Lawrence Raymond Burns, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0985

Lawrence Raymond Burns, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed March 8, 2021
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-8159

Lawrence Raymond Burns, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith M. Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorn ey, Adam E. Petras , Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Pres iding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
In this appeal from an or der denying his petition for postconviction relief, appellant
argues that the postconviction court erred by denying his claims under State v. Knaffla, 243

2
N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976 ). Because the postconviction court correctly determined
that the claims are Knaffla-barred, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Lawrence Raym ond Burns entered a Norgaard plea to fourth-degree
criminal sexual contact. Burns appealed his conviction directly, arguing that his plea was
not accurate. State v. Burns , No. A18-1629, 2019 WL 3886 914 (Minn. App. Aug. 19,
2019), review denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2019). We affirmed. Id. at *4.
After his direct appeal, Burns brought a pro se postconviction petition asserting two
claims for relief. First, Bu rns alleged that his attorney was ineffective for failing to
facilitate a psychiatric evaluation before he pleaded guilty. Second, Burns asserted that he
was denied the right to a psychiatric evaluation under the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, pursuant to Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985) and
State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. 1992). Burns relied sole ly on evidence in the
record to support his claims. The postconviction court denied Burns’s petition, concluding
that his claims were procedurally barred under Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741. This appeal
followed.
DECISION
Burns challenges the district court’s deni al of his postconv iction petition. We
review the denial of postconvictio n relief for abuse of discretion. Caldwell v. State, 853
N.W.2d 766, 770 (Minn. 2014). We review legal issues de novo and factual issues to
determine whether sufficient ev idence in the record supports the postconviction court’s
findings. Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 2015).

3
Burns alleged claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and denial of the right to a
psychiatric evaluation. “Claims that were raised on direct appeal, or were known or should
have been known but were not raised on direct appeal, are procedurally barred.” Sontoya
v. State, 829 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Minn. 2013) (citing Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741); see also
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2018) (“A petition for postconv iction relief after a direct
appeal has been completed may not be based on grounds that could ha ve been raised on
direct appeal of the conviction or sentence.”).
Some ineffective-assistance-of-counsel cl aims are not procedurally barred after a
direct appeal because they require the “examination of evidence outside the trial record and
additional fact-finding by the postconviction c ourt because it is not based solely on the
briefs and the trial court transcript.” Sanchez-Diaz v. State, 758 N.W.2d 843, 847 (Minn.
2008). But if the claim can “be determined on the basis of the trial record, the claim must
be brought on direct appeal or it is Knaffla-barred.” Sontoya, 829 N.W.2d at 604; see also
Torres v. State, 688 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn. 2004) (“A claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel that can be decide d on the basis of the trial c ourt record must be brought on
direct appeal and is procedurally barred when raised in a postconviction petition.”).
The postconviction court did not err in concluding that Burns’s claims were Knaffla-
barred. There is no doubt that Burns knew or should have known about both of his claims
before his first appeal—he relies exclusively on evidence and statements in the record to
support them. Specifically, Burns relies on his statements at the plea hearing and
statements in a psychological evaluation f iled before sentencing. And because his
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim relies exclusively on evidence in the record, it falls

4
within the class of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims that must be brought in a direct
appeal. See Sontoya, 829 N.W.2d at 604; Torres, 688 N.W.2d at 572.
There are two exceptions to the Knaffla-bar. A claim is not Knaffla-barred if
“(1) the claim is novel; or (2) the interests of fairness and justice warrant relief.” Sontoya,
829 N.W.2d at 604. Burns does not invoke either exception. His claim is clearly not novel,
and we find no indication in th e record that the in terests of fairness and justice require a
review of the merits of Burns’s claims. Th us, we conclude that the postconviction court
did not abuse its discretion by denying Burns’s petition.
Affirmed.