In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: R. H. and P. R. F., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1028

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
R. H. and P. R. F., Parents.

Filed February 22, 2021
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Stevens County District Court
File No. 75-JV-20-47

Jennifer L. Thompson, JLT Law & Mediation, Litchfield, Minnesota (for appellant-father
P.R.F.)

Aaron K. Jordan, Stevens County Attorney, Allison T. Whalen, Assistant County Attorney,
Morris, Minnesota (for respondent Stevens County Human Services)

Charlotte L. Culbertson, Fluegel, Anderson , McLaughlin & Brutlag, Morris, Minnesota
(for child)

Geri Kruger, Glenwood, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Ross, Pres iding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
On appeal from the termination of his parental rights (TPR), appellant-father argues
that the record does not supp ort the district court’s determ inations that (1) reasonable
efforts by the county failed to correct the conditions leading to the out-of-home placement

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of father’s daughter (the child), (2) the child was neglected and in foster care, and (3) TPR
is in the child’s best interests. We affirm.
FACTS
The child is the only joint child of mother and father. As further described below,
when this child-protection case began, mother and father had split up and the child had not
resided with father since she was very young.
This child-protection case began in March 2019, when the child was removed from
the care of her older half-sister (sister), w ho was living in Morris, Minnesota. The child
was 13 years old at the time. Th e child was adjudicated in need of protection or services
(CHIPS) within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, su bd. 6(8) (2018), and legal
custody of the child was transferred to Stevens County. The county petitioned for TPR in
February 2020 pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), (8) (2018). The child has
remained in court-ordered out-of-home placement since her removal in March 2019.
In June 2020, the district court held an adjudicatory heari ng on the TPR petition.
The county presented testimony from the case manager, the psychologist who conducted a
psychological evaluation and parenting assessment of father, and the guardian ad litem.
The child, sister, mother, and father also testified at the hearing. At the close of evidence,
the district court accepted mother’s request for voluntary termination of her parental rights.
Family history before Minnesota
The child was born during mother and fathe r’s three-year relationship. During that
time, mother, father, the child, and sister regularly resided together in Indiana. Sister is the
daughter of mother; she is three years older than the child and has lived with the child most

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of the child’s life. At the time of trial, the child was 14 years old. She had recently received
diagnoses of autism spectrum disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder.
Mother testified that she fled from Indian a and father’s home when sister told her
that father had sexually abused her. Mother se nt both the child and sister to Missouri and
followed soon after. Moth er stated that she did not report father to Indiana authorities at
that time because of her own negative e xperience reporting sexual abuse to law
enforcement. Mother then relocated to California with her children. There, mother felt safe
to report sister’s sexual abuse to law enforcement and did so.
Missouri’s and Minnesota’s social-services contact with the child
Several years later, mother, the child, and sister returned to Missouri, where the
child and sister lived with their maternal gr andparents. In 2018, sister was married—with
mother’s consent—at the age of 15 and left with her husband to live in Minnesota. Missouri
social services became involve d with mother in early 2019 after discovering significant
health, safety, and neglect concerns regarding the child’s environment at the grandparents’
home. A Missouri social worker oversaw a process in which mother signed two power-of-
attorney documents authorizing sister and her husband to become the child’s primary
caregivers.1 At that time, sister was pregnant and 16 years old, a nd her husband was 18
years old. In February 2019, sister retrieved the child from Missouri and brought her to live
with sister and her husband in Minnesota.

1 Mother’s actions to assign custody to sist er and her husband were evidently valid under
Missouri law.

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In March 2019, the coun ty received a welfare report concerning the child’s
supervision. The report stated that sister had power of attorney over the child and that sister
was in the hospital having a baby. The case manager met with the child the same day that
she received the report and confirmed that the child was staying by herself without an adult
or supervision. A petition for emergency protective care (EPC) was filed and granted, and
the county obtained custody of the child. A CH IPS petition was filed soon after. At first,
the case manager hoped that the child could still be placed w ith sister, but, by July, the
county also had custody of sister and both children were placed in the same foster home.
Father’s contact with the child
Father testified that, until he was contacted by the county in 2019, he had not seen
the child since 2009 despite efforts by him to locate mother and child. Father was living in
Indiana. He had served in the military and had various deployment s over the years,
including to Iraq. Father was honorably discharged from the United States Army in 2012.
In April 2019, after hearing from the county, father expressed his interest in reuniting with
the child. Father traveled to Minnesota for a court appearance in April 2019 and had his
first of several in-person visits with the child. During father’s second or third visit, he and
the child exchanged ph one numbers. Father and the chil d’s initial phone contact was not
supervised. However, the phone conversations became supervised when the foster parent
told the case manager her concerns about the effect that father’s communication had on the
child. The foster parent explained that the ch ild was always nervous to talk on the phone
with father and that she did not want to be alone on thos e phone calls. After a phone call
with father, the child would withdraw and not e ngage with others, an indicator that she is

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stressed. The foster parent also testified that father raised several inappropriate topics with
the child that extremely agitated her.
Sexual-abuse investigation of father
In June 2019, sister disclosed to the ca se manager that father had sexually abused
her. The county began a maltreatment inve stigation of fathe r. The case manager
interviewed mother, who said that sister ha d previously disclosed the abuse to her, and
father, who denied the allegations. The case manager contacted Indiana and California law
enforcement to obtain records in order to corroborate sister’s allegations. The case manager
contacted California several times to procure the records. In September 2019, California
authorities responded that it would take 12 to 14 weeks to send the records.
In the meantime, in July, the county filed a motion requesting that the district court
rescind an order requiring an expedited Inters tate Compact on the Placement of Children
(ICPC) procedure, which would relieve the county from assessing father as a permanency-
placement option for the child. The district court did not rule on that motion. And so, until
the case manager could corroborate sister’s allegations, the county moved forward with
father’s case plan and the child’s permanency-placement options.
Placement suitability
The case manager created an out-of-home placement plan for father in October
2019. The out-of-home placement plan reco mmended that father obtain a parental
assessment, known in Indiana as a “clinical interview and assessment” (CIA). Father
completed the CIA in January 2020. The psychological evaluator who performed father’s
CIA indicated that father was dismissive of the child’s autism-spectrum-disorder diagnosis.

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She also recommended that father undergo a full psychological evaluation to determine the
severity of his PTSD symptoms and degree of his intellectual functioning. Father testified
that his PTSD symptoms stem from his military service. The psychological evaluator stated
that a full psychological evaluation would be important to determine whether father can
successfully parent a child with autism-spectrum-disorder and trauma diagnoses.
The county offered father services, includi ng the CIA, the follow-up referral for a
full psychological evaluation, initiating the IC PC process with Indiana, scheduling in-
person visits as well as weekly phone calls, and discussing individual therapy with him.
Father did not ask for other services. Father complied with most of his case plan. He
completed the CIA and the psychological evaluation and attended weekly phone calls.2 But
the district court determined that he violated his case plan in three major respects. Father
did not share his Department of Veterans Affairs records with the psychological evaluator,
as ordered by the district court; he did not ma intain regular contact with the county from
June to September 2019; and he failed his home assessment during the ICPC process.
The county completed an IC PC request with Indiana. The case manager sent the
ICPC request on a non-expedited basis at th e recommendation of an official from the
Minnesota Department of Human Services’ ICPC Unit. In January 2020, an Indiana ICPC
worker conducted a home visit at father’s residence. The Indiana ICPC worker found that
father’s residence was not suitable for a ch ild because it was in extreme disrepair. The

2 From June 2019 to sometime in September 2019, before the implementation of the case
plan, father did not have contact with the child. He attributes the loss of contact to child’s
getting a new phone, but father did not contact the county during this time in order to obtain
the new phone number.

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Indiana ICPC worker gave father three weeks to remedy the issues. When the Indiana ICPC
worker returned, the issues were not corrected and so father’s ICPC request was denied.
It is possible to resubmit an ICPC request in Indiana. To do so, the county would
have to find that it is in the child’s best interests to liv e with father. He re, the county
determined that it is not in the child’s best in terests to live with fath er. It did so in mid-
February 2020. At that time , the county received the sexua l-abuse report from California
authorities, which concluded th at the allegation was unsubsta ntiated but confirmed that
mother had reported the sexual-assault allegation that sister had earlier disclosed to her.
The same day that the county received the California report, the county determined, based
on its investigation, that sister’s allegatio n was substantiated. Because of the county’s
ongoing concerns regarding father’s parenting abilities and the maltreatment determination
against him, the county denied father’s request to resubmit an ICPC request for the child’s
placement in Indiana. The county then filed a TPR petition.
The child’s current foster-care placement and improvements since her placement
The county introduced into evidence the child’s history in foster care, showing that,
at the start of her foster-care placement, the child was unable to as k for what she wanted
or, when offered help, to accept that someone wanted to help her. She could not
communicate that she was hungry or thirsty, and she would hoard food in her room for fear
that she would be unable to eat again. At 14 years old, the child did not know how to brush
her hair, brush her teeth, or wash her body.

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Since her placement, the child has receiv ed many services, including a diagnostic
assessment, children’s mental health case ma nagement, individual therapy, speech and
occupational therapy, living skills, an individualized education plan, and mentoring.
All the county’s witnesses testified that the child’s behavior and health has
improved significantly during her placement in foster care. She enjoys her school and she
is involved in many activities including piano, speech team, and local university theater
productions. She lives with sister and sister’s son in her foster care placement, and she is
particularly fond of sister’s s on. The child has repeatedly expressed her fervent desire to
remain near sister. The foster parent testified that sister and the child are very bonded now
that sister no longer needs to assume the role of parenting th e child and they can just be
sisters to each other. As soon as sister was placed in the same foster care, the child’s self-
injurious behavior decreased dramatically and she can verbalize her feelings and the reason
behind her feelings.
The child is well-adjusted to her life now and expressed to the district court that she
would be “[f]urious, very, very furious” if she were forced to move to Indiana to live with
father. The child testified that she feels that she gave fath er a chance to visit her and
communicate with her but that she does not see the point in continuing to talk with him if
he does not listen to her. In particular, the child is angry at father for refusing to agree to a
contact agreement with the child and purs uing court action when she has asked him
repeatedly to avoid court.
Other county witnesses—the guardian ad litem, the foster parent, and the case
manager—all agreed that terminating father’s parental rights was in the child’s best

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interests for her safety needs, as well as her physical, mental, and emotional health. Mother
also testified that she voluntar ily terminated her parental rights because she believed the
child’s current foster care placement is in the child’s best interests.
The district court granted the TPR pe tition pursuant to Minn . Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(5), (8), finding that the county had made reasonable efforts at rehabilitation and
that, despite these efforts, father failed to correct the conditions, and that the child was
neglected and in foster care. The district cour t also concluded that termination of father’s
parental rights was in the best interests of the child. In evaluating the best-interest factors,
the district court specifically found that si ster’s testimony of sexual abuse by father was
credible and that the child’s safety would therefore be at risk if she were in father’s care.
Father appeals.
DECISION
Father argues that the record does not support the district court’s findings that two
statutory bases exist for terminating his parental rights. “[O]n appeal from a district court’s
decision to terminate parental rights, we will review the district court’s findings of the
underlying or basic facts for clear error, but we review its determ ination of whether a
particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating parental rights is present for an abuse
of discretion.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App.
2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012). If a statutory basis to terminate parental rights
exists, we give considerable deference to a district court’s decision regarding whether to
actually terminate parental rights. See In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381,
385 (Minn. 2008). We will affirm a district court’s TPR “when at least one statutory ground

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for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence and termination is in the best
interests of the child, provided that the county has made reasonable efforts to reunite the
family.” Id. “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is either manifestly contrary to the weight
of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of
Children of S.R.K., 911 N.W.2d 821, 830 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). We defer to
the district court’s “determinations of witness credibility and the weight to be given to the
evidence.” In re Welfare of T.D., 731 N.W.2d 548, 555 (Minn. App. 2007).
I. The child was neglected and in foster care.

Father argues that the district court abused its discretion by ruling that the child was
neglected and in foster care. The TPR statute defines “neglected and in foster care” as
follows:
“Neglected and in foster care” means a child:
(1) who has been placed in foster care by court order;
and
(2) whose parents’ circumstances, condition, or conduct
are such that the child cannot be returned to them; and
(3) whose parents, despite the availability of needed
rehabilitative services, have faile d to make reasonable efforts
to adjust their circumstances, condition or conduct, or have
willfully failed to meet reasonable expectations with regard to
visiting the child or providing financial support for the child.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 24. (2018).
The statute also sets forth factors that the district court must consider in determining
whether the child is neglected and in foster care:
In determining whether a child is neglected and in foster
care, the court shall consider, among other factors, the
following:
(1) the length of time the child has been in foster care;

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(2) the effort the parent has made to adjust
circumstances, conduct, or conditions that necessitates the
removal of the child to make it in the child’s best interest to be
returned to the parent’s hom e in the foreseeable future,
including the use of rehabilitati ve services offered to the
parent;
(3) whether the parent has vi sited the chil d within the
three months preceding the f iling of the petition, unless
extreme financial or physical hardship or treatment for mental
disability or chemical depe ndency or other good cause
prevented the parent from visiting the child or it was not in the
best interests of the child to be visited by the parent;
(4) the maintenance of regular contact or
communication with the agen cy or person temporarily
responsible for the child;
(5) the appropriateness a nd adequacy of services
provided or offered to the parent to facilitate a reunion;
(6) whether additional services would be likely to bring
about lasting parental adjustment enabling a return of the child
to the parent within an ascertainable period of time, whether
the services have been offered to the parent, or, if services were
not offered, the reasons they were not offered; and
(7) the nature of the efforts made by the responsible
social services agency to rehabilitate and reunite the family and
whether the efforts were reasonable.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 9 (2018).
The district court addressed all of these factors in its order and concluded that the
child was neglected and in foster care. Father challenges all of the district court’s findings
except the finding on factor three, which was favorable to father. We first address father’s
arguments related to the coun ty’s efforts and services o ffered before turning to his
arguments related to the length of time the child was in foster care, father’s parental efforts,
and father’s contact with the county.

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The county’s reasonable efforts and appropriate services provided to father
The district court found that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify the family
and that “at this stage in the child’s life[,] no additional services offered or efforts by
[father] would be likely to change the fact that it is not currently . . . in her best interests to
be in his custody.” Father contends that the county failed to make reasonable efforts. In
particular, he argues that, if the county had expedited the ICPC request or resubmitted his
denied ICPC request, created a contact agr eement, offered reunification therapy, or
provided assistance for the child to meet her paternal relatives, the family could reunify.
“Whether the county has met its duty of reasonable efforts requires consideration of
the length of time the county was involved and the quality of effort given.” In re Welfare
of H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). To
determine whether efforts were reasonable, th e district court must determine whether the
services offered were: “(1) relevant to the sa fety and protection of the child; (2) adequate
to meet the needs of the ch ild and family; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and
accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6 ) realistic under the circumstances.” Minn.
Stat. § 260.012(h) (2018). Whether the county made reasonable efforts is an underlying
factual finding that is reviewed for clear error. See S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 387. We first
address father’s arguments related to the ICPC process.
Father argues that county unduly delayed the ICPC proce ss; the record supports a
different finding. The record reflects that the ICPC process was initiated in December 2019,
and that it was not initiated soon er because the county had hop ed that the child could be
placed with sister or mother—placement options that were both unsuccessful. By the time

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that the county had determined that the child’s placement with sister or mother was not
possible, sister had disclosed the sexual abus e against father to the case manager. The
county did not believe that it was in the child’s best interests to be placed with father during
its investigation into sister’s sexual-abuse a llegations. Father has not shown that this was
an unreasonable delay given the seriousness of the allegations against him.
Father also asserts that the county should have resubmitted an ICPC request after
father failed his first ICPC home assess ment. If a possible placement fails a home
assessment, the county may resubmit an ICPC request once the pl acement has complied
with the assessment’s reco mmendations. But, after father had failed his first home
assessment, the county made a maltreatment de termination of sexual abuse of sister by
father. Given this determination, the county did not resubmit an ICPC request for the
child’s placement with father. Father’s co mplaint that the ICPC request was not
resubmitted is essentially a challenge to the finding of sexual abuse. We address the district
court’s finding of sexual abuse in part II of this opinion, concluding that the finding is
supported by the record.
The record contains evidence of other services offered by the county. These services
included finding appropriate foster-care pl acement for the child , searching for and
obtaining records from California, Missouri, and Indiana, initiating the ICPC process for
father’s home in Indiana, sending out kinshi p letters, facilitating visits and phone calls
between father and the child, and investigating the sexual-abuse allegations against father.
In addition, father was offered a psycholo gical evaluation, a parenting assessment,
discussion with father about where he could obtain individual therapy, and an out-of-home

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placement plan. The child also participated in indivi dual therapy and mental-health
services and has an individualized education plan at school.
The district court found that the services offered to father were adequate and
appropriate to facilitate a reunion between father and the child and that there were no other
services that could be provided to father that would “bring about a lasting adjustment” and
allow the child to go to father’s care within an ascertaina ble amount of time. The district
court found that father had tried; it observed that the barriers to reunification may not be
entirely father’s fault as “[t]he the child is who she is, needs what she needs, and knows
what she wants.” Although father has identified other efforts that he believes should have
been made, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err by finding that the
county’s efforts were reasonable, the servi ces provided to father were adequate and
appropriate, and additional services would not have led to reunification.
The length of time the child was in foster care, father’s efforts, and father’s contact with
the county
Regarding the length of time the child was in foster care, the district court found
that the child was in foster car e for 454 days as of trial. Father does not argue that this
figure is incorrect; rather, he argues that th e child’s time in foster care could have been
reduced if the county had in itiated the ICPC process sooner. But, as discussed above, a
sexual-assault investigation was ongoing and ultimately resulted in a maltreatment
determination, making father’s argument unpersuasive.
As to father’s parental efforts, the district court found that while father made efforts
to correct the conditions leading to the denial of the ICPC, father had not addressed sister’s

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sexual abuse or demonstrated that he is able to successfully care for a child who has autism
and has experienced trauma. Father’s challenge to this factor does not address the district
court’s findings regarding sister’s sexual abuse or the child’s autism and trauma diagnoses.
Rather, father reiterates that he corrected the conditions leading to the denial of the ICPC
by repairing his home and that he underwent a psychological evaluation. Because father
does not address the district court’s findings, father has failed to meet his burden showing
that the district court erred. See Horodenski v. Lyndal e Green Townhome Ass’n , 804
N.W.2d 366, 372 (Minn. App. 2011) (stating that, on appeal, “the burden of showing error
rests on the party asserting it”).
Lastly, the district court determined that father did not maintain regular
communication with the county. Father asserts that the district court erred by its
determining that he did not maintain contac t with the county be cause the case manager
testified that, during the three months that father and child were not in contact, she had not
reached out to father. The statute states that the factor is whether the parent maintains
regular contact with the county, not whether the county maintains regular contact with the
parent. Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 9(4). The record establishes that father had the case
manager’s contact information and knew ho w to contact her. Because father has not
pointed to any evidence showing that he ma intained regular contact with the county
throughout the process, father failed to meet his burden in establishing error. See
Horodenski, 804 N.W.2d at 372.
In sum, the district court did not clearly err by finding that clear and convincing
evidence established that the child was neglecte d and in foster care. We need not address

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father’s arguments regarding the other statut ory basis relied upon by the district court
because only one statutory basis is ne cessary to terminate parental rights. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (allowing termination of parental rights upon satisfaction of “one
or more” statutory conditions).
II. Termination of father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests.

Even when the district court finds that a statutory ground for termination is met,
“the district court must separately find that termination is in the child’s best interests.” In
re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 92 (Minn. App. 2012). When terminating a
parent’s rights to a child, “the best inte rests of the child mu st be the paramount
consideration.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2018).
“In analyzing the best interests of the ch ild, the court must balance three factors:
(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest
in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.” In
re Welfare of R.T.B. , 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 19 92). “Competing interests include
such things as a stable environment, health considerations and the child’s preferences.” Id.
If the district court finds the existence of a statutory basis for term inating parental rights
but “the interests of parent and child conflic t, the interests of the child are paramount.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7. We review “a district court’s ultimate determination that
termination is in a child’s best in terest for an abuse of discretion.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at
905.
Here, in determining that TPR was in the ch ild’s best interests, the district court
explained:

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The Court cannot find it is in th e child’s best interests for
[father] to have custody of the child. The child’s older sibling
testified credibly about the se xual abuse allegations she has
against [father]. Although the California records found these
allegations to be unsubstantiated, [the county] made a
maltreatment determination. The child testified credibly she
would not feel safe in [father’s] care. It is understandable the
child would not feel safe. She knows what happened to her
sister. The Court learned from the testimony of the real
potential for deterioration in th e child’s mental health should
she live with [father] – concerns she may start to self-harm
again or otherwise regress or decompensate.

Father argues that the evid ence shows that both he and the child have an interest in
preserving the parent-child re lationship. Though the district court recognized that father
has made efforts to visit the child and maintain contact with the child through phone calls
and that the child has expressed curiosity ab out father, it found that any interest in
preserving the parent-child relationship is outweighed by fath er’s failure to meaningfully
address his abuse against sister, by the child’s repeated statements that she wants to remain
where she is, and by the child’ s feelings that father does not respect her opinions. These
findings are supported by the record.
Father next argues that the only alleged competing interest of the child is the
county’s concern for her safety based on “unsubstantiated allegations of sexual abuse of a
different child over eleven years ago.” As an initial matter, the district court did not find
the allegations unsubstantiated; rather, it found sister’s testimony regarding abuse credible,
and we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations. T.D., 731 N.W.2d at 555.
Moreover, father’s argumen t fails to acknowledge th e testimony from sister, the
child’s foster parents, the case manager, mother, and most importantly, the child that

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reflects concerns apart from the sexual-abuse issue—specifically, concerns regarding the
child’s mental and physical health if she is removed from her current placement. The
testimony reflects that the child’s current placement is the most stable and safe environment
that the child has lived in and that she is receiving all the support services she needs. The
child is excelling at and enjoying school. She plays piano and participates in speech team
and the local university theater productions. The child’s foster parents provide a loving
home for the child, and her needs are met there. The child is strongly bonded to both sister
and sister’s infant son. The child testified th at, in a perfect world, “[she] would be living
with [sister]” and that until she is 18, she wants to live with her foster parents. The child
also expressed that she would be “very furious ” if she were forced to live with father.
Overall, the record contains ample evidence that the child has done well in her foster care
placement, that she has made progress since sh e was placed there, and that, if she were
removed, she might regress or deteriorate.
The district court analyzed the three fact ors outlined above and concluded that the
child’s best interests are served by terminating father’s parent al rights. The district court
did not abuse its discretion when it found that it is in the best interests of the child that
father’s parental rights be terminated.
Affirmed.