State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0864

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Richard Raymond Glaser, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed May 3, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-19-1494

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant Coun ty Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Richard Raymond Glaser, Jr., seeks reversal of his conviction for
attempted second-degree murder, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the

2
jury’s verdict. Because the evidence was sufficient to esta blish Glaser’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, we affirm.
FACTS1
One evening in February 2019, Glaser f ought with his girlfriend and then messaged
another woman, M.L.P., for a ride. Glaser and M.L.P. had known each other for about six
months and had briefly been sexual partners. M.L.P. picked up Glaser in her Volkswagen
Jetta and took him to the house of his friend, K.D. Glaser went inside while M.L.P. waited
in the car. Eventually, M.L.P. tired of waiting and went to her friend’s house, about a block
away from K.D.’s house.
Glaser messaged M.L.P. and asked her to return to K.D.’s house because he had left
his phone in her car. When M. L.P. returned, they unsuccessfully searched her car for the
phone. Glaser and K.D. were also unable to locate the phone inside the house. While
searching for the phone, Glaser became incr easingly upset. Eventually, Glaser, M.L.P.,
and K.D. got into M.L.P.’s car—Glaser was in the driver’s seat; M.L.P. was in the
passenger’s seat; and K.D. was in the back seat. Glaser pulled a handgun out of his waist
area and set it on his lap. He accused M.L.P. and K.D. of taking his phone, stating that one
of them must have it.
Glaser let K.D. leave the car. He then drove to another friend’s house with M.L.P.
still in the passenger’s seat. Wh en they arrived, Glaser left M.L.P. in the car and went
inside. He took M.L.P.’s keychain, which included her car key and apartment key, despite

1 Our summary of the facts is derived from the trial record.

3
M.L.P.’s request that he leave it with her. He said he would return her keys when he got
his phone back.
M.L.P. started the car using a spare key that she kept in the glove compartment. She
then drove to the nearby house of J.C., a mutual friend. M.L.P. picked up J.C. and they
drove back to the house where Glaser had gone. J.C. said she would help M.L.P. retrieve
the keys.
M.L.P. and J.C. entered the house where Gl aser had gone. They went into a small
bedroom where five people, including Glase r, were smoking methamphetamine. M.L.P.
later testified that she was sober at this tim e and did not use any su bstances that night
because she had to go to work th e next day. But J. C., who had come to assist M.L.P. in
retrieving her keys, joined the others in sm oking methamphetamine, which upset M.L.P.
M.L.P. again asked Glaser for her keys, and he again respo nded that she would get them
when he got his phone. Finally, M.L.P. th reatened to call the po lice. When M.L.P.
mentioned the police, all the individuals smoking methamphetamine, including Glaser,
prepared to leave.
As the group left the house, M.L.P. and J.C. got into M.L.P.’s Jetta, with M.L.P. in
the driver’s seat and J.C. in the passenger seat. Glaser got into a blue SUV parked across
the street from M.L.P.’s car. According to M.L.P., she had a clear view and saw Glaser
enter the passenger-side of the SUV. She also observed a White male she did not recognize
get into the driver’s seat. A White woman also entered the SUV.
M.L.P. did not want Glaser to leave, so she tried to block the SUV with her car while
she called 911. As she maneuvered her ca r, the SUV pulled around her, and the two

4
vehicles, sliding on ice and snow, collided. After the impact, M.L.P. observed Glaser exit
the passenger-side door, reach into his pocket, lift his shirt, grab the gun she saw earlier,
and start shooting toward her car. M.L.P. duc ked and then drove straight to get away.
During this time, M.L.P. was still on the phone with the 911 operator, but hung up as she
drove away.
M.L.P. drove her car about three blocks before hitting a snow bank. Still fearful
about being shot, M.L.P. and J.C. ran away from M.L.P.’s car in opposite directions.
M.L.P. then called 911 again. She told the operator that she was “shot at.” But M.L.P. did
not name Glaser in either 911 call. In the first call, she identified the shooter as “a friend”
and said she did not know his “government name.” In the second call, she stated that “two
[W]hite males and one female” shot at her.
A witness also called 911. The witness reported that she saw a “little Volkswagen”
and a black SUV, that two shots were fired, and that the black SUV then drove off. When
asked which car the shots were fired from, the witness said, “I don’t know. . . I was trying
to duck,” and that she “was ju st trying to drive off withou t getting shot.” The witness
described the person she saw as short, “Asian,” and wearing a black hoodie and tan pants.
According to the witness, this man jumped out of the SUV and tried to open the passenger
side door of the Volkswagen, and then returned to the SUV and got into the driver’s seat.
When M.L.P. and J.C. returned to the Je tta, two police officers had arrived. The
officers questioned M.L.P. about the incident in the presence of J.C. M.L.P. did not
immediately identify Glaser as the shooter. She later explai ned that she was afraid of
Glaser and that she feared J.C. would tell Glas er that she had identified him. When J.C.

5
walked away from the police, M.L.P. immediately identified Glaser as the shooter. The
police took M.L.P.’s car as ev idence. The vehicle had sha ttered glass and bullet holes,
including a bullet hole in the driver’s headrest.
A few days later, an inve stigator interviewed Glaser about the shoo ting. In a
Mirandized statement, Glaser told the investigator that M.L.P. was jealous of his girlfriend
and she had hoped they would have sex and use drugs that night. Much of Glaser’s
summary of the events matched M.L.P.’s ac count: he messaged her, she picked him up,
they went to K.D.’s house, M.L.P. left, then Glaser told her to come back, and they moved
on to another house. According to Glaser, he le ft in an SUV with a male friend. He said
that they drove away and he went home. Glaser admitted to using meth that night, but
denied being involved in the shooting. He initially denied there had been any shooting—
“There was a little bit of yelling and sh-t . . . about the keys and my phone, but other than
that, there was no altercation. There wasn’t.” After the investigator told Glaser that a
neighbor had heard gunshots, Glaser denied shooting anyone. He said, “I don’t have a gun.
I never had a gun. I’m telling you I never had a gun. Yeah. They never caught me with
no guns.”
Following Glaser’s statement, the state ch arged him with second-degree assault with
a dangerous weapon (count one), Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2018). The state later
amended the complaint, adding charges of a ttempted second-degree murder (count two),
Minn. Stat. §§ 609.19, subd. 1(1), .17, subd . 1 (2018), and possession of a firearm by an
ineligible person (count three), Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 2(b) (2018).

6
Glaser had a jury trial. At the trial, the state presented the testimony of M.L.P., a
neighbor who heard the gunshots, both respo nding police officers, the investigator who
interviewed Glaser, and a 911 call-center clerk. The state also introduced photos of
M.L.P.’s car, a bullet fragment removed from M.L.P’s car, the 911 calls, and footage from
the responding officers’ body-worn cameras.
While M.L.P. was on the witness stand, she believed that the driver of the SUV
entered the courtroom and she immediately no tified the prosecutor. The court recessed
while the state investigated this information. The prosecutor ultim ately determined that
the person who entered the courtroom had been in prison on the day of the shooting, so he
could not have been the driver of the SUV. But the district court allowed Glaser’s counsel
to cross-examine M.L.P. about her mistaken belief that the driver had entered the
courtroom.
K.D. testified on behalf of Glaser. According to K.D., once Glaser smoked
methamphetamine, he said that he no longer cared about his missing phone. K.D. testified
that M.L.P. also smoked methamphetamine. He heard nothing about keys that night. But
he did notice that M.L.P. seemed upset that Glaser would not leave with her. K.D. testified
that he never saw Glaser with a gun. He observed the Jetta and SUV collide, and after the
two vehicles drove off, he heard gunshots but could not see the vehicles or shooter.
The jury found Glaser guilty of the three charged offenses. Following the verdicts,
the district court sentenced Glaser to 190 months in prison for attempted second-degree
murder.
Glaser appeals.

7
DECISION
An accused may be convicted only “upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970). In a criminal trial, the st ate bears the burden of
proving guilt. See State v. Peterson , 673 N.W.2d 482, 486 (Min n. 2004). The state can
only overcome the presumption of innocenc e with proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every element of a charged offense. Id.
Glaser argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction of
attempted second-degree intentional murder. To convict Glaser of attempted second-
degree intentional murder, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Glaser performed an act that is “a substantial step toward, and more than preparation for,”
the commission of second-degree intentional murder. Minn. Stat. §§ 609.17, subd. 1, .19,
subd. 1(1). Specifically, the state had to establish the fo llowing elements: (1) Glaser
performed an act that is a s ubstantial step toward causing th e death of M.L.P., (2) Glaser
acted with the intent to kill M.L.P., and (3) Glaser’s ac t took place in February 2019 in
Ramsey County. See id.
In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, an appellate court performs “a
painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the conviction,” was su fficient to allow the ju ry to reach a guilty
verdict. State v. Ortega , 813 N.W.2d 86, 10 0 (Minn. 2012) (quo tation omitted). We
assume that “the jury believed the state’s w itnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the
contrary.” State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). And

8
the reviewing court “will not disturb the verdict if the jury, ac ting with due regard for the
presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could
reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Ortega, 813
N.W.2d at 100.
Glaser’s sole contention is that the stat e failed to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was the individual who fired the gun toward M.L.P. He argues that M.L.P.’s
account of the incident—the only eyewitness testimony co nnecting him to the offense—
was unreliable for several reasons.
First, Glaser contends that M.L.P. onl y had a limited opportunity to observe the
shooter due to the position of he r car. But the jury had an op portunity to consider this
argument. Defense counsel questioned M.L.P. about her ability to view the shooter during
cross-examination and challe nged her credibility. And in closing argument, defense
counsel urged the jury to reject M.L.P.’s testimony as unreliable. The jury clearly
concluded otherwise, notwithstanding the defense theory.
Second, Glaser claims that M.L.P.’s id entification of him as the shooter was
significantly undermined when, mid-trial, M.L.P. misidentified a stranger in the courtroom
as the driver of the SUV. Again, however, this evidence was ava ilable to the jury in
evaluating M.L.P.’s credibility; defense co unsel cross-examined M.L.P. about the
mistaken identification. Moreover, as the state points out, M.L.P. had only met the driver
one time, and thus, her ability to identify him was fundamentally different than her ability
to identify Glaser—a person she knew well.

9
Finally, Glaser argues that the 911 caller id entified the shooter as an Asian man,
casting serious doubt on M.L.P.’s testimony identifying Glaser. The jury was free to reach
its own conclusion about the significance of the 911 call, however, and was given the tools
for doing so. During the trial, the jury heard the 911 call, including the caller’s description
of the shooter. In closing argument, defense counsel argued to the jury that the 911 caller’s
description of the person wh o exited the SUV undermined the reliability of M.L.P.’s
identification of Glaser.
Assessing the credibility of witnesses and weighing testimony are functions that are
exclusive to the fact-finder—in this case, the jury. See State v. Landa , 642 N.W.2d 720,
725 (Minn. 2002). On review, we must defer to the jury’s credibility determinations. State
v. Porte , 832 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. App. 20 13). Although Glaser identifies the
weaknesses in M.L.P.’s identifi cation of him as the shooter, the jury was also aware of
these problems. The jury clearly found M.L.P. credible nonetheless. We must defer to the
jury’s determination about the veracity of her testimony.
Glaser also suggests that a conviction ca nnot rest on the uncorroborated testimony
of a victim. This argument is contrary to law. See State v. Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536, 539
(Minn. 2004) (affirming conviction based on victim’s initial account of incident, and
observing that there is no requirement for co rroboration of a victim’s testimony). And in
any event, the evidence at tria l consisted of more than M. L.P.’s testimony. The state
presented M.L.P.’s 911 calls. In video footage from the officers’ body-worn cameras,
M.L.P. named Glaser as the shooter. And Glaser’s own statement to the police contained
inconsistencies about the events on the night of the shooting and lacked detail.

10
Based on our careful review of the reco rd, we conclude that there was sufficient
evidence at trial for the jury to convict Glaser of attempted second-degree intentional
murder.
Affirmed.