In re the Estate of: Shirley Joy Pratt, Deceased.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0872

In re the Estate of:
Shirley Joy Pratt, Deceased.

Filed February 22, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-PR-18-70

John A. Wehrly, Steinhagen & Crist, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Teresa B. Molinaro, Molinar o Davis Law P.L.L.C., Burnsville, Minnesota (for appellant
Deanne L. Pratt)

Elizabeth C. Henry, Francis J. Rondoni, Chestnut Cambronn e P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondents Mary J. Aadland and Richard L. Pratt Jr.)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s di stribution of her mother’s estate, arguing
that the district court erred by: (1) disregar ding the will, (2) erroneously applying the law
of advancements, and (3) violating the homeste ad exemption. Because the district court
properly concluded that appellant had alread y received her share of the estate under the

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will and appellant’s remaining ar guments do not require revers al, we affirm the district
court’s order distributing the remainder of the estate to appellant’s siblings.
FACTS
The following summarizes the district court’s findings of fact and the evidence
received at trial. Shirley J oy Pratt died on April 19, 2017 . Predeceased by her husband
Richard, Shirley’s four children survived her: Richard Pratt Jr., Mary Aadland, John Pratt,
and appellant Deanne Pratt. 1 Respondents Richard and Mary are Shirley’s stepchildren.
John and Deanne are her biological children. All four children were raised by Richard and
Shirley as their own.
Shirley executed a will in 2014 which stated that all of the property and residue of
her estate would be divided equally betwee n the four siblings. In November 2016,
Shirley’s estate contained cash assets of a pproximately $121,000, a motor vehicle, and a
condominium (the St. Paul Condo), which was valued at approximately $300,000.
Shirley suffered from many health problems towards the end of her life. In 2012,
Shirley fell and broke her right leg and femu r. By 2014, she was diagnosed with mild
dementia and was prone to c onfusion. Shirley continued to declin e both physically and
cognitively throughout 2015 and 2016. Sh e had to be hospitalized in August 2016
following another serious fall. Shirley required 24-hour supervision after recovering from
this fall. In September 2016, Deanne move d into the St. Paul Co ndo with Shirley and
assisted her with daily activities.

1 Appellant’s legal name is Deanne LaRue, but she went by Deanne Pratt for the purposes
of the original action and this appeal.

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Starting in 2014, well before Deanne moved in with Shirley, Shirley began paying
Deanne $1,000 each month in compensation for the care and companionship that Deanne
provided. Deanne drove her mother to doc tor’s appointments and ran errands for her
several times a week after Shirley stopped dr iving in 2014. Thes e payments continued
from 2014 through sometime in 2017, and totaled between $36,000 and $40,000.
In May 2016, Deanne contacte d an attorney who had previously represented Shirley.
Deanne informed the attorney that she was caring for her mother, who had Alzheimer’s
disease. Deanne also conveyed that she was worried about how this role might affect her
own financial situation and asked for guidanc e on what she could do to ensure her own
financial stability. Deanne was going through a divorce at that time and also was receiving
Social Security Disability Income. In a subsequent phone message, Deanne informed the
attorney that she was handling all of Shirley’s finances and that she had questions about
how to properly compensate herself for the time she spent caring for Shirley. The attorney
referred Shirley, through Deanne, to Attorney Frasier, an attorney who specialized in elder
law and long-term care planning.
In November 2016, Deanne met with Atto rney Frasier alone. During the meeting,
the two discussed how Shirley could preserve her estate. Deanne informed Attorney
Frasier that she had been on Social Security Disability Income si nce she was diagnosed
with Meniere’s disease
2 in 2003. Attorney Frasier explained to Deanne that her disability
provided a unique opportunity for Shirley to preserve her estate and begin receiving

2 Meniere’s disease can cause vertigo and dizzy spells, and is at times 100% incapacitating.

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Medical Assistance by transferring her assets to Deanne. Ordinarily, a person cannot
transfer assets to others at below market value and still qualify for Medical Assistance if
the transfer occurs within less than a certain amount of time before the person applies for
Medical Assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(A) (2018). But a person can transfer an
unlimited amount of assets to a disabled child and still qualify for Medical Assistance. Id.
(c)(2)(B)(iii) (2018). Attorney Frasier and Deanne also discussed that there was a
significant question about whether Shirley had th e capacity at that time to consent to a
transfer of assets. Attorney Frasier advised Deanne to have a family meeting to inform her
siblings of the estate preservation plan bei ng considered. Deanne declined to do so.
Attorney Frasier also advised Deanne to set up a personal services agreement with Shirley
for the $1,000 monthly payments that she was receiving. Despite this advice, Deanne never
set up such an agreement.
In December 2016, Attorney Frasier met wi th both Deanne and Shirley. At this
meeting, Shirley explained that she wanted to preserve her estate for her children and that
she wanted Deanne to get more than her sibli ngs because of the care that she provided.
Shirley never suggested that her intention was for Deanne to retain all the assets. During
the meeting, Attorney Frasier advised Deanne to set up a family investment agreement or
family trust for any funds that Shirley transferred to her.
In January 2017, A ttorney Frasier met with Deanne and Shirley again. The purpose
of the meeting was for Shirley to sign a deed transferring the St. Paul Condo to Deanne so
that Shirley could qualify for Medical Assistan ce. Prior to the deed transfer, Shirley
transferred her cash assets to Deanne for this same purpose. The day after Shirley signed

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the deed, she suffered another bad fall and was hospitalized. Shirley never returned to the
St. Paul Condo prior to her death on April 19, 2017. Despite Attorney Frasier’s advice to
inform her siblings of the estate planning, De anne failed to inform them that Shirley had
transferred the cash assets and the St. Paul Condo to Deanne for the purpose of preserving
the assets for the estate. Deanne also failed to inform her siblings of Shirley’s intent that,
after Deanne received compensation for the se rvices she provided to Shirley before her
death, the remaining assets would be divided equally among the four siblings.
In June 2017, Attorney Frasier wrote to a ll four siblings and notified them that for
estate preservation purposes “the condominiu m and a cash account were transferred to
Deanne.” Attorney Frasier cl arified that once Deanne had settled the taxes and expenses
for the estate, “she [would] be in a position to make distributions in four equal shares from
the balance of that cash account.” Attorney Frasier also confirmed that “the condo
ultimately will distribute in four equal shares.” In December 2017, Attorney Frasier wrote
to all four siblings again and indicated that she recently spoke with Deanne to discuss “a
timeline for distribution of the remaining property.”
In January 2018, Richard an d Mary petitioned the Ramsey County District Court to
probate Shirley’s will, alleging that Deanne had acted contrary to the will in fulfilling her
role as the estate’s personal representative. They alleged that Deanne had not made any of
the distributions discussed by Attorney Frasier and continued to live in the St. Paul Condo.
The petitioners sought the appointment of Richard in Deanne’s place as personal
representative of Shirley’s estate. The district court held a trial in February 2020 and made
extensive findings of fact, none of which are disputed on appeal.

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The district court found that before 2016, Shirley intended to split her estate equally
among her children. The district court found that Shirley informed Attorney Frasier in
2016 that she wanted Deanne to receive “more than her siblings because of the additional
care that [she] was providing.” But “[a]t no time in any of the discussions between Shirley
and Attorney Frasier did Shirley indicate that she wanted Deanne to retain all of her assets.”
Instead, the district court found that “it wa s Shirley’s specific understanding that the
unequivocal transfer of her $121,000 in cash assets and St. Paul Condo to Deanne was for
the purpose of preserving the assets and pr eventing the dissipation of assets for nursing
home care or other private home care.” The di strict court also found that “although the
transfer was unequivocal, it was done with th e specific understanding and intent that
Deanne would then use her position to distribute those assets equally among her siblings.”
The district court further found that “Deanne has, in fact, kept and retained all of
[Shirley’s] cash assets, has faile d and refused to distribute a ny of those cash assets, has
retained control and ownership of the St. Paul Condo, and has failed and refused to
distribute any portion of the asse ts to her siblings.” The dist rict court found that Deanne
took this action “despite Shir ley’s intentions, Deanne’s un derstanding of her mother’s
intentions, and the purpose behind the transfer of assets to Deanne.” The district court
noted that, prior to trial, Deanne had “depleted all of the $121,000 in cash assets,” meaning
the St. Paul Condo and Shirley’s vehicle were the only remaining assets of significant
value. With regard to the vehicle, the di strict court found that Deanne “wrongfully
transferred title to the vehicle to herself” after her mother’s death.

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The district court determined that “D eanne failed to provide a reasonable
explanation for her failure to distribute, or take any steps to distribute, the assets pursuant
to the understanding and intent expressed at the time the estate pla nning was done,” and
that “the only reasonable conclusion that ca n be drawn from Deanne’s refusal and failure
to notify her siblings of the estate planning and transfer of assets is that she did so with the
purpose of concealing Shirley’s intent from her other children.” The district court
determined that “Deanne’s refusal to distribute” the assets was contrary to Shirley’s will.
The district court further found that “Shirl ey did not have the capacity to understand,
and did not understand, that Deanne would be able to disinherit Shirley’s other three
children.” And, the district court found
by clear and convincing evidence that Deanne exercised undue
influence over her mother Shirley by having the cash assets of
$121,000 and the St. Paul Condo transferred to her, by
providing Shirley the understand ing and false assurance that
she would follow her mother’s wishes and distribute those
assets as her mother desired, when in fact she never intended
to do so, and by failing to do so following her mother’s death.
Based on its finding that the transfer of the St. Paul Condo from Shirley to Deanne
was the result of undue influence exerted by De anne on Shirley, the district court voided
the deed conveying the St. Paul Condo to Dean ne. The district court declared the deed
void in the interests of “[j]ustice and equity . . . to remedy the undue influence and unjust
enrichment of Deanne.” The district court also declared Deanne unsuitable to serve as
personal representative and appointed Richard as the new personal representative. The
district court directed Richard to sell the St. Paul Condo and distribute the proceeds equally
between himself, Mary, and John. The district court excluded Deanne from any

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distribution of the remaining estate assets. Th e district court reasoned: “By virtue of the
monthly payments received by Deanne, the use and transfer of title to the motor vehicle,
and use and consumption of the $121,000, Deanne has rece ived all of her inheritance,
including any additional amount she should have received for her service and care for
Shirley.” Deanne now challenges the district court’s order directing Richard to sell the
St. Paul Condo and distribute the proceeds of that sale to her siblings.
DECISION
On appeal, Deanne does not contest the di strict court’s conclusion that she exercised
undue influence over her mother. Nor does she challenge the di strict court’s authority to
void the deed and order the sale of the St. Paul Condo to redress the undue influence.
Instead, she disputes the district court’s decision to exclude her from receiving any of the
proceeds of the sale of the St. Paul Condo.
Deanne argues that the district court committed reversible error by: (1) disregarding
the terms of the will, (2) applying the law of advancements to the will, and (3) terminating
her right to her share of her mother’s homestead in violation of the homestead exemption.
We address each argument in turn.
I. The district court ordered distribution of Shirley’s estate in accordance with
her will.
Deanne argues that the district court violated its duty to order the personal
representative to distribute Shirley’s es tate in accordance with her will. See Minn.
Stat. § 524.3-703(a) (2020) (providing that the personal representative shall distribute the
estate in accordance with the will). She contends that “it is undisputed that the terms of

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the decedent’s Will require the personal representative to distribute the assets of the estate
in four equal parts,” including one-fourth to her. She maintain s that the district court did
not have the equitable authority to order that the proceeds of the sale of the St. Paul Condo
be distributed to her siblings and not to her because the district court’s order is contrary to
the terms of Shirley’s will.
We are not persuaded. We conclude that the district court’s order was a proper
exercise of its equitable authority, necessary to overcome the result of the undue influence
that Deanne exerted upon Shirley. We also conclude that the district court’s order furthered
Shirley’s intent as expressed by the will.
District courts have “original jurisd iction . . . in law and equity for the
administration of estates of deceased persons. ” Minn. Stat. § 484.01 , subd. 1(4) (2020);
see also Minn. Const. art. VI, § 11. Minnesot a has adopted the Uniform Probate Code,
which further provides that, unless displaced, “the principles of law and equity supplement
its provisions.” Minn. Stat. § 524.1-103 (20 20). Chapter 524 of the Minnesota Statutes
states that the provisions of that chapter “shall be libera lly construed and applied to
promote the underlying purposes and policies,” which include “discover[ing] and mak[ing]
effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of property.” Minn. Stat. § 524.1-102(a),
(b)(2) (2020). And when hearing probate matters, a district court has “full power to make
orders, judgments and decrees and take all other action necessary and proper to administer
justice in the matters which come before it.” Minn. Stat. § 524.1-302(b) (2020).
A district court sitting in equity “may fashion equitable remedies based on the
exigencies and facts of each case so as to accomplish justice.” Gabler v. Fedoruk ,

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756 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Minn. App. 2008) (quotation omitted). In such a case, the district
court has “broad discretion wh en fashioning remedies.” Id. We “review equitable
determinations for abuse” of that discretion. City of N. Oaks v. Sarpal, 797 N.W.2d 18, 23
(Minn. 2011). “A district court abuses its discretion if its ruling is against the facts in the
record or if its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law.” State ex rel. Swan Lake
Area Wildlife Ass’n v. Ni collet Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs , 799 N.W.2d 619, 625 (Minn. App.
2011) (quotation omitted).
The record supports the district court’s de termination that its equitable authority was
required to remedy the undue influence and unj ust enrichment of Deanne. The district
court made the following findings that are rele vant to our consider ation of whether the
district court acted within its “broad discretion” in fashioning the remedy challenged here.
First, the district court found that Shirley’s will reflected an intent for her estate to be split
equally among her four children. Second, the district court found that in November 2016—
before the transfers that stemmed from undu e influence—Shirley had cash assets of
$121,000, a vehicle, and the St. Paul Condo. Third, the district court found that Shirley
transferred her $121,000 in cash assets and the St. Paul Condo to Deanne “for the purpose
of preserving the assets and preventing the dissipation of [the] assets.” Fourth, the district
court found that Deanne knew Shirley’s purpose in transferring the assets to her. Fifth, the
district court found that Shir ley wanted Deanne to receive more than her siblings as
compensation for her services, but desired the remaining assets to be divided equally after
factoring in additional compensation for Deanne.

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The district court found that Deanne di d not follow Shirley’s wishes. Instead,
Deanne spent all of the money in the cash account, transferred title to the vehicle to herself,
and lived in the St. Paul Condo with no apparent plans to sell it and distribute the proceeds.
Given the district court’s findings regarding the value of Shirley’s estate just before Deanne
exercised undue influence upon her, the distri ct court properly determined that Deanne
received more than her share.3 And because Deanne does not challenge the district court’s
findings of fact on appeal, we accept those findings as true. See Beliveau v. Beliveau, 14
N.W.2d 360, 365 (Minn. 1944) (“We are bou nd to accept as verities the findings of
fact . . . because appellant does not cha llenge the findings.”). Consequently, the
distribution ordered by the district court carries out Shirley’s intent to the extent possible,
given that Deanne had already received more than her share.
Deanne relies on two cases to support her contention that the district court
disregarded Shirley’s will. First, she cites Laymon v. Minn. Premier Props., LLC, for the
proposition that “[a] personal representative is under a duty to see that the assets
constituting the testator’s estate are not diverted from the course prescribed by the testator.”
903 N.W.2d 6, 14 (M inn. App. 2017) (quotation omitted), aff’d, 913 N.W.2d 449 (Minn.
2018). But Deanne does not contest the district court’s finding that she diverted Shirley’s
estate assets from the course that Shirley prescribed. Read in context of the district court’s

3 Based on the district court’s findings as to the value of Shirley’s estate before the
transfers, a one-fourth share of that estate would be approximate ly $103,825. After
factoring in the care payments, cash assets , and conversion of Shirley’s car, Deanne
received between $163,000 and $167,000 of estate assets. Accordingly, the district court
properly concluded that Deanne received her share and the additional amount that Shirley
wanted her to receive.

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equitable remedy here, Laymon cuts against Deanne’s argument because the district court’s
order returns the remaining estate assets to the course prescribed by Shirley.
Second, Deanne cites In re Cosgrave’s Will for the proposition that a court “cannot
change the rights of the beneficiaries inter se by enlarging the rights of some at the expense
of others.” 31 N.W.2d 20, 33 (Minn. 1948). Cosgrave also does not support Deanne’s
argument. In Cosgrave, the supreme court considered th e propriety of trustees of a
testamentary trust making ad ditional payments to the te stator’s widow beyond the
payments contemplated by the trust. Id. at 23-24. The supreme court held that the trustees
had contravened the intentions of the test ator by making the additional payments. Id. at
26. Here, Deanne is in a similar position to the trustees in Cosgrave—and not the aggrieved
beneficiaries—because she contravened Shirle y’s intentions by fai ling to distribute the
estate assets as she promised. The district court’s order does not “enlarge” the rights of the
other beneficiaries to the will at Deanne’s expense because the order corrects Deanne’s
wrongful diversion of estate assets to herself. Deanne sought to enlarge her own rights at
the expense of her siblings’ rights, and the district court’s order remedies that inequity.
With Laymon and Cosgrave read in context, we have no trouble concluding that the
district court properly exercised its equitable authority to redress Deanne’s undue influence
and order the remainder of the estate distributed in accordance with Shirley’s will.
II. The district court did not rely on th e law of advancements in its decision.
Deanne next argues that “the district c ourt made it clear from its reasoning that it
was applying the law of advanc ements” when it concluded that she “should be excluded
from her share of the estate.” She argues that the district court committed reversible error

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because the law of advancements applies only where the decedent dies intestate, meaning
without a will. We are not persuaded that the district court used the law of advancements
when it concluded that Deanne had already received her share of Shirley’s estate.
The law of advancements a pplies where an individual who dies without a will has
made gifts during their lifetime of property that would otherwise be pa rt of their estate.
Minn. Stat. § 524.2-109(a) (2020) . In such a case, the gifts that the beneficiary received
may be treated as an advancement of their in testate share, provided that the decedent or
heir acknowledged in writing their intent to treat the gift as an advancement. Id.
Deanne is correct that the law of advancements applies only to intestate succession.
Id. But Deanne provides no support for her ar gument that the district court relied on the
law of advancements when it determined that she had already received her share of
Shirley’s estate. Moreover, the district court’s order itself refutes Deanne’s argument. The
district court never referred to the law of advan cements in its order. Instead, the district
court concluded that “[j]ustice and equity require, in order to remedy the undue influence
and unjust enrichment of Deanne,” that the deed conveying the St. Paul Condo to Deanne
be declared void. Read in context, it is plain that the district court used its equitable power,
rather than the law of advan cements, when it declared the de ed void and when it further
ordered that the proceeds of the sale of the St. Paul Condo be distributed to Deanne’s
siblings.4 Accordingly, Deanne’s second argument is unavailing.

4 Richard and Mary argue that Deanne’s exercise of undue influence over Shirley and the
resultant transfers indebted Deanne to the estate, and that the district court offset that debt
against her share under Minn. Stat. § 524.3-903 (2020). There are two problems with this
argument. First, the district court never refe rred to Minn. Stat. § 524.3-903 in its order.

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III. The homestead exempt ion does not apply.
Deanne’s third argument is based on th e homestead exemptio n set forth in the
Uniform Probate Code. See Minn. Stat. § 524.2-402(c) (2020). Relying on the homestead
exemption, she argues that the district court la cked authority to term inate her interest in
Shirley’s homestead because the decedent’s “homestead is not a part of the estate for the
purposes of administration.” Deanne further argues that she has an “absolute right” in the
homestead that “in no manner yiel ds to principles of equity.” She then argues that the
effect of the district court’s order voiding the deed is that “the decedent’s homestead must
now be distributed as part of the residue of the estate,” and that she is entitled to one-quarter
of the proceeds.
The homestead exemption of the probate code provides that “[i]f the homestead
passes by descent or will to the spouse or decedent’s descendants . . . it is exempt from all
debts which were not valid charges on it at the time of decedent’s death.” Id. Deanne does
not explain why this section of the Uniform Probate Code entitles her to claim a one-fourth
share of the homestead despite th e district court finding that she already received her full
share of the estate. Moreover, the homestead exemption does not bar a district court from
ordering the sale of a homestead as pa rt of the distribution of an estate. See In re
Anderson’s Estate, 279 N.W. 266, 268 (M inn. 1938) (indicating that a homestead may

Second, the district court did not explicitly find that Deanne was indebted to the estate. For
her part, Deanne argues that she cannot be indebted to th e estate due to the cash account
because that account would have automatically gone to her upon Shirley’s death. But
because Deanne does not challenge the district court’s factual finding that the cash account
was an estate asset, we do not reach this argument.

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be sold if doing so is in the best interests of the beneficiaries); Overvold v. Nelson ,
243 N.W. 439, 440-41 (Minn. 1932) (upholding the sale of a homestead , but concluding
that the proceeds belonged to the testator’s beneficiaries instead of her creditors). And the
cases that Deanne relies upon to support her argument do not persuade us that Deanne has
an absolute right to a share of the homestead.
First, Deanne cites In re Estate of Van Den Boom , 590 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Minn.
App. 1999), review denied (Minn. May 26, 1999). In Van Den Boom , the district court
ordered the sale of the homestead to pay estate expenses over the objection of beneficiaries
who held a remainder interest in the homestead. 590 N.W.2d at 352. We reversed the
district court’s order because the estate expenses were not valid charges on the homestead,
as those debts were not owed at the time of the decedent’s death. Id. at 353-54. Here, the
St. Paul Condo will be sold to distribute the es tate, not to pay estate expenses. The only
question is how the proceeds of th e sale are to be divided, and Van Den Boom has no
bearing upon that question.
Second, Deanne cites a nonprecedential ca se involving an appeal from a district
court’s order directing the personal representative of an estate to sell the homestead to pay
estate expenses. In re Estate of O’Neil, No. A06-1224, 2007 WL 1191781, at *1-2 (Minn.
App. Apr. 24, 2007). That case is likewise inapposite because it concerns the propriety of
selling the homestead to pay administrative expenses, which is not at issue here.
Third, Deanne relies on Tomlinson v. Kandiyohi Cty. Bank , 202 N.W. 494, 495
(Minn. 1925). In Tomlinson, the issue involved the homestead right of a surviving spouse.
202 N.W. at 494-95. The supr eme court concluded that “if the wife has been wrongfully

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induced by fraud or deception to sign a re lease or conveyance of their homestead
rights . . . she is entitled, in a court of equity, to have such a conveyance set aside.” Id. at
495. On that basis, the supreme court upheld the district court’s order voiding a mortgage
on the homestead. Id. at 496. Because the Tomlinson court addressed the question of
homestead rights in the context of a fraudulent conveyance, and Deanne was not the victim
of a fraudulent conveyance, Tomlinson does not support Deanne’s argument that the district
court lacked equitable authority to conclude that she is not entitled to proceeds from the
sale of the St. Paul Condo.
Moreover, the district court here did no t “terminate” Deanne’s interest in the
homestead as she claims. While the district court did order that Deanne was “divested of
any and all ownership rights in the St. Paul Condo,” that language must be read in context
of the district court’s decision to void the de ed conveying the St. Paul Condo to Deanne.
Had Deanne received fewer assets from Shirle y, she would be entitled to share in the
proceeds of the St. Paul Condo. But, because of the assets that she already received, the
district court properly concluded that Deanne had no right to any further estate assets.
Having one’s share in an estate satisfied is different from having an interest in a homestead
terminated.
In sum, Deanne has failed to demonstrate a basis for reversal of the district court’s
order. The district court acted well within its discretion when it exercised its equitable
authority to order that the remainder of Shirley’s estate be distributed to Deanne’s siblings.
Affirmed.