In the Matter of: Gohar Yesayan, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0968

In the Matter of: Gohar Yesayan,
Respondent,

vs.

Sarkis Mkhsyan,
Appellant.

Filed April 19, 2021
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-DA-FA-20-2499

Gohar Yesayan, (pro se respondent)

Ryan J. Grove, Rogosheske, Rogosheske & Atkins, PLLC, South St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this appeal from the issuance of an order for protection (OFP), appellant
challenges the district court’s factual findings and the district court’s decision to grant the
OFP petition. Because the reco rd supports the district co urt’s findings and because the
decision was not against logic, we affirm the district court’s decision.

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FACTS
On May 7, 2020, respondent Gohar Yesayan petitioned for an OFP against appellant
Sarkis Mkhsyan. At the time of the petition, Yesayan and Mkhsyan had been married for
17 years and had three minor ch ildren together. In her petition, Yesayan alleged that
Mkhsyan had abused her and th at the most recent abuse o ccurred on May 6, 2020. The
petition indicated that Mkhsyan forced Yesayan out of their home, threatened her, said he
was going to keep their children, took her phone, and cut off her access to financial
resources. Yesayan also alleged that Mkhsya n hit her on May 1, 2020: “After my visit
with the doctor for our newborn baby, he clai med I was late, got angr y and hit me in the
head.” The district court issued an ex parte OFP on May 8, 2020. Mkhsyan was personally
served with the ex parte O FP and requested an evidentiary hearing on the matter on May
13, 2020.
On June 9, 2020, the district court held an evidentiary hearing. Yesayan testified
that on May 1, 2020, Mkhsyan hit her on the head in anger:
Q: When was the last time Mr. Mkhsyan physically abused
you?
A: May 1st.
Q: What happened that day?
A: I had taken my young child to the doctor’s appointment.
Q: What is the name of your youngest child?
A: [A.M.].
Q: What happened when you t ook [A.M.] to the doctor’s
appointment?
A: Unfortunately, the appointm ent lasted too long. When
I came home, [Mkhsyan] was very upset. He needed his car so
that he can go to work. So at that time he said really bad words
to me and hit me on the head.
Q: Where did this happen?
A: In our home.

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Q: And who was there?
A: Myself, [Mkhsyan], and [A.M.].
Q: Were you holding [A.M.]?
A: Yes.
Q: How did you feel when this happened?
A: I was very afraid.

Yesayan also testified that the parties got into an argument on May 5, 2020, and that
on that day, Mkhsyan took away her telephone and told her she had to leave the house.
Yesayan used her son’s phone to contact her friend to pick her up, and she ultimately left
the home with the parties’ two youngest children on May 6, 2020. The parties’ oldest son
remained with Mkhsyan. Yesayan also te stified that Mkhsyan hit her in January 2020
when she was pregnant and that he abused her throughout their marriage.
In his testimony, Mkhsyan denied hitting Yesayan, causing her physical harm,
putting her in fear of immediate physical harm, or threatening her with physical harm. But
he did acknowledge that there was a dispute between his family and her family, and that
he sent her family members a heated text message after Yesayan left with the two younger
children. The parties’ oldest son also testif ied briefly at the evidentiary hearing. He
testified about the events on May 5, 2020, but not about the events of May 1, 2020. The
oldest son explained that on May 5, 2020, Mkhsyan yelled for him to come downstairs and
“get your mother away from me” and that he noticed “she was trying to . . . make it
physical.” He did not see his father hit his mother. Yesayan also presented the testimony
of her friend who stated that Yesayan told her in a conve rsation on May 3, 2020, that
Mkhsyan was physically abusiv e toward her. This witne ss did not testify regarding
personal knowledge of any specific incidents of abuse.

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Following the evidentiary h earing, the district court found Yesayan to be more
credible than Mkhsyan. In addition, the district court made the following finding about the
parties’ son’s testimony: “While the parties’ [o ldest son] testified th at he did not witness
any abuse on May [5], the Court did not hear testimony that he was present during the other
incidents of domestic abuse to which [Yesayan] testified.” Based on Yesayan’s testimony
that Mkhsyan had hit her on the head, the district court determined that Yesayan had proven
by a preponderance of the evidence that Mkhsyan committed domestic abuse against her.
The district court granted the petition, and Mkhsyan appeals.
DECISION
Mkhsyan makes two primary arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the district
court erred when it made the following thre e findings: (1) Yesayan was credible;
(2) Mkhsyan was not credible; and (3) the pa rties’ son did not witness any abuse on May
5, 2020. Mkhsyan believes the evidence presented does not support the credibility findings
and that the son’s testimony di sproves the alleged act of abuse on May 1, 2020. Second,
Mkhsyan challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that Yesayan’s testimony that
he hit her on the head cannot support the district court’s decision to grant the petition and
issue the OFP. Neither argument has merit.
The Domestic Abuse Act governs issuance of an OFP. See Minn. Stat. § 518B.01
(2020). The statute prov ides that a district court may issue an OFP upon a finding of
domestic abuse. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, su bd. 4. “[I]f committed against a family or
household member by a fami ly or household member,” domestic abuse includes the
following conduct: “physical harm, bodily injury , or assault,” “criminal sexual conduct,”

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and “the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault.”
Id., subd. 2(a). An OFP petitioner has the burden of proving that domestic abuse occurred
by a preponderance of the evidence. Oberg v. Bradley, 868 N.W.2d 62, 64 (Minn. App.
2015). Once a district court de termines that domestic abuse has been established, it may
“examine all of the relevant circumstances pr oven to determine whether to grant or deny
the petition for an OFP.” Thompson ex rel. Minor Child v. Schrimsher, 906 N.W.2d 495,
500 (Minn. 2018).
We view the record in the light most favor able to the district court’s findings and
will reverse only if we are “left with the defi nite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made.” Braend ex rel. Minor Children v. Braend, 721 N.W.2d 924, 927 (Minn. App.
2006) (quotation omitted). In doing so, “[w] e neither reconcile conflicting evidence nor
decide issues of witness credibility, which are exclusively the province of the factfinder.”
Gada v. Dedefo, 684 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. App. 20 04). We review a district court’s
decision granting an OFP petition for an abuse of discretion. Ekman v. Miller, 812 N.W.2d
892, 895 (Minn. App. 2012). A district court abuses its discretion by resolving the matter
in a manner that is against logic and the facts. Beardsley v. Garcia, 731 N.W.2d 843, 848
(Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted), aff’d, 753 N.W.2d 735 (Minn. 2008).
First, Mkhsyan argues that the district court erred in determining that Yesayan was
credible and that he was not credible. Becaus e these findings relate to the district court’s
credibility determinations, they ar e exclusively within the provin ce of the district court.
Mkhsyan also challenges the district court’s factual finding regarding the son’s testimony,
arguing that this testimony conf licts with Yesayan’s allegati ons of abuse. We are not

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persuaded. The son’s testimony concerned events on May 5, 2020, and Yesayan testified
that Mkhsyan hit her on the head on May 1, 2 020. Given this testimony, we are not left
with the firm conviction that the district court made a mistake when it found that the parties’
oldest son did not witness any abuse on May 5, 2020.
Second, Mkhsyan argues that Yesayan’s testimony is insufficient evidence to
support issuing the OFP. In her testimony, Yesayan claimed that on May 1, 2020, she took
the parties’ infant child to a doctor’s appointment and return ed home later than expected
because the appointment ran long. When she returned home that day, Mkhsyan was “very
upset” because he needed the car to go to work. According to Yesayan’s testimony,
Mkhsyan said “really bad word s to [her] and hit [her] on th e head.” Yesayan further
testified that she was holding their baby when Mkhsyan hit her on the head. This made her
feel “very afraid.” Mkhsyan argues that the testimony is not sufficient to establish that he
inflicted bodily harm or the fear of bod ily harm because there was no physical or
corroborating evidence, and because Yesayan did not report the abuse to law enforcement
when they went to the parties’ home on Ma y 6, 2020. There is no requirement that
domestic abuse be corroborated by physical evidence or injury or that petitioners report
incidents of abuse to the police. The distri ct court determined that Yesayan testified
credibly when she stated that she became “very afraid” after Mkhsyan hit her on the head
while she was holding their infant child. We conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion because given this testimony, granting the petition was not against logic.
We need not address either of Mkhs yan’s remaining arguments. Mkhsyan
challenges the district court’s legal conclusions as “insufficient” and asserts that the district

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court granted the petition based on testimony regarding allegations that were not mentioned
in the petition. Mkhsyan does not identify what additio nal legal conclusions were
necessary or direct us to any legal authority requiring additional conclusions. Likewise,
Mkhsyan presents no argument why the outco me would have been different absent
Yesayan’s testimony that Mkhsyan hit her in January 2020 when she was pregnant and
absent her general allegation that Mkhsyan abused her during their marriage. We decline
to address these two arguments because Mkhs yan did not adequately brief the arguments
and did not identify reversible error. See State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel
Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address issue not adequately
briefed); Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr., Inc. , 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1975)
(stating that, to obtain relief on appeal, an a ppellant must show both error and prejudice
resulting from that error); Waters v. Fiebelkorn , 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (Minn. 1944)
(“[O]n appeal error is never pr esumed. It must be made to appear affirmatively before
there can be reversal . . . [and] the burden of showing e rror rests upon the one who relies
upon it.”).
Affirmed.