State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1021

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Melvin Ronaldo Serrano-Santana,
Appellant.

Filed May 17, 2021
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-19-6526

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Jeffrey A. Wald, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appella te Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions for first-degree burglary, threats of violence,
and domestic assault by strangulation, arguing that he is entitled to a new trial because the
district court abused its discretion by admitting relationship evidence and by failing to sua
sponte provide a cautionary instruction regarding the proper use of that evidence.
Appellant also argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of domestic
assault by strangulation as a matter of law. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged ap pellant Melvin Serrano -Santana with
first-degree burglary, threats of violence, domestic assault by strangulation, and violation
of a domestic -abuse-no-contact order (DANCO) based on conduct that occurred on
August 28, 2019 . At trial, the state presented evidence that Serrano -Santana and C.R.
began a romantic relationship in 2017. C .R. testified that Serrano -Santana was a “good
man” at the beginning of their relationship, but “once he started feeling more comfortable
with [her], he started maltreating [her].” According to C.R., Serrano-Santana refused to
allow her to speak with her friends, broke her phone, and monitored her whereabouts with
a tracking application on her phone. C.R. also claimed that Serrano -Santana once held a
knife to her neck and prevented her from going to work for two days.
In February 2019, C.R. obtained a D ANCO against Serrano-Santana. On May 15,
2019, C.R. came home from work to find Serrano-Santana sleeping in her bed. When C.R.
told him that she was going to call the police, Serrano -Santana took her phone away , and

3
the two “struggled.” C.R. testified that she was eventually able to call the police, and when
they arrived, Serrano-Santana was “grabbing [her] by the neck.” The state then introduced
two photographs of C.R. from the May 15 incident, which showed bruising on C.R.’s cheek
and beneath her shoulder.
C.R. testified that, after she ended their relationship, she moved to get away from
Serrano-Santana because he repeatedly entered her residence without her permission.
According to C.R., Serrano -Santana came to her residence on August 27, 2019, a nd
attempted to convince her to get back together with him. C.R. claimed that, during that
encounter, Serrano-Santana grabbed her by the neck.
The next day, C.R. arrived home from work at about 5:00 p.m. When she arrived
home, C.R.’s daughter was asleep in the apartment, and C.R. discovered that the front door
was unlocked. And when C.R. entered the apartment, Serrano -Santana was coming out.
C.R. testified that she asked Serrano-Santana what he was doing there, and he told her that
he “was just t here to see what he would find” and showed her that he had taken her
bankcard. C.R. testified that she told Serrano-Santana that she was going to call the police
and he then grabbed her by the neck “like he always does.” C.R. claimed that Serrano -
Santana put her against the wall , covered her mouth , and squeezed her neck. C.R.
explained that, although she was able to breathe through her mouth, she was afraid and
thought Serrano-Santana was going to kill her. According to C.R., Serrano -Santana then
left with her bankcard.
C.R. called 911 . An o fficer responded to the call and described C.R. as “very
distraught, v ery confused, [and] very scared .” C.R. informed the officers that her ex -

4
boyfriend got inside her apartment, grabbed her by the neck, and showed her that he had
taken her bankcard. C.R. also told the officers that her neck was sore and that she could
not swallow. Although one of the officers testified that C.R. was embarrassed because she
had lost control of her bladder when Serrano-Santana grabbed her neck, C.R. testified that
she did not remember the officers asking her about that.
Officers observed a fresh scratch on C.R.’s neck, just below her chin. Officers also
observed that one of the screens on a window to C.R.’s ground -floor apartment had been
cut and that a window on another side of the apartment would allow entrance into the
apartment. Photographs of the windows and of C.R.’s neck were taken by the officers and
admitted into evidence.
Officers searched the area for Serrano-Santana, but they were unable to locate him.
Later that evening, Serrano-Santana repeatedly called and texted C.R., both threatening her
and trying to reconcile their romantic relationship . Serrano -Santana continued
communicating with C.R. the next day and eventually came to C.R.’s apartment, where he
was arrested.
C.R. gave a statement to Sergeant Michelle Giampolo on August 30, 2019. C.R.
described the pressure that resulted when Serrano-Santana squeezed her neck on August 28
as a six out of ten. C.R. also told Sergeant Giampolo that “as a result of being strangled ”
by Serrano-Santana on August 28, she “ urinated on herself ,” “saw stars,” and th at “her
vision started to go black.” According to Sergeant Giampolo, bladder control is a symptom
of being strangled. Sergeant Giampolo testified that C.R. said that as a result of being

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strangled by Serrano -Santana, her “voice was raspy and sore and it hurt when she
swallowed.”
The jury found Serrano -Santana guilty as charged . The district court entered
judgments of conviction for first-degree burglary, threats of violence, and domestic assault
by strangulation and sentenced him to serve 60 months in prison for those crimes. Serrano-
Santana appeals.
DECISION
I.
Serrano-Santana contends that the district court abused its discretion by admitting,
under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2020 ), evidence regarding his relationship with C.R. and that
the court plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury, s ua sponte, regarding the proper use
of that evidence. We address each argument in turn.
Admission of Relationship Evidence
Minn. Stat. § 634.20 is a rule of evidence that allows the admission of “relationship”
evidence in certain circumstances. State v. Fra ga, 864 N.W.2d 615, 627 (Minn. 2015).
The statute provides that “[e]vidence of domestic conduct by the accused against the victim
of domestic conduct, or against other family or household members, is admissibl e unless
the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .” Minn.
Stat. § 634.20. “Domestic conduct” includes, among other things, “evidence of domestic
abuse.” Id. “Domestic abuse” includes “physical harm, bodily injur y, or assault,” if
committed against a family or household member. Minn. Stat . § 518B.01, subd. 2(a)(1)
(2020); see also Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (incorporating that definition of domestic abuse).

6
We review the district court’s decision to admit evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Lindsey , 755 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Minn. App. 2008) ,
review denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2008) . The a ppellant has the burden to establish that the
district court abused its discretion and that appellant was prejudiced. Id.
Prior to trial, the state filed notice of intent to introduce relationship evidence under
Minn. Stat. § 634.20 . Later, the state mov ed in limine to introduce evidence regarding
three prior domestic -related incidents inv olving Serrano -Santana and C.R. The district
court, over Serrano -Santana’s objection, granted the state’s request to admit evidence
regarding incidents that had occurre d in February and May 2019, but the court ruled that
evidence regarding the third incident would not be allowed . Ultimately, the state did not
present evidence regarding the February 2019 incident at trial.
Serrano-Santana argues that evidence regarding t he May 15, 2019 incident had
limited probative value and was outweighed by its prejudicial effect “because it made [him]
appear to have a propensity for violence towards [C.R.].” Serrano -Santana cites State v.
Hormann as support, a case in which the defendant was charged with stalking and installing
a tracking device on his wife’s car without permission. 805 N.W.2d 883, 886 (Minn. App.
2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012). At trial, the Hormann complainant testified
about the defendant’s conduct during their 20-year marriage, which consisted of domestic
violence and controlling and destructive behavior. Id. at 886-87. On appeal, this court
stated that the complainant’s “general testimony about the marriage was only marginally
relevant to establish why she believed her car was being tracked” by the defendant and
“had little apparent value other than to establish [the defendant’s] bad character.” Id. at

7
891. This court concluded that the “limited probative value of the evidence w as
outweighed by the danger of prejudice and the district court abused its discretion by
admitting it.” Id.
Serrano-Santana’s reliance on Hormann is unavailing because, unlike the defendant
in Hormann, Serrano-Santana was charged with domestic-assault-related offenses. And in
this case, the relationship evidence helped the jury to assess C.R.’s credibility. As Serrano-
Santana notes in his br ief to this court, “[t]his case hinged on [C.R.’s] credibility.”
Relationship evidence has “significant probative value in assisting the jury to judge witness
credibility.” Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d at 757.
Moreover, “u nfair prejudice is not merely damaging evidence, even severely
damaging evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate
means, giving one party an unfair advantage.” State v. Ware, 856 N.W.2d 719, 729 (Minn.
App. 2014) (quotation omitted). We acknowl edge that the relationship evidence was
prejudicial to Serrano -Santana. But Serrano -Santana fails to establish that the evidence
persuaded by illegitimate means or gave the state an unfair advantage. A nd although the
district court failed to provide a limiting instruction, the prosecutor mitigated the risk of
unfair prejudice by telling the jury that “[y]ou are not to convict [Serr ano-Santana] based
on the[] May, 2019 acts.”
In sum, the probative value of the May 15, 2019 incident was not substantially
outweighed by potential for unfair prejudice, and the district court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting it.

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Cautionary Jury Instruction
In State v. Zinski, the supreme court adopted the rule that if “a district court admits
relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20, over a defendant’s objection that the
evidence does not satisfy section 634.20, the court must sua sponte instruct the jurors on
the proper use of such evidence, unless the defendant objects to the instruction by the
court.” 927 N.W.2d 272, 278 (Minn. 2019).
At trial, Serrano -Santana did not request a cautionary instruction regarding the
proper use of the relationship evidence, nor did he object to the district court ’s failure to
provide such an instruction. “Failure to request specific jury instructions or to object to
instructions given generally results in forfeiture of the issue on appeal.” State v. Goodloe,
718 N.W.2d 413, 422 (Minn. 2006). But, under the plain-error doctrine, we have discretion
to consider a forfeited issue. Zinski, 927 N.W.2d at 275. Under that standard, we may
consider an unobjected-to error “if the defendant establishes (1) an error, (2) that was plain,
and (3) that affected his substantial rights.” Id. If those elements are satisfied, we will
reverse if the error seriously affects the fairness, integ rity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. State v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269, 274 (Minn. 2014).
An error is “plain” if it “contravenes caselaw, a rule, or a standard of conduct.”
Zinski, 927 N.W.2d at 275 (quotations omitted).
The third prong, re quiring that the error affect
substantial rights, is satisfied if the error was prejudicial and
affected the outcome of the case. The defendant bears the
burden of persuasion on this third prong. We consider this to
be a heavy burden. We have defined plain error as prejudicial
if there is a reasonable likelihood that the giving of the

9
instruction in question would have had a significant effect on
the verdict of the jury.

State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1998) (footnotes and quotation omitted).
Serrano-Santana argues, and the state agrees, that under Zinski, the district court’s
failure to provide a cautionary instruction regarding the relationship evidence was error
and that the error was plain. We agree. Because the district court admitted relationship
evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 over Serrano-Santana’s objection and he did not object
to an instruction regarding the proper use of such evidence, the district court plainly erred
by failing to sua sponte provide a cautionary instruction. See Zinski, 927 N.W.2d at 278.
Serrano-Santana argues that a “reasonable likelihood existed that the failure to give
a cautionary instruction substantially affected the verdict.” But Serrano-Santana cites no
precedential case in which the failure to provide a cautionary instruction regarding the
proper use of evidence admitted under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 affected the defendant ’s
substantial rights . Nor does our research reveal any Minnesota appellate decision,
precedential or otherwise, that reversed a defendant’s conviction on the basis that there was
a reasonable possibility that the lack of a cautionary instruction related to the use of
relationship evidence substantially influenced the jury’s decision to convict.
In State v. Meldrum, this court held that the lack of a cautionary instruction on the
proper use of relationship evidence did not prejudice the defendant. 724 N.W.2d 15, 21 -
22 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn. Jan. 24, 2007). In reaching that conclusion,
we analogized relationship evidence to Spreigl evidence and concluded that because the
risk presented by both types of evidence to a fair trial is significant, a precautionary limiting

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instruction should be given in relationship -evidence cases, as it is in Spreigl-evidence
cases. Id. at 17. But we stated that the lack of a limiting instruction regarding relationship
evidence did not prejudice the defendant because other evidence at trial supported the
conviction, the relationship evidence was not used for an improper purpose, and the other
strong evi dence at trial negated the risk of prejudicial impact from the relationship
evidence. Id. at 22.
This court has since held, in several precedential opinions, that defendants were not
prejudiced by the lack of a cautionary instruction regarding the proper use of relationship
evidence because the other evidence of guilt was strong . See State v. Melanson , 906
N.W.2d 561, 568 (Minn. App. 2018) (stating that “the relationship testimony . . . was brief,
its scope was limited, neither party placed undue emphas is on it, and the record contained
other strong evidence of [the defendant’s] guilt ”), review granted (Minn. Mar. 28, 2018)
and appeal dismissed (Minn. June 5, 2019); see also State v. Barnslater, 786 N.W.2d 646,
654 (Minn. App. 2010) ( reasoning that the limited nature of the complainant’s testimony
minimized the potential for unfair prejudice , the district court’s final jury instruction s
alleviated much of the risk that the jury would improperly convict the defendant for the
prior offenses rather than the charged offense, and the evidence supporting the defendant’s
conviction was very strong), review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 2010); State v. Word , 755
N.W.2d 776, 785 -86 (Minn. App. 2008) ( reasoning that the evidence of the defendant’s
guilt was strong, the pro secutor did not attempt to use the relationship evidence for an
improper purpose, and the district court instructed the jury not to convict the defendant for
any prior offenses).

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Here, the state presented strong evidence of Serrano -Santana’s guilt, in addition to
the relatio nship evidence regarding the Ma y 2019 incident. C.R. testified, without
objection, that Serrano-Santana had been violent in the past, and Serrano-Santana does not
argue that that testimony was wrongly admitted. C.R. also testified —specifically and
consistently—about the August 28, 2019 events that resulted in the underlying charges
against Serrano-Santana. She testified that she came home from work to find Serrano -
Santana in her home while her daughter was asleep; that he pushed her against a wall; that
he put his hands over her mouth; that he squeezed her neck; that he ran away with her
bankcard, and that he later threatened her . In addition, evidence was presented that C.R.
called 911 to report the incident , and the 911 call in w hich C.R. informed the dispatcher
that Serrano-Santana had broken into her home was admitted into evidence.
The state also presented the testimony of the responding officer, who testified that
C.R. “was very distraught, very confused, [and] very scared.” According to the officer,
C.R. told him that her ex-boyfriend got inside her apartment, grabbed her by the neck, and
showed her that he had taken her bankcard. The officer also testified that C.R. stated that
her neck was sore and that she could not swa llow. Moreover, the officer testified that he
observed a fresh scratch on C.R.’s neck, just below her chin, and two windows from which
Serrano-Santana could have gained entry into C.R. ’s apartment. Photographs of th ose
windows and of C.R.’s neck were taken and admitted into evidence.
In addition to the strength of the evidence regarding the August 28 incident, there is
no indication that the prosecutor used the relationship evidence for an improper purpose.
In fact, the prosecutor specifically told the jury not to convict Serrano -Santana “based on

12
the[] May 2019 , acts.” And the district court properly instructed the jury on the
presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as well
as the proper elements of the offenses.
In sum, other evidence at trial supported the conviction , the relationship evidence
was not used for an improper purpose, and the other strong evidence at trial negated the
risk of prejudicial impact from the relationship evidence. Thus, we are not persuaded that
the district court’s failure to provide a cauti onary instruction regarding proper use of
evidence related to the May 2019 incident affected Serrano-Santana’s substantial rights .
He therefore is not entitled to relief under the plain-error standard.
II.
Serrano-Santana argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction
of domestic assault by strangulation. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we
normally conduct “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence,
when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient.” State v. Ortega,
813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). We assume that “the jury believed
the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Caldwell, 803
N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). A reviewing court “will not disturb
the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the
defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100.
Serrano-Santana was convicted of domestic assault by strangulation under Minn.
Stat. § 609.2247, subd. 2 (2018). That statute provides that “whoever a ssaults a family or

13
household member by strangulation is guilty of a felony.” Minn. Stat. § 609.2247, subd.
2. “‘Strangulation’ means intentionally impeding normal breathing or circulation of the
blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck or by blo cking the nose or mouth of
another person.” Id., subd. 1(c) (2018).
Serrano-Santana argues that because C.R. testified that Serrano -Santana “grabbed
her by the throat and cupped his hand over her mouth, but she could still breathe,” his
“actions did not impede her normal breathing” within the meaning of section 609.2247,
subdivision 1(c). Thus, Serrano -Santana argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction of domestic assault by strangulation and that this court must reverse
and remand with instructions to reduce his conviction to gross -misdemeanor domestic
assault.
Serrano-Santana’s sufficiency -of-the-evidence argument requires us to determine
the meaning of “impeding normal breathing or circulatio n of the blood,” which raises an
issue of statutory interpretation. See State v. Vasko , 889 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 2017)
(deciding a statutory-interpretation question in order to analyze the sufficiency of the
evidence). Statutory interpretation is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. See State
v. Prigge, 907 N.W.2d 635, 638 (Minn. 2018).
This court “interpret[s] statutory language t o ascertain and effectuate the
Legislature’s intent.” State v. Bowen , 921 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Minn. 2019) (quotation
omitted). “If the L egislature’s intent is clear from the statute’s plain and unambiguous
language, then we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning.” State v. Glover ,
952 N.W.2d 190, 193 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted).

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The parties disput e the meaning of the term “impede” in Minn. Stat. § 609.2247,
subd. 1(c), and that term is not defined in the statute. In such circumstances, we “may look
to other interpretive tools to determine its meaning, including dictionary definitions.” Id.
One d ictionary defines “impediment” as “[a] hindrance or obstruction.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 870 (10th ed. 2014). Another dictionary defines “impede” as “[t]o retard or
obstruct the progress of.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 879
(4th ed. 2006).
The dictionary definitions of “impede” do not support Serrano-Santana’s position
that a person’s normal breathing must be completely or entirely obstructed to constitute
strangulation under Minn. Stat. § 609.2247, subd. 2. Instead, the common dictionary
definition of “impede” indicates that a person’s normal course of breathing need only be
hindered. Moreover, the strangulation statute requires only that normal breathing be
impeded by “applying pressure on the throat or neck or by blocking the nose or mouth of
another person.” Minn. Stat. § 609.2247, subd. 1(c) (emphasis added). The fact that the
statute requires only the blockage of the nose or mouth for a strangulation to occur indicates
that a strangulation victim could still be abl e to breathe even while strangled within the
meaning of the statute. See id.
C.R. testified that Serrano-Santana grabbed her by the neck, put her against the wall,
and squeezed her neck with “his two fingers” for “one minute.” C.R. also testified that her
“airway” was “blocked” from her nose because of the way he positioned his hand over her
mouth. And C.R. testified that, after the assault, it hurt when she swallowed her saliva or
drank water. Although C.R. stated that she could still breathe through her mouth as she

15
was strangled by Serrano -Santana, the statute does not require that she was completely
unable to breathe. Instead, the statute requires only that her normal breathing was impeded
by the application of pressure to her neck or the blockage of her nose or mouth. See id.
Moreover, Sergeant Giampolo testified that C.R. told her that “as a result of being
strangled [C.R.] urinated on herself and she saw stars and her vision started to go black.”
Sergeant Giampolo’s testimony further suppor ts the jury’s determination that C.R.’s
normal breathing was impeded by Serrano-Santana’s actions. Although C.R. testified that
she did not urinate on herself during the assault, this court views the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict. See Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100.
C.R.’s testimony, in conjunction with Sergeant Giampolo’s testimony, supports the
jury’s determination that C.R. was strangled by Serrano -Santana. Accordingly, the
evidence is sufficient to support Serrano -Santana’s convict ion of domestic assault by
strangulation.
Affirmed.