State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1012

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jonathon Ross Rudquist,
Appellant.

Filed April 19, 2021
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CR-19-323

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Angella Erickson, Assistant County Attorney,
Chaska, Minnesota (for respondent)

Deborah Ellis, Ellis Law Office, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions fo r dissemination and possession of child
pornography, arguing that the district court improperly imposed sentences for offenses that

2
were committed as part of a single behavioral incident and abused its discretion by denying
his request for a downward dispositional departure. We affirm.
FACTS
In December 2019, appellant Jonathon Ross Rudquist pleaded guilty to two counts
of dissemination of child por nography in violation of Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 3(a)
(2016), and four counts of possession of child pornography in viola tion of Minn. Stat.
§ 617.247, subd. 4(a) (2016). Rudquist admitted that on June 13 and 14, 2017, an FBI
agent downloaded 44 images of child pornography that Rudquist made available from his
computer; on June 17, 2017, an FBI agent downloaded 119 files of child pornography that
Rudquist made available from his computer; on July 25, 2017, he personally downloaded
three images of child pornography; and on Ju ly 27, 2017, he person ally downloaded one
image of child pornography.
A presentence-investigation (PSI) report showed that the presumptive sentences for
the counts of dissemination of child pornography were 24 months stayed for count one and
36 months stayed for count two. The presumptive sentence for the first count of possession
of child pornography was also a stayed sentence of 30 months. The presumptive sentences
for the final three possession counts were presumptive commits of 39 months, 51 months,
and 60 months respectively. The PSI report recommended that the district court sentence
Rudquist to 60 months in prison.

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Rudquist objected to the criminal-histo ry-score calculation in the PSI report,
arguing, among other things, that the possession counts were part of a single behavioral
incident.1 Rudquist also moved for a downward dispositional departure.
At Rudquist’s sentencing, the district court indicated that it reviewed the PSI report
and the victim-impact statements. Rudquist argued that he should receive probation
because he has no new offenses and will continue to be observed on probation. He argued
that he took accountability fo r his actions, was remorseful, and that his mental illness
contributed to his offenses. Rudquist argu ed that he has a close friend who was a sex-
trafficking victim who understands what he did and supports him. Rudquist argued that he
never intentionally disseminated material, he was “simply participating in the system as it
exists.”
The state argued that Rudquist did not se ek treatment on his ow n after the search
warrant was executed in 2017, but waited until after he was charged and retained counsel
in 2019. The prosecutor also noted that Rudquist was ranked at a moderate-to-high risk to
reoffend and noted that his remorse stemmed from the fact that he was facing prison. The
prosecutor stated that the videos were “ho rrific” and the children were “torture[d] and
abuse[d],” but Rudquist was not disturbed and sought out the vi deos for sexual pleasure.
The prosecutor agreed that Rudquist had little criminal history and was cooperative and

1 The Hernandez method permits a conviction for which the defendant is first sentenced to
be added to his criminal-history score for another conviction when he is sentenced for
multiple convictions on the same day. See State v. Williams, 771 N.W.2d 514, 521 (Minn.
2009). But when a defendant is sentenced for multiple convictions based on a single
behavioral incident, the district court is prohibited from using the Hernandez method to
calculate the defendant’s criminal-history score. Id. at 522.

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appropriate in court, but stated that similar offenders are also appropriate and respectful
and have minimal criminal history.
The district court denied Rudquist’s motion for a dispositional departure. It imposed
concurrent stayed sentences on counts one th rough three: 24 months on count one, 36
months on count two, and 30 months on count three. The district court sentenced Rudquist
to a concurrent 27 months in prison on count four, whic h was a downward durational
departure, and did not impose sentences on counts five and six. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Sentences for possession convictions
Rudquist first argues that the counts of possession of child pornography either arose
out of a single behavioral incident with the dissemination counts, or were themselves part
of a single behavioral incident for which he should have received one sentence. When
facts are not in dispute, this court reviews de novo “[w]hether multiple offenses form part
of a single behavioral act.” State v. Marchbanks, 632 N.W.2d 725, 731 (Minn. App. 2001).
The single-behavioral-incident rule requires a district court to impose punishment
for only one crime when a defendant is convicted for conduct that involves more than one
crime. See Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2016); Williams, 771 N.W.2d at 520. The rule
intends to “prohibit double punishment and . . . insure that punishment for a single incident
of criminal behavior involving a multiplicity of violations will be commensurate with the
criminality of [the] defendant’s misconduct.” State v. Johnson, 141 N.W.2d 517, 521-22
(Minn. 1966). Whether criminal behavior is a single behavioral incident depends on
“factors of time and place . . . [and] whether the segment of conduct involved was

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motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective.” Id. at 525 (emphasis omitted).
The state bears the burden of establishing that the underlying conduct did not occur as part
of a single behavioral incident. State v. Williams, 608 N.W.2d 837, 841-42 (Minn. 2000).
Dissemination and possession offenses
“[P]ossession of a pornographic work invo lving a minor is an included offense of
dissemination of such a work.” State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 664 (Minn. 2006). “[A]
defendant cannot be convicte d of both dissemination and possession of a pornographic
work unless the offenses constitut e separate criminal acts.” State v. McCauley , 820
N.W.2d 577, 590 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Oct. 24,
2012). In determining whether two offenses ar e separate criminal acts, courts consider,
“whether the conduct (1) shar es a unity of time and place and (2) was motivated by an
effort to obtain a single criminal objective.” Id. at 591 (quotation omitted).
Here, the dissemination and possession offens es are separate criminal acts because
they do not share unity of time. The dissemi nation offenses occurred in June 2017; the
possession charges occurred in July 2017. Further, this court determined in McCauley that
child pornography dissemination and possession offenses are not motivated by the same
criminal objective, because possession is fo r “personal use and prur ient enjoyment,” and
dissemination is “sharing those files with others.” Id.
Possession offenses
The single-behavioral-incident rule has several exceptions, including an exception
for multiple victims. State v. Skipintheday, 717 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Minn. 2006). A district
court may impose multiple sentences for crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident

6
when there are multiple victims and the sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality
of the defendant’s conduct. Id. The multiple-victim exceptio n applies to sentencing for
multiple convictions of possessing child pornography when the crimes affected more than
one victim. State v. Rhoades, 690 N.W.2d 135, 139 (Minn. App. 2004). This court reviews
a district court’s decision to impose multiple sentences invo lving multiple victims for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Cruz-Ramirez , 771 N.W.2d 497, 512 (Minn. 2009). On
appeal, Rudquist bears the burden of showing that his sentence unfa irly exaggerates the
criminality of his conduct. See State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1998).
In pleading guilty to the four possession offenses, Rudquist admitted that “each of
the children depicted in these images are identified children that were under the age of 16
that were identified by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children,” and that
“each of the images . . . depicted separate, dis tinct children.” As different victims were
identified and admitted to, the district c ourt properly imposed multiple sentences for
multiple victims. Additionally, the district court did not impose sentences on counts five
and six, and Rudquist receive d a downward durationa l departure on count four; thus, he
has not shown that his sentence unfairly exaggerates the criminality of his conduct.
Dispositional departure
Finally, Rudquist argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
motion for a downward dispositional departure. A sentence prescribed by the sentencing
guidelines is presumed appropriate. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014). A
district court may depart from a presumptive sentence only if “identifiable, substantial, and
compelling circumstances” warrant a departure. State v. Solberg , 882 N.W.2d 618, 623

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(Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted ). Appellate courts “afford the [district] court great
discretion in the imposition of sentences a nd reverse . . . only for an abuse of that
discretion.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 307-08 ( quotation omitted). “[I]t would be a rare case
which would warrant reversal of the refusal to depart.” State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7
(Minn. 1981).
In considering a motion fo r a downward dispositional depa rture, a district court’s
focus is on the defendant and whether he is particularly amenable to probation. State v.
Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1 982) (stating that in assessing whether a defendant is
particularly amenable to probation, a district court may consider age, prior record, remorse,
cooperation, attitude in court, and support of family and friends).
Rudquist argues that after analyzing the Trog factors, the district court concluded
that he was particularly amenable to probatio n, but denied him a di spositional departure.
The district court stated that, although Rudquist was particularly amenable to probation, an
“executed sentence [was] necessary in this case.” A district court may deny a dispositional
departure even if the defendant is amenable to probation. State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662,
664-65 (Minn. App. 2009). And, as the district court did here, a district court may consider
offense-related factors in deciding whether a dispositional departure is appropriate. See
State v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018).
The district court stated that it had kept an open mind while giving a lot of thought
to Rudquist’s sentence and decided that a prison sentence was required based on the
reasons explained by the pros ecutor. The prosecutor argued th at Rudquist did not seek
treatment until after he was charged in 2019, even though the search warrant was executed

8
in 2017; was ranked at a moderate-to-high risk to reoffend; did not undergo a polygraph to
assess whether he had ever sexually touched a child, and most individuals similarly charged
have engaged in contact offenses; was remo rseful only because he was facing prison;
sought out videos for sexual pleasure in whic h children were “torture[d] and abuse[d]”;
and was like most child-pornography-possession offenders in that he was cooperative and
appropriate in court and had minimal criminal history. Thus, the district court properly
considered all relevant fact ors and did not abuse its disc retion by denying Rudquist a
downward dispositional departure.
Affirmed.