In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: J. S.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0938

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: J. S.

Filed November 2, 2020
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Pope County District Court
File No. 61-JV-19-107

John E. Mack, New London Law, P.A., New London, Minnesota (for appellant)

Neil Nelson, Pope County A ttorney, Troy E. Nelson, A ssistant County Attorney,
Glenwood, Minnesota (for respondent)

Geri Krueger, Glenwood, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
This case involves appellant-mother’s seco nd challenge to the termination of her
parental rights to a child born in 2019. Appellant’s first challenge resulted in this court
remanding the matter back to the district c ourt for findings regarding the child’s best
interests. On remand, the district court made detailed findings and again terminated
appellant’s parental rights. In the current a ppeal, appellant argues that the district court
abused its discretion by declining to reope n the record on remand and by denying her

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post-remand motions. Because the district court did not abus e its discretion by declining
to reopen the record or by denying appellant’s motions, we affirm.
FACTS
On March 19, 2019, appellant-mother J.S. gave birth to a child.1 The next day, Pope
County Human Services opened an investiga tion because mother’s parental rights to
another child had recently been involuntarily terminated. After launching the investigation,
the county petitioned the district court to involuntarily termin ate mother’s parental rights
to the newborn child based on palpable unfitness to parent under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(4) (2018). Pursuant to its petitio n, the county took immediate custody of the
child and requested a hair follic le test from mothe r. The hair follicle tested positive for
methamphetamine.
In June 2019, the district court held a trial. The court heard testimony from two
child protection social workers and the guardi an ad litem. All three expressed concern
about mother’s ability to parent the child. The first social wo rker testified that mother’s
parental rights to her previous child had been terminated in 2018 because of child neglect.
She also testified that mother was not a viable option for permanent placement for the child
because of her “recent involuntary terminati on of parental rights, her child protection
history, and past drug use.” She expressed her belief that it would be in the child’s best
interests to remain in foster care. The second social worker testified to concerns about
mother’s ability to parent the child based on her “prior [ter mination of parental rights],

1 Father is not a party to this appeal and was not a party to the original appeal.

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[her] criminal history, [and her] child protection history.” The guardian ad litem testified
that mother was not a viable permanency option because of he r lack of understanding of
why her parental rights had previously been terminated, her drug use, and her lack of stable
housing. Mother also testifie d. Mother acknowledged that her parental rights to another
child were involuntarily terminated in 2018, but testified that she had taken positive steps
to maintain a safe and sober environment fo r both children. Mother also acknowledged
multiple periods of relapse from sobriety.
By an order dated July 29, 2019, the district court involuntarily terminated mother’s
parental rights to the child. The district court concluded that the county satisfied its burden
of proving that mother was presumed to be palpably unfit under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(4), that mother failed to rebut the presumption, and that involuntary termination
of mother’s parental rights was in the child’s be st interests. But the district court did not
analyze the best-interests factors set forth in Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04 or make any
specific findings to support its best-interests determination. Moth er appealed, and we
reversed and remanded for the district court to make proper best-interests findings. In re
Welfare of Children of J.S., No. A19-1505, 2020 WL 774012, at *3 (Minn. App. Feb. 18,
2020). We also provided that “the district court, in its discretion, may reopen the record or
hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id.
Shortly after remand, mother moved the di strict court for an order directing the
county to provide her with services aimed at reunification of mother and child. In support
of her motion, mother included an email describing her efforts to better herself. The email
provided updated information about mothe r’s circumstances, but did not offer any

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information about ho w long she had been sober. And, mother did not mo ve the district
court to reopen the record or request an evidentiary hearing after remand.
Prior to issuing a decision on mother’s motion for services, the district court issued
its order on remand. In that order, the district court noted that it reviewed the information
included in the email provided by mother along with her motion for services and concluded
that the new information did not warrant reopening the record on remand. It stated:
The motion [requesting provision of services] was
accompanied by an email from Mother. Although no affidavit
or admissible evidence was provided, Mother makes no
mention in the email about her length of sobriety, which is a
primary concern in the case. Th e District Court declines to
re-open the record because it finds that it had sufficient
evidence at the time of the trial to make a determination on the
child’s best interests.
The district court then made detailed findings of fact, based on the evidence presented at
trial, about the child’s best interests and mother’s fitness to parent. Based on those factual
findings, the district court again conclude d that mother had fa iled to overcome the
presumption of palpable unfitness and that termination was in the child’s best interests. On
that basis, the district court reaffirmed its earlier decision to termin ate mother’s parental
rights to the child.
After the district court issued its order on remand, mother moved for a new trial.
On August 21, 2019 the district court held a hearing to consider mother’s motion for a new
trial and her motion requesting that the county provide services aimed at reunification. The
district court denied both motions. This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to reopen the
record or hold an evidentiary hearing after remand.
Mother contends that the district court abused its discretion by declining to reopen
the record or hold an evidentiary hear ing after remand. The co unty responds that the
district court acted within its discretion when it declined to do so . We agree with the
county.
A district court’s duty on remand is to “execute the mandate of the remanding court
strictly according to its terms.” Duffey v. Duffey, 432 N.W.2d 473, 476 (Minn. App. 1988).
If the remanding court does not give specific instructions, the district court may handle the
case “in any manner not inconsistent with the remand order.” Id.
Appellate courts “review a district court’s compliance with remand instructions for
an abuse of discretion.” State v. Montermini, 819 N.W.2d 447, 454 (Minn. App. 2012). A
district court abuses its discretion if “it acts against logic and the facts on record, or if it
enters fact findings that are unsupported by the record, or if it misapplies the law.” In re
Adoption of T.A.M. , 791 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn. App. 2010) (quotation and citations
omitted).
Mother raises two main arguments in support of her contention that the district court
abused its discretion by not reopening the reco rd or holding an evid entiary hearing after
remand. First, she argues that our prior decision required the district court to either reopen
the record or hold an evidentiary hearing af ter remand. Mother’s argument is based on a
misreading of our decision. In our decision, we stated that the district court “in its

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discretion, may reopen the record or hold an evidentiary hearing.” J.S., 2020 WL 774012,
at *3. Our use of the word “may” makes clear that we left the decision to the discretion of
the district court. If we had intended to requi re the district court to reopen the record or
hold an evidentiary hearing, we would have used the word “m ust” rather than the word
“may.” Mother’s argument is inconsistent with the plain language of our decision.
Second, mother argues that even if the district court had the discretion to reopen the
record or hold an evid entiary hearing, the district cour t abused its discretion by failing to
do so. She contends that the district court abused its discretion because it needed updated
information about mother’s circumstances to make its determination on remand. The
record shows otherwise.
On remand, the district court considered whether to reopen the record or whether to
base its decision on the existing record develope d at the July 2019 trial. In reaching its
decision, the district court considered the email from mother filed in support of her motion
for reunification services. The email was th e only new information filed by mother prior
to the district court’s order on remand. The email discussed changes in mother’s life since
trial, including housing, employment, par ticipation in counseling, attendance at “NA
meetings,” and other matters. But the email did not discu ss how long mother had been
sober. The district court focused on this om ission in its decision regarding whether to
reopen the record. The district court noted “[m]other makes no mention in the email about
the length of her sobriety, which is a primary concern in the case .” (Emphasis added.)
The district court then concluded that it had sufficient evidence at the time of trial to make
a determination on the child’s best interests and declined to reopen the record.

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The district court’s decision to not re open the record on remand was a proper
exercise of its discretion. The remand by this court was for the purpose of making
best-interests findings. Id. The best-interests factors incl ude: (1) the child ’s interest in
preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-
child relationship; and (3) any competing intere sts of the child. Minn . R. Juv. Prot. P.
58.04(c)(2)(ii). Competing interests of the child may include a “stable environment, health
considerations[,] and the child’s preferences.” In re Welfare of the Children of J.R.B., 805
N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6,
2012). If “the interests of th e parent and child conflict, th e interests of the child are
paramount.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2018).
In its order on remand, the district court made detailed findings of fact regarding the
best-interests factors and analyzed each factor individually. With regard to the first factor,
the district court concluded that the child had no interest in preser ving the parent-child
relationship because the child, who was placed in foster care shortly after birth, did not
have a relationship with mother. The district court also determined that the child is
vulnerable and needs a caregiver who will prioritize his needs. With regard to the second
factor, the district court concluded that moth er has a great interest in preserving the
parent-child relationship based on her testimony that she loves her child and wants to care
for the child. Finally, with regard to the competing interests of the child, the district court
did not believe that mother could provide a safe environment free from the influence of
drugs. And the district court was concerned that the child’s health could be compromised
as a result of “[m]other’s drug issues” if the child were returned to mother. The court

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recognized “[m]other’s efforts at sobriety” but did not believe that the child could “live a
healthy life in her care as evidenced by [m]oth er’s multiple relapses and ongoing issues
with drug use.” The district court was especially concerned that mother did not “recognize
how her drug use impacts her children.” Bala ncing the interests, the district court
concluded that it was in the child’s best interests that mother’s parental rights be
terminated.
Given the court’s focus on mother’s ability to remain sober and her history of
challenges with drug use, we conclude that the district court acted well within its discretion
when it declined to reopen the record after remand for purposes of making the best-interests
findings. While mother’s updated information in her email was relevant to the
best-interests factors, the r ecord supports the district cour t’s determination that the new
evidence did not address a key factor identified by the court—mother’s sobriety. And the
court was able to fully address the best-inter ests factors with the evidence developed at
trial. Thus, the district court acted within its discretion in declining to reopen the record or
hold an evidentiary hearing.
Mother also argues that the district court abused its discretion by not seeking input
from the parties before it decided not to reopen the record. But mother fails to identify any
statute or caselaw requiring the district court to hold such a hearing or otherwise seek input
from the parties on remand. The case relied upon by mother, El Nashaar v. El Nashaar ,
529 N.W.2d 13, 14 (Minn. App. 1995), does not involve a matter on remand. Rather, that
case addresses a situation wher e the district court continued a hearing on an ex parte
temporary order for protection beyond the period permitted by statute. Id. Moreover, in

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this case, mother never filed a motion to reopen the record or a request for a hearing on the
matter. And mother has not suffered any prejudice because, as discussed above, the district
court considered her new information when deciding whether to reopen the record. In sum,
the district court did not ab use its discretion when it deci ded not to reopen the record
without first holding a hearing on the matter.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denyin g mother’s motion
for a new trial.
Mother also challenges the district court’ s denial of her motion for a new trial, which
she filed after the district court issued its order on remand. Mother argues that the district
court abused its discretion in denying her motion for a new trial because a new trial was
“the only way . . . new evidence could be presented to the court” regarding the
developments in her life since the June 2019 trial. In addition, she raises substantive
challenges to the merits of the district court’s decision denying her motion for a new trial.
Appellate courts review “a district court’s decision to grant or deny a new trial for
an abuse of discretion.” Christie v. Estate of Christie, 911 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Minn. 2018).
A district court abuses its discretion if “it acts against logic and the facts on record, or if it
enters fact findings that are unsupported by the record, or if it misapplies the law.” T.A.M.,
791 N.W.2d at 578 (quotation and citations omitted).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother’s
motion for a new trial because the motion was not properly before the district court. Mother
filed her motion for a new trial in June 2020 after the district court issued its May 2020
order on remand. This was mother’s second motion for a new trial. Mother had previously

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filed a motion for a new trial in August 2019 af ter the June 2019 tria l, which the district
court denied.
Mother’s most recent motion for a new trial was procedurally improper because the
district court did not hold a trial after rema nd. “A motion for a new trial is an anomaly
where there has been no trial and the denial of such a motion is not appealable.”
Johnson v. Johnson, 439 N.W.2d 430, 431 (Minn. App. 1989). And, while mother’s first
motion for a new trial was timely, this most recent motion was brought well past the ten-day
window for a new trial in rela tion to the June 2019 trial an d July 2019 order terminating
mother’s parental rights. See Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 21.01, subd. 1 (requiring a motion for
a new trial to be served within ten days of service of notice of the filing of the court’s order
finding that the statutory grou nds set forth in the petition ar e proved). Because mother’s
most recent motion for a new trial was not prope rly before the district court, the district
court did not err in denying the motion. See Brodsky v. Brodsky , 733 N.W.2d 471, 480
(Minn. App. 2007) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a
motion that was procedurally defective). Consequently, it is not necessary to address
mother’s substantive challenges to the district court’s denial of that motion and we decline
to do so.2
We do note, however, that we are not pers uaded that a motion for a new trial was
the only avenue available to mother to pres ent new evidence to the district court after

2 Mother’s substantive arguments include tha t: (1) the district court erred by concluding
that it was not required to consider mother’s new evidence on remand, and (2) the district
court erred by concluding that Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4 ) is constitutional as
applied to mother.

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remand. Mother could have filed a motion to re-open the record on ce she received our
remand decision in her first appeal, but she chose not to do so.3 Instead, she filed a motion
requesting that the district court order the co unty to provide reunification services. The
district court’s denial of that motion is addressed below.
III. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by denyin g mother’s motion
for provision of services.
Mother argues that the district court ab used its discretion by denying her motion,
made after remand, for an order directing the county to provide her with services aimed at
reunification. Generally, in a juvenile-prot ection proceeding, the district court must
“ensure that reasonable efforts . . . by the social services agency are made to . . . reunite
the child with the child ’s family at the earliest possibl e time.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)
(2018). But reasonable efforts by the social se rvices agency are not required where the
petitioner shows a prima facie case that “the pa rental rights of the parent to another child
have been terminated involuntarily.” Id. (a)(2).
In its order denying mother’s motion for services, the district court noted that it had
previously found that the county made a prima facie showing that mother’s parental rights
to another child had been involuntarily terminated. On that basis, the district court denied
mother’s motion for services consistent with Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)(2). The district court
also denied the motion on the grounds that mo ther’s request was beyond the scope of our
remand.

3 A party can make a motion for relief or an or der under Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 14.01 and
request a hearing on that motion under Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 14.06.

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In her brief, mother recogni zes that the district court was not required to order the
county to provide th e requested services. But she ar gues that the court still had the
discretion to order the services. And she contends that its failure to do so was an abuse of
discretion because the provision of services w ould have provided the district court with
updated information on the lives of mother a nd the child that could have been used in
making its findings on remand.
District courts are vested with broad di scretionary powers in juvenile-protection
matters. In re Welfare of Child of S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d 723, 733 (Minn. App. 2009). Even
assuming those broad discretionary powers in clude the authority to order the requested
services after remand, the district court ac ted well within its discretion when it denied
mother’s motion for services. As the district court correctly noted, the law does not require
reunification services where, as here, the c ounty has made a prima facie showing that the
parent previously had their parental rights involuntarily terminated. See Minn.
Stat. § 260.012(a)(2). And th e record supports the district court’s conclusion that it
had sufficient evidence from the trial to ma ke the required best-interests findings on
remand.
The district court also properly concluded that the motion was beyond the scope of
our remand to the district court. Our decision required findings on the best-interests factors
and gave the district court the discretion to reopen the record. J.S., 2020 WL 774012, at *3.
But we did not require, or even address, the provision of additional services by the county.

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See id. Accordingly, we conclude that the dist rict court did not abuse its discretion by
denying mother’s motion for the provision of services.
Affirmed.