State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0982

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Brian Lynn Paxton,
Appellant.

Filed August 2, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Kanabec County District Court
File No. 33-CR-18-232

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Barbara McFadden, Kanabec Co unty Attorney, Steven C. Cundy, Assistant County
Attorney, Mora, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and
Frisch, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of dom estic assault, terrori stic threats, and
unlawful possession of ammunition, and argues th at he is entitled to reversal of his
convictions and a new trial because the distri ct court abused its discretion by admitting

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relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2020). Appellant also argues that his
conviction of possession of ammunition must be reversed because the evidence is
insufficient to prove that he possessed ammunition. And, in a supplemental brief, appellant
further challenges the admission of relations hip evidence and claims that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
FACTS
In June 2018, respondent State of Minnes ota charged appellant Bryan Lynn Paxton
with three offenses: (1 ) domestic assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4
(2016), (2) threats of violence in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2016), and
(3) possession of ammunition by an ineligible person in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713,
subd. 1(2) (2016).
The complaint alleged that on June 9, 2018, Paxton’s 17-year-old son called police
because his father had been making threats against him and his grandmother (Paxton’s
mother). After receiving the call, three de puties and a sergeant fro m the local sheriff’s
department went to the residence of Paxton’s mother. There, Paxton’s son told one of the
responding deputies that he was with friends when he received a call from his grandmother
telling him that Paxton was causing a disturbance. Paxton’s son traveled to the residence.
Paxton and his son got into an argument. Paxton’s son told the deputies that Paxton shoved
him. Paxton’s son also told the deputies that Paxton threatened to “chop [him] in the
throat” and that Paxton “made comments about wanting [him] dead and gone and of having
visions of killing [him].” One of the respon ding deputies also sp oke with Paxton, who
admitted to having an argument with his so n but denied making any threats or being

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physical. After speaking with Paxton’s son and his friends, th e deputies arrested Paxton.
During a search incident to arrest, the arresting deputy found a bullet in Paxton’s pocket.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. Before trial, the parties stipulated that Paxton
had two prior domestic-violence-related convictions and that he was ineligible to possess
ammunition. Also before trial, the state requested that it be allowed to present “relationship
evidence” involving threats made by Paxton ag ainst his mother as well as prior threats
against his son. The district court concluded that the relationship evidence was admissible
under Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
At trial, the jury heard testimony from the three responding deputies, the sergeant,
Paxton’s mother, his son, and his son’s friends who were at the residence at the time of the
alleged conduct. Paxton chose not to testify. The following is a summary of the evidence
presented at trial.
Evidence Regarding the Alleged Incident and Prior Threats
At the time of the incident, Paxton was liv ing in a camper on his mother’s property
but their relationship was strained. According to Paxton’s mother, Paxton had been arguing
with her “almost every day.” On the day of the incident, Paxton was particularly “agitated.”
He threatened to have her “locked up in a mental institution” and also said that “he would
see [her] dead.” Because she was concerned, Paxton’s mother called Paxton’s son (her
grandson) and asked him to come to her residence to try to deescalate the situation.
Paxton’s son testified that, after receiving the call, he went to his grandmother’s
house with some friends to ch eck on her. He also planned to get a fishing boat that was
stored on the property. Paxton confronted his son about the boat because he did not want

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his son taking the boat. In the course of the confrontation, Paxton “got up in [his son’s]
face,” shoved him, and threatened to “chop” him in the throat. Paxton’s son was concerned
about the threat because he r ecently had neck surgery and a blow to the ne ck could have
caused him to bleed “to death.” Paxton’s son testified that Paxton was well aware that he
recently had neck surgery. Paxt on’s son also testified that Paxton had threatened him in
the past with various methods of killing him, that he was fearful about the threats, and that
Paxton had also threated his grandmother in the past.
Paxton’s son’s friends confirmed his account of the alter cation. On the day of the
incident, they each told the deputies that they saw Paxton approach and shove his son. The
friends also confirmed that Paxton threatened to hit his son in the throat and made other
threats of a more general nature.
One of the responding deputies also testified that he spoke to Paxton’s younger son
on the day of the incident. The younger son to ld the deputy that Paxton had yelled at his
older brother but that he did not see Paxton push his brother. Another deputy reported
having spoken to Paxton on the day of the incident. Paxton admitted to the deputy that he
had a verbal dispute with his son, but he denied making any threats or getting into a physical
altercation.
Evidence Regarding the Ammunition
At trial, the state produced a 357-caliber bullet. The arresting deputy identified the
bullet as the one found in Paxton’s pocket during a search incident to arrest. The deputy
also described the process of placing the bullet into a sealed evidence bag for secure storage
to preserve the evidence. The deputy acknowledged a discrepancy regarding the caliber of

5
the bullet in his police report. He attribut ed the discrepancy to human error. Another
deputy on the scene testified that she too erred in her police report regarding the caliber of
the bullet. She indicated that the error was a “typo.” Finally, the sergeant, who worked as
an evidence technician for the sheriff’s department at the time of Paxton’s arrest, discussed
the process that the sheriff’s department us ed to collect and store evidence. And the
sergeant testified that, based on his training and experience, the proper procedures were
used in placing the bullet into evidence an d logging it into the department’s computer
system.
The Limiting Instruction
During trial, the district court gave the jury a limiting instruction regarding evidence
introduced by the state about the relationship between Paxton, his son, and his mother. The
district court gave the instruction on three occasions. When the jury first heard testimony
about the threats that Paxton made towards his mother, the district court instructed the jury
as follows:
[The] State has introduced c onduct by Mr. Paxton on the
alleged date of the offense that was admitted for the limited
purpose of demonstrating the nature and extent of the
relationship between Mr. Paxton, [his son], and other family or
household members. It’s admitted to assist you in determining
whether Mr. Paxton committed those acts with which he’s
charged in the complaint.

The defendant is not being tried for—for and may not
be convicted of any behavior ot her than the charged offenses.
You’re not to convict Mr. Pa xton on the basis of similar
conduct that may have occurre d towards others. To do so
might result in unjust double punishment.

6
When the district court first provided the instruction, it told the jury that it should keep the
instruction “in mind as you hear the evidence in this case.” The district court repeated the
instruction one more time during testimony and again after closing arguments.
The jury found Paxton guilty of all three crimes charged. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Paxton argues that he is entitled to a new tr ial for three reasons. First, he argues that
the district court abused its di scretion by allowing the state to present evidence of threats
that he made against his mother. Second, he argues that the evidence is legally insufficient
to prove that he possessed ammunition. Third, in a supplemental brief, he argues that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel. We address each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its disc retion by admitting evidence of Paxton’s
threats against his mother.
Paxton argues that the district court a bused its discretion by allowing the state to
introduce evidence of threats that Paxton made against his mother as relationship evidence
under Minn. Stat. § 634.20. He does not ch allenge the admission of evidence regarding
prior threats against his son, the alleged victim of the offenses. We first review the law
surrounding the admission of relationship evidence and then address Paxton’s arguments.
Evidence falling within the scope of Minn. Stat. § 634.20 is commonly referred to
as relationship evidence. See State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635, 638 n.4 (Minn. 2006) (noting
that evidence offered under section 634.20 is a subtype of ge neral relationship evidence).
Section 634.20 provides that “[e]vidence of domestic conduct by the accused against the
victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or household members, is admissible

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unless the probative value is s ubstantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”
Minn. Stat. § 634.20. “Domestic conduct” in cludes, among other things, “evidence of
domestic abuse.” Id. “Domestic abuse” includes “the infliction of fear of imminent
physical harm, bodily injury, or assault,” if committed against a family or household
member.1 Minn. Stat. § 518B.01 , subd. 2(a)(2) (2020); see also Minn. Stat. § 634.20
(incorporating that definition of domestic abuse). “We review the district court’s decision
to admit relationship evidence for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Andersen ,
900 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Minn. App. 2017). To be entitled to a new trial, “an appellant must
demonstrate that the district court erred by admitting the evidence and that the erroneously
admitted evidence substantially influenced the jury’s decision.” Id.
Paxton first contends that the district court erred by treating evidence of threats
against his mother as relationship evidence under section 634.20. He further argues that,
even if the evidence falls within section 634.20, the district court abused its discretion by
admitting the evidence because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. We are not persuaded by either argument.
A. The district court properly considered the evidence under section 634.20.
Paxton argues that the district court abus ed its discretion by admitting evidence of
his threats against his mother as relationshi p evidence under sec tion 634.20 because the
admission of the evidence violated the general ban against propensity evidence set forth in
Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). We disagree.

1 “Family or household members” includes “parents and children.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01,
subd. 2(b) (2020).

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Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1) prov ides that evidence of a defendant’s prior “crime,
wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action
in conformity therewith.” But “evidence of domestic conduct by the accused against
family or household members other than the victim ma y be admitted pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 634.20.” State v. Fraga, 864 N.W.2d 615, 627 (Minn. 2015). “[T]he rationale for
admitting relationship evidence under section 634.20 is to illuminate the relationship
between the defendant and the alleged victim and to put the alleged crime in the context of
that relationship.” State v. Valentine , 787 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Minn. App. 2010), review
denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010). Evidence of the relationship between a defendant and a
non-victim family member is relevant because “evidence showing how a defendant treats
his family or household members . . . suggest s how the defendant may interact with the
victim.” Id. Moreover, the supreme court has expressly adopted Minn. Stat. § 634.20 as a
rule of evidence and has held that the rule al lows “the introduction of evidence of similar
acts . . . without requiring that they first be established by clear and convincing evidence”
as would be required for propensity evidence. State v. McCoy , 682 N.W.2d 153, 161
(Minn. 2004).
The evidence of Paxton’s thre ats against his mother fits squarely within the scope
of section 634.20. As noted above, section 634.20 provides that evidence of “domestic
conduct” by the accused against other family or household members is admissible unless
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The
evidence fits within th e scope of the statute because Pa xton’s mother is a member of
Paxton’s family within the meaning of the statute. An d Paxton’s threats constitute

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evidence of “domestic conduct” because “dom estic conduct” includes “the infliction of
fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault.” See Minn. Stat. §§ 518B.01,
subd. 2(a)(2), 634.20. Paxton’s mother’s tes timony establishes that Paxton intentionally
inflicted fear of physical harm and bodily injury. Paxton’s mother testified that Paxton got
“in [her] face” and threatened that “he would see [her] dead” or “loc ked up in a mental
institution.” Further, she testified that his th reats made her fearful. Paxton’s statements
can reasonably be construed as intentionally inflicting fear of imminent physical harm in
his mother. We are not persuaded otherwise by Paxton’s assertions in his supplemental
brief that his statements to his mother show nothing more than an unhealthy relationship.
Thus, the district court properly concluded th at Paxton’s threats ag ainst his mother fell
within the scope of section 63 4.20, and the district court pr operly analyzed the evidence
under section 634.20 rather than rule 404(b).2
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the danger
of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the
evidence.
Paxton also argues that, even if the evidence of Paxton’s threats against his mother
was properly analyzed by the district court as relationship evidence under section 634.20,
the district court abused its discretion by dete rmining that the danger of unfair prejudice
did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. Again, we disagree.

2 Alternatively, Paxton’s statements may ha ve been admissible as immediate-episode
evidence. State v. Riddley , 776 N.W.2d 419, 424 (Minn. 2009). Immediate episode
evidence is admissible, without reference to rule 404(b), “where two or more offenses are
linked together in point of time or circumstances so that one cannot be fully shown without
proving the other.” Id. at 425 (quotation omitted).

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The record supports the district court’s determination. First, the testimony about
Paxton’s prior threats had high probative value. The evidence of Paxton’s threats against
his mother helped to illumi nate the relationship betw een Paxton and his son. See
State v. Ware, 856 N.W.2d 719, 729 (Minn. App. 2014) (notin g “the probative value of
relationship evidence involving a family or household member is high” because it “sheds
light on how the defenda nt interacts with those close to him” (quotation omitted)). And,
as the district court noted, the threats provi ded context for the ju ry to evaluate the
conflicting statements made by Paxton and his son to the de puties about th e conduct at
issue. Assisting the jury by “providing a context for the charged offense[s]” is “particularly
important” when the jury has to ev aluate contradictory statements. State v. Lindsey,
755 N.W.2d 752, 757 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2008). In
addition, relationship evidence is important in cases involving charges of domestic abuse
because “[d]omestic abuse is unique in that it typically occurs in the privacy of the home,
it frequently involves a pattern of activity th at may escalate over time, and it is often
underreported.” McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 161.
Second, when balancing the probative va lue against the potential for unfair
prejudice, the district court properly ap plied the standard in section 634.20 and
appropriately exercised its discretion. The district court recognized that, given the nature
of the evidence, the evidence could have been prejudicial to Paxton. But the district court
concluded that the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative
value. In deciding whether to allow the evidence to be admitted, the district court
specifically noted that it would provide a limiting instruction to the jury.

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We are not persuaded otherwise by Paxton ’s argument that “[t]he inflammatory
nature of the conduct—threatening one’s ow n mother with death and civil commitment”
demonstrates that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. “When balancing the probative value against the potential
prejudice, unfair prejudice is not merely damaging evidence, even severely damaging
evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate means, giving
one party an unfair advantage.” Ware, 856 N.W.2d at 729 (quotation omitted). Here, the
district court immediately gave a limiting inst ruction after the jury first heard testimony
about threats to Paxton’s mother and repeated its limiting instruction two more times before
the jury deliberated. That in struction reminded the jury th at Paxton was “not being tried
for . . . and may not be convicted of any beha vior other than the charged offenses.” We
“assume that the jury followed the [district] court’s inst ructions and properly considered
the evidence.” State v. Vang, 774 N.W.2d 566, 578 (Minn. 2009). Thus, by giving this
limiting instruction, the district court guarde d against the possibility that the jury would
use the evidence for an improper purpose. In sum, while the evidence of Paxton’s threats
against his mother had the potential to be damaging to Paxton’s case, the evidence did not
have the potential to persuade by illegitimate means. Accordingly, Paxton has not shown
that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that th e potential for unfair
prejudice did not substantially outweigh the pr obative value of the relationship evidence
involving Paxton’s mother.

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II. The evidence is sufficient to supp ort Paxton’s conviction of possessing
ammunition.
Paxton makes an additional argument for reversal of his c onviction of unlawful
possession of ammunition. Paxton argues that the evidence is insuffi cient to support his
conviction because the police testimony created a reasonable doubt as to whether the bullet
produced at trial was the same bullet as the one found in his pocket at the time of his arrest.
The state contends that the testimony provided a sufficient chain of custody to prove that
the bullet produced at trial wa s the bullet recovered from Paxt on when he was arrested.
We agree with the state.
Where, as here, the state proves an offe nse with direct evidence, we apply the
traditional standard in reviewing th e sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Horst ,
880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016). Under the traditional standard, we “view the evidence
in a light most favorable to the verdict and assume the fact-finder disbelieved any testimony
conflicting with that verdict.” State v. Balandin , 944 N.W.2d 204, 213 (Minn. 2020)
(quotation omitted). This court “will not overturn a verdict i f, giving due regard to the
presumption of innocence and to the prosec ution’s burden of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, the jury could reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the charged
offense.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The state charged Paxton with violating Mi nn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2), which
provides that “a person who has been convicted of . . . a crime of violence” shall not “be
entitled to possess ammunition or a pistol or . . . any other firearm.” To convict Paxton of
this offense based on possession of ammunition, the state had to prove, in relevant part,

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that Paxton knowingly possessed the ammunition an d that he was ineligible to possess it.
See State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017) (discussing elements of possession
of firearm by ineligible person).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to th e verdict and assuming the
jury disbelieved any conflicting testimony, we conclude that th e evidence is sufficient to
support Paxton’s conviction of unlawful possession of ammunition. Paxton stipulated that
he was ineligible to possess ammunition because of two prior convictions. The deputy who
discovered the bullet in Paxton’s pocket testified that he “located a 357-magnum bullet” in
Paxton’s pocket. And he testified that he placed that bullet into a “sealed evidence bag.”
The evidence technician, a sergeant who also worked as a field-training officer and
was on the scene when the a rresting officer discovered the bullet, testified as to the
chain-of-custody process used by the department. He testifie d that sealed evidence bags
are logged into the computer system and then are placed into an evidence locker to which
only the evidence technicians have access. Th e technician explained that each evidence
locker stores only evidence from one particular case and each item of evidence stored in
the locker is identified with a property number that is associated with a particular case.
And he testified that all the proper procedures for placing an item into evidence were
followed in this case with respect to the bullet found in Paxton’s pocket. In finding Paxton
guilty of unlawful possession of ammunition, the jury necessarily concluded that the deputy
and the sergeant were credible and that the bullet produced at trial was the bullet recovered
from Paxton following his arrest.

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Paxton argues that discrepancies in th e reports and testimony of certain deputies
regarding the caliber of the bullet renders the evidence insufficient to support his
conviction. But Paxton is essentially asking us to reweigh the evidence or to disregard the
jury’s credibility determination regarding that testimony. We follow the jury’s credibility
determinations. Balandin, 944 N.W.2d at 213. And case law “does not permit us to
re-weigh the evidence.” State v. Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 2009). On this record,
Paxton has given us no basis to conclude that the jury could not have reasonably found him
guilty of being an ineligible person in possession of ammunition. In sum, the evidence is
sufficient to support his conviction of unlawful possession of ammunition.
III. Paxton did not receive ine ffective assistance of counsel.
In his supplemental brief, Paxton argues that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel because his trial counsel (1) did not call his younger so n to testify, and (2) failed
to challenge the introduction of the relationship evidence. We are not persuaded.
To show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, Paxton must “prove that
his counsel’s representation fell below an objec tive standard of reasonableness” and that
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.” Chavez-Nelson v. State, 948 N.W.2d 665, 671
(Minn. 2020) (quotation omitte d) (describing the “two-p rong test set forth in”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 20 52, 2064 (1984)). Paxton has
not made this showing and presents no legal authority in support of his allegations. His
argument that his trial counsel was ineffec tive for not calling Paxton’s younger son to
testify is unpersuasive because decisions about which witnesses to call are a matter of trial

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strategy that we generally do not review. See Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn.
2013) (explaining that defense counsel’s presentation of evidence to the jury is considered
part of trial strategy). And Paxton’s sec ond argument mischaracterizes the record. His
trial counsel argued against admission of the relationship evidence, but the district court
concluded that the threats against Paxton’s mother were admissible over his counsel’s
objection. Accordingly, Paxton has not demons trated in his supplemental brief that he is
entitled to relief.
Affirmed.