure the
lawyer’s fee or expenses; and (2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a
civil case.” M inn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.8(i). Because the representation agreements are
contracts for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case, they are exceptions to rule 1.8(a).
The first comment to rule 1.8 confirms our interpretation by stating that rule 1.8 “does not
apply to ordinary fee arrangements between client and lawyer.” Because Walz fails to
explain how rule 1.8(a) applies to the representation agreements , and we find no basis for
the argument, it fails.
B. Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(e)
Rule l.5(e) is relevant if one party tries to enforce a fee-splitting agreement. Because
Roberts is not attempting to enforce a fee-splitting agreement and concedes that one never
existed, the rule 1.5(e) requirements do not apply. Here, the district court did not enforce
the 1/3 contingency-fee provision under the representation agreements. Instead, the district

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court established the attorney lien based on Minnesota caselaw governing joint -
representation agreements when there is no valid fee-splitting agreement.
Alternatively, Walz asserts that Roberts forfeited all fees because Christensen v.
Eggen stands for the proposition that all ethical rules must be complied with as a condition
precedent to collecting fees. 577 N.W.2d 221 (Minn. 1998). This argument fails for three
reasons. First and foremost, Walz misstates the law: Christensen holds that “fee-splitting
agreements between attorneys of different firms must comply with all of the requirements
of the rule to be deemed enforceable and consistent with public policy.” 577 N.W.2d at
222 (emphasis added) (interpreting Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(e)). Second, b ecause
Roberts did not attempt to enforce a fee -splitting agreement, rule 1.5(e) and Christensen
do not apply. Third, under Foster, the district court is not required to turn a summary
proceeding into a lengthy trial for alleged violations of all ethical rules. 699 N.W.2d at 7.
IV. The district cou rt did not err in its method of calculating the amount of
Roberts’s attorney lien, and its findings are supported by the record.

Walz appears to argue that the district court er red in calculating the attorney -lien
amount and that the district court made findings not supported by the record. We disagree.
Although the reasonable value of attorney fees is a question of fact, we review de
novo whether the district court employed the proper method to calculate the amount of an
attorney lien. Foster, 699 N.W.2d at 4 (citations omitted) . When a representation
agreement does not include fee provisions, “the amount of the lien is determined by the
reasonable value of the services rendered.” Id. at 6 (citation omitted). In determining the
reasonable value of the services rendered between two firm s in a contingency -fee case,

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courts consider the factors listed in In re L-tryptophan Cases: “(1) the length of time each
firm spent on the case; (2) the proportion of funds invested by each firm; (3) the quality of
representation; (4) the result of each firm’s efforts; (5) the reason the client changed firms;
(6) the viability of the claim at transfer; (7) the amount of recovery realized; and (8) any
pre-existing partnership agreements” (L-tryptophan factors). 518 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Minn.
App. 1994). Although the reasonable value of the services rendered in a contingency -fee
arrangement is determined on quantum meruit, this does not require a court to calculate
fees on an hourly basis . Ashford v. Interstate Trucking Corp. of Am ., Inc., 524 N.W.2d
500, 503 (Minn. App. 1994).
Because the parties agree that the reasonable value of the services rendered is
approximately $569,000.00, the only remaining dispute is which portion of that amount
each attorney earned. The district court reviewed fees and costs from Walz and Roberts
and then applied the L-tryptophan factors to determine the reasonable value of each
attorney’s contribution to the case. These findings are supported by the record.
On the first factor, the district court found that Roberts contributed 94% of the costs,
time, fees, and paralegal time ; that Walz contributed 6 %; and that Roberts’ s costs were
reasonable and related to the case. Roberts submitted a time log that shows over 150 time
entries ranging from 0.15 to 14 hours each, over more than two years, totaling 202.3 hours.
The district court found all of Roberts’ s hours reasonable and attrib utable to his
representation. Walz submitted 485.30 hours , but the district court could not determine
how the majority of his hours were attributable, necessary, or reasonable to his role as an
attorney for this matter . On the second factor, Roberts submitted $11,435.03 in costs to

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various health-care institutions and police departments, with receipts showing him as the
corresponding attorney. Conversely, Walz submitted $771.50 in costs which include
copying costs, payment to a third-party attorney of $450.00, and a filing fee.
On the third and fourth factors, the district court noted that Roberts had the lead on
communications with the liability carrier, including the global mediated settlement
agreement. The record shows that only Roberts signed on behalf of the appellants on the
global mediated settlement agreement. The district court also found that Roberts obtained
appointment of the trustee, frequently contacted the county attorney, was the only attorney
authorized to speak to the county attorney and submitted information helpful to the
underlying case , addressed medical -billing issues, drafted documents relevant to the
settlement, and served necessary parties. These findings are supported by the emails that
Roberts submitted requesting information from the various health-care institutions and the
county attorne y. The district court found that not all o f Walz’s activities, including
research on punitive damages, drafting opening and closing arguments, and sentencing
argument, provided value to the case. Walz billed for all of these activities even though
Roberts settled the matter before the need to pre pare closing arguments or other trial
materials arose.
On the fifth factor, Roberts ceased working on the case after the settlement because
Walz communicated that Theis-Walz wanted Roberts to stop work. The district court
determined that Walz released Roberts because “the only reasonable explanation . . . is the
action was taken to obtain a reduction of Mr. Roberts’ s fees and redistributions of
settlement proceeds. This is because a global settlement agreement had already been

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reached when Attorney Walz ’s[sic] took over the case.” Walz made changes to increase
distributions to the trustee , his wife, out of the amount held in trust for attorney fees and
shifted more fees to himself. On this record, the district court did not find that Roberts was
discharged for any reason attributable to him.
The district court did not directly analyze the seventh factor, but it noted that
Roberts’s efforts resulted in a 2.75 million dollar settlement and that Walz became active
only after Roberts reached the settlement. The remaining factors are inapplicable.
Walz argues that the district court erred by not considering that the “ paternal
grandparents have subsidized the parents of [C.L.W.] since before [C.L.W.’s] birth by
providing a home and daycare at no cost,” and that Walz drafted poem s which added
specific facts to the demand letter. Although laudable, those actions are not part of the L-
tryptophan factors, and the district court found that those actions appeared to be in Walz’s
personal capacity as the paternal grandfather to C.L.W., not as an attorney.
We conclude that the district court did not err in calculating the reasonable value of
services rendered between Roberts and Walz, who had no fee-splitting provision in the
contingency-fee agreements and that its underlying findings on the L-tryptophan factors
are supported by the record.
Affirmed.