State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1010

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lawrence Carl Demetrious White,
Appellant.

Filed September 27, 2021
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-CR-17-708

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Patrick R. McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Susan B. DeVos, Assistant County
Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent)

Craig E. Cascarano, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Rodenberg,
Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s denial of his postconviction petition seeking to
withdraw his guilty plea, appellant argues hi s plea was unintelligent because he was not
made aware of the “special conditions” of probation imposed by the court. Because
appellant was aware and understood the direct consequences of his gu ilty plea and is not
required to be aware of or understand all potential conditions of probation because they are
collateral, his guilty plea was valid, no manifest injustice occurred by the court accepting
his guilty plea, and we therefore affirm.
FACTS
Following appellant Lawrence Carl Demetrious White’s suspected involvement in
prostitution in Blue Earth Coun ty, respondent State of Minne sota charged appellant with
fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle, prom otion of prostitution of an individual, and
engaging in sex trafficking of an individual.
In July 2020, appellant pleaded guilty via an Alford1 plea to promotion of
prostitution of an individual, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1a(2) (2016). The
district court accepted the plea agreement, dismissed the other counts, and ordered a
presentence investigation (PSI) report. The district court st ayed execution of 74 months’
imprisonment and placed appellant on probation for ten years. The district court imposed
ten “general conditions” and 21 “special conditions” of probation. The “special

1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970).
3
conditions,” each of which we re recommended by proba tion as part of the PSI, 2 include
“[p]rovid[ing] all banking and investment records” and “monthly reporting of all income .
. . as requested by [his] supervising agent” as well as “[f]il[ing] income taxes as required
by state and federal law and provid[ing] any proof of such to probation upon request.”
The district court denied appellant’s postconviction petition without holding an
evidentiary hearing. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellate courts review a district court’s “summary denial of a petition for
postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion.” Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422
(Minn. 2018). A district court abuses its discretion “when its de cision is based on an
erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Id.
A district court “must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea” when “necessary
to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Cr im. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice
exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). To
be valid, a plea “must be accura te, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. Appellant argues that
the plea was not intelligent.
A plea is intelligent if a defendant “understands the charges against him, the rights
he is waiving, and the consequences of his plea.” Id. at 96. The defendant must understand
the plea’s “direct consequences.” Id. Direct consequences “are those which flow

2 During oral argument before our court, co unsel for the state info rmed the court that
appellant desired to relocate to California while on probation. As a result, and as part of
the PSI, the Minnesota probation agent contacted a California probation agent who would
be supervising appellant and who recommended many of the “special conditions.”
4
definitely, immediately, and automatically from the guilty plea—the maximum sentence
and any fine to be imposed.” Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn. 1998); State v.
Crump, 826 N.W.2d 838, 841-42 (Minn. App. 20 13) (holding direct consequences “are
those which flow definitely, immediately, and automatically from the guilty plea, such as
the maximum sentence to be imposed and the amount of any fine”) (quotation omitted),
rev. denied (Minn. May 21, 2013). “A defendant need not be advised of every consequence
for his plea to be intelligent” and “[i]gnorance of a collateral consequence does not entitle
a criminal defendant to withdraw a guilty plea.” Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 903-04
(Minn. 2020) (emphasis omitted).
Unlike direct consequences—which a defendant is required to understand for a plea
to be intelligent—collateral c onsequences are those which “f low[] from the plea that are
not punishment” and “serve a substantially di fferent purpose than those that serve to
punish, as they are civil and regulatory in nature and are imposed in the interest of public
safety.” Id. at 905. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that “[f]ailure to advise [a
defendant] of” collateral consequences “does not make [a] plea unintelligent, and does not
constitute a manifest injustice that mandates the withdrawal of [a] plea.” Id. at 907.
Appellant believes that because “he was not informed of all the conditions the
[district] court could impose on a probationary sentence,” a nd in particular the “special
conditions” recommended in the PSI and imposed by the distri ct court, his plea was not
intelligent.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. The record reflects that appellant was made
aware at multiple times during the plea hearing of the direct consequences of his guilty
5
plea. The plea petition, which appellant indicat ed he reviewed “lin e by line” with his
attorney before signing it, states that he ha d “received, read and discussed a copy of the
[c]omplaint” and “[appellant has] been told by [his] attorney and [he] understand[s] . . .
[t]hat the maximum sentence wh ich may be imposed is fifteen years in jail/prison and/or
$40,000 fine.” The sentencing transcript also reflects that the district court informed
appellant of the direct conse quences of a guilty plea during the plea hearing, stating that
“the presumptive duration of sentence [for count two] is between 53 months and 74 months,
with a middle of the box range of 62 months and a presumptive disposition is commitment
to the Commissioner of Corrections.” The dist rict court reiterated to appellant the plea
agreement which states that appellant would accept a “downward dispositional departure,
meaning that the 74-month sentence would not be executed . . . [but] that he would be
sentenced at the top of the applicable box . . . which would be 74 months.” Finally, the
criminal complaint indicated that the “Maximum Sentence” that could be imposed for
count two was “15 years and/or $40,000.”
Appellant asserts the “special conditions” recommended in the PSI and imposed by
the district court should be viewed as dir ect consequences because they are “Draconian 3
and overly regulatory” and he “was not aware that the [district] court could impose” them.
But Minnesota caselaw requires only that a defendant be aware of the direct consequences

3 “Draco [was an] Athenian lawgiver whose harsh legal code punished both trivial and
serious crimes in Athens with death—hence the continued use of the word draconian to
describe repressive legal measures.” Draco, Encyclopedia Britannica,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Draco-Greek-lawgiver (last visited September 20,
2021)
6
of a guilty plea. The failure to inform a defendant of co llateral consequences before
pleading guilty does not render a guilty plea unintelligent. Kaiser, 641 N.W.2d at 907.4
In sum, it is clear from the record that appellant was well-info rmed of the direct
consequences he would face from his guilty plea and the plea was therefore intelligent.5
Affirmed.

4 There exists another aven ue by which a defenda nt may challenge specific conditions
imposed by a district court, which is that a defendant may request to modify probation
conditions in district court and, if unsuccessful, appeal the sentence. State v. Franklin, 604
N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn. 2000).
5 Appellant also argues that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing. But,
no evidentiary hearing is required when the alleged facts “are legally insufficient to entitle
[the petitioner] to the requested relief.” Rossberg v. State, 932 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Minn. 2019).
Because there are no alleged facts that would entitle appellant to withdraw his guilty plea,
summary dismissal was proper, and we need not remand for an evidentiary hearing.