Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- 933 N.W.2d 408 not in our corpus
- Hickman v. Commissioner of Human Services 682 N.W.2d 697
- In re Welfare of J.W. 807 N.W.2d 441
- Rodne v. Commissioner of Human Services 547 N.W.2d 440
- Sweet v. Commissioner of Human Services 702 N.W.2d 314
- Wallace v. Commissioner of Taxation 184 N.W.2d 588
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0871
L. M. P.,
Relator,
vs.
Minnesota Department of Human Services,
Respondent,
Minnesota Department of Health,
Respondent.
Filed March 15, 2021
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge
Minnesota Department of Human Services
Case Study No. 2068647
Russell A. Squire, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
relator)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Kaitrin Vohs, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondents)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Relator challenges the decision of the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) that
relator is disqualified under the Background Studies Act from providing services to persons
in licensed facilities, arguing that : (1) Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS)
decisions of May 2018 and February 2020 are reviewable by this court under Jackson v.
Comm’r of Human Se rvs., 933 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 2019); and (2) the MDH May 2020
decision is arbitrary and unsupported by substantial evidence. Because we see no violation
of Jackson and the MDH decision is not arbitrary and is supported by substantial evidence,
we affirm.
FACTS
In November 2013, relator L.M.P. was a passenger in a car that had been reported
stolen and was being driven by her then-boyfriend, who had been on probation for burglary.
Police who stopped the car found a crow bar, bolt cutters, keys, butane torches, a glass
pipe, large pliers, and some personal items that were determined to have been stolen. In
relator’s purse, they found a center punch tool, use d for breaking windows.1 Relator was
arrested for, but not charged with, felony possession of stolen property and felony
possession of burglary tools.
In March 2018, a request for a Background Studies Act report on relator was
received by the Anoka County Human Services Division (ACHSD) because relator wanted
1 Relator claimed the tool would enable her to get out of an underwater vehicle while ice
fishing.
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to rent a room in a home where a licensed fac ility was operated. AC HSD recei ved
information about the November 2013 incident from the Minn esota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension and the Roseville Police Department.
In April 2018, ACHSD determined that relator had committed an act defined as a
felony level possession of burglary tools and was subject to a disqualification ; ACHSD
notified relator of her disqualification. She submitted a request for reconsideration, which
was forwarded to the DHS, together with a request for the information used to disqualify
relator.
In May 2018, DHS notified relator that she had been disqualified, that it would not
set her disqualification aside because she posed a risk of harm to persons in the licensed
program, and that it would grant her a time -limited variance to the disqualification until
January 1, 2020, because there were conditions that minimized the risk. Relator was also
informed that she could appeal the DHS decision by requesting a hearing within 30 days
of receipt of the notice. Relator never requested a hearing.
In February 2020, relator wanted to enr oll in a nursing program at an area college .
Under the Backgound Studies Act, the college requested a background study on relator.
DHS again notified relator of her disqualification. Relator’s attorney requested
reconsideration from the MDH, which was responsible for deciding this reconsideration
request under Minn. St at. § 144.057, subds. 2, 3 (2020 ). The attorney disputed both the
correctness of relator’s disqualification and the decision not to set the disqualification
aside; relator submitted an affidavit and 13 exhibits in support of the reconsideration
request.
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In April 2020, MDH notified relator that: (1) her disqualification had been correct,
based on a preponderance of the evidence from the November 2013 incident, but (2) her
disqualification was set aside with respect to the college because relator did not pose a risk
of harm to those a t the college .2 In May 2020, r elator’s attorney asked MDH for
clarification of its determination of the correctness of relator’s disqualification , and MDH
sent a letter that superseded its April 2020 letter. This letter informed relator that: (1) both
the supplementary information sent with the request for reconsideration and the
information originally used to disqualify relator had been reviewed in finding the
disqualification to be correct; (2) relator’s disqualification was final because she had not
requested a hearing within 30 days of her May 2018 notification of the disqualification ;
and (3) relator’s disqualification had been set aside with respect to R.C. because relator did
not pose a risk of harm to those at the college.
On appeal, relator challenges the May 2018 and February 2020 DHS decisions that
a preponderance of the evidence showed that relator had committed an act that met the
definition of felony possession of burglary tools and the May 2020 MDH decision on the
ground that it was arbitrary and unsupported by substantial evidence.
DECISION
1. Review of the May 2018 and February 2020 DHS Decisions
Relator devotes much of her brief and her reply brief to challenging these decisions,
both of which state that a preponderance of the evidence supports relator’s disqualification
2 A disqualification is set aside only with respect to a particular, specified enti ty. Minn.
Stat. § 245C.22 (2020).
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under the Background Studies Act. But “[c]ertiorari ordinarily is available only when the
order from which the appeal is taken is a final determination of the parties’ rights, rather
than an interlocutory or intermediate order.” Hickman v. Comm’r of Human Servs ., 682
N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn. App. 2004); see also Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03 (providing
that appeals must be from final judgments or orders).
Neither of these decisions was a final deter mination of relator’s rights. The May
2018 decision provided that, if relator wanted to challenge the disquali fication, she could
seek a hearing within 30 days under Minn. Stat. § 256.045 ; the February 2020 decision
provided that relator could request rec onsideration if she believed either that the
information used to disqualify her was incorrect or that she would not pose a risk of harm.
It is undisputed that relator did not seek a hearing within 30 days of notifica tion of
the May 2018 decision. “A disqualification is conclusive for purposes of current and future
background studies if: . . . (3) the individual did not timely request a hearing on the
disqualification under . . . [Minn. Stat. §] 256.045 after previously being given the right to
do so.” Minn. Stat. § 245C.29, subd. 2 (a) (2020). Relator relies on Jackson, which she
says contradicts Minn. Stat. § 245C.29, subd. 2(a) (3) and holds that “a correctness
challenge may be made regardless of whether a determination disqualifying an individual
has become ‘conclusive’ under Minn. Stat. § 245C.29, subd. 2(a) (3).” She argues that,
under Jackson, this court may review “all determin ations made by DHS and MDH,”
including the May 2018 and February 2020 DHS determinations that a preponderance of
the evidence supports relator’s disqualification.
But Jackson noted that the Background Studies Act provides a
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presumption of correctness once a disqualification becomes
conclusive because the reconsideration process puts the
evidentiary burden on the disqualified individual to put forth
evidence of the incorrectness of the decision. . . . [F]or
conclusively disqualified individuals, DHS is not required to
prove to a neutral decision -maker that a prepon derance of
evidence supports its decision.
Jackson, 933 N.W.2d at 416 n. 2. Thus, relator had the burden s of proving in her request
for reconsideration that the evidence supporting her disqual ification was incorrect and of
producing new evidence that would justify the contrary finding that she had not committed
an act defined as felony possession of burglary tools. Cf. In re Welfare of J.W., 807 N.W.2d
441, 445 (Minn. App. 2011) (holding that, to rebut a presumption of palpable unfitness to
be a parent, a party must produce evidence to rebut or meet the presumption). Relator did
not submit new information that would justify a contrary determination. Jackson does not
entitle relator to appellate review of the DHS May 2018 and February 2020 decisions that
she committed a disqualifying act.
2. The MDH May 2020 Reconsideration Determination
Relator also argues that the May 2020 MDH decision failed to follow Jackson
because it was “devoid of findings of fact and contain[ed] no reasoning of how the
conclusion was reached that [relator] committed a felony -level offense”; it simply stated
that MDH had reviewed the information relator submitted and the information used t o
disqualify her. But Jackson does not require that MDH reconsideration notices provide
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factual findings or legal analysis to justify a disqualification or the denial of a request to
remove the disqualification.
A decision concerning a request for reconsideration of a disqualification is a quasi-
judicial decision. Rodne v. Comm’r of Human Servs. , 547 N.W.2d 440, 444 (Minn. App.
1996).
An appellate court may reverse an administrative decision if it
is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is arbitrary and
capricious. Substantial evidence is 1. such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion; 2. more than a scintilla of evidence; 3. more than
some evidence; 4. more than any evidence; and 5. evidence
considered in its entirety. An agency’s conclusion is arbitrary
and capricious if there is no rational connection between the
facts and the agency’s decision.
Sweet v. Comm’r of Human Servs. , 702 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn. App. 2005) (citation
omitted), review denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 2005). A quasi-judicial decision is arbitrary and
capricious if there is no rational connection between the facts and the decision. Id.
Relator argues that there was not substantial evidence to support her disqualification
because she was not convicted of felony possession of burglary tools. But conviction of a
particular crime is only one alternative reason for disqualification, see Minn. Stat.
§ 245C.14, subd. 1(a) (1) (2020); another alternative is that “a preponderance of the
evidence indicates the individual has committed an act or acts that meet the definition” of
the crime. Minn. Stat. § 245C.14, subd. 1(a)(2) (2020). The MDH was provided with and
reviewed evidence from the Roseville Police Departme nt, the Anoka County Attorney’s
Office, and the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, as well as the 13 exhibits and
the affidavit provided by relator and the letters provided by her attorney. The
8
preponderance of this evidence indicated that relator had committed an act or acts that met
the definition of felony possession of burglary tools. The determinati on that the evidence
“[did] not cause [relator’s] disqualification to be changed” was supported by substantial
evidence.
Relator also argues that the MDH decision was arbitrary and capricious because it
did not provide either findings of f act based on the evidence or legal analysis supporting
the disqualification. But the Background Studies Act provides detailed information on
what must or must not be disclosed to whom and when. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. §§ 245C.17,
subd. 2 (2020) (stating what the commissioner must disclose to the subject of a study who
has been disqualified from direct contact with persons served by a licensed program),
245C.23 (2020) (stating what the commissioner must tell an applicant and a license holder
on a reco nsideration determination), 245C.22, subd. 7(c)(3) (2020) (prohibiting the
disclosure of certain information), and 256.0451 (2020) (stating what information must be
provided in the decision following a fair hearing). The legislature did not see fit to require
findings of fact or legal analysis in MDH responses to requests for reconsideration when
the disqualification is not rescinded. This court may not supply “that which the legislature
purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks.” Wallace v. Comm’r of Taxation, 184 N.W.2d
588, 594 (Minn. 1971). The failure to include materials not required in its response did not
make the MDH response arbitrary and capricious.
Affirmed.