State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0890

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Eric Clayton Nord,
Appellant.

Filed May 3, 2021
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Gaïtas, Judge

Becker County District Court
File No. 03-CR-19-401

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian W. McDonald, Becker Co unty Attorney, Braden F. Sczepanski, First Assistant
County Attorney, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jason R. Steffen, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; La rkin, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Eric Clayton Nord challenges his convictions for possession of a firearm
by an ineligible person and receiving stolen property, arguing that the district court plainly
erred by failing to provide the jury with instructions on corroboration of accomplice

2
testimony and specific unanimity. He also ar gues that his sentence for receiving stolen
property must be reversed because it was ca lculated using an incorrect criminal history
score. In a pro se supplemental brief, No rd raises five additional challenges to his
convictions. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
The charges against Nord stemmed from two events occurring just days apart, a
burglary and a “controlled buy” of stolen fi rearms arranged by law enforcement, both
involving Nord and his accomplice, D.M. (accomplice). Both Nord and accomplice were
charged for their suspected involvement in the two events.
The Burglary
On February 27, 2019, Nord and accomp lice were working on a stalled car outside
the home of B.G. B.G., who was familiar w ith Nord and accomplice, briefly spoke with
them and invited them inside to warm up. Later in the day, B.G. left town while Nord and
accomplice were still outside working on the car. Nord’s friend C.E. eventually drove her
van to that location to meet him. Nord loaded some “luggage” and bags into the van, and
C.E. dropped Nord off at her home, where he wa s staying. C.E. then returned to pick up
accomplice. She dropped accomplice off elsewhere.
B.G. returned that evening. The next morning, B.G. fo und footprints in the snow
leading from his driveway to his neighbor L. K.’s home, although L. K. had been out of
town for some time. L.K. returned on March 1 to find that his home had been burglarized
and some of his belongings were missing. L.K. reported the burglary to the sheriff’s office
and identified his missing property, which in cluded two firearms ( one shotgun and one

3
semi-automatic rifle), toolkits (one bearing L.K.’s initials and containing a drill), other
hardware and tools, hunting eq uipment, a laptop, two metal detectors, tax and insurance
paperwork, approximately 14 grams of gold, and various gemstones. About one week later,
L.K. received notice that most of the stolen property had been recovered; he met with
officers and confirmed the items were his.
The Controlled Buy
In early February 2019, P.W. (informa nt) was facing criminal charges and a
probation violation unrelated to this case. Hoping for lenien cy in his criminal cases,
informant agreed to work as a police informant.
Informant met Nord for the first time several weeks later; he was stranded and paid
Nord for a ride. A few days af ter their initial meeting, Nord went to a motel room where
informant was staying and showed him some “merchandise” that he was selling. Nord told
informant that he had “hit some licks.”1 He showed informant some gemstones, and then
mentioned that he also had a couple of firearms available. Informan t said that firearms
were “more [his] style” and expressed interest in buying them. When Nord left, informant
contacted law enforcement to report his meeting with Nord.
The day after the motel me eting, informant arranged another rendezvous with Nord
at the instruction of law enforcement. Officers equipped informant with an audio recording
device and gave him $400 in buy money.

1 According to informant, to “hit some licks” means “to go out and . . . rob somebody.”

4
Informant then went to C.E.’s residence, where Nord was staying. Officers were
stationed nearby, conducting surveillance. Informant entered C.E.’s garage, where he met
with Nord and accomplice. A ccording to informant, Nord laid two firearms on a table—
one shotgun and one semi-automatic rifle—before agreeing to sell the semi-automatic rifle
to informant for $400. Informant gave Nord the buy money and then left the garage with
the semi-automatic rifle. He turned the gun over to officers and provided a detailed account
of the controlled buy. The en tire encounter was also audio re corded but the recording is
muffled and difficult to understand. However, isolated portions of the transaction are
discernible and support informant’s description of the events.2
A short time later, C.E., Nord, and accomp lice left the residence in C.E.’s van.
Officers stopped C.E.’s van a nd searched it, locating the $4 00 in buy money. Nord and
accomplice were arrested. Officers went to C.E.’s residence and secured the scene until a
search warrant was issued. Wh en officers ultimately search ed C.E.’s residence pursuant
to the warrant, they found L.K.’s property in a corner of the garage, including his shotgun
and documents bearing his signature. Do cuments belonging to Nord were also
commingled with L.K.’s property in the garage.
Jury Trial
In a single complaint, the state charged No rd with counts relating to the burglary of
L.K.’s residence on February 27, 2019, a nd counts relating to th e controlled buy on
March 4, 2019. For the burglary, Nord was charged with second-degree burglary, Minn.

2 For example, informant can be heard offeri ng $400 for one gun, and it is clear that two
guns are available for sale.

5
Stat. § 609.582, subd. 2(a)(1) (2018), and one count of ineligible person in possession of a
firearm, Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1b(a) (2018). And, in connection with the controlled
buy and the stolen property found in the gara ge, he was charged with a second count of
ineligible person in possession of a firearm and receiving st olen property, Minn. Stat.
§ 609.53, subd. 1 (2018). Nord pleaded not guilty and moved pretrial to suppress the fruits
of the search warrant, claiming deficiencies with the warrant and Fourth Amendment
violations. The district court denied the motion and Nord had a jury trial.
At trial, the state called 11 witnesses and offered over 20 exhibits into evidence.
Informant testified about his meeting with Nord at the motel and about the controlled buy
in C.E.’s garage. Accomplice also testified against Nord in exchange for a favorable plea
deal on his own related charge s. According to accomplice, Nord had been staying with
C.E. and storing things in her garage. Consistent with informant’s testimony, accomplice
testified that Nord showed in formant two firearms that were for sale and informant paid
cash for one of them. Nord’s counsel cro ss-examined accomplice about his motives for
testifying against Nord and about the benefits of the plea deal he received from the state.
Nord exercised his right to remain silent and called one witness.
Near the end of trial, the district court in structed the jury on the law of the case.
Neither party requested an instruction on the requirement for corroboration of an
accomplice’s testimony or an instruction directing jurors that they must all agree on which
of the two firearms Nord posse ssed, and the district court di d not provide either of these
instructions. The jury acquitted Nord of the two charges rela ted to the burglary. But the

6
jury found him guilty of th e two charges stemming from th e controlled buy—ineligible
person in possession of a firearm and receiving stolen property.
Sentencing
The district court sentenced Nord to 60 months in prison for the firearm conviction,
which was a statutory mandatory minimum se ntence. Additionally, the district court
imposed a concurrent term of 24 months for the receiving-st olen-property offense. In
calculating the 24-month sentence for receivi ng stolen property, the district court
seemingly relied on the criminal history score set forth in the sentencing worksheet. The
worksheet states that Nord’s criminal history score is four, with three points resulting from
past crimes and one custody-status point. Th e custody-status point was apparently added
because Nord committed the offenses here with in the term of proba tion originally set by
the district court in another matter.
Nord appeals.
DECISION
I. Although the district court plainly er red by failing to give the jury an
accomplice-corroboration instruction, the omission of the instruction did not
affect Nord’s substantial rights.

Nord first argues that he sh ould receive a new trial because the district court failed
to instruct the jury that an accomplice’s testimony must be corroborated by independent
evidence. Because Nord did not request the accomplice-co rroboration instruction, we
review his challenge for plain error. See State v. Ezeka , 946 N.W.2d 393, 407 (Minn.
2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 934 (2020).

7
A criminal defendant forfeits appellate review of jury instructions when no specific
request or objection was presente d to the district court. Id. But an appellate court may
address the unpreserved issue if the defendant can establish (1) an error occurred, (2) that
was plain, and (3) the error affected his substantial rights. Id.; see Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02.
A “plain” error is one that is “clear or obvious.” Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d at 407
(quotations omitted). Plain error occurs when the district court fails to provide a required
instruction. See id.; State v. Vasquez, 776 N.W.2d 452, 459 (Minn. App. 2009). When it
is reasonably likely that a required instruction would have significantly affected the jury’s
verdict, the district court’s failure to pr ovide the instruction affects the defendant’s
substantial rights. State v. Davenport, 947 N.W.2d 251, 262 (Minn. 2020).
A. The failure to provide an accomplice-corrobor ation instruction was
plain error.

Minnesota law recognizes that “the cr edibility of an accomp lice is inherently
untrustworthy.” State v. Lee , 683 N.W.2d 309, 316 (Minn. 2004). Accordingly, “a
criminal conviction cannot be based on the un corroborated testimony of an accomplice.”
State v. Smith , 932 N.W.2d 257, 264 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted); see Minn. Stat.
§ 634.04 (2018). District courts have an obligation to instruct jurors that the testimony of
a witness who may reasonably be considered an accomplice to the defendant must be
corroborated by other evidence. Smith, 932 N.W.2d at 264. A district court’s “duty to
instruct remains regardless of whether counsel for the defendant requests the instruction.”
Davenport, 947 N.W.2d at 260 (quo tation omitted). The omi ssion of the accomplice-
corroboration instruction is plain error. Vasquez, 776 N.W.2d at 459.

8
In relevant part, the pattern accomplice- corroboration jury inst ruction provides:
“You cannot find the defendant guilty of a cr ime on the basis of the testimony of an
accomplice unless that testimony is corroborated by other evidence that tends to convict
the defendant of the crime.” 10 Minnesota Practice , CRIMJIG 3.18 (2018). The
instruction also provides:
The evidence that can corro borate the testimony of an
accomplice must do more than merely show that the crime was
committed or show the circumst ances of the crime, but the
corroborating evidence need not convince you by itself that the
defendant committed the crime. It is enough that the
corroborating evidence tends to show that the defendant
committed the crime, and that the corroborating evidence,
when considered with the te stimony of an accomplice,
convinces you beyond a reasona ble doubt that the defendant
committed the crime.

Id. An “accomplice” is merely a witness who could have been, or was, “indicted and
convicted for the crime with wh ich the accused is charged.” Davenport, 947 N.W.2d at
261 (quoting Lee, 683 N.W.2d at 314).
Nord contends, and the state concedes, that accomplice was, in fact, an accomplice
as a matter of law. We agree—the record confirms that accomplice was similarly charged
on the same facts as Nord. Although an accomplice-corrobor ation jury instruction was
warranted, the district court did not give one. Thus, the district court plainly erred.
B. The error did not affect Nord’s substantial rights.
Next, we must consider whether the omission of an acco mplice-corroboration
instruction affected Nord ’s substantial rights. Davenport, 947 N.W.2d at 260. An
accomplice-corroboration instruction “ensure[ s] that the jury did not reject the

9
corroborating evidence and base its verdict solely on the accomplice’s testimony.” Id. at
262. In assessing the impact of the district court’s error, we therefore must determine
“whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury relied solely on [the accomplice’s]
testimony.” Id. Four factors help guide our analysis on this issue: (1) whether “significant
evidence” corroborated th e accomplice’s story, (2) whether leniency or a plea deal was
exchanged for the accomplice’s testimony, (3) whether the pr osecution emphasized the
accomplice’s testimony in closing argument, and (4) any instructions read to the jury about
witness credibility. Id. at 262-63 (citing State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 38 (Minn. 2016);
State v. Jackson, 746 N.W.2d 894, 899 (Minn. 2008)).
Applying these factors here, we conclude that there is no reasonable likelihood that
the jury verdicts rest solely on accomplice’s testimony.
First, significant independent evidence corroborated accomplice’s testimony.
Corroborative evidence “must affirm the truth of the accomplice’s testimony and point to
the guilt of the defendant in some substan tial degree”; but such evidence “need not,
standing alone, be sufficient to support a conviction.” Reed v. State, 925 N.W.2d 11, 21
(Minn. 2019). An accomplice’s testimony ca n be corroborated by “the defendant’s
opportunity and motive to commit the crime and his proximity to the place where the crime
was committed.” See Staunton v. State , 784 N.W.2d 289, 299 (Minn. 2010) (quotation
omitted). Moreover, “[c]ircu mstantial evidence may be sufficient to corroborate the
testimony of an accomplice.” State v. Clark, 755 N.W.2d 241, 254 (Minn. 2008) (quotation
omitted). Here, accomplice’s testimony was corroborated by informant’s testimony, some
portions of the audio recordin g of the controlled buy, C.E .’s testimony that Nord was

10
staying at her home and used her garage to store his belongings, Nord’s presence at the
scene of the crime, the stolen property found in the garage, and the commingling of Nord’s
personal property and the stolen items.
Nord argues that informant’s testimony was unreliable and therefore insufficient to
corroborate accomplice’s claims, citing Vasquez, 776 N.W.2d 452. But Vasquez—where
the informant was a “jailhouse informant”—is readily distinguishable from Nord’s case.
776 N.W.2d at 456. In Vasquez, the informant testified that the defendant had confessed
to selling drugs to a person wh o died from an overdose. Id. at 456, 461. But informant
had no firsthand knowledge about the defenda nt’s culpability for th e overdose death at
issue in the case. Moreover, the informant testified that the defendant denied any
involvement in the specific sale that led to the overdose. Id. at 461.
Here, by contrast, informant was directly involved in a controlled buy with Nord.
He wore a wire, he used recorded buy mone y, he was under police surveillance, and he
produced a semi-automatic rifle for officers after the controlled buy. Informant’s
participation in the controlled buy was, in its elf, independent corroboration of his claims.
And unlike Vasquez, where there was scant evidence implicating the defendant beyond the
testimony of the informant and the accomplice, here there was strong independent evidence
of Nord’s guilt. The recovery of the second stolen firearm among Nord’s personal property
in the garage was particularly damaging evidence against Nord. Thus, this case presents a
very different set of circumstances than Vasquez. W e a l s o n o t e t hat the jury had the
opportunity to evaluate info rmant’s credibility—defense c ounsel fully cross-examined

11
informant about the leniency he received in his own crim inal matters in exchange for his
testimony against Nord.
Second, although accomplice, like informant, received leniency in exchange for his
testimony against Nord, the jury was fully aware of this as well. Defense counsel
emphasized that accomplice rece ived leniency for testifyi ng against Nord, covering the
specific terms of accomplice’s plea bargain. And in closing argument, defense counsel
reminded the jury that accomplice had “a huge stak e” in testifying and that he was not “a
credible, reliable guy.”
Third, the prosecutor discussed, but di d not emphasize, accomplice’s testimony in
closing argument. The prosecutor touched on all of the evidence implicating Nord’s guilt.
And fourth, we observe that the jury rece ived appropriate instruction on how to
evaluate the credibility of witnesses. See 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 3.12 (2018).
Jurors were told to consider, among other things, each witness’s “interest or lack of interest
in the outcome of the case,” “frankne ss and sincerity,” “reasonableness or
unreasonableness of their testimony in light of all the other evidence,” and any
impeachment of the w itness’s testimony.” See id. Appellate courts presume that jurors
followed the district court’s instructions. State v. Whitson, 876 N.W.2d 2 97, 305 (Minn.
2016).
Given all of these circumstances, we are sati sfied that the jury’s guilty verdicts do
not rest on accomplice’s testimony alone. Thus, we conclude that the district court’s error
in failing to provide an a ccomplice-corroboration instruc tion did not affect Nord’s
substantial rights.

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II. The district court did not plainly err by not instructing the jury that all jurors
had to agree about which firearm Nord possessed.

Nord next argues that the district court plainly erred by failing to provide the jury
with a specific unanimity instruction. He cont ends that the district court was required to
instruct jurors that they ha d to unanimously agree about which firearm he possessed on
March 4, 2019—the semi-automatic rifle th at informant “bought” or the shotgun that
informant was offered but did not purchase. According to Nord, the district court’s failure
to provide a specific unanimity instruction lik ely led to disagreement among jurors about
which of the two guns he possessed, violating his right to a unanimous verdict and requiring
reversal of his conviction for ineligible person in possession of a firearm. Because Nord
did not request such an instruction during trial, we ag ain apply plain error review. See
Davenport, 947 N.W.2d at 260 (applying plain erro r review to claim of failure to give
necessary instruction); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02.
Nord’s claim of plain error relies on State v. Stempf, where we addressed the district
court’s denial of a specific unanimity instruction. 627 N.W.2d 352, 354, 358 (Minn. App.
2001). There, the state alleged that the defendant was guilty of one count of drug
possession, but presented evidence of two separate acts of possession that occurred on two
different occasions and in two different locations. Id. at 354. We reaffirmed in Stempf that
jury instructions that “allow for possible significant disagreement among jurors as to what
acts the defendant committed” violate a defe ndant’s right to a un animous verdict. Id. at
354. Under the circumstances presented in Stempf—where the state alleged two “separate
and distinct culpable acts, e ither one of which could suppor t a conviction” that “lack[ed]

13
unity of time and place”—we determined that the district court erred in denying the
defendant’s request for a speci fic unanimity instruction. Id. at 358-59. Because the jury
could have disagreed about which act of possession the defendant actually committed, we
concluded that a new trial was required. Id.
Although Nord did not request a specific-unanimity instruction, he now argues that
his jury may have disagreed about which fire arm he possessed, implicating his right to a
unanimous jury verdict. He contends that the state presented evidence of two independent
acts of possession, and that some jurors coul d have found that he possessed the semi-
automatic rifle, while other jurors could have found that he possessed the shotgun.
We disagree. While the two guns may have been recovered at different times—
with the semi-automatic rifle being the product of the controlled buy and the shotgun being
discovered during the subsequent search of the garage—the state alleged that Nord
committed one act, possessing the two guns in th e same place at the same time. Both
accomplice and informant testifie d that they witnessed Nord lay two guns out on a table
during the controlled buy, and their testimony was corroborated by other circumstantial
evidence already discussed. Given the testimony that Nord simultaneously possessed two
firearms, and the fact that both firearms were ultimately recovered, there is no reasonable
likelihood that jurors could have disagreed about which of the two guns Nord possessed.
A plain error is generally shown by a clea r or obvious violation of caselaw, a rule,
or standard of conduct. See State v. Zinski, 927 N.W.2d 272, 275 (Minn. 2019) (discussing
plain-error standard). Under the circumstances here, Nord has not shown that the district
court’s failure to give a specific unanimity in struction was a clear or obvious violation of

14
Stempf or any other applicable authority. Where there is no potential for “possible
significant disagreement among jurors as to what acts the defendant committed,” Stempf,
627 N.W.2d at 354, the district court was not required to sua sponte provide a specific
unanimity instruction. Thus, the district co urt did not plainly err when it did not give
Nord’s jury a specific unanim ity instruction for the offens e of ineligible person in
possession of a firearm.
III. Nord’s sentence for receiving stolen property is based on an incorrect criminal
history score.

Nord argues that the district court err oneously sentenced him to 24 months for his
receiving-stolen-property conviction because his criminal history score incorrectly
included a custody-status point. Although the present offenses occurred during the original
term of Nord’s probation for a prior conviction, he points to court records showing that he
was actually discharged from probation before the date of the offenses here. And according
to Nord, his sentence must be reversed ba sed on a 2019 amendment to the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines and our recent decision in State v. Robinette, 944 N.W.2d 242, 248
(Minn. App. 2020), review granted (Minn. June 30, 2020), which instructs district courts
to apply that amendment in all cases sentenced after the amendment’s effective date.
To address this issue, we must consider de novo the proper interpretation of the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and the effect of our relevant precedent. See State v.
Strobel, 932 N.W.2d 303, 306 (Minn. 2019). Under the 2018 ve rsion of the sentencing
guidelines, a custody-status point was to be assigned “if the offender [was] discharged from
probation but committ[ed] an offense within the initial period of probation pronounced by

15
the court.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.2.a(1 )-(4) (2018). But in 2 019, this provision of
the sentencing guidelines was modified; the change allows the assignment of a custody-
status point only when an offender commits an offense while still on probation . Minn.
Sent. Guidelines 2.B.2.a(1)-(4) (Supp. 2019).
Normally, a district court must senten ce a defendant under the version of the
sentencing guidelines in effect at the time of the offense of conviction. Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2 (2018). But as Nord notes, we have held th at the 2019 amendment at issue
applies to sentences imposed from August 1, 2019, onward, regardless of the offense date.
See Robinette , 944 N.W.2d at 249, 2 51. Our decision in Robinette was based on the
common-law amelioration doctrine, which provides “that a law that mitigates punishment
be applied to acts committed before the law’s effective date, so long as no final judgment
has been reached and the legislature has not explicitly expressed contrary intent.” Id. at
249 (citing State v. Kirby, 899 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. 2017)). We determined that there
was no legislative intent to circumvent the amelioration doctrine, and accordingly, applied
the modification, reversed the defendant’s sentence, and remanded to the district court for
resentencing. Id. at 251.
The state does not address Nord’s assertion that he was no longer on probation at
the time of his sentencing hearing. Instead, the state asks us to “stay” our consideration of
Nord’s sentencing issue while Robinette is on review at the Minnesota Supreme Court. We
decline to do so because “a precedential opinion of this court has immediate authoritative
effect.” State v. Chauvin, 955 N.W.2d 684, 691, (Minn. App. 2021), review denied (Minn.
Mar. 10, 2021).

16
Because Nord’s offenses occurred when the 2018 senten cing guidelines were in
effect, but he was sentenced after the 2019 amendment took effect, Robinette instructs that
the 2019 guide lines apply. See Robinette, 944 N.W.2d at 248-50. The record confirms
that Nord was assigned one custody-status point because the instant charges occurred
“within the original probation term” of a 2017 felony motor-vehicle-theft conviction. The
record also confirms that No rd was discharged from probation in that case as of May 1,
2018. Thus, under the 2019 version of the guid elines in effect when Nord was sentenced
in April 2020, he would not receive a custody- status point for the discharged probation.
See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.2.a(1)-(4) (Supp. 2019). The inclusion of a custody-status
point has a significant effect on the ultimate sentence. With the custody-status point, Nord
received a presumptive sentence of 24 months in prison. But without it, the sentencing
guidelines call for a 21-month stayed sentence. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A, 5.A
(2018).
“[W]hen a defendant is sentenced based on an incorrect criminal history score, a
district court must resentence the defendant.” State v. Provost , 901 N.W.2d 199, 202
(Minn. App. 2017). Because court record s indicate that Nord was discharged from
probation before he was sentenced, we revers e his sentence for receiving stolen property
pursuant to our holding in Robinette and remand to the district court for further sentencing
proceedings consistent with this opinion.3

3 Unless shown otherwise on remand, our de cision has no impact on the statutorily
mandated 60-month sentence for Nord’s othe r conviction for inelig ible possession of a
firearm. See Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd. 5 (2018).

17
IV. Nord’s pro se arguments do not entitle him to relief.

Finally, Nord raises five additional argum ents in his pro se supplemental brief,
claiming that he was unjustly convicted base d on an informant’s false allegations, the
district court erred in denying his pretri al motion to suppress evidence, he received
ineffective assistance of counsel, his right to a speedy trial was violated, and his convictions
rest on insufficient evidence. We address each of these claims in turn.
A. Veracity of informant testimony
Nord first challenges the vera city of informant. He asserts that testimony submitted
by informants generally leads to “untrue al legations, resulting in unjust convictions.”
While an informant’s testimony may be less cr edible than the testimony of a lay witness,
“[i]t is not our role as a reviewing court to evaluate the credibility of the evidence.” State
v. Ivy, 873 N.W.2d 362, 367 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2016).
Rather, “[i]t is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the credibility of witnesses in a
criminal trial.” State v. C.J.M., 409 N.W.2d 857, 859 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied
(Minn. Sept. 18, 1987). In th e absence of any authority or specific arguments to support
Nord’s position, we decline to reexamine the jury’s determination as to the credibility of
the informant’s testimony in this case.
B. Pretrial motion to suppress evidence
Nord next asks us to review the district court’s order denying his pretrial motion to
suppress the evidence. But he does not identify any legal ba sis for his challenge to the
district court’s decision and he provides no argument or authority. Appellate courts “will
not consider pro se claims on appeal that are unsupported by either arguments or citations

18
to legal authority.” State v. Reek, 942 N.W.2d 148, 165 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted).
Due to inadequate briefing, and because we see no obvious error in the district court’s
denial of the motion to suppress, we need not further consider Nord’s argument.
C. Ineffective assistance of counsel
Nord alleges that his trial counsel and the various other attorneys who represented
him throughout this case provided ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defe ndant must prove that (1) his counsel’s
performance was objectively unreasonable and (2) but for counsel’s errors, there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have been different. Reek, 942
N.W.2d at 166 (applying Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2064 (1984)); see also Peltier v. State, 946 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. 2020) (explaining that
a court need not consider both prongs of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test where a
defendant fails to prove one prong).
Nord makes just one assertion in support of his claim that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel: he alleges that hi s five separate atto rneys “portrayed good
intentions” but “certainly remained unaware of ‘the bigger pictur e’ that is, this case as a
whole.” This lone claim is unclear and does not establish that Nord’s legal representation
was deficient. State v. German, 929 N.W.2d 466, 477 (Minn. App. 2019) (“Arguments are
forfeited if they are presented in a summary and conclusory form, do not cite to applicable
law, and fail to analyze the law when claiming that errors of law occurred.” (quotation
omitted)). Nord therefore does not present a vi able claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.

19
D. Speedy trial violation
Nord next argues that his due-process right to a speedy trial was violated. He claims
that although he never waived his right to a speedy trial, he spent months in custody before
his trial.
“Criminal defendants have the right to a speedy trial under the constitutions of both
the United States and Minnesota.” State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 19 (Minn. 2015) (citing
U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Co nst. art. I, § 6.). Alleged speedy trial violations receive
de novo review on appeal. Id. When reviewing such clai ms, Minnesota courts must
carefully weigh various factors: “(1) the leng th of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay;
(3) whether the defendant asserted his or he r right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the
delay prejudiced the defendant.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also Barker v. Wingo , 407
U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972).
Nord has not addressed any of these fact ors and offers no specific argument as to
how he was deprived of a speedy trial or whether he suffered prejudice. We do note,
however, that the record reveals Nord formally demanded a speedy trial on November 25,
2019, and his trial commenced 49 days later, which was well within the timeframe provided
by the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09(b) (requiring
trial to commence with in 60 days after entry of a demand); State v. Brown, 937 N.W.2d
146, 152 (Minn. App. 2019) (providing that delays beyond the 60 days contemplated under
the rule are “a presumptive [speedy trial] violation”), review denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 2020).
Additionally, the delays during pretrial proceedings were attributable to continuance
requests from both the state and defense co unsel, unsuccessful plea negotiations, and

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litigation of Nord’s pretrial motions. Based on the record before us, and without the benefit
of any meaningful legal argument, we discern no violation of Nord’s speedy-trial rights.
E. Insufficient evidence
Finally, Nord argues his conviction is unjust because the state presented no
fingerprint or DNA evidence and “coerced” the testimony of witnesses through mitigated
charges or plea deals.
These arguments are without merit. The state was not required to offer fingerprint
or DNA evidence because “the standard of proof beyond a reasona ble doubt does not
dictate any particular type of evidence.” State v. Birk, 687 N.W.2d 634, 638 (Minn. App.
2004). The state was only required to present sufficient evidence to establish Nord’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
As an appellate court, we cannot “re-wei gh the evidence and sit, in essence, as a
13th juror.” Reek, 942 N.W.2d at 166. But our review of the record satisfies us that the
evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.