Wayne Nicolaison, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0923

Wayne Nicolaison,
Appellant,

vs.

Peter Puffer, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed March 29, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Carlton County District Court
File No. 09-CV-20-94

Wayne Nicolaison, Moose Lake, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, R.J. Detric k, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Pres iding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Wayne Nicolaison, a patient of the Minnesota Sex Offender Program
(MSOP), sought a declaratory judgment that prov ides he must be prescribed a specific
medication to treat his acid reflux disease a nd that the Medical Assistance program must
pay for that medication. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a

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claim on which relief can be granted because the complaint asserts only the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), and not an underlying cause of action, as a basis for
relief. On appeal, Nicolaison argues that th e district court erred by failing to liberally
construe his complaint, and that his complaint, liberally construed, asserts several viable
causes of action. We affirm.
FACTS1
Nicolaison is committed indefinitely to the MSOP in Moose La ke. His complaint
alleges that for several years, MSOP medical staff prescribed him Zantac to treat his acid
reflux disease. Nicolaison has a Medical Assistance card th at he used to pay for the
prescription Zantac. His complaint alleges that in December 2019, when he went to request
a refill of the prescription, respondent Keri 2 Ovsak who is a nurse practitioner, informed
him that Zantac had been recalled. According to Nicolaison, Ovsak then told him that he
would need to purchase the over-the-count er medication Omeprazole from the MSOP
canteen as an alternative treatment.
Omeprazole, according to the complaint, is available at the canteen for $13.99 per
bottle. Nicolaison receives monthly cash as sistance through Henne pin County Welfare
Agency in the amount of $102 and has no other source of income. The complaint alleges
that the cash assistance is for “personal needs,” such as clothing, telephone calls, hygienic

1 For the purposes of reviewing a case dismissed pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e), we
accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true. Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A. , 851 N.W.2d
598, 606 (Minn. 2014).

2 Respondents represent that Nicolaison’s pleadings misspell Ovsak’s first name as
“Carrie.”

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supplies, postage, and electronics, and that it is not for “medical treatments” because
medical treatments are “to be paid for by medical assistance.” Since the time that
Nicolaison’s Zantac prescription expired, his symptoms of acid reflux have returned.
Nicolaison sued respondents Peter Puffe r, allegedly the MSOP facility director
during the relevant period, and Ovsak under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act
(UDJA), Minn. Stat. §§ 555.01-.16 (2020), seeking a declaratory judgment that
“Defendants are liable to treat [his] ‘acid reflux disease’ [by] prescribing Omeprazole” and
that Medical Assistance will pay for the Omeprazole. Respondents moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing that Nicolaison’s complaint sought relief
based only on the UDJA, which does not create an independent cause of action. They also
argued that the complaint was substantively meritless because the facts alleged do not give
rise to a claim for relief.
Following a hearing, the district court gr anted the motion to dismiss the complaint.
The district court reasoned that “[t]he UDJA is not an independent source of jurisdiction
and, as such, a party seeking a declaratory judgment must have an independent underlying
cause of action based upon a common law or statutory right.” The district court concluded
that because Nicolaison had “not pled an i ndependent underlying cause of action based
upon any common law or statutory right,” his complaint must be dismissed.
Nicolaison appeals.
DECISION
On appeal from a district court’s order di smissing a complaint for failure to state a
claim under rule 12.02(e) of the Minnesota Ru les of Civil Procedure, “the only question

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before [the reviewing court] is whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim
for relief.” Barton v. Moore , 558 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn. 1997). In analyzing this
question, we liberally construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
See Abel v. Abbott Nw. Hosp. , 947 N.W.2d 58, 68 (Minn. 2020); Gertken v. State , 493
N.W.2d 290, 292 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Feb. 9, 1993). We accept the
facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party. Sipe v. STS Mfg, Inc., 834 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Minn. 2013); St. James Capital Corp.
v. Pallet Recycling Assocs. of N. Am., Inc. , 589 N.W.2d 511, 514 (Minn. App. 1999).
Whether the complaint is suffi cient to survive dismissal unde r rule 12.02(e) is a question
of law that is reviewed de novo. See Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 606.
Nicolaison’s complaint purports to be base d on the UDJA. The UDJA provides that
when a person’s “rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal
ordinance, contract, or franchise,” the pe rson “may have determined any question of
construction or validity arisi ng under the instrument, statut e, ordinance, contract, or
franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.”
Minn. Stat. § 555.02. The UDJA gives the district court the “power to declare rights, status,
and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” Minn. Stat.
§ 555.01. “The purpose of th e statute is to settle uncertai nty and it is to be liberally
construed and administered.” All. for Metro. Stability v. Metro. Council, 671 N.W.2d 905,
915 (Minn. App. 2003); see Minn. Stat. § 555.12.
This court has explained, though, that the UDJA “is not an express independent
source of jurisdiction.” All. for Metro. Stability , 671 N.W.2d at 915. And “the [UDJA]

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cannot create a cause of action that does not otherwise exist.” Id. at 916; see also Anderson
v. County of Lyon, 784 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Aug. 24,
2010).
Nicolaison is a self-represented litig ant. Though courts may make “some
accommodations” for self-represented litigants, “this court has repeatedly emphasized that
[self-represented] litigants are generally held to the same st andards as attorneys and must
comply with co urt rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald , 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App.
2001). “While [a self-represented] appellant . . . is usually accorded some leeway in
attempting to comply with court rules, he is still not relie ved of the burden of, at least,
adequately communicating to the court what it is he wants accomplished and by whom.”
Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc., 400 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. 1987).
Nicolaison appears to argue that the di strict court erred by failing to liberally
construe his complaint, and that the complaint, if liberally construed, contains underlying
causes of action based on (1) the commitmen t order, (2) the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Unite d States Constitution, and (3 ) Minnesota Statute section
256B.0625, subdivision 13 (2 020), which governs Medical Assistance benefits. In so
arguing, he appears to concede that the UDJA is not an independent source of
jurisdiction—as the district c ourt correctly held—and that he must assert an underlying
cause of action based on statutory or common law.3

3 Nicolaison asserts, for example, that “[t]he error of the [district] court upon review” is
that the complaint “indeed provided an in dependent cause of action based upon common
law or statutory rights.”

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After a careful review, we conclude that Nicolaison’s complain t, even liberally
construed, does not assert a claim u pon which relief could be granted. See Minn. R. Civ.
P. 12.02(e). The complaint specifically seeks a declaratory judgment “as to the responsible
party’s cost for care for the purchase of medica tion to treat severe ‘a cid reflux disease.’”
Regarding the “responsible party,” he asserts that Medical Assistance must pay the cost of
the requested medication. To support this position, the complaint references only the 1992
order of the district court that authoriz ed Nicolaison’s indefinite commitment (the
commitment order). The commitment order stat es that “Appropriate public funding will
pay for the costs of care and treatment to the extent [Nicolaison] is unable to pay.”
As to Nicolaison’s assertion that th e complaint raises certain constitutional
challenges, the complaint makes no referenc e to due process, equal protection, the
Fourteenth Amendment, or the United States Constitution. Nor does it allege facts that
could support such claims.4

4 Under the Due Process Clause of the Fo urteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, the state cannot “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Due process “imposes constraints on
governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within
the meaning of the Du e Process Clause.” Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96
S. Ct. 893, 901 (1976). Nicolaison’s comp laint does not specifically identify any
constitutionally protected liberty or property interests affected here, nor does it describe
the process that was necessary to lawfully deprive him of such an interest.

The Equal Protection Clause, for its part, provides that “[no state shall] deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.” U.S. Co nst. amend. XIV, § 1. The
Equal Protection Clause “direct[s] that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike,” but “only invidious discrimi nation” violates the Constitution. In re Estate of
Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767, 769 (M inn. 1986) (quotation om itted). Thus, unless the
discrimination involves a suspect classificati on or fundamental right, the state need only
have a rational basis for the differential treatment. See id. The complaint does not assert

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The complaint similarly do es not reference any specif ic statutory provisions
governing Medical Assistance benefits. In his appellate brief, Nicolaison references
Minnesota Statutes section 256B.0625, subdivi sion 13, which describes the “drugs” that
Medical Assistance covers. But the complaint does not cite or reference this statute and,
even if it did, Nicolaison has not shown how the Medical Assistance benefit statute permits
a cause of action against the respondents here, who have no responsibility for administering
the Medical Assistance program.
The commitment order, which requires th at “[a]ppropriate public funding will pay
for the costs of care and treatment to the extent [Nicolaison] is unable to pay,” is referenced
in the complaint, and the complaint could be liberally read to suggest that the commitment
order is the basis for respondents’ alleged obligation to prescribe Nicolaison the requested
medication. But Nicolaison does not cite a ny authority for the proposition that a court
order can form the basis for a declaratory judgment action under the UDJA.
Moreover, even if Nicolaison can base his action for declaratory judgment on a
violation of the commitment order, he has not alleged facts to support a claim that the
respondents violated that order. Again, th e commitment order states that “[a]ppropriate
public funding will pay for th e costs of care and treatment to the extent [Nicolaison] is
unable to pay.” (Emphasis added.) Nicolaison does not allege that he is unable to pay for
the over-the-counter medication; instead, he alleges that he should not have to pay for the

that respondents treated Nicolaison differently than similarly-situat ed individuals, much
less on the basis of a suspect classification or fundamental right. He accordingly did not
adequately plead an equal-protection violation.

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medication out of his monthly cash assistance of $102. Acco rdingly, he has not alleged
facts to show that the respondents violated their obligations under the commitment order.
The district court did not err in determin ing that Nicolaison could not bring a claim
based solely on the UDJA. And even liberally construed, the complaint does not assert an
underlying cause of action based upon any common law or statutory right.
Affirmed.