In re the Matter of the Petition of Wendy Nevins.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0901

In re the Matter of the Petition of Wendy Nevins.

Filed March 8, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-ET-CV-19-159

Robert J. Hajek, Hajek & Beauclaire, L.L.C., Minnetonka, Minnesota (for appellant Robert
Nevins)

Kevin J. Dunlevy, Beisel & Dunlevy, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Timothy A. Netzell, Netzell Legal Services , P.L.L.C., Eden Prairie, Minnesota (for
respondent Wendy Nevins)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Pres iding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
We have been asked to determine whethe r a dissolution decree conferred on one
party an interest in real property that th e other party had acquired during the parties’
marriage. We conclude that the district cour t erred by not giving proper effect to the
parties’ separation agreement, which was inco rporated into their dissolution decree and
states that any property that was acquired during the parties’ marriage but not provided for

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in the separation agreement sha ll be deemed to be owned by bo th parties. Therefore, we
reverse and remand.
FACTS
This appeal concerns a parcel of real prope rty in the city of Crystal. In 1958, the
parents of Wendy Nevins acquired the property as joint tenants. In 1999, Wendy’s parents
conveyed the property by quit-claim deed to their three a dult children and reserved a life
estate for themselves. The deed reflects that each of the adult children received a one-third
interest as tenants in common. The Torrens certificate of title also reflects three tenants in
common and, in addition, the names of the spouses of the tenants in common.
At the time of the conveyance of the Crystal property, Wendy was married to Robert
Nevins, whom she had wed in 1996. Their marriage was dissolved by a Colorado court in
2003. The dissolution decree adopted and incorporated by reference the parties’ written
separation agreement, which was signed by both parties and their respective attorneys.
Paragraph 2 of the separation agreement stat es that it “is inte nded as a complete
settlement of the matters of maintenance, division of marital property, payment of marital
debts, custody of the minor ch ildren, parenting time, child support, and all of the rights,
duties, and obligations of the parties toward one another arising out of their marriage to
one another.” Paragraph 12 of the agreement st ates, in part, “The pa rties agree that each
has made a complete disclosure of any and all significant items of property in which he or
she has any interest . . . .” In paragraph 17, Robert waived any claim to a marital interest
in a particular promissory note that previously had been given to Wendy. In paragraph 18,
which is captioned “Real Estate,” the parties ag reed that two particular parcels of real

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property, which were characterized as marital property, should be awarded to Wendy. And
in paragraph 30, the parties agreed as follows:
Undisclosed Property: In the event that there is
discovered any real or pers onal property which has been
acquired by the Wife or the Husband during this marriage and
which has not been provided for herein, then, in that event,
such property is deemed to be owned by both Wife and
Husband as tenants in common un til such time as the parties
can divide such property by agreement or otherwise.

In 2019, after Wendy’s parents had passed away, Wendy and her siblings entered
into an agreement for the sale of the Crystal property. Robert declined Wendy’s request to
execute a quit-claim deed to disclaim any interest in the property. The record indicates that
the buyers have made payment and that Wendy’ s portion of the net proceeds of the sale,
approximately $102,000, has been placed in an escrow account.
In August 2019, Wendy pe titioned the district court for the cancellation of the
existing certificate of title for the Crystal pr operty, which refers to Wendy’s marriage to
Robert, and the issuance of a new certificate of title that does not ma ke any reference to
Robert. See Minn. Stat. § 508.71, subd. 2 (2020). In February 2020, the district court
referred the matter to the examiner of titles for Hennepin County.
In March 2020, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Robert
requested that he be awarded a one-sixth interest in the property and that the district court
order the issuance of a new certificate of title reflecting such an interest. In support of his
motion, he submitted an affidavit that stat es, “I never knew that [Wendy] obtained an
interest in [the Crystal pr operty] during our marriage.” Wendy requested that she be
granted the relief she sought in her amended petition. In support of her motion, she

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submitted an affidavit stating that her parent s’ conveyance of the Crystal property “was
disclosed and discussed with Robert on several occasions during the marriage.”
In June 2020, the deputy examiner of titles filed a nine-page report, which includes
a statement of undisputed facts, a conc lusion of law, a recommended order, and a
memorandum of law. The deputy examiner determined that Robert “has no interest” in the
Crystal property because it “was a gift to [Wendy] and was her non-marital property under
either Minnesota or Colorado law.” The de puty examiner recommended that the district
court order the registrar of titles to cancel the existing certificate of title and to issue a new
certificate of title in favor of the two buyers. The district court filed an order adopting the
report of the deputy examiner. Robert appeals.
DECISION
Robert argues that the deputy examiner and the district court erred by granting
Wendy’s summary-judgment motion and, acc ordingly, by granting her petition and
ordering a new certificate of title that does not recognize his interest in the Crystal property.
A district court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. A genuine issue of material fact exists if a rational trier of
fact, considering the record as a whole, could find fo r the nonmoving party. Frieler v.
Carlson Mktg. Grp., Inc., 751 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Minn. 2008). This court applies a de novo
standard of review to the district court’s legal conclusions on summary judgment and views
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was
granted. Commerce Bank v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 870 N.W.2d 770, 773 (Minn. 2015).

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Robert contends that the deputy examiner and the district court erred by not giving
effect to the Colorado court’s dissolution decree, which incorporated the parties’ separation
agreement. Robert relies primarily on paragraph 30 of the agreement, which provides that
if “there is discovered any real or personal property which has been acquired by the Wife
or the Husband during this marriage and which has not been provided for herein, . . . such
property is deemed to be owned by both Wife and Husband as tenants in common.”
The deputy examiner considered paragrap h 30 but reasoned that it does not apply
on the grounds that the separation agreement was limited in scope to the division of marital
property and that Wendy’s interest in the Crystal property was non-marital in character
because it was a gift from her parents. This reasoning reflects a mi sinterpretation of the
separation agreement and, thus, a misinterpretation of the parties’ dissolution decree. The
scope of the separation agreement was much br oader than merely a division of marital
property. Paragraph 2 of the agreement states that it “is intended as a complete settlement
of the matters of maintenance, division of marital property , payment of marital debts,
custody of the minor children, parenting time, child support, and all of the rights, duties,
and obligations of the partie s toward one another arising out of their marriage to one
another.”
Furthermore, other provisions of the se paration agreement make clear that Wendy
was obligated to disclose her interest in the Crystal property to Robert, even if it was non-
marital in character. Paragraph 12 states, “The parties agree that each has made a complete
disclosure of any and all significant items of property in wh ich he or she has any interest
. . . .” (Emphasis added.) The parties’ obligation to disclose all property—whether marital

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or non-marital in character—is confirmed by paragraph 30, which is triggered if “there is
discovered any real or personal property which has been acquired by the Wife or the
Husband during this marriage and which has not been provid ed for herein.” (Emphasis
added.) Accordingly, the deputy examiner sh ould not have disreg arded paragraph 30 on
the ground that Wendy’s interest in the Crystal property was non-marital in character.
Pursuant to paragraph 30, Robe rt has an interest in the Crystal property if he has
satisfied two requirements. The first requirement is that the Crystal property was acquired
by Wendy during the marriage. There is no dispute that it was. Wendy stated in an affidavit
that, “at the time of the execution of the Quit Claim Deed, I was married to Robert Nevins.”
The second requirement is that the Crystal prop erty was “not . . . pr ovided for” in the
separation agreement. There is no dispute that it was not provided for. Wendy’s brief
states, “The separation agreement does not include a description of the subject
property. . . .” Our independent review of the separation agreement confirms that it makes
no mention of the Crystal property. As a resu lt, the Crystal property must be “deemed to
be owned by both [Wendy] and [Robert] as tenants in common.” That is the consequence
to which the parties agreed in 2003.
Thus, the deputy examiner erred by concluding that Robert does not have an interest
in the Crystal property. Consequently, the district court erred by granting Wendy’s motion
for summary judgment and deny ing Robert’s motion for summary judgment. Therefore,
we reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to deny Wendy’s motion for
summary judgment, grant Robe rt’s motion for summary judgment, and deny Wendy’s

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petition for cancellation of the existing certificate of title and issuance of a new certificate
of title.
Reversed and remanded.