In re the Marriage of: John Alex Walker, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1009

In re the Marriage of:
John Alex Walker, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Laura Margaret Walker,
Respondent.

Filed June 21, 2021
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-18-2386

Sonja Trom Eayrs, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Michael P. Boulette , Taft, Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Timothy D. Lees, Lees Family Law, Ltd., Edina, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this appeal from a final judgment dissolving a 19-year marriage and two
post-dissolution orders denying a new trial and granting attorney fees, appellant-husband
challenges the district court’s awards to respondent-wife of permanent spousal
2
maintenance, an upward deviation in child support, and need-based attorney fees. Because
the district court clearly erred in its factual findings relating to husband’s ability to pay and
because the district court erroneously included the children’s expenses when setting the
amount of wife’s spousal maintenance, we reverse in part and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. But because the record supports the district
court’s decision to award an upward deviation in child support and need-based attorney
fees, we affirm in part.
FACTS
Appellant John Alex Walker (husband) and respondent Laura Margaret Walker
(wife) married in September 2000. The couple separated in January 2018, and husband
petitioned for divorce in April 2020. They have four children, who, at the time of
dissolution, were between the ages of 15 and 18. At the time of dissolution, husband
worked as a senior director of pharmaceutical sciences at Upsher-Smith Laboratories Inc.1
After they married, wife left her employer to work at home and care for their children. In
January 2019, wife gained employment outside the home at Children’s Minnesota as a
grant writer.
The parties agreed on many issues. They agreed to joint physical and legal custody
of the children and an equal division of the marital estate, with each receiving about
$545,000. They also agreed on the extent of each party’s nonmarital assets: husband’s
nonmarital assets were $415,000 and wife’s were $598,000.

1 Husband notes that his position was eliminated after entry of the dissolution judgment
and, in 2020, he became a senior regulatory-affairs program manager at Medtronic.
3
But husband and wife disagreed on whether wife should receive spousal
maintenance and, if so, the appropriate amount. And husband opposed wife’s position that
he should pay an upward deviation for child support and need-based attorney fees. In
September 2019, the referee conducted a two-day bench trial, after which it issued findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and an order for judgment and decree, which the district court
adopted.
Spousal maintenance
In the written findings of fact, the district court first considered the parties’ incomes.
The district court found that husband earned a “gross income of $245,619 per year, or
approximately $20,468.00 per month ” and “[a]pproximately $10,010 per year or $834 per
month is received as an automobile allowance.” The district court added the car allowance
to husband’s gross income. T he district court also added the average of three years of
bonuses to husband’s gross income. The district court concluded that husband’s “total gross
annual income for purposes of determining spousal maintenance and child support is
$318,525 or approximately $26,544 per month.”
The district court then found wife’s “gross income of $68,994 per year or
approximately $5,749.50 per month.” While the district court discussed some before-tax
and after-tax salary deductions for both husband and wife, the district court did not make
an express finding of husband’s or wife’s net incomes, even though the parties submitted
expert reports that calculated net income.
The district court next addressed husband’s and wife’s proposed budgets. Husband
estimated his monthly expenses were $9,718. But the district court rejected some items in
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husband’s budget because the items were not “appropriate compared to the parties’ marital
standard of living.” T he district court found that husband’s “reasonable total monthly
budget is $9,305.”
Wife estimated her monthly expenses were $11,803. The district court determined
that while “most of Wife’s claimed monthly expenses are appropriate and reflect the
parties’ marital standard of living . . . some are not.” For example, the district court found
that wife’s proposed budget included “$1,725.00 per month for children’s expenses.” The
district court noted that wife testified “many of her higher budget line items related to the
costs of caring for the parties’ four minor children.” The district court also found that
husband had agreed to pay for many of these line-item expenses, including “Tutor, Sports,
Music Lessons, Hockey, and other Clubs/Camps.” Still referring to the children’s expenses
in the wife’s budget, the district court stated that it “removed these expenses from Wife’s
budget.” But, without further explanation, the district court reduced “Wife’s children’s
expenses by $1,415.00.” In other words, the district court did not remove $310 that it had
identified as “children’s expenses” from wife’s proposed budget. The district court
concluded that wife’s “reasonable monthly budget is $8,714, which leaves a monthly
shortfall of $2,964” based on her gross income.
The district court then discussed each of the spousal-maintenance factors. For
example, the court determined that before their marriage, wife worked “in the field of
continued medical educational training,” but after the marriage the parties agreed wife
would be “the primary parent to the parties’ four (4) children.” “[S]he cannot easily resume
her previous career,” but eventually obtained “her current full-time job with Children’s
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Minnesota.” The district court determined that “if Wife had not left the workforce to care
for the parties’ daughters, she would be earning a higher income than she is earning now.”
The district court determined that because of wife’s monthly shortfall, she “cannot
provide adequate self-support, after considering the standard of living established during
the marriage.” It also found that “[t]he vast majority of the parties’ assets . . . are held in
the form of non- liquid, pre-tax retirement assets, so Wife would incur taxes and steep
penalties if she were to withdraw funds from those accounts.” The district court concluded
that “Husband has the ability to pay Wife some maintenance if necessary,” and that w ife
had “proven her need by a preponderance of the evidence, and there is no reasonable
question as to Husband’s ability to pay.” The district court awarded wife $2,964 in
permanent, monthly spousal maintenance.
Child-support deviation
Using the husband’s and wife’s gross incomes, the district court determined that
husband’s presumptively appropriate guideline child-support obligation was $2,569 per
month. Wife requested a $1,725 per month upward deviation from the guideline obligation
to pay other expenses for the children, “which are above and beyond basic expenses
covered by Guideline child support.”
The district court noted that husband testified he was willing to pay for some of the
children’s expenses, citing the statutory factors for a child- support deviation, Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.43, subd. 1 (2020). The district court found that
Husband has, by agreeing to pay for ongoing expenses for the
children, effectively agreed that there is a basis for an upward
deviation in child support. He clearly agrees that these are the
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types of things the children should be doing, and testified how
much the children enjoyed doing them. They are clearly the
types of things the children would be doing if the family were
still together. . . . Father cannot claim that he is willing to pay
these additional expenses while raising a credible challenge to
the appropriateness of including [these expenses] as an upward
deviation.

But the district court also found that some of the agreed-to expenses, such as car insurance
for the children who were not yet driving, were “speculative,” and omitted those items from
the deviation amount. The district court ordered “a yearly deviation amount of $18,550, or
$1,546 per month.”
Attorney fees
The district court then addressed the parties’ requests for conduct-based attorney
fees and wife’s request for need -based attorney fees. The district court found that
conduct-based attorney fees were “inappropriate” because “in the big picture, neither party
‘unreasonably contributed’ to the length or expense of this proceeding.” The district court
found, however, that “Wife does not have the means to pay all of her attorneys’ fees, but
that Husband does have the means to pay them—or at least a portion of them.” Following
the submission of an affidavit on the amount of wife’s attorney fees, the district court
ordered husband to pay $40,000 of wife’s legal expenses and fees.
Husband moved for amended factual findings and conclusions of law, or in the
alternative for a new trial. The district court denied husband’s motions, and husband
appeals.
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DECISION
I. The district court abused its discretion in determining the amount of spousal
maintenance.
A district court may grant spousal maintenance if it finds that the spouse seeking
maintenance “shows sufficient, reasonable need” and the inability to satisfy that need,
either from property or another means of self-support, after considering the marital
standard of living. Kampf v. Kampf, 732 N.W.2d 630, 633 (Minn. 2007); see Minn. Stat.
§ 518.552, subd. 1 (2020). The central inquiry is “basically” about “the financial needs” of
the party seeking maintenance and “her ability to meet those needs balanced against the
financial condition” of the party from whom maintenance is sought. Erlandson v.
Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 39-40 (Minn. 1982). While wife’s need for maintenance was
disputed during district court proceedings, on appeal, husband challenges only the amount
of maintenance awarded.
“The standard of review on appeal from a trial court’s determination of a
maintenance award is whether the trial court abused the wide discretion accorded to it.” Id.
at 38. “Maintenance awards are not altered on appeal unless the district court abused its
wide discretion.” Youker v. Youker, 661 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Minn. App. 2003), review
denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2003). A district court abuses its discretion if its findings of fact are
unsupported by the record or if it improperly applies the law. Dobrin v. Dobrin,
569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997).
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A. The district court erred in considering husband’s ability to pay spousal
maintenance.
1. Failure to consider husband’s net income
After the district court determines a spouse’s need for maintenance, Minnesota law
provides that the court must consider “all relevant factors” to determine the amount and
duration of a maintenance award and lists eight nonexclusive factors. Minn. Stat.
§ 518.552, subd. 2 (2020). All eight statutory factors are relevant and “no single factor is
dispositive.” Maiers v. Maiers, 775 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Minn. App. 2009). Factor (g) is “the
ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet needs while meeting those
of the spouse seeking maintenance.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(g).
Husband’s arguments focus on caselaw interpreting the ability of a spouse to pay
maintenance while meeting his or her own needs and providing that “[i]n order to
determine ability to pay, the [district] court must make a determination of the payor
spouse’s net or take-home pay.” Kostelnik v. Kostelnik, 367 N.W.2d 665, 670 (Minn. App.
1985), review denied (Minn. Jul y 26, 1985). In Kostelnik, the district court determined
husband’s income before business expenses and taxes, but did not make findings about his
pre-tax, after-business-expense income, or his after-tax income. Id. On appeal, this court
concluded that the spousal-maintenance award was “not based upon a finding of
[husband’s] disposable (take-home) income, and was unreasonably high.” Id. We
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remanded with instructions to “make a determination of [husband’s] net income and award
a reasonable amount of maintenance based upon that figure.” Id.2
Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining his ability
to pay spousal maintenance while meeting his own needs because it failed to consider his
net income. He argues that, after considering his monthly obligations for spousal
maintenance and child support he is left with a net “deficit,” while wife has “substantially
more monthly income than she require[s].” Wife counters that the record includes evidence
of tax returns and expert reports detailing net income for both parties and, based on this
record evidence, argues that the district court adequately considered husband’s ability to
pay. Wife also argues that the district court’s finding that “there is no reasonable question
as to Husband’s ability to pay” rested on its review of all of the statutory maintenance
factors, therefore, the district court did not err.
3

2 We note that, at the same time as the release of our opinion, this court is also releasing
Schmidt v. Schmidt, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, No. A20-0884, (Minn. App. June 21, 2021).
Schmidt states that “the district court’s failure to consider [appellant’s] income-tax
obligations when denying her request for spousal maintenance” was an abuse of discretion.
Schmidt, slip op. at 9 (emphasis added) . While the parties did not have the benefit of our
analysis in Schmidt, we believe Schmidt clarifies the importance of considering net income
when deciding on spousal maintenance.

3 Both husband and wife cite unpublished (nonprecedential) decisions by this court.
“Nonprecedential opinions and order opinions are not binding authority.” Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c); see also Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis. v. Wozniak Travel, Inc.,
762 N.W.2d 572, 575 n.2 (Minn. 2009) (“[T]he unpublished Minnesota court of appeals
decisions do not constitute precedent.”). Perhaps more importantly, as the supreme court
has reminded us, “ each marital dissolution proceeding is unique and centers upon the
individualized facts and circumstances of the parties and, . . . accordingly, it is unwise to
view any marital dissolution decision as enunciating an immutable rule of law applicable
in any other proceeding.” Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d at 201; see also Honke v. Honke ,
10
Preliminarily, we observe that other caselaw establishes that “the district court is
not required to make specific findings on every statutory factor if the findings that were
made reflect that the district court adequately considered the relevant statutory factors.”
Peterka v. Peterka, 675 N.W.2d 353, 360 (Minn. App. 2004) (citing Rosenfeld v.
Rosenfeld, 249 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Minn. 1976)); see generally Hansen v. Todnem,
908 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2018) (holding “that the district court was required to
consider only the relevant best-interest factors in [the parenting-time modification statute],
and was not required to make specific and detailed findings on those factors” when not
required by statute).
Still, Kostelnik is helpful because it highlights the need to consider net income in
assessing a spouse’s ability to pay, which is husband’s precise argument. The record
evidence includes the parties’ tax returns, pay stubs, W-2 statements, and financial
disclosures, along with testimony and reports from two experts and husband’s own
testimony about husband’s and wife’s net incomes. But, on this record, we are not
persuaded by wife’s argument that the district court’s findings show it “adequately
considered all of the relevant statutory factors.”
While the district court received sufficient evidence to determine husband’s ability
to pay, its order and findings do not demonstrate that it actually considered the net-income
evidence. This is so even though husband concedes that “net income can easily be
determined from the reports by adding back support and maintenance amounts to cash flow

___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2021 WL 2125821, at *4 (Minn. May 26, 20 21). Thus, we do not
discuss the unpublished decisions cited by either party.
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totals.” In a single line of its 40-page order, t he district court addressed husband’s ability
to meet his own needs while paying spousal maintenance, stating that it “finds that Husband
has the ability to pay Wife some maintenance if necessary.” Later in the order, the district
court also stated that “there is no reasonable question as to Husband’s ability to pay,” but
provided no further detail. From these two brief statements, we are unable to conclude that
the district court consi dered husband’s net income when determining his ability to pay
spousal maintenance. The order fails to mention or discuss husband’s or wife’s net
incomes, despite ample record evidence, and only references gross income. We therefore
conclude that the district court abused its discretion.
We only briefly address husband’s argument about his budgetary “shortfall.”
Husband argues that the district court’s decision puts him at a net “deficit” and gave wife
“a significant surplus, ” after considering expenses, child support, and maintenance
payments. The mere fact that husband may face a monthly deficit does not mean that the
district court abused its discretion. See Ganyo v. Engen, 446 N.W.2d 683, 687 (Minn. App.
1989) (affirming a maintenance award which created a monthly deficit for the
payor-spouse). Both parties will sometimes have a budgetary shortfall after dissolution,
even though a district court has determined net income, carefully reviewed the proposed
budgets, and found all expenses reasonable. B ecause we are reversing and remanding the
spousal-maintenance award, we need not further consider husband’s perceived budgetary
“shortfall.”
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2. Error in double-counting husband’s car allowance
Because the district court adopted wife’s expert’s analysis of husband’s gross salary,
which already included the car allowance, the district court inadvertently double-counted
the car allowance when it added it to husband’s gross income. Husband asserts that this
double-counting is reversible error. Wife agrees that the district court erred by
double-counting the car allowance but contends that the error is de minimis and we should
ignore it. She points out that the double -counting caused the district court to overstate
husband’s gross income by three percent, which she contends is harmless “in light of the
vast income disparities between the parties.”
We determine that the district court clearly erred by overstating husband’s gross
income by $834 per month. The rules of civil procedure direct us to ignore “any error or
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Minn.
R. Civ. P. 61. Wife points to Wibbens v. Wibbens, where, because the maximum additional
amount in dispute had a de minimis effect, we declined to remand to correct the error.
379 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Minn. App. 1985). In Wibbens, the district court erred by omitting
a “mandatory” biennial cost-of-living adjustment in a child-support calculation. Id. This
court determined that the “maximum additional support at stake is about $120” in total. Id.
Because “the effect in this case is de minimis,” we “decline[d] to remand for this technical
error.” Id.
Our caselaw does not prescribe a rigid method for differentiating between de
minimis errors and those that affect the substantial rights of a party. But the district court’s
overstatement of husband’s income by $834 is quantitatively far larger than other de
13
minimis errors discussed in caselaw. See, e.g., Duffney v. Duffney, 625 N.W.2d 839, 843
(Minn. App. 2001) (district court’s failure to include $25 per month of income); Risk ex
rel. Miller v. Stark, 787 N.W.2d 690, 694 n.1 (Minn. App. 2010) (district court’s failure to
account for $400 total in marital property), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010).
Far more importantly, the district court’s error in double- counting husband’s car
allowance has a quantitatively significant effect. Both husband and w ife submitted
itemized budgets to establish their needs and the marital standard of living; in doing so,
both parties included many itemized expenses far less than $834. Erroneously adding $834
per month to husband’s gross income is important, in part because husband contends that
he has a $1,300 monthly deficit after his net income, spousal maintenance, child support,
and his needs are considered. The district court’s error in determining husband’s income
also is significant because an $834 per month overestimate in husband’s income has an
ongoing, substantial effect when it is part of the baseline for subsequent review of the
maintenance award. See Hecker v. Hecker, 568 N.W.2d 705, 709 (Minn. 1997). Thus, even
though the error only amounts to three percent of husband’s gross income, the error in this
case is not de minimis.
In short, we are unable to determine whether the district court considered husband’s
net income when determining his ability to pay and the district court clearly erred in
double-counting the car allowance when determining husband’s gross income. Thus, we
reverse the award of spousal maintenance and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
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B. The district court erred by including children’s expenses when
determining wife’s need for spousal maintenance.

Spousal maintenance is “an award made . . . from the future income or earnings of
one spouse for the support and maintenance of the other.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a
(2020). Maintenance is appropriate when a spouse cannot “provide for reasonable needs”
or “is unable to provide adequate self-support.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1(a), (b); see
also Lyon v. Lyon, 439 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Minn. 1989) (stating that an award of spousal
maintenance requires a showing of need).
Husband argues that the district court erroneously included the children’s expenses
when it determined wife’s reasonable need before setting maintenance. He points out that
wife’s proposed expenses combined expenses for wife and the children in certain
categories, like household expenses and travel, and included items that the district court
described as “children’s expenses.” Husband acknowledges that the district court
“removed” $1,415 of wife’s proposed monthly children’s expenses. B ut husband argues
that “[t]he remainder of the children’s expenses remained as part of [wife’s] budget.” As
discussed above, the district court identified $1,725 in wife’s proposed monthly budget as
“children’s expenses,” yet removed only $1,415 before setting her budget at $8,714.
Wife argues that “there will always be some bleed-over or blurring of expenses”
because of shared expenses between parents and children. She points to “mortgage
payment[s], utilities, property taxes, and homeowner’s insurance” as costs that “would be
incurred by the obligee, with or without children,” and contends that trying to “break out
what portion is attributed to the children from dishwasher detergent, toilet paper,
15
toothpaste, and cleaning products . . . . would be speculative at best.” Wife also notes that
husband’s budget incl uded expenses for the children. Yet wife also concedes that
“[s]pousal maintenance and child support are two separate issues, addressed by two
separate statutes; in fact, two separate chapters.”
While the law does not require strict delineation of a spouse’s shared expenses for
their children after dissolution, the district court erred by including children’s expenses
when it determined wife’s reasonable monthly need before addressing the
spousal-maintenance issue. Spousal maintenance is awarded to support and maintain the
spouse who cannot meet needs independently. Minn. Stat. §§ 518.003, subd 3a, .552,
subd. 1. While there may be some crossover between wife’s, husband’s, and the children’s
expenses, and the district court is afforded wide discretion in determining which expenses
comprise a spouse’s need, a district court errs when it sets the amount of spousal
maintenance based on an assessment of need that includes itemized, child-only expenses.
Clear identification of need for spousal maintenance is important because a
spousal-maintenance award is “the baseline circumstances against which [later] claims of
substantial change are evaluated.” Hecker, 568 N.W.2d at 709. As husband notes, the
district court’s order awards wife permanent spousal maintenance that includes the
children’s expenses “which will end over the next three years.” Because the district court
erred by including children’s expenses when determining wife’s need for maintenance, we
reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding an upward deviation
in child support.

Husband denies that he agreed to an upward deviation in child support, and requests
that we reverse and remand child support “for review in light of the children’s needs and
his ability to pay.” Wife counters that husband agreed to pay for certain activities and
extracurricular expenses, and that the district court’s decision follows the relevant statutory
factors for a deviation.
After determining the presumptive child-support obligation, the district court may,
at the parties’ request, consider statutory factors to determine whether to depart from the
child-support guidelines. Minn. Stat. § 518A.43 (2020); Haefele v. Haefele, 837 N.W.2d
703, 708 (Minn. 2013). The relevant statutory factors include “all earnings, income,
circumstances, and resources of each parent,” and “the standard of living the child would
enjoy if the parents were currently living together, but recognizing that the parents now
have separate households.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.43, subd. 1(1), (3).
The district court has “broad discretion” in determining child support. Rutten v.
Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984). A district court abuses its discretion if it resolves
the support question in a manner “that is against logic and the facts on record before this
court will find that the trial court abused its discretion.” Id. “Detailed findings by the trial
court on the relevant statutory factors are necessary for proper appellate review.” McNulty
v. McNulty, 495 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. Apr. 12,
1993).
Husband makes two arguments; we address each in turn.
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A. The district court’s findings support an upward child-support deviation.
Husband argues that “the [district] court never made explicit findings as to the
children’s expenses outside certain delineated categories,” and “[ a]s a result the district
court could not determine the extent to which those ‘extra’ expenses may, in fact, have
already been met through guideline support.” Wife asserts that husband “expressly agreed”
to pay extracurricular expenses.
The district court determined that, based on the child-support guidelines, husband’s
child-support obligation totaled $2,569 per month. The district court also found that
husband agreed to pay the children’s extracurricular expenses that were not included in the
presumptive amount of child support. While the district court omitted some “purely
speculative” expenses submitted by wife, the district court determined a monthly upward
deviation of $1,546 was warranted. We reject husband’s argument for two reasons.
First, in discussing w ife’s request for an upward deviation, the district court noted
the request was made to “apply toward additional expenses incurred on behalf of the
parties’ four (4) minor children which are above and beyond basic expenses covered by
Guideline child support.” (Emphasis added.) This statement introduced the district court’s
findings for an upward child-support deviation, and reasonably implies that the district
court found that these expenses were “beyond basic expenses covered by Guideline child
support” amount.
Second, as wife argues, “The trial court considered the factors under Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.43, subd. 1, expressly incorporating the statutory language in its Judgment and
Decree.” The district court detailed the relevant factors in its order, and found that the
18
deviation amount was “appropriate” under the statute “because it considers and reflects
(i) the earnings and circumstances of each parent; and (ii) the standard of living the children
would enjoy if the parties continued to live together.” While perhaps not as expressly as
would be ideal, the district court did find that the children had expenses outside the
guideline amount, which the children would enjoy if the parents were currently living
together. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.43, subd. 1; Haefele, 837 N.W.2d at 714.
B. Husband’s net income and agreement to pay
Husband next argues that “the failure to make any findings regarding [his] net
income precluded any meaningful consideration as to whether the upward deviation was
within [his] ability to pay.” And he contends that his agreement to “pay certain expenses
was tied to his trial position that [wife’s] needs could be met through $2,719 in total
monthly support, not the $7,044 actually ordered.”
Wife counters that “there was no testimony from [husband] placing any caveat or
qualification on his agreement to pay those expenses.” The record support’s wife’s view.
When husband testified that he would pay for the children’s extra expenses, his testimony
was not conditional. Husband included $1,000 a month for “children’s activities,” which
included car insurance for two of the children, camp for three of the children, tutoring for
two of the children, an orchestra trip, music lessons, art classes, and hockey. He agreed that
he was “voluntarily agreeing to be responsible for and pay directly certain expenses.”
In the dissolution judgment, the district court found that husband testified he was
willing to pay for the children’s extracurricular activities on top of the child-support award.
While husband’s budget included only $1,000 for these activities, the district court
19
determined the annual estimated expense of these items based on record evidence. The
district court then reduced that amount to $1,546, after excluding some items proposed by
wife. The record evidence supports the district court’s finding, which also follows caselaw
affirming upward deviations in child support to cover “extracurricular activities such as
music and dance lessons, and summer camps .” McNulty, 495 N.W.2d at 472. Thus, the
district court did not err by determining that the $1,546 deviation in child support was
appropriate.
We reject husband’s net income argument. The child-support caselaw does not
require consideration of net income. Rather, a guideline child-support obligation depends
on “gross income” as defined by Minn. Stat. § 518A.29 (2020), and a deviation considers
“all earnings, income, circumstances, and resources of each parent.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.43, subd. 1(1). Here, the district court relied on husband’s testimony that these
extra expenses were part of the marital standard of living and that he agreed to pay for
them. We therefore affirm the upward deviation in child support.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding need-based attorney
fees to wife.

Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion when it ordered him to
pay some of wife’s attorney fees. He contends that “where [wife] held property sufficient
to pay her own fees, she cannot reasonably be said to be unable to pay them.” Wife counters
that record evidence supports the award and that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in making the award.
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In a dissolution proceeding, the district court “shall award attorney fees, costs, and
disbursements in an amount necessary to enable a party to carry on or contest the
proceeding,” so long as three requirements are met . Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2020).
The district court must find “(1) that the fees are necessary for the good faith assertion of
the party’s rights . . . ; (2) that the party from whom fees, costs, and disbursements are
sought has the means to pay them; and (3) that the party to whom fees, costs, and
disbursements are awarded does not have the means to pay them.” Id. We review the award
of attorney fees for abuse of discretion. Gully v. Gully, 599 N.W.2d 814, 825 (Minn. 1999).
The district court found that “Wife does not have the means to pay all of her
attorneys’ fees, but that Husband does have the means to pay them —or at least a portion
of them,” and directed wife to submit an affidavit detailing her fee request. Wife submitted
an affidavit documenting $67,361.56 in legal expenses and fees, and asked the district court
to award $40,000. The district court found “that the entire amount was necessary for
[wife’s] good faith assertion of her rights” and awarded $40,000.
Husband does not contest the district court’s finding that the fees were necessary
for the good-faith assertion of wife’s rights. Still, husband contests the second and third
requirements and argues that the district court did not state the required findings with
specificity. “Conclusory findings on the statutory factors do not adequately support a fee
award.” Geske v. Marcolina, 624 N.W.2d 813, 817 (Minn. App. 2001). But we will not
overturn an award “where review o f the order reasonably implies that the district court
considered the relevant factors and where the district court was familiar with the history of
the case and had access to the parties’ financial records.” Id. (quotations omitted). We
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consider whether this record shows that the district court considered evidence on the two
contested requirements.
As for husband’s ability to pay, wife argues that “there was ample evidence upon
which the [district] court could rely in concluding that [husband] had the ability to
contribute to [wife’s] attorney’s fees.” Wife points to evidence that husband received an
inheritance of $380,000, which was “presumptively liquid” because husband had spent
“approximately $79,000 by the time of trial.” Thus, the record supports the district court’s
determination that husband had the ability to pay “a portion” of wife’s attorney fees.
As for wife’s ability to pay her own fees, husband contends that our caselaw has
rejected “the notion that ‘need’ under Minn. Stat. § 518.14 is synonymous with a bare
disparity in the parties’ finances.” He cites two cases to establish this point of law, but
neither case is otherwise helpful. In both cases, we affirmed a district court’s decision to
deny attorney fees.
First, in Schallinger v. Schallinger , the appellant asked us to overturn the district
court’s denial of a fee award. 699 N.W.2d 15, 24 (Minn. App. 2005), review denied (Minn.
Sept. 28, 2005). We affirmed the district court after concluding that the record evidence
established that the appellant could pay her own fees and, in fact, had already paid her own
fees. Id. Here, there is no evidence that wife had already paid her own attorney fees.
Second, in Burns v. Burns, we affirmed the denial of an attorney-fee award, noting
that “[a]lthough appellant’s earning capacity is somewhat greater than respondent’s,
respondent received substantial marital assets, including a $37,000 cash award.”
466 N.W.2d 421, 424 (Minn. App. 1991). Here, the district court found that husband’s
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earning capacity is more than three times that of wife’s, and the district court also found
that wife would incur tax penalties if she used her nonliquid assets to pay attorney fees.
Moreover, the Burns court’s reference to “earning capacity” evokes the pre-1990
attorney-fee statute, which required consideration of “the financial resources of the
parties.” Berenberg v. Berenberg, 474 N.W.2d 843, 849 (Minn. App. 1991) (discussing
Minn. Stat. § 518.14 (1988)). But as husband notes, the legislature has since “remove[d]
any comparative analysis” from the attorney-fee statute. 1990 Minn. Laws ch. 574, § 10 at
2129-30. Thus, Burns offers little to assist our review.
The record shows that wife’s assets following dissolution were largely “non-liquid,
pre-tax retirement assets” and that she needed her share of the proceeds from the sale of
the marital home to purchase a new home. Also, wife received both a loan of $25,000 and
a separate gift of $20,432 from her parents. Wife testified that she “had to go into debt and
[] use[] some of the money that [she] received from [her] parents” to pay for her ongoing
attorney fees. Record evidence reasonably supports the district court’s determination that
wife lacked the ability to pay “at least a portion” of her legal fees. We therefore find no
error in the district court’s exercise of its discretion.
In conclusion, we reverse and remand the amount of spousal maintenance because
the district court erred in its analysis of husband’s ability to pay and included child-only
expenses when assessing wife’s need. The district court may reopen the record to address
these matters at its discretion. We affirm the district court’s decision to award an upward
deviation in child support and to award need-based attorney fees to wife.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.