Lineth Arrocha, et al., Appellants,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0876

Lineth Arrocha, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

Como Park Zoo And Conservatory, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed March 29, 2021
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-19-1214

Aaron W. Ferguson, Aaron W. Ferguson, P.L.L.C., Roseville, Minnesota (for appellants)

Lyndsey M. Olson, St. Paul City Attorney, Anissa M. Mediger, Assi stant City Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presid ing Judge; Connolly , Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellants Lineth Arrocha and her moth er Edith Mariela Ruiz challenge the
summary-judgment dismissal of their negligen ce claims against respondents Como Park
Zoo and Conservatory and the City of Saint Paul. Appellants’ negligence claims arise from

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personal injuries that they su ffered when they tripped and fell on a raised sidewalk joint
while visiting the zoo.
Appellants first argue that the district court erred by determining as a matter of law
that the zoo (and, by extensio n, the city) qualifies for recrea tional-use immunity and that
the trespasser exception to recreational-use immunity does not apply. They also argue that
alleged code violations under the Amer icans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Minnesota Accessibility Code (MAC) forecl ose the application of recreational-use
immunity. Finally, appellants argue that applying recreational-use immunity here violates
their constitutional right to equal protection. We affirm.
FACTS
On appeal from summary judgment, a revi ewing court must construe the evidence
in the light most favorable to the part y against whom judgment was granted. Fabio v.
Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993) (cita tion omitted). Applying that principle,
we consider the facts as follows.
In March 2016, appellants visited the zo o with their family . While they were
walking together, Ruiz tripped and fell on a raised sidewalk joint. The raised sidewalk joint
created a lip between an inch and a half and two inches high. As Ruiz fell, she tried to hold
onto Arrocha, which led to Arrocha’s fall. The falls took place near the Gorilla Forest area
of the zoo in a plaza where ther e are often picnic tables and umbrellas for guests to relax
and eat. The zoo constructed the plaza as part of its 2013 renovations and has not done any
work to the plaza since its construction. There were no signs calling attention to the raised
sidewalk joint, and a shadow partially concealed the lip.

3
As a result of their falls, appellants sust ained physical injuries. Arrocha suffered
injuries to her hips and lower back. The inju ry to her lower back required surgery. Ruiz
suffered injuries to her head, neck, and lower back, and to her right shoulder, leg, and ankle.
Appellants contend that respondents’ negligence by failing to remedy the raised sidewalk
joint led to their personal injuries.
The zoo, which is part of the larger Co mo Park, is owned by the city and operated
by the city’s department of parks and recreation. The city bought the land for Como Park
in 1873 and has continuously used the land as a public park since that time.
As a public space, the zoo is subject to various code requirements, derived, in part,
from the MAC and federal regulations promulgated under the ADA. The park maintenance
supervisor testified at his deposition that the zoo conducts almost daily inspections of the
zoo grounds and that similar, easily remedied, defects had been found on other walkways.
In addition, maintenance employees at the zoo conduct semiannual reviews to identify and
address major defects. Several park officials testified during their depositions that the zoo
has no discretion as to whether to fix code violations; if there is a violation, the zoo must
remedy it.
Appellants sued the zoo and the city for negligence. Both respondents moved for
summary judgment.
The district court determined that there wa s no genuine issue of material fact as to
the application of recreational-use immunity and that respondents are immune as a matter
of law, precluding respondents’ liability fo r appellants’ injuries. As part of that

4
determination, the district court concluded that the trespasser exception to recreational-use
immunity did not apply.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
We review de novo a district court’s summary judgment decision. See Riverview
Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Co., LLC , 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010) (citation
omitted). “In doing so, we determ ine whether the district court properly applied the law
and whether there are genuine i ssues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.”
Id. Summary judgment is appropriate “whe n the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue of material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. Because this case presents issues of the application of a
statute to the facts of the case, it presents questions of law, which are also reviewed de
novo. See STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Minn. 2002).
On appeal, we view the eviden ce in the light most favorable to the party against whom
judgment was granted. See Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 761. The moving party has the burden to
show that summary judgment is appropriate. Valspar Refinish, Inc. v. Gaylord’s, Inc., 764
N.W.2d 359, 364 (Minn. 2009).
Appellants make four arguments in support of their assertion that the district court
erred by granting summary judgment against them. First, they contend that the district court
erred by applying recreational-use immunity because the zoo does not qualify for it.
Second, they argue that, even if recreational-use immunity could apply to the zoo, it does

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not apply in this case because of the trespasser exception to immunity. Third, they assert
that various code violations nullify any claim of immunity. Finally, they argue that the
application of recreational-use immunity violates their equal-protection rights. Appellants
seek a ruling either that recreational-use immunity does not apply as a matter of law or that
there are genuine issues of material fact ba rring summary judgment. We address each of
appellants’ arguments in turn.
I. Recreational-use immunity generally applies to the zoo.
Municipalities are generally liable for their torts. Minn. Stat. § 466.02 (2020). One
exception to this general rule is when the claim is barred by “recreational-use immunity.”
See Ariola v. City of Stillwater , 889 N.W.2d 340, 353-54 (Mi nn. App. 2017). The statute
codifying recreational-use immunity provides that it applies to “[a]ny claim based upon the
construction, operation, or maintenance of any property owned or leased by the
municipality that is intended or permitted to be used as a park, as an open area for
recreational purposes, or for the provision of recreational services.” Minn. Stat. § 466.03,
subd. 6e (2020).
Appellants argue that the zoo does not qualify for immunity under this statute. To
evaluate the argument, we must interpret the statute. The object of statutory interpretation
is to “ascertain and effectuate th e intention of the legislature.” See Minn. Stat. § 645.16
(2020). We apply the plain meaning of a statut ory provision if the legislative intent “is
clear from the unam biguous language of the statute.” See Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud ,
853 N.W.2d 713, 716-17 (Minn. 2014). In determining whether a statute is unambiguous,
we construe nontechnical words and phrase s “according to their plain and ordinary

6
meanings.” See Larson v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 855 N.W.2d 293, 301 (Minn. 2014); see
also Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2020).
Appellants argue that the statute does not apply because the zoo is not a “park.”
Since “park” is not a term defined by statute, appellants rely on a di ctionary definition of
“park” as “a piece of ground in or near a city or town kept for ornament and recreation” or
“an area maintained in its natural state as a public property.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/park (last visited Mar. 19, 2021).
Appellants contend that the zoo is not a “park” because it is neither used for “recreation”
nor maintained in a “natural state.”
We conclude that, under the plain meani ng of section 466.03, subdivision 6e, the
statute unambiguously applies to the zoo. Under the statute, immunity applies to
“property . . . intended or permitted to be used as a park.” Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6e.
Even using the dictionary definition of “park” suggested by appellants, the zoo fits neatly
within the meaning of the statute. The zoo lies within Co mo Park. The record shows that
the city built Como Park on land bought by the city in 1 873 and that the city has
continuously used that land as a park si nce then. The zoo is operated by the city’s
department of parks and recreation, and it is free and open to the public. As part of Como
Park, the zoo has been intended and permitted to be used by the public.
And the public, we conclu de, uses the zoo for “recreation.” Section 466.03,
subdivision 6e, applies recreational-use immuni ty to property used “as an open area for
recreational purposes.” Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6e. “Recreation” is not defined by
statute, but it carries a dictionary definition of the “refreshment of strength and spirits after

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work.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary , https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
recreation (last visited Mar. 19, 2021). People go to the zoo to relax, observe animals, and
enjoy time outdoors. These activities aid in the “refreshment of strength and spirits.” Thus,
the zoo meets the dictionary definition of “recreation.”
But appellants contend that “recreation” has a much narrower meaning; they equate
the term “recreation” in section 466.03, subdivision 6e, with the term “outdoor recreation”
as that term is used and defined in a different Minnesota statute—specifically, Minn. Stat.
§ 86A.03, subd. 3 (2020 ). That statute is part of Minne sota Statutes chapter 86A, the
“Outdoor Recreation Act of 1975,” Minn. St at. § 86A.01 (2020), which establishes a
system of state parks, recreation areas, trails, and other state areas and facilities, Minn. Stat.
§ 86A.04 (2020). The Outdoor Recreation Act defines “outdoor recreation” as
any voluntary activity, including hunting, fishing, trapping,
boating, hiking, camping, and engaging in winter sports, which
is conducted primarily for the pu rposes of pleasure, rest, or
relaxation and is dependent upon or derives its principal
benefit from natural surroundings ; “outdoor recreation” shall
also mean any demonstration, st ructure, exhibit, or activity
which is primarily intended to preserve, demonstrate, or
explain a significant aspect of the natural and cultural history,
and archaeology of Minnesota[.]

Minn. Stat. § 86A.03, subd. 3 (emphasis added ). For recreational-use immunity to apply,
appellants argue, the recreation must derive from “natural surroundings.” Because the zoo
is an artificial environment, they contend, recreational-use immunity cannot apply.
This argument fails for two reasons. Fi rst, appellants’ definition of “outdoor
recreation” only applies to the state’s “outd oor recreation system.” Minn. Stat. § 86A.03,
subd. 1 (2020). The state outdoor recreation system does not include municipal parks. See

8
Minn. Stat. § 84A.04 (defining what stat e-owned properties cons titute the “outdoor
recreation system”). Thus, this statutory definition is inapplicable.
Second, we have repeatedly applied muni cipal recreational-use immunity to claims
arising from artificial or manufactured environments. See, e.g., Prokop v. Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. 625, 754 N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. App. 2008) (concluding that public school district
qualified for recreational-use immunity for injury occurring in a batting cage); Unzen v.
City of Duluth , 683 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Minn. App. 2004) (conc luding that municipality
generally qualifies for recreati onal-use immunity for injury occurring inside a clubhouse
on a municipal golf course but that the tr espasser exception to immunity applied);
Lundstrom v. City of Apple Valley , 587 N.W.2d 517, 519 (Minn. App. 1998) (concluding
that municipality qualified for recreational-use immunity for injury occurring on an indoor
tennis court).
Our decision in Unzen is most apposite here. In Unzen, we concluded that
recreational-use immunity could apply to a claim by an individual who tripped and fell
down a stairway in a clubhouse on a municipa l golf course. 683 N.W.2d at 879. In doing
so, we rejected the argument that recreation al-use immunity extends to only users of
property while they are engaged in recreational activities or within a building designed to
house recreational activities. Id. Instead, we explained that recreational-use immunity “is
not based on what the injured person was doing, but on the intended recreational function
of the property.” Id. Because the clubhouse was “part of the same propert y as the golf
course, provides services rela ted to the course, and fac ilitates use of the course,”
recreational-use immunity (absent an excep tion) would apply to any tort within the

9
clubhouse. Id. The same reasoning applies here. Ap pellants tripped and fell in a plaza
where patrons of the zoo could relax and eat. Because the plaza is part of the same property
as the rest of the zoo, provid es services related to the zoo, and facilitates recreation at the
zoo, recreational-use immunity applies.
Applying recreational-use immunity to th e claim here also accords with other
caselaw concluding that recreational-i mmunity applied as a matter of law. See, e.g. ,
Johnson v. Washington County , 518 N.W.2d 594, 598-99 (Minn. 1994) (applying
recreational-use immunity to artificia l swimming pond in a county park); Habeck v.
Ouverson, 669 N.W.2d 907, 908 (Minn. App. 2003) (applying immunity for torts at county
fairgrounds when a tractor-t railer transporting fairgoers fatally injured a visitor), review
denied (Minn. Dec. 23, 2003); Stiele ex rel. Gladieux v. City of Crystal, 646 N.W.2d 251,
254 (Minn. App. 2002) (applying the standard to city parks generally); Lloyd v. City of St.
Paul, 538 N.W.2d 921, 924 (Minn. App. 1995) (applying recreational-use immunity to an
accident caused by paddle boats used in a city park), review denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 1995).
We therefore reject appellants’ argument that the zoo does not qualify for recreational-use
immunity.
II. Appellants, as a matter of law, cannot establish the trespasser exception.

Appellants argue that, even if the zoo generally qualifies for recreational-use
immunity, the district court erred by concl uding as a matter of law that the trespasser
exception to immunity does not apply.
Recreational-use immunity is not absolute. Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6e, provides
that the immunity does not preclude “the liability of a municipality for conduct that would

10
entitle a trespasser to damages against a pr ivate person.” If recreational-use immunity
applies to the zoo, but appellants have presented sufficient ev idence to meet the
requirements of the trespasser exception, summary judgment is inappropriate.
To interpret the statutory trespasser ex ception to recreational-use immunity, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted the Re statement (Second) of Torts § 335 (1965).
Johnson, 518 N.W.2d at 599. Under section 335, a landowner is liable for any bodily harm
that a trespasser suffers due to the landowner’s failure to exercise reasonable care to warn
of an artificial condition if (1) the condition is one that the landowner created or maintains,
(2) the condition is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, (3) the landowner knows
of this danger, and (4) the da nger is concealed or hidden. Id. The burden is on appellants
to establish all four elements to defeat an immunity claim. See Krieger v. City of St. Paul,
762 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Minn. App. 2009). If appellants fail to subm it sufficient evidence
to meet any one of the elements of the trespasser exception, recreational-use immunity bars
their claim. See id. at 277.
The first element—that the condition is one the landowner created or maintains—is
not at issue. Neither party contests that th e raised sidewalk joint was not created or
maintained by the zoo and the city. We therefore turn to the remaining three elements.
A. The raised sidewalk joint was unlikely to cause death or serious bodily
harm.

In assessing whether an artificial condition is likely to cause death or serious bodily
harm, we do not rely on the actual injuries suffered in the case. Johnson v. State , 478
N.W.2d 769, 773 (Minn. App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 1992). Instead, we

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consider whether the cond ition was “likely to cause serious bodily harm.” Id. I t i s n o t
enough “that serious bodily harm might actually result.” Id. (quotation omitted). If serious
injury is only a remote possi bility, then the condition does not “rise to the level of an
inherently dangerous condition.” Id.
The raised sidewalk joint at the zoo wa s not a condition likely to cause death or
serious bodily harm. The lip was around one and a half to two inches. While appellants
suffered major injuries, includi ng some that required surger y, one could not reasonably
have anticipated that such serious injuries were likely to result from tripping over the raised
sidewalk joint. Thus, the raised sidewalk joint was not a condition likely to cause death or
serious bodily harm.
This conclusion is supported by our decision in Johnson. There, a woman severely
injured her wrist when she tripped over a rais ed sidewalk joint at a travel information
center. Id. at 770-71. We concluded that the raised sidewalk joint was not a condition likely
to cause death or serious bodily harm. Id. at 773. The sidewalk joint in Johnson was around
an inch to an inch and a half tall. Id. at 770-71. We reasoned that, while the woman did
suffer a severe injury, it was not a likely injury and therefore the raised sidewalk joint was
not an inherently dangerous condition. Id. at 773. Here, as in Johnson, there is no genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the raised sidewalk joint was a condition likely to cause
death or serious bodily harm.
Appellants rely on Unzen to argue that we should look to the prevalence of serious
injury or death caused by th e artificial condition rather th an to whether the artificial
condition itself has da ngerous propensities. Unzen, 683 N.W.2d at 880-81. In Unzen, we

12
concluded that 40-year-old metal nosing at th e top of a staircase in a golf clubhouse was
likely to cause death or great bodily harm, t hus establishing the tr espasser exception to
recreational-use immunity. Id.
But Unzen differs from this case in three ways. First, Unzen noted that Minnesota’s
caselaw “is replete with instances where failing down a flight of stairs has caused death or
serious bodily harm.” Id. at 881 (citing cases). In contrast, here, appellants have not made
a showing, other than citing to one district court opinion, that tripping over a raised
sidewalk joint typically causes death or serious bodily harm. Second, in Unzen, around a
dozen people had tripped and fallen down the same stairway that caused the injury in that
case. Id. at 880-81. Here, appellants have not pres ented any evidence that the particular
sidewalk joint on the zoo’s plaza caused mu ltiple individuals to fall and suffer serious
injuries. Third, stairs are inherently more dangerous than a paved plaza. Falling down stairs
exposes a person to a greater range of injuri es than falling onto a fl at, paved surface. In
fact, in Unzen, we specifically contrasted the risk of falling down stairs with the risk of
tripping over a raised sidewalk. See id. at 881 (explaining that, in Johnson, we held that a
raised sidewalk joint was not a condition likely to cause death or serious bodily harm).
Based on the record here, there is no genuine dispute of fact that the raised sidewalk
joint was not a condition likely to cause death or serious bodily harm.
Although appellants’ trespasser-excepti on argument fails because they cannot
establish this first element, for completeness we evaluate the remaining two elements.

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B. The zoo did not have actual knowledge of the raised sidewalk joint.
For the landowner to “know” of the danger, they must have actual knowledge of the
serious danger posed by the dangerous condition. Ariola, 889 N.W.2d at 355. 1 The parks
maintenance supervisor testified that zoo employees inspect the property almost every day
and that similar issues with sidewalk jo ints are common. The zoo also conducts a
semiannual review of the property to identi fy major defects. Based on the record, no
inspection revealed the specific raised sidewalk joint that caused appellants’ injury and zoo
workers did not recall any complaints over this specific sidewalk joint before appellants’
accident.
Thus, appellants failed to establish that there was a genuine issue of material fact of
the zoo’s actual knowledge of the raised joint.
C. The raised sidewalk joint was not concealed or hidden.
Finally, appellants must show that they can establish that the raised sidewalk joint
was concealed or hidden. Id. at 354. In determining whether a condition is hidden, we look
to “the visibility of the condition, not . . . whether the injured party actually saw the
danger.” Lishinski v. City of Duluth, 634 N.W.2d 456, 459 (Minn. App. 2001). If one can

1 Appellants assert that it is still undecided by the Minnesota Supreme Court whether actual
knowledge is required. While this may be true , this court has repeat edly held that the
landowner must have actual knowledge of the dangerous condition for the trespasser
exception to apply. See Ariola, 889 N.W.2d at 355 (citing Krieger, 762 N.W.2d at 278;
Prokop, 754 N.W.2d at 715; Lundstrom, 587 N.W.2d at 520; Cobb v. State, Dep’t of Nat.
Res., 441 N.W.2d 839, 841-42 (Minn. App. 1989); Lawler v. Soo Line R.R. , 424 N.W.2d
313, 317 (Minn. App. 1988), review denied (Minn. Aug 24, 1988); Henry v. State , 406
N.W.2d 608, 612 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Aug. 12, 1987)).

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see the danger with a “bri ef inspection,” then th e danger is not hidden. Id. (quoting
Johnson, 478 N.W.2d at 773).
Appellants argue that, because of a shadow, it was hard to see the raised sidewalk
joint. They also argue that, because the visitors at the zoo are looking at the exhibits, they
are not looking for tripping hazards and therefore the raised sidewalk joint was hidden. But
this interpretation of the concealed or hidden requirement conflicts with our decision in
Johnson. There, we concluded that a raised side walk joint at a trav el information center
was not a concealed danger. Johnson, 478 N.W.2d at 773. We reasoned that the raised
sidewalk joint was not hidden, even though there was no posted warning cautioning visitors
of the raised sidewalk joint, because a brie f inspection would have revealed the raised
sidewalk joint. Id.
Here, too, there were no warnings about th e raised sidewalk jo int. But, although
some evidence shows that the raised sidewalk joint might have been slightly concealed by
shadows, on this record, as in Johnson, a brief inspection still wo uld have revealed the
hazard. While appellants state that they did no t see the raised sidewa lk joint before they
fell, the “test is not whether the injured party saw the dange r, but whether it was in fact
visible.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the raised sidewalk joint was visible.
The undisputed evidence establishes that appellants cannot satisfy three elements of
the trespasser exception to recreational-use immunity.2

2 Appellants spend a significant amount of time in their brief requesting that we reevaluate
court of appeals caselaw interpreting the trespasser exception to recreational-use immunity.
We decline to do so. As the supreme court ha s explained, “following precedent promotes
stability, order, and predic tability in the law.” Fleeger v. Wyeth , 771 N.W.2d 524, 529

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III. The zoo’s alleged code violations do not overcome recreational-use immunity.

Appellants next argue that the raised sidewalk joint violated various code
requirements under the MAC and ADA and that those violations overcome recreational-
use immunity. Specifically, they assert that the codes gave the zoo no discretion to permit
a raised sidewalk and that the zoo is th erefore not entitled to immunity because a
municipality is liable for torts resulting from non-discretionary acts under Minn. Stat.
§ 466.02.3
Appellants’ argument appears to conf late recreational-use immunity and
discretionary immunity. Sectio n 466.03, su bdivision 1, states that a municipality is not
liable for “any claim enumerated in this sec tion.” Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 1 (2020).
Section 466.03 goes on to sepa rately list claims protected by discretionary immunity and
claims protected by recreational-use immunity. See Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subds. 6, 6e. The
statute thus makes clear that recreational-us e immunity and discretionary immunity are
independent exceptions to municipal tort liability. Because respondents meet the
requirements of recreational-use immunity, there is no statutory requirement that they meet
the requirements of discretionary immunity to be protected from tort liability. Appellants

(Minn. 2009) (citation omitted). Appellants have not shown a reason to depart from our
precedent.

3 A municipality is immune from tort liability for its discretionary acts. Minn. Stat.
§ 466.03, subd. 6 (2020). To determine what classifies as “discretionary” courts distinguish
between “planning” and “operationa l” functions of government. Schroeder v. St. Louis
County, 708 N.W.2d 497, 504 (Minn. 2006) (cita tion omitted). If the act occurred as part
of a planning-level function, discretionary immunity applies. Id. If the act occurred as part
of an operational-level function, discretionary immunity does not apply. Id.

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cannot use respondents’ alleged nondiscretionary acts under the ADA and MAC to nullify
recreational-use immunity.
IV. Recreational-use immunity does not violate appellants’ right to equal
protection.

Finally, appellants challenge application of recreational-use immunity as a violation
of equal protection.
Under equal-protection analysis, when a statute does not involve a suspect class, as
is the case here, we apply the rational-basis standard. See Gluba ex rel. Gluba v. Bitzan &
Ohren Masonry, 735 N.W.2d 713, 719 (M inn. 2007). Under that standard, we consider
whether: (1) the distinctions separating the individuals in the class from others are genuine
and substantial; (2) a clear connection exists be tween the distinctive needs peculiar to the
class and the prescribed remedy; and (3) the statute furthers a legitimate state purpose. See
Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273, 280 (Minn. 1981) (quotation omitted).
Under the statutes governing municipal liability, persons who are injured while
using city property intended to be used as a park or for recreation are treated differently
from those who are injured while using other city property. Persons injured while using
recreational city property face the barrier of recreational-use immunity, while the others do
not.
Respondents argue that this classification is necessary for municipalities to provide
low-cost recreational services to citizens by insulating municipalities from the potentially
large tort liability caused by operating recreational areas. Thus, respondents argue, the
legislature had a rational basis for passing the statute codifying recreational-use immunity.

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This rationale underpins our analysis in Lloyd. There, we upheld recreational-use
immunity in the face of an equal-protection challenge because “it is rational to relieve the
state of potentially huge tort liability for da mages to property caused by the operation of
outdoor recreational areas.” Lloyd, 538 N.W.2d at 925 (quotation omitted).
Appellants argue that relying on Lloyd would overextend the policy supporting
recreational-use immunity. They argue that a z oo is not a park and, because the sidewalk
is unnatural and the zoo bans forms of recreation like running or playing football or soccer,
the classification between individuals is not a genuine and substantial distinction. But the
paddle boat at issue in Lloyd was not a “natural” condition, and we concluded that the
statute was constitutional in that context. Id. And we have repeatedly extended
recreational-use immunity to artificial properties and hazards. See, e.g. , Unzen, 683
N.W.2d at 879. Thus, conclu ding that recreational-use i mmunity constitutionally applies
to the zoo is in line with our precedent.
Appellants urge us to reconsider our holding in Lloyd, arguing that the current state
of recreational-use immunity is too broad. But they provide little support for this argument,
and, considering the deference given to previous decisions, we rely on Lloyd to find the
recreational-use immunity statute constitutional. See Fleeger, 771 N.W.2d at 529.
Based on the uncontested facts, and taking all inferences in appellants’ favor, we
conclude that recreational-use immunity applie s as a matter of law and that the district
court did not err by granting summary judgment for respondents on appellants’ claims.
Affirmed.