In the Matter of the Application of Anthony Theodore Wagoner for a Change of Name.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0962

In the Matter of the Application of
Anthony Theodore Wagoner for a Change of Name.

Filed June 1, 2021
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Carlton County District Court
File No. 09-CV-19-2425

Anthony Wagoner, Bayport, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Jessica J. Fralich, Assistant County Attorney,
Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his application for a name change . Because we
conclude that the state’s compelling interest in public safety outweighs the burden on the
exercise of appellant’s religious beliefs and the district court did not abuse its discretion ,
we affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant Anthony Theodore Wagoner is currently serving a 95 -month prison
sentence imposed in January 2019 for first-degree aggravated robbery. The offense
involved robbery of a convenience store during which Wagoner threatened a clerk with a
hatchet. He has an extensive criminal history, including convictions of: first-degree
aggravated robbery (2004); second-degree burglary, unlawful possession of a firearm, and
second-degree a ssault with a dangerous weapon (2012); and numerous misdemeanor
offenses (2011-12).
In December 2019, Wagoner applied to change his name, asserting his religious
beliefs require him to use the name “Thorvald Anthony -Theodore Ueland.” Respondent
St. Louis County—the authority that prosecuted the offense for which Wagoner is
incarcerated—objected. The county cited Wagoner’s criminal history, and asserted that
his request was made with intent to defraud or mislead, was not made in good faith, and
that granting the change would compromise public safety.
Wagoner filed a responsive memorandum further detailing the reasons for his
request. He explained that he practices the Asatru religion, which involves runic
interpretation. In September 2019, Wagoner conducted a “Nine World Rune Cast ” that
revealed to him, “in no uncertain terms”:
a) That the Gods and Ancestors will no longer honor my
devotion to, and my practice of, the Asatru religion if I do not
change my name and begin to conduct ALL of my affairs, both
mundane and sacred, under this new name. b) This new name
must honor my matern al ancestry and must also reflect the
sacred path I have chosen. c) That references to my old
surname “Wagoner” must be minimized as much as possible
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in order to minimize the destruction that each reference will
reap upon my Hamingja (part of a person’s soul complex).

Wagoner further asserted that denying his request would substantially burden his faith, and
that this burden outweighs the interest in public safety because modern technology makes
it possible to accurately track a person’s criminal history across multiple names.
The district court denied Wagoner’s request following a hearing. It determined that
the state’s compelling interest in public safety overcomes Wagoner’s exercise of his
religious beliefs and there is no less -restrictive alternative to denying his requested name
change. The court rejected Wagoner’s argument that modern technology will eliminate
confusion, noting that he proposed to drop his surname entirely and that the “public should
not be forced to sift through name change and oth er records to find out if their records
search is in fact accurate.”
Wagoner moved the district court to reconsider, asserting he is not a threat to public
safety and further explaining the significance of the rune cast to his faith. The district court
declined to reconsider its decision, reasoning that while Wagoner’s religious beliefs are
sincere, he understates the potential for confusion and the public-safety concerns associated
with changing his name. Wagoner appeals.
DECISION
Minnesota Statute sec tion 259.13 (2020) governs requests by convicted felons
seeking to change their name. The statute gives the prosecuting authority the right to object
if the request (1) is intended to “defraud or mislead, ” (2) “is not made in good faith, ”
(3) “will cause injury to a person, ” or (4) “will compromise public safety. ” Minn. Stat.
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§ 259.13, subd. 2. When the prosecuting authority does object, the applicant must prove
by clear and convincing evidence that there is no basis for denying the name change. Id.,
subd. 3. But a district court must “grant a name change if failure to allow it would infringe
on a constitutional right of the person.” Id., subd. 4. We generally review a district court’s
decision on a name-change request for abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of C.M.G., 516
N.W.2d 555, 561 (Minn. App. 1994). But we review de novo whether a district court’s
decision violated a person’s constitutional rights. State v. Tate , 682 N.W.2d 169, 174
(Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004).
Wagoner argues that the denial of his requested name change infringes upon his
rights under the Freedom of Conscience Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. See Minn.
Const. art. I, § 16 (recognizing the “right . . . to worship God according to the dictates of
[one’s] own conscience”). To determine whether these rights have been violated, we apply
“the compelling-state-interest test.” State v. Pedersen, 679 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Minn. App.
2004), review denied (Minn. Aug. 17, 2004). This test considers whether: (1) the religious
belief is “sincerely held,” (2) “the state regulation burdens the exercise of religious beliefs,”
(3) “the state interest . . . is overriding or compelling,” and (4) “the state regulation uses
the least restrictive means.” Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487
N.W.2d 857, 865 (Minn. 1992).
The district court determined —and the parties agree —that Wagoner’s religious
beliefs are sincere and that denying his re quested name change burdens them. See
Pedersen, 679 N.W.2d at 376 (stating a belief is sincere if it is not “a personal, secular
belief” but is instead tied to “philosophical principle or religious tenet”). He has been
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practicing the Asatru faith since 2005 and expresses extensive knowledge of its practices
and core beliefs. Wagoner asserts that the S eptember 2019 rune cast compels him to
change his name. Denying his request to do so creates a “real and not remote” risk of
interference with his religious practices. Edina Cmty. Lutheran Chur ch v. State , 745
N.W.2d 194, 204 (Minn. App. 2008) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Apr. 29,
2008). Accordingly, Wagoner satisfies the first two prongs of the Hill-Murray compelling-
state-interest test.
But the record persuades us that the state’s compelling interest in public safety
overrides the burden on Wagoner’s religious beliefs. The state has a fundamental interest
in protecting public safety and a compelling interest in maintaining records of violent
crimes. See State v. Ambaye , 616 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 2000) (implicitly sanctioning
the district court’s recognition of a compelling interest in “maintaining [a] record of
violence”); State v. Hershberger , 462 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1990) (“The interest in
public safety is also fundament al, and serves as a rationale for the very formation of our
state government.”).
Wagoner’s proposed name change implicates this compelling interest. He is
currently incarcerated for first-degree aggravated robbery —one of several crimes of
violence he has committed since 2004. He contends that he poses no risk to public safety
because “[a]ll of [his] crimes have been committed out of absolute desperation or self -
defense,” and he has for the first time expressed a commitment to remain crime-free. But
Wagoner has not demonstrated law-abiding behavior when released from incarceration in
the past. And it is difficult to square his explanations for his past acts with the v iolent
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nature of the offenses. We are not convinced that the state’s interest in public safety ,
including the state’s ability to maintain and provide information to the public regarding
Wagoner, will be met if Wagoner is permitted to assume a new and very different name.
The nature of the relief Wagoner seeks further supports our conclusion that denial
of his name -change request will not impermissibly infringe on his religious practices.
Existing law provides no less-restrictive alternative—the only options available under the
statute are to grant or deny the name change. See Minn. Stat. § 259.13, subds. 3, 4. Because
the state’s interests in maintaining an accurate record of Wagoner’s criminal history
override Wagoner’s sincerely held beliefs, and there is no less -restrictive alternative,
denying the name -change request does not impermissibly infringe on Wagoner’s
constitutional rights.
Having concluded that denial of Wagoner’s request did not impermissibly infringe
on his constitutional rights, we consider whether the district court otherwise abused its
discretion by denying his request. C.M.G., 516 N.W.2d at 561. The district court
determined that the state’s interest in maintaining accurate records is compelling given the
seriousness of Wagoner’s past criminal conduct. And the court was not persuaded that
Wagoner’s records would be easily tied to his proposed new name, stating that Wagoner
“is overly optimistic that every search through an appropriate agency would provide
accurate records without confusion .” Based on our review of the record, we discern no
abuse of discretion in the district court’s implicit conclusion that Wagoner did not meet his
evidentiary burden. Wagoner’s unproven and conclusory assertions that his name change
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would not cause confusion about his identity and criminal history are not clear and
convincing evidence that his name change will not compromise public safety.
Finally, we note the district court’s observation that Wagoner may renew his name-
change request after he is released from prison. In the past, Wagoner has not remained
law-abiding when released from custody. But he will ha ve the opportunity to choose a
different path. Doing so may mitigate public-safety concerns and warrant more favorable
future consideration of a proposed name change.
In sum, the denial of Wagoner’s requested name change did not impermissibly
burden th e exercise of his religious beliefs. And the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying his request.
Affirmed.