Special School District No.1, Minneapolis Public Schools, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0906

Special School District No.1, Minneapolis Public Schools,
Appellant,

vs.

Minneapolis Federation of Teachers,
Respondent.

Filed March 15, 2021
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-19-21340

Margaret A. Skelton, Christian R. Shafer, Frank E. Langan, Ratwik, Roszak & Maloney,
P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Debra M. Corhouse, Education Minnesota, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Pres iding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Rodenberg,
Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
This is an appeal from an order of the di strict court confirming an arbitration award
granting the grievance filed by respondent via the parties’ collective bargaining agreement

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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(CBA). Appellant argues that the district c ourt erred by deferring to the arbitrator and
concluding that the arbitrator had not exceed ed his authority. Because appellant did not
raise a genuine issue of arbitrability and the di strict court is required to give deference to
the arbitrator of both the facts and the law, we affirm.
FACTS
This appeal stems from a grievance file d by respondent Minneapolis Federation of
Teachers (the federation) against appellant Sp ecial School District No. 1, Minneapolis
Public Schools (Minneapolis Public Schools) on behalf of grievant K.T.
In 1997, Minneapolis Public Schools hire d K.T.—then 50 years old—as a Japanese
language teacher. On May 25, 2010, Minneapolis Public Schools discharged K.T.—then
age 64—citing “discontinuance and lack of pupils.” K.T. began employment in a different
school district during the 2010-11 scho ol year, where she was employed until her
retirement six years later.
As part of her preparation for retirement, K.T. contacted the federation and inquired
regarding her eligibility for th e “wellness pay” benefit—a pa yment of “up to fifty (50)
percent of their unused sick leave at their cu rrent daily rate of pay” into a “Minnesota
Retirement System (MSRS) Post Retirement Health Care Savings Account.” In response
to the federation’s formal application on behalf of K.T. for this benefit, Minneapolis Public
Schools indicated on August 2, 2017, that K.T. was not to receive “wellness pay” benefits.
On August 11, 2017, the fede ration filed a grievance on behalf of K.T., alleging that
“[K.T.] submitted a retirement form to [Minn eapolis Public Schools] during the 2016-17
school year and is being denied the Wellness Sick Leave benefit (50% of sick leave benefit)

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as part of the 2016-17 class of retirees.” Pursuant to the terms of the CBA, the grievance
ultimately proceeded to arbitrati on. The arbitrator ruled in favor of K.T., and found that
she was eligible to receive “wellness pay” benefits. Minneapolis Public Schools
challenged the arbitrator’s award in the Hennepin County District Court. The district court
confirmed the arbitrator’s award. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court properly deferred to the arbitrator in affirming his award.

Appellate courts “ha[ve] de novo review when reviewing arbitration clauses.”
Onvoy, Inc.v. SHAL, LLC, 669 N.W.2d 344, 349 (Minn. 2003). However, while “[appellate
courts] review arbitration awards de novo, j udicial review of arbitration decisions is
generally extremely limited.” See City of Richfield v. La w Enf’t Labor Servs., Inc. , 923
N.W.2d 36, 41 (Minn. 2019).
[A]n arbitrator, in the absence of an agreement limiting his
authority, is the final judge of both law and fact, including the
interpretation of the terms of a ny contract, and his award will
not be reviewed or set aside for mistake of either law or fact in
the absence of fraud, mistake in applying his own theory,
misconduct, or other disregard of duty.

State, Office of State Auditor v. Minn. Ass’n of Prof’l Emps., 504 N.W.2d 751, 754 (Minn.
1993) (quotation omitted). An ar bitrator’s award may also be overturned if the arbitrator
“clearly exceeded the powers granted to them in the arbitration agreement.” Seagate Tech.,
LLC v. W. Digital Corp., 854 N.W.2d 750, 760-61 (Minn. 2014) (emphasis in original).
On appeal, Minneapolis Public Schools argues that the district court erred by
(1) deferring to the arbitrator on questions of timeliness,
(2) concluding that the arbitrator

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had not exceeded his authority in interpreting the CBA, and (3 ) affirming the arbitrator’s
award despite the arbitrator’s impermissibl e constitutional determin ations. Because we
must defer to the arbitrat or as the “the final judge of both law and fact,” Minn. Ass’n of
Prof’l Emps., 504 N.W.2d at 754, and we otherwise find no grounds for reversal, we affirm
the decision of the district court upholding the arbitrator’s award.
A. Timeliness 1
Pursuant to the terms of th e CBA, a grievant is required to seek relief “within twenty
(20) days after the event giving rise to the grievance occurred.” The arbitrator ruled that
K.T.’s grievance was timely because “the event giving rise to the grievance” was August 2,
2017, the date when Minneapolis Public Schools provided the federation written notice of
its denial of “wellness pay” benefits. Theref ore, the arbitrator concluded, the August 11,
2017 date for filing of the grievance was within 20 days of “the event giving rise to the
grievance” and was timely. Minneapolis Public Schools argues that the district court erred
by deferring to the arbitrator’s finding that K.T.’s grievance was timely because (1) K.T.
was no longer a teacher at the time the grievan ce was filed, and (2) the “event giving rise
to the grievance” took place well before the filing of her grievance in August of 2017.

1 Minneapolis Public Schools fra mes this as an issue of bot h timeliness and arbitrability.
However, “arbitrability” does not appear to be he re disputed. The issue presented is one
of timeliness—i.e., when the event giving rise to the grievance occurred, and whether the
grievance was filed at an appropriate time so as to permit arbitration. Furthermore, the
arbitrator clearly had authority to decide su ch issues as they de rive from the CBA. See
Minn. Stat. § 572B.06(b) (2020) (“[I]n the case of a grievance arising under a collective
bargaining agreement . . . an arbitrator shall decide” arbitrability.).

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The arbitrator is the “fin al judge of both law and fact , including the terms of any
contract.” Minn. Ass’n of Prof’l Emps., 504 N.W.2d at 754. The arbitrator’s determination
as to what constituted “the event giving rise to the grievance” necessarily involved
questions of both law and fact. Therefore, the arbitrator’s determination regarding this
issue “will not be reviewed or set aside for mistake of either law or fact.” Id. As such, it
was proper for the district court to defer to th e arbitrator on this issue, and we affirm the
district court.
B. Interpretation of the “Wellness Pay” Provisions
Minneapolis Public Schools argues that the arbitrator “exceeded his authority by
modifying the language of the CBA” when he found that K.T. was not required to retire
from employment with Mi nneapolis Public Schools in or der to trigger eligibility for
“wellness pay” benefits.
It is important to first note that except as related to the issue of timeliness as
described above, Minneapolis Public Schools does not claim that the grievance filed by the
federation and pursuant to the terms of the CBA is not arbitrable. Nor does the record
suggest that arbitrability of the grievance related to th e CBA terms was raised during
arbitration or to the district court.
However, a claim that an arbitrator ex ceeded his authority in making an award
necessarily implicates arbitr ability—whether the determinati ons made by an arbitrator
were “within his authority to decide.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sankey , 605 N.W.2d 411,
414 (Minn. App. 2000). Insofar as appellant challenges the arbitrator’s interpretation of
the CBA as exceeding his authority, such challenge is not properly before us. See Minn.

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Stat. § 572B.06(b) (arbitrator decides arbitr ability in cases involving interpretation of a
collective bargaining grievance). Furthe rmore, any claims that the arbitrator
misinterpreted the CBA apart from arguments relating to arbitrability are similarly outside
our narrow scope of review, as the arbitrator was the “final judge of both law and fact,
including the interpretation of the terms of any contract.” 2 Minn. Ass’n of Prof’l Emps. ,
504 N.W.2d at 754. For these reasons, we affirm the district court.
C. Constitutional Issues
Finally, Minneapolis Public Schools argues that reversible error occurred when the
arbitrator made several improper c onstitutional determinations. Citing Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985), the arbitrator concluded: “The
School District denied [K.T.] property an d failed to afford [K.T.] due process” by
“refus[ing] ‘wellness pay’/severance pay . . . without fully informing the employee of the
circumstances under which her property rights will be termin ated.” Minneapolis Public
Schools argues that this impermissible determination requires reversal.
We agree that an arbitrator may not decide constitutional issues. McGrath v. State,
312 N.W.2d 438, 442 (Minn. 1981) (“The fact that we dec line to interfere with the
arbitration process does not confer upon the arbitrator the right to decide constitutional

2 Even were we to consider Minneapolis P ublic Schools’ argument that the arbitrator
materially misread and misinterpreted the language of the CBA, we disagree. Minneapolis
Public Schools argues that K.T. was required to retire at that time of her separation from
Minneapolis Public Schools. However, no language in this provision requires that a teacher
must do so—the only requirements are that (1) a teacher be eligible to retire at the time of
separation from Minneapolis Public Schools and (2) be at least fifty-five years of age. The
arbitrator was correct when it noted that K.T. met both of these qualifications, and thereby
qualified for “wellness pay.”

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issues . . . [A]rbitrators are withou t such authority in Minnesota.”); see also County of
Hennepin v. Law Enf’t Labo r Servs., Inc., Local No. 19 , 527 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn.
1995). However, we do not find this error to require reversal.
Both McGrath and County of Hennepin reiterate that arbitrators may not decide
constitutional claims. However, they do not stand for the proposition that an impermissible
constitutional determination requires reversal of an arbitrato r’s award which is otherwise
based upon proper grounds and Minneapolis Public Schools has cited no authority directing
such a result. Instead, the supreme court in McGrath specifically examined a situation in
which a case involving both claims under a collective bargaining agreement and other
constitutional claims were pres ented to an arbitrator. See McGrath, 312 N.W.2d at 441.
No constitutional claim was here raised as it was addressed by the arbitrator sua sponte.
In this case, the arbitrator’s permissi ble determinations—that the grievance was
timely and that the CBA provided for the “wellness pay” benefit—were made solely upon
his review of the CBA and consistent with his role as the arbitrator. It is these
determinations we review and affirm. The fa ct that the arbitrator impermissibly, and
alternatively, reached the same result via a constitutional basis does not mandate reversal
of an otherwise valid award.
Affirmed.