State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0892

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Larry Eugene Burrell, Jr.
Appellant.

Filed October 18, 2021
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-29126

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jacquelin e Bailey, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appe llate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Pres iding Judge; Worke, Ju dge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
This is a direct appeal from judgment s of conviction based upon a jury finding
appellant guilty of three cont rolled-substance charges and one illegal firearm-possession
charge. Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion
2
to suppress the results of a search of his residence or, alternatively, to convene a Franks
hearing.1 Appellant also claims the district court abused its disc retion by denying his
request to introduce “reverse- Spreigl”2 evidence during trial. In a pro se supplemental
brief, appellant claims there exists insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdicts. The
search of the house was based upon a valid search warrant and appellant did not establish
a sufficient basis to obtain a Franks hearing. Also, any error by denying the “reverse-
Spreigl” evidence is harmless, and sufficient evid ence supports the jury’s guilty verdicts.
For all these reasons, we affirm.
FACTS
During the execution of a no-knock search of a residence in Minneapolis, deputies
found controlled substances and firearms in a locked bedroom which also contained a
prescription bottle and several pieces of mail bearing the name of appellant Larry Eugene
Burrell. Appellant was charged with first-de gree sale of methamphetamine, first-degree
possession of methamphetamine, third- degree possession of heroin, and unlawful
possession of a firearm. A jury found appellant guilty of all charges.
Law enforcement first bega n investigating the reside nce following reports from a
confidential reliable informant (CRI) in an “ongoing weapons and narcotics investigation”
involving two individuals who were living at the residence. Appellant was not identified
by the CRI as one of the individuals. A judge issued a no-knock search warrant for the

1 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1985).
2 State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965); see also State v. Jones , 678 N.W.2d 1,
16 (Minn. 2004) (Jones I) (defining “reverse-Spreigl”).
3
residence. The search warrant application did not identify whether the residence to be
searched was a single- or multiple-occupancy residence.
Upon entering the residence, deputies obs erved that it was a split-level home with
steps to the lower and upper levels of the hous e. The deputies first searched the upstairs,
which included a kitchen, dining room, living room, and a hallway leading to a bathroom
and two bedrooms. One of the CRI-identified individuals was present in the home during
the search and the deputies found several co ntrolled substances, cash, paraphernalia, and
.45 caliber bullets belonging to that person.
The deputies next searched downstairs
, which included a liv ing room, a laundry
room, a bathroom, and two bedrooms. One of the downstairs bedrooms, which was locked
and had to be forced open, contained numerous controlled substances as well as a firearm.
The deputies also found a pres cription bottle and several pieces of mail with appellant’s
name on each in this bedroom.
Appellant asked the district court to supp ress the items seized pursuant to the search
warrant because the search warrant application “lacked the particularity necessary to search
a multiple occupancy building.” A ppellant alternatively requested a Franks hearing in
order to establish that the deputy who signed the search warrant application “intentionally
or recklessly . . . omitted material informat ion about [appellant], other tenants, or the
manner of house they intended to search.” The district court denied both requests.
During trial appellant sought, as “reverse- Spreigl” evidence, to cr oss-examine the
deputies who executed the search warrant re garding how the warrant was obtained. The
district court disallowed th is testimony as irrelevant , though it did allow the jury to learn
4
the names of the two individual s identified by the CR I. Following the ju ry’s verdict, the
district court sentenced appellant to 81 months’ imprisonment. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant claims three errors. First, that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to suppress the results of the search warrant or, alternatively, to
convene a Franks hearing. Second, that the district court abused its discretion by denying
his request to introduce “reverse-Spreigl” evidence during the trial. Third, appellant argues
in a pro se supplemental brief that the evidence presented was insufficient. Each argument
is addressed in turn.
I. Motion to Suppress
A. Multiple-Occupancy Residence
“When reviewing a district court’s pretri al order on a motion to suppress evidence,
we review the district court’s factual finding s under a clearly erroneous standard and the
district court’s legal determinations de novo.” State v. Gauster , 752 N.W.2d 496, 502
(Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
Appellant argues that the results from the se arch of his room in the residence should
have been suppressed due to the invalidity of the search warrant. Alternatively, appellant
argues that a Franks hearing should have been held to address his allegation that the deputy
applying for the warrant “intentionally or recklessly . . . omitted material information about
Mr. Burrell, other tenants, or the manner of house they intended to search.”
Appellant claims the search warrant was invalid because the residence was a
multiple-occupancy dwelling and “a search warrant for a ‘multiple occupancy building’ is
5
invalid unless it describes the particular unit to be searched with su fficient definiteness.”
State v. Lorenz, 368 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Minn. 1985). 3 However, as correctly analyzed by
the district court, one exception to this rule is when “police, acting reasonably, do not learn
until executing the warrant that the building is a multip le occupancy building.” In re
Welfare of T.L.K., 487 N.W.2d 911, 913 (Minn. App. 1992) (emphasis omitted).
The district court concluded that “there were insufficient indicators that would have
led officers to reasonably believe that [the house] was a mu ltiple occupancy residence at
the time of the execution of the search warrant.” The record supports this conclusion.
Exhibits received and testimony of the deputies established that the residence was a
typical split-level home with open stairs at the entrance leading to an upper and lower level.
Nothing from the outside of th e house, such as multiple ma ilboxes or dum psters, would
suggest this to be a multiple-occupancy residence. The upstairs contained several common
areas, including a kitchen, dining room, living room, and a hall leading to a bathroom and
two bedrooms. The downstairs contained more common areas, including a living room,
laundry room, and bathroom, as well as two bedrooms. Though the bedroom doors were
locked at the time of search, nothing in the record suggests the deputies who completed the
search were aware of this until searching the home.

3 No argument was made to the district court or to this court that the residence was a
building which includes “two or more peopl e . . . occupy[ing] a single residence in
common” as described in Lorenz, which is, therefore, not a multiple-occupancy building.
Id. We therefore presume the residence is a multiple-occupancy building and decline to
address an issue not raised before the district court. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357
(Minn. 1996).
6
We recently examin ed this issue in State v. Marsh, 931 N.W.2d 825 (Minn. App.
2019), which involved similar facts. Those facts are as follows:
[A]n agent involved in the search . . . described the outside of
the house as a traditional, two-st ory house. When he entered
the bottom floor, it included a kitchen, dining room, living
room, and an open staircase lead ing to a second floor. Upon
going up the stairs, the agents came upon an open area with a
mini fridge and doors leading to bedrooms. [Marsh]’s
bedroom door was partially open, with a padlock on the
outside. After talking with [M arsh], he agreed to leave and
they conducted the search. The room did not have any number
or signage on it identifying it as a separate rental unit.

Id. at 828. We recognized in Marsh that the “most significant fact that weighs in favor of
appellant is that he had a padlock on the front door” but we noted that “it is not
determinative of whether law enforcement objectively should have recognized it as a
separate residence.” Id. at 831. Ultimately, this court he ld that the record as a whole,
“when viewed in the context of the entire ho use,” was “not enough to have made the
officers at the time realize that appellant’s room was a separate residence.” Id. (emphasis
added).
On this record, the facts known to the deputies at the time of the search of the
residence were “not enough to have made the officers at the time realize that appellant’s
room was a separate residence.” Id. The search warrant was valid.
B. Franks Hearing
Appellant alternatively argues that, even if we conclude the district court did not err
in its suppression ruling, it did abuse its discretion by not convening a Franks hearing. In
Franks, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant may invalidate an otherwise
7
valid search warrant by challenging the truthf ulness of factual statements made in an
affidavit supporting the warrant. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155; see also State v. Moore , 438
N.W.2d 101, 105 (Minn. 1989) (discussing and applying Franks). However, to do so, the
defendant must show that “(1) the affiant deliberately made a statement that was false or
in reckless disregard of the truth, and (2) the statement was material to the probable cause
determination.” State v. Anderson , 784 N.W.2d 320, 327 (Min n. 2010). If a defendant
cannot establish a “substantial preliminary sh owing that a false statement knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth” has occurred, the district court may
deny a Franks hearing. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155.
The issue we review is whether appellant made “a substantial preliminary showing”
that the deputy knew that the residence was a multiple-occupancy residence and that he
“intentionally or recklessly” omitted that information from the search warrant application.
Appellant’s claimed basis for a Franks hearing is that the lack of a multiple-occupancy
identification in the search warrant applica tion, despite a week of surveillance by the
deputy of this residence and seeing multiple vehicles arriving and departing, entitles him
to a Franks hearing. We disagree.
As we have already noted, the record supp orts the district court’s conclusion that
the deputy acted reasonably in not identifying the reside nce as a multip le-occupancy
residence in the search warrant. This conclusion necessarily means that the mere absence
of such a statement in the search warrant is not evidence of “intentionally or recklessly”
omitting information. Appellant’s contenti on that the deputy knew and intentionally
withheld information regard ing the status of the resi dence as a multiple-occupancy
8
residence is, without alleging any facts in support, speculative. The district court did not
err in denying appellant’s request for a Franks hearing.
II. Reverse- Spreigl Evidence
“Evidentiary rulings rest w ithin the sound discretion of the district court, and we
will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Ali, 855
N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). If the distri ct court’s evidentiary ruling results in the
erroneous exclusion of defense evidence in violation of the defendant’s constitutional right
to present evidence, the verd ict must be reversed unless the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. 1994). Harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt means that “the reviewing c ourt must be satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that if the evidence ha d been admitted and the damagi ng potential of the evidence
fully realized, [a reasonable] jury . . . would have reached the same verdict.” Id.
“Reverse-Spreigl” evidence has been referred to by the supreme court as “evidence
of an alternative perpetrator’s prior bad acts.” State v. Jones, 753 N.W.2d 677, 696 (Minn.
2008) (Jones II). “This evidence may consist of . . . ot her facts tending to prove the third
person committed the crime.” Woodruff v. State, 608 N.W.2d 881, 885 (Minn. 2000).
Appellant reasserts his alternative-perpet rator claim that “[e]vidence [that the two
individuals identified by the CRI] had recen tly sold drugs while carrying firearms ‘for
intimidation and protection’ was not only rele vant, it was fundamentally important to
[appellant]’s case to show the drugs and the firearm found with it belonged to them.” We
need not decide whether the district court erred by denying the evidence. Assuming error
9
without so ruling, the record reveals that any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
First, the evidence appellant so ught to present as “reverse- Spreigl” was presented
to the jury via the state’s presentation of the deputies’ testimony. The jury learned that the
deputies were surveilling the two individual s identified by the CRI based on suspicion of
selling narcotics and firearms possession. Th erefore, the jury heard that the deputies
obtained the search warrant based on inform ation regarding those two individuals, not
appellant.
Additionally, the jury heard th at appellant also lived in the house and that the drugs
and a firearm were found in a locked downstairs bedroom that had appellant’s belongings
in it. All other drugs and weapons were found in the two bedrooms upstairs and with other
items which identified the othe r individuals who resided in the house. Denial of the
“reverse-Spreigl” evidence was therefore harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Finally, appellant argues in his pro se supplemental brief that “the evidence
presented to the district court was insufficien t to find appellant gu ilty of the constructive
possession charges because the state never o ffered evidence [appellant] had exclusive
access to or otherwise exercised control over the contraband nor the area [in which] it was
found.” Because the record demonstrates th at the evidence presen ted was sufficient to
establish appellant’s constructive possession of the drugs and the firearm, we disagree.
In examining the sufficiency of the evidence, “[t]he ve rdict will not be overturned
if the fact-finder, upon application of the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden
10
of proving an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably have found the
defendant guilty of th e charged offense.” State v. Griffin , 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn.
2016) (quotation and citations omitted). This court ordinarily undertakes “a painstaking
analysis of the record to de termine whether the evidence, wh en viewed in the light most
favorable to the conviction, was sufficient.” State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn.
2012) (quotation omitted). We assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and
disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn.
2011) (quotation omitted).
The above-stated standard of review app lies so long as a conviction is adequately
supported by direct evidence. State v. Horst , 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016). Direct
evidence is “evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true,
proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 599
(Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, is “evidence
from which the factfinder can infe r whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.”
Id. (quotation omitted). A convic tion depends on circumstantia l evidence if proof of the
offense, or a single element of the offense, is based solely on circumstantial evidence. See
State v. Fairbanks, 842 N.W.2d 297, 307 (Minn. 2014).
The state relied upon circumstantial evid ence that appellant constructively
possessed the drugs and the firearm. Appellant was not in the home at the time of the
search and the only evidence tying hi m to the contraband in the downstairs bedroom
consisted of a prescription bottle and mail be aring his name found inside the locked
bedroom. See State v. Salyers , 842 N.W.2d 28, 34 (Minn. App. 2014) (“The state can
11
prove possession either under a theory of actu al possession or constructive possession.”),
aff’d, 865 N.W.2d 156 (Minn. 20 15). To prove constructive possession, the state must
prove either:
(1) the police found [the contra band] in a place under the
defendant’s exclusive control to which other people did not
normally have access; or (2) if the police found it in a place to
which others had access, that there is a stro ng probability,
inferable from the evidence, that the defendant was, at the time,
consciously exercising dominion and control over it.

Id.
In reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, appellate courts use a two-
step analysis. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). “The first step is to
identify the circumstances proved.” Id. “ The s e c o nd s t e p i s to determine whether the
circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis except that of guilt. We review the circumstantial evidence not as isolated facts,
but as a whole.” Id. at 599.
Regarding the first step, the circumstances proved in this matter are that contraband
was found in a locked bedroom which also included a prescription bottle and mail bearing
appellant’s name. There was also evidence, arguably direct, that appellant lived in the
home based upon the testimony of the land lord, which was supported with a written
residential lease agreement.
Regarding the second step, the circumstan ces proved are consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt. The circumstances proved in
this matter are very similar to those in ot her cases in which constructive possession has
12
been found based simply on presence of contraband in an individual’s bedroom. In State
v. Mollberg , 246 N.W.2d 463, 472 (Minn. 1976), the supreme court determined that
constructive possession was sufficiently estab lished based on a “str ong probability” that
the defendant was consciously exercising dominion and control over marijuana found in a
bedroom closet because, though the defendant was not present at the time the bedroom was
searched, other personal possessions of the de fendant were found w ithin the bedroom.
Similarly, in Lorenz, the supreme court found that drugs located in a defendant’s dresser
in his bedroom were sufficient to establish sufficient evidence of constructive possession.
368 N.W.2d at 287-88.
In light of the circumstances proved in the present case, th e jury reasonably
concluded that appellant had constructive possession over the drugs and gun found in the
locked bedroom and these circ umstances are inconsistent w ith any rational hypothesis
other than guilt. The evidence in this case was sufficient to support the jury’s findings of
guilt.
Affirmed.