In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Esteban Trevino.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0996

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Esteban Trevino.

Filed January 19, 2021
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-PR-20-55

John E. Mack, New London Law, P.A., New London, Minne sota (for appellant Esteban
Trevino)

Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Aaron P. Welch, Kristen E. Pierce, Assistant
County Attorneys, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent Kandiyohi County)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Tracy M. Smith, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
The district court civilly re-committed Esteban Trevino to the custody of the
commissioner of human services on the ground that he is ment ally ill. The district court
also authorized the involuntary administrati on of neuroleptic medications. On appeal,
Trevino argues that he was denied his right to due process. We conclude that the district
court provided Trevino with the process to which he was due. Therefore, we affirm.

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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FACTS
In 2018, Trevino was comm itted by the Washington Count y District Court to the
custody of the commissioner of human services until July 5, 2019. The district court also
authorized the involuntary administration of neuroleptic medicati ons. In June 2019,
Trevino was re-committed for an additional 12 months by the same court. The district
court’s second order again authorized th e involuntary administration of neuroleptic
medications.
This action was commenced on June 9, 2020, when Kandiyohi County petitioned
the district court to re-commit Trevino. On the same date, Trevino’s treating psychiatrist
at the Anoka Metro Regional Treatment Ce nter petitioned the district court for re-
authorization to involuntarily administer ne uroleptic medications. The district court
promptly appointed an attorney to represent Trevino and appointed a licensed psychologist
to examine Trevino and submit a written report to the court concerning his condition and
the need for continued hospitalization.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing by videoconference on June 29, 2020.
Trevino appeared and was represented by his court-appointed attorney. The county called
the examiner as a witness and offered her report into evidence without objection. The
examiner testified that she had reviewed Tr evino’s records and had attempted to arrange
an evaluation but that he declined. The examiner testified that she diagnosed Trevino with
“unspecified schizophrenia spectrum or other psychotic disorders.” She testified that she
recommended re-commitment, that it is the le ast restrictive treatm ent option, and that
Trevino is not competent to consent to or refuse neuroleptic medications.

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The county also called Trevino’s treati ng psychiatrist, who testified about her
petition for re-authorization to involuntarily administer neuroleptic medications. She
testified that she diagnosed Trevino with “schizophrenia with a rule out for a trauma brain
injury by history and then alco hol use disorder in a controlle d setting.” She testified that
Trevino did not understand the benefits, risks, and alternatives to neuroleptic medications;
that the benefits outweighed the risks; and th at a reasonable person in Trevino’s position
would agree to take the proposed medications.
After the county rested its case, Trevino testified that he is not mentally ill and does
not want to be re-committed. He also testifie d that he should not be required to take the
medications that were being administered to him.
On the following day, the district court filed an order re-committing Trevino to the
custody of the commissioner of human serv ices for 12 months and re-authorizing the
involuntary administration of neuroleptic medications. Trevino appeals.
DECISION
Trevino argues that the district court erred on the ground that “the process by which
[he] was re-committed was rushed, perfuncto ry, and failed to provide him minimal due
process.” Specifically, he challenges the distri ct court’s use of a st andardized form in
preparing its order and, in a general way, the relatively quick an d non-confrontational
nature of the hearing.
A respondent in a civil commitment proceeding has numerous procedural rights as
a matter of state statutory law. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 253B.03 (2018). Such a person also
has a right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

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Constitution to not be confined because of a mental illness withou t due process, which
ensures both that the person cannot be confined unless ment ally ill and “‘that the nature
and duration of commitment bear some reasona ble relation to the purpose for which the
individual is committed.’” Lidberg v. Steffen, 514 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1994) (quoting
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)); see also Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312,
319 (Minn. 1995). In addition, if a petit ioner seeks judicial authorization for the
involuntary administration of neuroleptic medications to a committed person, detailed
statutory procedures apply. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.092 (2018). Those statutory
procedures vindicate the rights recognized by the supreme court as a matter of state
constitutional law. See In re Matter of Schmidt , 443 N.W.2d 824, 826-30 (Minn. 1989)
(citing Minn. Stat. § 253B.03, subd. 6a (198 8) (replaced by Minn. Stat. § 253B.092));
Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 147-49 (Minn. 1988).
Trevino’s appellate brief is devoid of a ny legal authority with which we might
analyze his arguments. He makes one gene ral reference to section 253B.03 of the
Minnesota Statutes, which is entitled “Rights of Patients,” but he does not argue with
particularity that any of the 11 subdivisions of that statute were violated. He does not cite
any other statute or any judicial opinion as the legal basis of his argument for reversal. He
does not invoke the well-known three-factor bala ncing test that often is used to analyze
claims of a denial of procedural due process. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976).
We are disinclined to analyze specific arguments that have not been made or specific
issues that have not been raised. See In re Application of Olson for Payment of Servs., 648

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N.W.2d 226, 228 (Minn. 2002). We will, however, respond to Trevino’s generalized due-
process argument. We believe that the app licable law may be found in a supreme court
opinion concerning a different but analogous issue: whether a mother’s right to due process
was denied by the entry of a default judgment after she failed to appear for an evidentiary
hearing on a petition to terminate her parental rights. In In re Welfare of Children of Coats,
633 N.W.2d 505 (Minn. 2001), the supreme court held that “a judgment will be held void
for want of due process only where the circum stances surrounding the trial are such as to
make it a sham and a pretense rather than a real judicial proceeding.” Id. at 512 (quotation
omitted). The supreme court concluded in that case that there was no due-process violation
because the district court received evidence on the merits of the petition, resolved the
appropriate factual and legal issues, and “w as focused on the welfare of” the persons
affected by its decision. Id.
In this case, the district court received the testimony of the court-appointed examiner
and Trevino’s treating psychiatrist as well as the testimony of Trevino himself. The record
reveals that the district court listened attentively, occasionally interjecting to ask a follow-
up question of a witness or to ask a witness to repeat an answer. Th e district court also
considered the examiner’s report and other documents, including records of Trevino’s prior
treatment. Trevino’s attorney cross-examin ed the examiner and presented a closing
argument. Nothing in the record indicates that the district court limited any party’s ability
to introduce any evidence or to make any argument. In short, the district court proceedings
plainly were not “a sham and a pretense ra ther than a real judicial proceeding.” See id.
(quotation omitted). Rather, th e district court received evidence on the merits of the

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petition, resolved the appropriate factual and legal issues, and “was focused on [Trevino’s]
welfare.” See id. Thus, there was no violation of Trevino’s right to due process.
This conclusion is not undermined by th e fact that the district court used a
standardized form (which was developed and approved by the Minnesota Judicial Branch)
as the outline of its five-page order. This cour t has held that the use of such a form may
result in inadequate findings, if the form is used improperly. See, e.g., In re Welfare of
J.L.Y., 596 N.W.2d 692, 696 (Minn. App. 1999) (reversing and remanding due to
inadequate findings); In re Welfare of M.R.S., 400 N.W.2d 147, 151-52 (Minn. App. 1987)
(same). But Trevino does not argue that th e district court’s findings are inadequate. See,
e.g., In re Civil Commitment of Spicer, 853 N.W.2d 803, 810-12 (Minn. App. 2014). Such
an argument likely would fail because, in paragraph 5 of the order, the district court made
relatively detailed narrative findi ngs, which demonstrate the district court’s familiarity
with the evidence and provide a factual basis for the district court’s conclusions of law.
Furthermore, to the extent that Trev ino challenges the district court’s re-
authorization of the involuntary administra tion of neuroleptic medications, his argument
does not account for the fact that judicial a pproval of a physician’s recommended course
of treatment need not be an extended, adversarial proceeding in every case. In Jarvis, the
supreme court noted that, if a treating physician’s treatment plan is not supported by his or
her peers, “serious questions arise regard ing the reasonableness and necessity of the
treatment plan,” and “[c]ourt approval in such cases may indeed be difficult to obtain, but
is necessary.” 418 N.W.2d at 149. But the supreme court al so noted that, if the medical
professionals are in agreement on a treatment plan, “ court approval shou ld be quickly

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forthcoming with little difficulty.” Id. (emphasis added). In this case, the court-appointed
examiner supported the Jarvis petition and testified that Trevino’s condition likely would
deteriorate if his medications were discontinued. Trevino did not provide the district court
with any evidence capable of contradicting the views of the medical professionals. In these
circumstances, the law does not require an unnecessarily contentious or protracted hearing.
In sum, the district court did not violate Trevino’s right to due process in the course
of ordering that he be re-committed for an additional 12 months and re-authorizing the
involuntary administration of neuroleptic medications.
Affirmed.