ProStar Exteriors, LLC, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0862

ProStar Exteriors, LLC,
Appellant,

vs.

Alan R. Walker, et al.,
Respondents,

Mortgage Registration Systems, Inc.,
Defendant.

Filed April 5, 2021
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-CV-18-2645

Jeffrey C. O’Brien, Emeric J. Dwyer, Jennif er J. Crancer, Chestnut Cambrone P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Mark R. Bradford, Maria P. Brekke, Bassford Remele, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Laura A. Hage, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A contractor commenced this action to en force a mechanic’s lien and recover an
unpaid debt of approximately $4,000. After obtaining a judgment in its favor, the

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contractor sought approximately $40,000 in attorney fees. The district court awarded only
$5,000 in attorney fees. On the contractor’s appeal, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by awarding $5,000 and, therefore, affirm.
FACTS
On June 11, 2017, a hail storm damaged the roof of a Rockford home belonging to
Alan R. Walker and Nina M. Walker. In July 2017, the Walkers hired ProStar Exteriors,
L.L.C., to repair the damage. The Walkers made a down payment of $8,214, which left a
balance of $4,417 to be paid after ProStar co mpleted its work. ProStar performed repair
work in August 2017. There was a dispute as to whether ProStar performed all of the work
to which the parties had agreed. The Walkers did not make any further payments.
In December 2017, ProStar recorded a mechan ic’s lien in the amount of $4,417. In
May 2018, ProStar commenced this action and alleged clai ms against the Walkers for
foreclosure of the mechanic’s lien, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, and
quantum meruit. The case was tried to the district court in August and September of 2019.
The district court concluded that ProSta r was not entitled to re lief on its claim for
foreclosure of the mechanic’s lien because it had not properly se rved process on a co-
defendant. The district court concluded that ProStar was entitled to relief on its breach-of-
contract claim and awarded damages of $4,417 plus interest. ProStar filed a post-trial
motion for amended findings with respect to th e foreclosure claim. The district court
granted on the ground that joinder of the co-defendant was not required and, accordingly,
granted relief to ProStar on its foreclosure claim.

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ProStar’s post-trial motion also included a re quest for an award of attorney fees in
the amount of $39,976. The district court granted the motio n in the amount of $5,000.
ProStar appeals from the district court’s ruling on its motion for attorney fees.
DECISION
ProStar argues that the district court erred by awarding attorney fees of only $5,000
instead of a greater amount.
If the holder of a mechanic’s lien is succes sful on a claim to foreclose on the lien,
the lienholder is entitled to judgment and, in addition, “costs and disbursements to be fixed
by the court.” Minn. Stat. § 514.14 (2020). In this context, the term “costs and
disbursements” includes attorney fees. See Jadwin v. Kasal, 318 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Minn.
1982). Upon a motion for attorney fees by a pr evailing lienholder, a district court should
consider the following nine factors: “[1] time and effort required, [2] novelty or difficulty
of the issues, [3] skill and standing of the a ttorney, [4] value of the interest involved,
[5] results secured at trial, [6] loss of opportunity for other employment, [7] taxed party’s
ability to pay, [8] customary ch arges for similar services, and [9] certainty of payment.”
Id. at 848. An award of attorney fees pursu ant to section 514.14 “s hould be made with
caution so that property owners are not discouraged from challenging defective
workmanship on the part of lien holders by excessive awards.” Asp v. O’Brien , 277
N.W.2d 382, 385 (Minn. 1979). Furthermore, the amount of a fee award under section
514.14 “should be in reasona ble relation to the amount of the judgment secured.”
Northwest Wholesale Lumber, Inc. v. Citadel Co., 457 N.W.2d 244, 251 (Minn. App. 1990)
(citing Asp, 277 N.W.2d at 385). This court applies an abuse-of -discretion standard of

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review to a district court’s award of attorney fees under section 514.14. See Jadwin, 318
N.W.2d at 848; Enviro-Fab, Inc. v. Blandin Paper Co., 349 N.W.2d 842, 848 (Minn. App.
1984), review denied (Minn. Sept. 12, 1984).
In this case, ProStar sought a fee awar d of $39,976. In response, the Walkers
argued, in part, that an award in that amount would be disproportionate to the value of
ProStar’s claim. The district court bega n its analysis by discussing each of the Jadwin
factors. In doing so, the district court dete rmined that the fifth factor favored ProStar’s
position; that the second, fourth, sixth, seve nth, eighth, and ninth factors favored the
Walkers’ position; and that the first and third factors were neutral. The district court then
reviewed monthly invoices submitted by ProStar and determined that the attorneys’ work
would justify a fee award of no more than $15,540. The dist rict court then concluded its
analysis as follows:
While the court could in its discretion award up to
$15,540.00 in attorney’s fees, the court must also consider all
of the factors outlined above. Based on the factors supporting
Defendants’ position regarding attorney’s fees as being
overwhelming, the court in its discretion should reduce the
attorney’s fees further. As outlined in the factors, this case was
overworked and overbilled by six attorneys, three law clerks,
and three paralegals especially in light of the amount in
controversy and complexity of the issues. Well-experienced
attorneys, as Plaintiff’s attorneys are, understand the prospect
of litigation expenses. The court believes the attorney’s fees
acted as an impasse to settleme nt and as the fees increased
while the case moved forward, this hindered any type of
resolution. Due to the factors strongly favoring a reduction in
attorney’s fees, the court will reduce the fees to $5,000.00.
Even after this reduction, this amount remains as more than
100% of the underlying claim.

ProStar makes four arguments for re versal, which we consider in turn.

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A.
ProStar’s primary argument is that the di strict court erred by making proportionality
(i.e., the relationship between the amount of the judgment and the amount of the fee award)
the predominant factor, thereby unfairly limiting the fee award.
The concept of proportiona lity is reflected in the Jadwin factors. For example, the
fourth factor is the “value of the interest in volved,” and the fifth fa ctor is the “results
secured at trial.” Jadwin, 318 N.W.2d at 848. These factors are merely two of nine factors
that must be considered. See id. Consistent with the caselaw, the district court addressed
all nine factors. In connection with the eighth factor, the district court stated that ProStar’s
fees and costs “are not in proportion to the amount in controversy.” Otherwise the district
court did not expressly discuss proportionality in its analysis.
Although district courts generally must consider all nine Jadwin factors, some fee
petitions are more likely than others to implic ate the factors related to proportionality. In
such a case, it is appropriate for a district court to consider this court’s admonition that the
amount of a fee award under section 514.14 “should be in reasonable relation to the amount
of the judgment secured.” Northwest Wholesale Lumber, 457 N.W.2d at 251. The district
court quoted this excerpt from our Northwest Wholesale Lumber o p i n i o n . I t w a s
appropriate for the district cour t to do so because ProStar s ought fees in an amount that
was almost ten times the amount of ProStar’s recovery.
Furthermore, the caselaw reve als that, in analogous cases, the appellate courts have
limited fee awards that otherwise woul d have been disproportionate. In Northwest
Wholesale Lumber, for example, two contractors obtained recoveries totaling $4,899 plus

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interest, and they were awarded a total of $5,970 in fees. See 457 N.W.2d at 251. On
appeal, this court reduced the fees to a to tal of $3,020 “[t]o bring the award into a
reasonable relationship to the amount of judgment.” Id. The supreme court took a similar
approach in Asp, in which the lienholder obtained a judgment of approximately $4,927 and
was awarded $2,400 in fees. 277 N.W.2d at 383. On appeal, the supreme court reduced
the fees to $1,000, stating, “we are not in clined to allow the award of the full amount,
particularly where the amount of the lien recovered is small in comparison to the attorney’s
fees assessed.” Id. at 385. Likewise, in Bloomington Elec. Co. v. Freeman’s, Inc. , 394
N.W.2d 605 (Minn. App. 1986), review denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 1986), the lienholder
obtained a judgment of approximately $12,000 and a fee award of $11,150. Id. at 608. On
appeal, this court stated that the fee awar d was “excessive” and reduced it to $5,000. Id.
These opinions illustrate that it is appropriate for a court to ensure th at a fee award is not
substantially more than the judgment.
The supreme court recently considered the pr oportionality of attorney fees in a case
arising under section 325F.665 of the Minnes ota Statutes, the so-called “lemon law.”
Green v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 826 N.W.2d 530, 532 n.1 (Minn. 2013). The supreme court
explained that a statutory award of attorney fees “should be ‘adequate to attract competent
counsel,’ but should ‘not produce windfalls to attorneys.’” Id. at 538 (quoting Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n.4, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1938 n.4 (1983)). The supreme court
explained further:
“In the private sector, ‘billing judgment’ is an important
component in fee setting. It is no less important here. Hours
that are not properly billed to one’s client are also not properly

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billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory authority.” Id.
at 434, 103 S. Ct. at 1933 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). District courts , therefore, are directed to
exclude from fee awards “hours that are excessive, redundant,
or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice
ethically is obligated to ex clude such hours from his fee
submission.” Id. Because billing judgment is necessarily
related to the merits of the cas e and the amount at issue in a
consumer protection case, divorcing an award of attorney fees
entirely from the amount at stake in the litigation would relieve
attorneys from the need to exercise such judgment.

Id. at 538-39. These principles apply to this case and support the district court’s ruling.
Thus, the district court did not improper ly consider the relationship between the
amount of ProStar’s recovery on its lien-foreclosure claim and the amount of the award of
attorney fees.
B.
ProStar also argues that the distri ct court erred by misanalyzing the Jadwin factors.
With respect to the first f actor, ProStar contends that the district court erred by
reasoning that ProStar served excessive disc overy requests on the Walkers. The district
court’s reasoning is reasonable in light of the amount at stake; ProStar’s service of 31
interrogatories, 6 document requests, and 21 requests for admission on each of the Walkers;
and the Walkers’ proposals that the parties engage in informal discovery. With respect to
the second factor, ProStar concedes that its cause of action was not novel. With respect to
the fourth factor, ProStar contends that the district court erred by reasoning that ProStar’s
claim for attorney fees impede d settlement discussions. The di strict court’s reasoning is
supported by affidavits executed by both of the Walkers, who stated that they tried to settle
the case multiple times but were told by ProStar’s attorneys th at they would need to pay

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attorney fees that were more than the amount of the a lleged debt. ProStar does not
challenge the district court’s analysis of the sixth factor. With respect to the seventh factor,
ProStar contends that the district court erred by reasoning that the Walkers might be unable
to pay a $40,000 fee award. The district court noted that the Walkers had a reduced earning
capacity due to health issues. The district court’s reasoning is supported by the Walkers’
affidavits, in which they describe their re spective health issues, loss of employment or
reduction in earnings, and minimal assets. With respect to the eighth factor, ProStar
contends that the district court erred by fo cusing on the total amount of fees incurred, not
on the hourly rates of its atto rneys and paralegals. But ProStar does not cite any legal
authority for the proposition that the eighth factor is solely concerned with hourly rates and
not concerned with the amount of fees incurred. With respect to the ninth factor, ProStar
contends that the district court erred by reas oning that the Walkers’ payment of a larger
award of attorney fees would be uncertain and might result in the foreclosure of their home.
The district court’s reasoning is supported by the Walkers’ affidavits, in which they say
that, in light of their minimal assets and reduced income, they likely would lose the home
to foreclosure.
Thus, the district court did not err in its analysis of the Jadwin factors.
C.
ProStar also argues that the district cour t erred by not awarding any fees for time
spent in trial and in post-trial proceedings. The district court did not expressly state why it
was limiting its award of fees to those incurred before trial. The district court likely did so
based on its concerns that ProStar’s claim for attorney fees “pushed the parties further apart

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in negotiations” and that the parties did not engage “in any type of formal alternative
dispute resolution.” Furthermore, the district court’s method of determining the amount of
the fee award is consistent with the caselaw, which gives district courts flexibility to either
“identify specific hours that should be eliminated or . . . simply reduce the award to account
for the limited success.” Milner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 748 N.W.2d 608, 624 (Minn. 2008)
(quotations omitted). Thus, given the circumstances of this case, the district court did not
err by limiting ProStar’s fees to those that were incurred before trial.
D.
ProStar last argues that the district court erred at the final stage of its analysis by
reducing its fees from $15,540 to $5,000. As stated above, the amount of a fee award under
section 514.14 “should be in reasonable relati on to the amount of the judgment secured.”
Northwest Wholesale Lumber, 457 N.W.2d at 251. In Northwest Wholesale Lumber, we
reduced a district court’s fee award of $5,9 70, which was less than the amount of fees
actually incurred but more than the amount recovered, “[ t]o bring the award into a
reasonable relationship to the amount of judgment.” Id. In Asp, the supreme court reduced
a district court’s fee award of $2,400 to $1,000 because “the amount of the lien recovered
[was] small in comparison to the attorney’s fe es assessed.” 277 N.W.2d at 385. And in
Bloomington Electric, this court reduced a district court’s fee award from $11,150, which
we considered “excessive,” to $5,000. 394 N.W.2d at 608. The district court’s ultimate
determination of the amount of ProStar’s fee award is consistent with these prior opinions.
Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing ProStar’s fees from $15,540
to $5,000.

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In sum, the district court did not err by awarding ProStar attorney fees of $5,000.
Affirmed.